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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

18 OCTOBER 1979

Analysis

A future of worries for Turkey

By Victor L. Simpson

Associated Press

ANKARA, Turkey — The future of Turkey, an important part of the NATO alliance, is uncertain as a result of national elections that led to the resignation of Premier Bulent Ecevit's 21-month-old leftist government.

No party commands a majority in parliament, and while Ecevit has joined others in calling for a "strong and effective" new government, the likelihood is a weak coalition unable to take action on its own.

That could create problems for Turkey, whose 30-year experiment with democracy has twice been interrupted by military intervention. Among the difficulties it must deal with, both at home and abroad, are:

- An inflation rate approaching 100 percent per year.
- Mile-long gas lines.
- Shortages of such essential goods as coffee, light bulbs and medicine.
- Terrorism that resulted in 100 deaths a month during Ecevit's term and the imposition of martial law in several provinces.
- Negotiations with the United States over four U.S. bases and American use of Turkey's airspace to monitor the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).
- Difficult talks over the long-standing dispute between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, the Mediterranean island where 18,000 Turkish troops have been stationed since 1974.

The winners

Former premier Suleiman Demirel and his centrist Justice Party were the big winners in Sunday's elec-

tions, capturing 47 percent of the vote. But only about a third of the nation's 20 million eligible voters took part in the mid-term elections, and Demirel is said to favor new general elections in an effort to win a clear mandate.

A Turkish Foreign Ministry official said in an interview yesterday that there was "goodwill" between the United States and Turkey in efforts to reach a new defense agreement by early January, when the old agreement expires, but the same official warned that Turkey does not intend to keep the four bases opened without an agreement.

Turkey closed down the four bases in 1973 after Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after the Turks invaded Cyprus. The bases were subsequently reopened and now are of even greater importance to the United States because of its loss of intelligence outposts in Iran.

The Turkish armed forces are seeking defense assistance of \$2.5 billion or more over a five-year period. The United States, apparently concerned about the size and length of the request, is proposing \$500 million in both military and economic assistance to be determined on a year-to-year basis.

Spy flights

Also still to be determined is whether Turkey will allow the United States to fly U-2 spy planes over its airspace in an attempt to monitor SALT II.

The Turks have said that they will permit such flights only if the Soviet Union agrees to them. Thus far, the Soviets have refused, but talks about the issue are believed to be continuing. The State Department refused comment yesterday.

Cyprus will pose another complex problem for any new government, and an early resolution is unlikely.

Turkey still insists the Greek Cypriots are blocking settlement talks and that they reneged on a 10-point agreement worked out between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, under the supervision of U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

Ecevit, as the man who ordered the invasion of Cyprus after the Greeks led a coup against Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios, was considered by many here as the only man who could get Turkey out.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3THE WASHINGTON POST
o8 October 1979

Bid to Amend SALT Beaten In Senate Panel by 9-6 Vote

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

By a vote of 9 to 6, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday rejected the first serious attempt to significantly alter the SALT II treaty with an amendment the Carter administration has described as "a killer."

While the committee proceeded with its line-by-line consideration of the strategic arms limitation treaty, Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) pressed ahead with less visible efforts to achieve new consensus positions on two major SALT issues in hope of building a two-thirds Senate majority for the treaty.

The amendment rejected by the committee was proposed by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.). It would have forced the Soviet Union to partially count its medium-to-long-range bomber known as Backfire under the treaty's numerical limits on strategic weapons systems. Baker also proposed to count some American medium-to-long-range bombers.

The Backfire, Baker suggested, should count as two thirds of a strategic system, while the U.S. FB-111 should count as one-half. "The Backfire bomber can reach and destroy any city in the United States," Baker said, and it is "inconceivable" to him that it not be counted under SALT II.

Opponents of the proposal, including several senators and administration officials who are taking part in the committee markup, responded that the decision to exclude Backfire from the SALT limits was part of a delicately balanced series of compromises on both sides. Tampering with it now, several said, would reopen several key issues and would be unlikely to result in any better deal for the United States.

"If this amendment is adopted that's

the end of the treaty as it's now written," Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said. The chairman of the committee recalled earlier testimony that the United States regarded the exclusion of Backfire as acceptable in light of Soviet willingness not to count hundreds of American weapons systems, based around the Soviet Union and on aircraft carriers, that could be used to attack the Soviet Union.

Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) quoted to Baker earlier testimony by former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, who said an amendment forcing the counting of Backfire would freeze the SALT process and perhaps create a crisis in Soviet-American relations.

Baker said "I don't think it matters" if SALT II is delayed for a year or more by Senate approval of some substantive amendment that requires reopening negotiations. Much worse, he said, would be approving a "bad SALT treaty."

The outcome of the SALT debate in the Senate may depend more on Byrd's efforts to build new consensus positions than on the results of the Foreign Relations Committee markup.

Byrd has established two committees of senators to look for a joint position both on increased defense spending and on forcing "deep reductions" of armaments in the next SALT pact that will appeal to a broad spectrum of senatorial opinion.

The idea that the Senate should try to force both the executive branch and the Soviet Union to make substantial reductions in the next round of SALT talks seems to be gaining a growing number of Senate adherents. (SALT II allows both superpowers to add significantly to their nuclear arsenals.)

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), an active proponent of this idea, said yesterday that the White House "has begun to realize that they're not going to get a treaty" unless it includes some insistence on significant arms reductions in the next round.

Moynihan chairs the ad hoc committee Byrd has formed to look into this issue. Moynihan revealed that he has begun negotiations with the White House on possible formulations that would give the Senate a vehicle for abrogating SALT II if it were dissatisfied with the SALT III negotiations.

The second committee formed by Byrd is seeking some way to commit the Senate, at least in principle, to increased defense spending in the future.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 OCTOBER 1979

Arms Treaty Survives a Test Vote

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 (Reuters) — The strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union survived a crucial test today when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected an amendment that would have required reopening negotiations.

The amendment, which would have included a controversial Soviet bomber within the treaty limitations, was defeated by an unexpectedly close vote of 9 to 6. The vote came as the committee examined the treaty text line by line to prepare it for debate by the full Senate.

The amendment, proposed by Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, the minority leader, dealt with a bomber, known in the West as Backfire, whose capabilities have been a matter of dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russians insist that it is a medium-range plane, and thus not to be included under the strategic, or long-range weapons covered by the treaty. Some Americans contend that it is capable of attacking the United States.

Backfire Issue Handled Separately

The matter was resolved through a separate written statement and an oral commitment made by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, to President Carter that production of the bomber would be limited to 30 a year and that it would not be given the capability of striking at the United States.

Senator Baker said the Backfire was an intercontinental bomber that could reach the United States on a one-way mission.

"We caved in on a point that gives significant and substantial advantage to the Soviet Union," he said.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who is the committee chairman, said that the Russians had also made a concession by agreeing to the exclusion of American forward-based systems in the West European theater of operations that could strike at the Soviet Union.

He said the United States stood to lose if it insisted on counting the Backfire.

"I think we have made a good deal," Senator Church said. "If we begin to insist that the Backfire be counted, then, of course, it is clear that our own theater weapons will be drawn into future negotiations and we might very well end up losing the good bargain we have made."

Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, whose support for the treaty has been in

doubt because of his concerns over verification, opposed the amendment. He said he did not want to see the whole treaty "shot down," asserting that the Backfire issue was not important enough.

Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, said the amendment would in effect "shoot down the treaty and delay the process for several years."

Today was the third day of committee debate on the treaty. In earlier action the committee voted to make the Backfire assurances legally binding and to give a series of so-called agreed statements and understandings between the United States and the Soviet Union the same force as the treaty itself.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
17 October 1979

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Verifying the Verification Report

The Senate Intelligence Committee's super-secret report on SALT II verification problems, now under lock and key in a remote corner of Capitol Hill, contradicts the verbal summary delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by intelligence committee Chairman Birch Bayh.

Sen. Bayh's two days of testimony behind closed doors, according to those present, was "highly selective." Ignoring the bad news and inflating the good, it differed in word and spirit from the 177-page report Bayh's committee prepared for the guidance of the foreign relations panel in considering the new arms limitation treaty.

That report is stamped "secret codeword," a classification reserved for unusually sensitive intelligence matters. The few senators who have followed burdensome security regulations to read the report cannot take the Senate floor to dispute Bayh. With the Senate required to vote on matters removed from public discussion, the few senators who understand what is going on—including some supporters of the SALT process—are frustrated both by the system and what they consider Bayh's manipulation of it.

Bayh's testimony did not make clear to listeners that the "secret codeword" report states unequivocally that the SALT II protocol (lasting to Dec. 31, 1981) cannot be verified. As for the treaty itself, the report downgrades Carter administration statements that monitoring Soviet weapons advances will be all that much easier with the treaty than without it.

"The Soviets could test a new ICBM system with a launch weight as much as 20 to 40 percent above the SS19 with less than a 50 percent chance of detection," the report says. This would seem to threaten enforcement of the SALT II provision that the one "new" system permitted by the treaty cannot be larger than the Soviet SS19.

Analyzing what Moscow could do secretly in an effort to "break out" of the

treaty's limitations, the report states: "If a covert deployment were attempted, the Soviets could evade detection and identification of the activity for as long as three years, during which some 200 missiles might become operational." So much for claimed monitoring advantages the United States would enjoy by ratifying the treaty; a block of 200 new missiles could change overnight the strategic balance of power.

The importance of Bayh's testimony lies in its impact on fellow senators. They tend to accept the chairman's statements at face value, without recognizing nuances, subtleties or fine print.

That tendency unites with problems of dealing with classified information to tie the hands and close the mouths of even the senators most skeptical about verification. The 177-page report is under 24-hour guard in an obscure chamber on the top floor of the Capitol. Admittance is restricted to the 100 senators themselves during normal working hours. No copies may be made; nor may notes on the report be taken out of the room.

Very few senators have read it, but an exception is Sen. John Glenn, a supporter of the SALT process but an informed skeptic on verification. He ripped Bayh's testimony apart in cross-examination during the foreign relations committee hearing. When we asked Glenn to confirm our information about the report, he declined but then put the problem in a nutshell:

"Nothing I have read or heard so far takes care of the verification problem, but I cannot even say why because of the high security classification that has been hung on this whole matter. What we have is euphoria based on official statements."

That euphoria might dissipate if every senator read the report, taking time out of tight schedules to cope with security limitations. They would learn that "the confidence with which we can detect tests of an ICBM with a mobile launcher [prohibited by the protocol] will be low at best."

Although cruise missiles with a ground-

launched or sea-launched range of more than 600 kilometers are banned during the three-year protocol, the report warns that "monitoring small changes in air intakes, horizontal and vertical stabilizers, antennae and warhead attachment points could be important SALT II monitoring tasks concerning cruise missile range. . . . Monitoring such changes would be extremely difficult."

The report says monitoring phases from SALT II will be few and far between. As a strong treaty advocate, Bayh naturally dwelled on these. But he sped lightly over the damaging statement that the United States consistently has exaggerated its ability to "monitor Soviet production" of nuclear weapons.

Nobody can forecast the impact of SALT ratification even if every senator were fully aware of these facts. But to accept Bayh's clearly loaded testimony in favor of the treaty is tantamount to voting blind, a condition that someday could return to haunt the Senate.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 October 1979

Turkish upheaval could stymie US missile watch

Listening posts would verify SALT II pact

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

US Government foreign analysts believe the electoral defeat and resignation Oct. 16 of Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit could spell new complications in Turkish-US defense relations, and in Turkey's wider arc of problems with Greece over Cyprus and the NATO alliance.

Five US intelligence monitoring stations operating in Turkey are of crucial importance in observing Soviet missile tests and collecting other intelligence needed to verify the SALT II arms-limitation treaty with the Soviet Union, which is now before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The sites took on added importance after loss of similar stations in northern Iran last February, and after Mr. Ecevit's refusal to permit Cyprus-based US spy-plane flights through Turkish airspace without Soviet approval.

On Oct. 8, as Mr. Ecevit's final days in office began, the Turkish Cabinet extended until Jan. 9 the provisional authorization to the US to operate the sites which otherwise would have ended Oct. 9. This was because there was "progress," the Ankara statement said, on drafting a comprehensive new US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement. This would provide for guaranteed US arms and logistical and economic aid to Turkey.

US congressmen sympathetic to the

Greek Cypriot cause have blocked important portions of a military-aid package for the Turkish armed forces. Supply shortages were caused in part by the US congressional arms embargo from 1975 to 1978 which was intended to penalize Turkish use of US weapons to invade Cyprus in 1974.

Any new Turkish coalition government, Turkish political analysts say, will almost certainly include the conservative Islamic National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan, if not the smaller, neo-Fascist National Action Party of former Col. Alpaslan Turkes. Though neither has opposed US-Turkish defense cooperation, both have been far more hawkish than Mr. Ecevit toward compromise deals on Cyprus, or readmission of Greece to NATO's fractured southeastern military command in the Aegean Sea.

Mr. Erbakan has also advocated full recognition of the Turkish-occupied, self-styled Turkish Federate State in northern Cyprus. If other Islamic states followed Turkey's example, the Cyprus republic might find itself permanently partitioned in a two-state system between the Greek majority in the south and the Turkish minority, reinforced by imported Turkish mainland settlers, in the north.

On Aug. 23, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim submitted confidential suggestions to Greek and Turkish Cypriots for resumption of their peace talks, broken off last May. He advocated dealing with the broadest and toughest Cyprus issues: the future Cyprus state's constitution, its security, and a framework in which Turkey would allow the return home of Greek Cypriot refugees from the Turkish-occupied port city of Famagusta, under UN auspices.

In identical letters Oct. 10 to Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho and Rep. Clement Zablocki (D) of Wisconsin, two key congressional foreign-policy makers, Turkish Ambassador Sukru Elekdog says Turkish Cypriot representatives accept Mr. Waldheim's Aug. 23 proposals "and are ready to resume the intercommunal negotiations."

Greek Cypriot diplomatic sources say they believe the uncertain political situation in Turkey makes it impossible to resume negotiations before the scheduled Cyprus debate in the United Nations in early November.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
17 October 1979

Senate panel ties SALT to limits on Backfire

By HENRY L. TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—With Carter administration approval, a Senate committee voted yesterday to make ratification of the SALT II treaty contingent on formal Soviet limits on the Backfire bomber.

In the whole context of treaty developments so far, it was a significant step. A reservation adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee would require Soviet leaders to make a pledge they have withheld for years.

If the Soviets accept it, they will undertake the equivalent of a treaty commitment to limit both production and range of the bomber. Previously they had offered only informal assurances and had refused to do more.

For its part, the administration had been satisfied that it had received the maximum Soviet concession on the point. But several senators whose votes are necessary for ratification had insisted on a firm commitment.

By yesterday the administration was cooperating with the committee on the issue. And Lloyd N. Cutler, the White House counsel, told the committee that "we see no reason why the Soviet Union should not confirm" the reservation.

There was no indication whether the administration had been in touch with the Soviet government on the point. But a committee source emphasized, "This is by no means a cosmetic reservation."

About the reason for administration cooperation, another official said, "It had no choice. This was the best it could get."

The reservation would require formal Soviet confirmation of promises President Leonid I. Brezhnev had made informally to President Carter in Vienna last June. Mr. Carter had treated them as binding. The Senate wanted more.

In his first pledge, Mr. Brezhnev

named Mr. Carter an unsigned statement that the Backfire was a medium-range bomber that would not be given the capability to strike the United States. In his second, the Soviet leader, under pressure from Mr. Carter, confirmed orally that the bomber production rate of 30 per year would not be increased.

The two points are important to the internal U.S. debate over SALT II, the strategic arms limitation treaty. Many opponents of SALT insist that the Backfire should have been covered by the treaty.

Some of the reservations being attached to the treaty amount to internal U.S. understandings. The one regarding the Backfire is in a category that must be accepted by the Soviet government.

The Soviets have argued previously that since the Backfire is not a long-range bomber, it is not a matter for SALT negotiations.

Whether they now will accept the new reservation is publicly unclear. They obviously give up nothing by doing so that they had not promised earlier. Senate sources concede that they may indeed have counted on making some such gesture to help SALT in the Senate.

SALT opponents most concerned about the Backfire surely will not be satisfied. Even under the reservation, they may point out, the Soviet Union already has 200 Backfires and can be expected to have 400 by the time SALT II expires in 1985.

U.S. Soviet expert predicts 'a difficult year'

Washington (NYT)—The government's ranking Soviet expert said yesterday in congressional testimony that the United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads on almost every issue except their treaty limiting strategic arms and that these differences "are unlikely to be reconciled in the near future."

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NEW YORK TIMES
17 OCTOBER 1979

Senator Disrupts Arms Hearing by Citing Rule

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — A parliamentary objection today threatened to cause further delay in Senate action on the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union and several senators proposed modifications that, if adopted, could endanger final Soviet acceptance.

It appeared very possible, although not certain, that these potentially serious problems would be overcome or circumvented.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee met for the second time this week to give line-by-line consideration to the arms control agreement. But it was forced to suspend its work at midday when it learned that a Republican senator had objected to the meeting.

As is the practice, the senator's name was not made public, but several sources said it was Jesse A. Helms, the North Carolina conservative. Unanimous consent by the Senate is required for a committee to meet more than two hours after the full Senate has gone into session.

The minority leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, declined to identify the senator who objected but said he believed the objection would be a continuing one.

Less Time to Consider Treaty

If so, the result could be to shorten the working hours the Foreign Relations Committee can devote to the treaty each day, prolong the committee's detailed sessions and delay the date on which the treaty would be ready to be sent to the Senate. That had been about Nov. 1.

Such a delay might possibly jeopardize the chances that the Senate could act on the pact this year.

Several senators commented that the problem might be ameliorated by beginning committee meetings earlier, starting Senate sessions later in the day or by a combination of both.

on Committee Hours

Before the Foreign Relations Committee was forced to recess, it adopted by a vote of 9 to 1 a motion to declare that written and oral assurances by President Leonid I. Brezhnev about the Soviet bombers known in the West by the code-name Backfire, not counted in the treaty as a strategic weapon, "are legally binding upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel, did not object to this step. However, Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, declared an intention to propose another "understanding" to the treaty that would state that any significant increase in "the range or payload" of Backfire bombers would constitute an "extraordinary event" constituting grounds for American withdrawal from the pact.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, the New York

Republican, and Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, both of whom are counted as friends of the treaty, indicated that they also wished to clarify the assurances that the Soviet Union did not intend to give the Backfire greater intercontinental capability.

Senator Glenn ultimately agreed to have his understanding considered later.

In another development, Senator Richard B. Stone, Democrat of Florida, said he intended to offer an amendment or reservation to the treaty that would count about 20 diesel-powered Soviet submarines armed with about 60 medium-range nuclear missiles in the totals of strategic weapons limited by the treaty. Those submarines are presently exempted.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14THE WASHINGTON POST
17 October 1979

SALT Foe Deliberately Slows Senate Progress

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

For the first time yesterday, a Senate opponent of SALT II deliberately sought to delay action on it—a hint of possible trouble to come as proponents seek to push the strategic arms limitation treaty through the Senate by December.

According to an authoritative source, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) offered a lone protest that prevented the Foreign Relations Committee from continuing its markup of SALT II more than two hours after the full Senate went into session. As a result, the committee had to cancel its afternoon meeting and made almost no headway on the markup.

Today the Senate leadership has put off the floor session until an unusually late hour, 4 p.m., enabling the committee to meet both morning and afternoon, as intended yesterday.

The committee's leadership had hoped to complete action on the treaty by the end of next week, but this deadline looks increasingly unreachable, particularly if some senators adopt tactics that deliberately slow the committee down.

In an interview yesterday, Helms said: "I just feel the need of slowing this thing down. . . I just think we ought to have plenty of time" to consider the treaty. Helms said he would not agree to a fixed time for the full Senate's debate at least until the debate was well under way and "we can see how the headcount is going."

Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) has indicated a desire to get a time agreement that would limit the floor debate to several weeks. Without one, there seems little prospect that the Senate can act by early December.

The significance of that date was the subject of heated discussion in the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday. Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) complained that the committee was in "a rush to finish that has never been ex-

plained," a comment that provoked Sen. Jacob K. Javits (N.Y.), the ranking Republican.

There is a reason to move quickly, Javits said—"the western alliance is in grave peril." If the Senate has not acted on SALT II by the time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meets in December to consider plans for modernizing allied nuclear forces in Europe, that modernization could fall by the wayside, Javits warned.

"If they make a decision against us at that time," Javits told Glenn, "you'll be mighty sorry that you didn't rush."

Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) joined this discussion, observing that he would not permit the desires of allied countries to determine the Senate's schedule. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) responded heatedly to Baker, saying it wasn't the needs of the allies but "our naked self-interest" that argues for speedy action on SALT. "Our security is at stake," Biden declared.

The linkage of SALT to this pending decision on NATO modernization, which would include the deployment of new nuclear missiles bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union, has become a key issue for SALT proponents.

The proponents argue that defeat of SALT would guarantee the collapse of the delicately balanced plan to modernize the NATO nuclear force, and perhaps an unraveling of the alliance, since the allies are counting on approval of SALT as a sign that arms control efforts will continue and eventually include the European theater.

Helms said yesterday this argument was "poppycock."

Before its meeting had to end, the committee did approve one reservation to SALT II incorporating into the treaty assurances the Soviets have given that would hold their Backfire bomber production to the current rate of 30 per year.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-3**NEW YORK TIMES
16 OCTOBER 1979

Senate Panel Begins Voting on Arms-Pact Changes

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today began considering modifications of the nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union and adopted two measures that opponents of the treaty dismissed as "cosmetic."

The committee nearly wandered into a diplomatic minefield by discussing the possibility of rewording the assurances from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, on the bomber known in the West as the Backfire. But when Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, and the White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, pointed out the diplomatic dangers of such a demand, the committee agreed to postpone action on the Backfire bomber question.

In one vote today the committee voted 13 to 0 to make the "Agreed Statements and Common Understandings" that help define the terms and obligations of the treaty to be "of the same force and effect as the provisions of the treaty itself."

The Carter Administration said the reservation was unnecessary because the "statements and understandings," which were signed by President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna last June, were "clearly binding." However, the White House did not oppose the step on the ground that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would object.

Calls Vote 'Cosmetic'

Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, a Republican who opposes the treaty, said that "this is a cosmetic change if there ever was one." Senator Lugar suggested that supporters of the treaty may hope to make it appear they are "making constructive changes" in order to "cover yourself for a pro-SALT vote."

The committee also adopted, by a vote of 10 to 2, an "understanding" proposed by Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, which called for the joint statement of principles on negotiations for the next arms limitation treaty, agreed to by both nations but not submitted for ratification, be mentioned in the Senate's resolution as providing the "basis" for future negotiations.

Earlier, the committee seemed to come close to posing a serious difficulty for the treaty. The issue was an unsigned statement and an oral statement on the Backfire bomber given by Mr. Brezhnev to President Carter in Vienna in June. Together the statements indicated that the Soviet Union would not increase the annual production rate of the Backfire bomber beyond 30 planes and did not intend to give it intercontinental capability or extend its radius of range.

The motion was to pass a Senate understanding stating that the Brezhnev statements were a legally binding part of the treaty.

Seek to Clarify Brezhnev Statement

However, Senator John H. Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, pointed out that the Soviet Union had told the United States that it would not be bound by American interpretations of the Brezhnev statement. Several Senators then began to discuss changing the wording of the Brezhnev statement to "clarify" it.

Senator Sarbanes and the White House pointed out that the Soviet Union might object strongly to any Senate change in the wording of President Brezhnev's statement. Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the Committee chairman, then announced that the motion was being withdrawn for "redrafting" and consideration at a later time.

Senators Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky and Birch Bayh of Indiana, both Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, introduced a reservation to the treaty that would require the Presi-

dent to report to the Senate every six months on how the treaty was being verified, on Soviet practices that effect verification and on possible treaty violations.

The committee leadership is expected to be able to stave off passage of the so-called "killer amendments" that would be likely to cause Moscow to reject it.

AVIATION WEEK
15 October 1979

Washington Roundup

Intelligence Push

Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence last week called for a very high budget priority for intelligence collection systems, as well as processing and analysis functions. The committee's report on the capabilities of the U.S. to monitor the SALT 2 treaty is being described in Congress and the Pentagon as a "but on-the-other-hand report." It does point out that the U.S. intelligence community underestimated the Soviet rate of strategic nuclear weapons buildup, adding, "The committee believes that the Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages which the provisions . . . of the SALT 2 treaty might permit."

It goes further: "The Soviet Union will probably continue nearly all its present concealment and deception practices, and additional concealment and deception practices may be attempted." The committee wants to use technical experts from outside the intelligence agencies to examine possible Russian treaty violations. The report also calls for an aggressive U.S. verification policy.

First Wave

Washington's intrepid press corps, apparently nettled by President Carter's accusation that it spends all their time in the District of Columbia, beat the U.S. Marine Corps to the beaches of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in the wake of the President's televised speech on the Soviet army brigade massed near Havana for training purposes. The 60 journalists even paid the U.S. Navy \$186 a head for a round-trip ride to Gitmo on a Navy/McDonnell Douglas C-9 and when they got there found that the resident fleet brass really didn't want to talk much about the base, except to allow that the folks assigned there liked the duty. It eventually turned out that television camera teams wanted footage of the naval base, and the Navy figured it might as well fill up the airplane with other paying customers. At any rate, the 38th Marine Amphibious Unit was delayed by bad weather at Morehead City, N. C., last week and the landing exercises were postponed.

Although Defense Secretary Harold Brown went to Key West, Fla., for a guided tour of the base that will house his new Caribbean contingency joint task force headquarters conducted by Rear Adm. Thomas H. Repogle, a naval aviator who has just taken command of the 60-member unit, Cuba rumbles on. Brown said President Carter "has effectively neutralized the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba," by saying that it cannot be an effective military force outside Cuba. He said as much later to the Miami Chamber of Commerce in a plea for support of the SALT 2 treaty, countering a demand by Sen. Frank Church (D.-Idaho) to delay ratification until the Soviet troops get out of Cuba. Meanwhile, President Carter approved renewal of Lockheed SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba after a two-year moratorium on such surveillance.

—Washington Staff

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A2THE BALTIMORE SUN
16 October 1979

Backfire snag stumps panel discussing SALT

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began shaping SALT II for ratification yesterday and promptly bogged down over how to treat the Soviet Backfire bomber.

The question is one of several critical to Senate approval of the strategic arms limitation treaty. It centers on whether to require the Soviet Union to formalize the restraints on the Backfire that it has promised informally.

Action was deferred as it became clear that several moderate senators, whose positions may be decisive, favored the firm commitment. Administration officials proposed a secret session of the committee to work out details.

The Backfire became a point of contention as the committee began at least a week of so-called "mark-up" sessions. The sessions entail line-by-line consideration of the treaty and its related documents, and ultimately will prepare the package for Senate floor debate.

What happens to SALT in the process could determine whether it receives the 67 votes—two-thirds of the Senate—necessary for ratification.

With only brief discussion, the committee attached two reservations yesterday.

One, offered by Senators Frank Church (D, Idaho), the committee chairman, and Jacob K. Javits (R, N.Y.), the senior Republican, was essentially technical. It merely imparts to a long list of Soviet American understandings about the meaning of treaty language the same weight as the treaty itself.

Since the list was signed earlier by Soviet officials, no one expected argument from Moscow on that point. The same was true of a reservation from Senator George McGovern (D, S.D.) reinforcing both governments' avowed goal of making deep cuts in nuclear arsenals in future negotiations.

But the Backfire problem was more ticklish. The bomber was omitted from the constraints of the strategic arms limitation treaty after Soviet officials refused to treat it as a long-range weapon capable of hitting the United States.

But many American critics of SALT insisted it should be included. As a compromise gesture, Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev gave President Carter assurances, partly orally and partly in an unsigned document, that the production rate of the Backfire would not be increased and that the bomber would not be equipped to strike the United States.

Soviet officials continued to insist that the Backfire was a medium-range, not long-range, bomber. And they refused to comment formally on American claims—which the administration says are a correct—that they are producing 30 Backfires a year.

Mr. Church and Mr. Javits, judging the Senate mood about Backfire, had submitted earlier a reservation that treated the informal Soviet assurances as a commitment.

Mr. Church made it clear he expected the reservation to be adopted in a way that would require Soviet leaders to accept it, thus making the formal commitment they had rejected earlier. "We are supplying the missing signature," the senator declared.

But the language of the reservation apparently was not strong enough for several committee members, including John H. Glenn (D, Ohio) and Charles H. Percy (R, Ill.). As the discussion became more intense, the administration intervened.

Lloyd N. Cutler, the White House counsel, suggested that the delay proposed by Mr. Church was a good idea. In fact, he said, it might be easier to discuss the problem in a secret session.

The administration apparently had hoped to attach the reservation in a way requiring only tacit, not direct, Soviet acquiescence. Such indirection is not rare in delicate negotiations.

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ON PAGE A-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 OCTOBER 1979

Storms Greet SALT II at Beginning of Its Passage Through Senate Panel

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began final consideration of SALT II yesterday, and immediately demonstrated that the treaty's passage through the panel will be a precarious voyage.

Within two hours of the opening gavel, senators were toying with a new "understanding" on the Backfire bomber that would push the Soviet Union farther than it was willing to go when the treaty was negotiated. That matter was temporarily withdrawn from consideration when the discussion ranged beyond foreseen limits.

The committee did approve two reservations, a formal one that incorporates into the document the joint statements and common understandings that accompany the treaty text, and another that has no effect.

But this first session was just "a warmup," as one committee source put it. The process of marking up the treaty, or considering its provisions one at a time, will take at least two weeks, and probably more.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the committee, began the session in a crowded hearing room, made bright and hot by television lights, with brief remarks comparing SALT II's significance to that of the Treaty of Versailles. The ranking Republican, Jacob K. Javits (N.Y.), called SALT II "critically important . . . to the peace of the world," and added, "the eyes of the world are fixed upon us."

During the hearing, Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill.) announced that he had received a letter from Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, supreme allied commander in Europe, endorsing the arms limitation treaty and reporting strong NATO support for it.

In July, anti-treaty sources in the Senate said Rogers was skeptical of SALT II, and might have prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff from endorsing it unanimously had he not been moved in June from his post as Army chief of staff to the NATO command.

Rogers' letter to Percy, however, contained a strong personal endorsement of the treaty, as well as the observation that "ratification of SALT II is considered crucial by our NATO allies."

This is a line on which administra-

tion spokesmen are relying with increasing emphasis in their efforts to sell SALT II to the Senate. Defense Secretary Harold Brown said on the NBC "Today" show yesterday that he foresaw "a very serious danger" that NATO might unravel if SALT is defeated.

Rogers said he knew some treaty critics had argued in private, at least, that many European military men and political leaders opposed to SALT II. "I do not believe this is the case," the NATO commander wrote.

During deliberations on the treaty, the Foreign Relations Committee plans to consider reservations or understandings to the treaty in three categories: those the Soviets must accept when (and if) the treaty is formally ratified; those that will be brought to the Soviets' attention, but do not require their acceptance, and those that affect intergovernmental relations only on the U.S. side.

The committee leadership, which designed these categories, opposes any amendment to the treaty text, and so far no member of the committee has formally proposed one. But that is still possible. Treaty opponents on the committee have not signaled whether they intend to offer a lot of substantive amendments at the committee level, or plan instead to propose them on the floor.

SALT II is likely to be approved in the committee by a decisive majority, but what reservations or understandings may be attached remains open. Yesterday's debate on the Soviet Backfire bomber showed why.

Church and Javits proposed incorporating into the Senate's resolution of ratification a reservation that would give binding legal status to the written and oral commitments the Soviets gave in June in Vienna. At that time they proposed to restrict production of the medium-to-long-range Backfire to 30 planes a year.

In the discussion of this, Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) read from a letter from the State Department a description of President Carter's statement to the Soviet side in Vienna that he would regard any "significant upgrading" of the Backfire's capabilities as a violation of their assurances.

The Soviets replied that they would not be bound by unilateral American statements.

Washington Post
14 October 1979

Two Can Shadow Play

IT WOULD BE audacious to claim that we have understood every fresh development in Sen. Frank Church's SALT position as it has emerged over the last few weeks, rather in the disjointed and endlessly surprising manner of clowns climbing out of a circus car. His current stand, however, as best we can make it out, calls for President Carter to "affirm" that the Soviet troops in Cuba "are not engaged in a combat role" and "will not become a threat to any country in the Western Hemisphere." The Senate would then proceed, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hopes, to ratify the treaty.

Well, okay. Jimmy Carter engaged in a certain amount of shadow play to get himself out of the box he had put himself in by promising prematurely that he would not tolerate the "status quo," whatever it was—it has still not been established what it was—beyond a reasonable doubt. Frank Church had locked himself into a similar box by demanding that the Soviets withdraw their troops before the Senate takes up SALT, and he is entitled to a certain amount of shadow play of his own. The demand for presidential assurance would be attached as an "understanding" to the Senate's resolution of ratification of SALT, not to the treaty itself. The significance of this is that the Senate would not be making a direct, and

unenforceable, demand on the Soviet Union. But the Senate would be doing *something* to satisfy those senators who feel that *something* must be done. The administration has its lawyers looking at the fine print, and figures it can crack the case.

So much for Mr. Church, who is running for reelection in a state said to be highly inflamed against the very idea of SALT. The practical effect of his latest move is to clear the way for the treaty to reach the Senate floor, perhaps by the end of October; a vote on it could come by Thanksgiving. This is right. The evident sense of the Senate is to move past the troops issue, which is generally and correctly perceived to be a poorly designed rampart on which to take a stand either on Soviet global policy as a whole or on Jimmy Carter's conduct of his office. Those who believe that the treaty contributes to American security and that its defeat would impair American security are anxious to call the question before things get worse. Those who oppose the treaty flat out believe things are bad enough. A third group, the swing group, has used the ratification process to apply leverage and to generate steam for higher defense spending and for a tougher foreign policy. Most members of this group appear to believe they have made their point. In brief, the end is in sight.

Washington Post
14 October 1979

Leader Byrd Nears SALT Endorsement; Senate Committee Starts Voting Monday

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) appeared on the brink of formally endorsing the strategic arms limitation treaty yesterday as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared to begin voting on it Monday.

Although Byrd insisted at a press conference that he hasn't quite made up his mind whether to endorse the arms treaty with the Soviet Union, which is President Carter's single most important request to Congress this year, Byrd revealed that he had met with "eight to 10 senators" privately Friday to seek some idea of how much defense spending must be beefed up to quell fears of national-security dangers.

Byrd said that if "the McGovern and the Nunn, the Stennis and the Moynihans" could get together and draw some compromise "fine line" on what to spend and on certain other national security concepts, "then we could put together a two-thirds majority on the SALT treaty."

He said he had asked Majority Whip Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who has been sharply critical of the Soviets, to head special units to study both arms reduction and needed increases in defense spending. The Friday meeting, he said, included several

Republicans but he declined to name anyone present.

Byrd said he has told the White House flatly that the treaty won't come to the Senate floor for a final vote until and unless it hands over five-year military spending projections, with some details, which he said in many cases firms lobbying for defense contracts already know. He said the president had agreed to supply the projections.

As Byrd appeared to be nearing open endorsement of the treaty, Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) announced in Chicago that he will vote for the treaty provided the Senate adopts two "understandings," which he expects. One makes clear the United States can continue transferring defense technology to its allies; the other requires Senate approval before a three-year "protocol," limiting some missile ranges, can be extended further.

The Foreign Relations Committee on Friday killed by a 10 to 5 vote a proposal by Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) to delay any consideration of the treaty until it can study the implications of the five-year projections, once they are received from Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Instead, it agreed to start voting Monday. Glenn was joined by Republicans Howard H. Baker (Tenn.), Richard Lugar (Ind.), S.I. Hayakawa (Calif.) and Jesse Helms (N.C.).

Byrd, who said he favors televising the Senate SALT debate provided a

time limit can be agreed on, said his own reading of "backup materials" has convinced him that "funding more money" to beef up U.S. arms is a must with or without the treaty in view of Soviet strides. He said that on verification of the SALT agreements, the "bottom line" of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assessment is "that without SALT II our ability to monitor [Soviet arms] is going to be less than that with SALT II—the committee seemed to be pretty much unified on that point."

Byrd also told reporters:

- He doesn't particularly like GOP presidential candidate John Connally's concept of using U.S. forces to keep peace in the Mideast and he thinks Carter's Camp David approach is better.

- Gasoline lines "will be back, no question they'll be back," so it's good that Congress is moving to pass major energy and synfuels legislation.

- Attaching anti-abortion and other substantive legislative provisions to appropriations bills and thereby holding up the U.S. budget is becoming a "legislative abomination . . . a nightmare . . . legislative blackmail" and he hopes to get together with House leaders on some way to control it.

- With luck, Congress might be able to complete energy, synfuels, appropriations and windfall-profits legislation, and then complete SALT, by Thanksgiving, but "we may be in till Christmas" though he doesn't really believe it will be that long.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8CHICAGO TRIBUNE
13 October 1979

Time to ratify SALT

The Senate Intelligence Committee has reported SALT II will make it easier for the United States to find out what the Soviets are up to than would be the case if the Senate rejects the treaty. The report is another forceful argument for speedy ratification.

Knowledge of the size and capability of the Soviet strategic arsenal is critical to U.S. defense planning. Take for example the mobile missile system designed to respond to concerns that in a few years U.S. land-based ballistic missiles would be theoretically vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

The idea of the mobile system is to increase the number of targets the Soviets would have to destroy before they could be confident they had demolished the main part of the U.S. land-based missile fleet. If there are many more targets than the Soviets have warheads to hit, a first strike would not be decisive. The U.S. would still be able to render a devastating counterstrike.

But the system now favored by the administration, costly as it is, would be useless if the U.S. were not sure whether the Soviets had increased the number of their warheads so as to be able to strike all the new targets.

SALT II's prohibition of measures of "deliberate concealment" is a useful device for making sure the Soviets are living up to their end of the bargain and for determining, through vigilance, the true size of their arsenal. We cannot afford, with or without SALT II, to rely solely on Soviet assurances. We must be

able to see for ourselves. And the "deliberate concealment" ban makes it possible for the United States to insist that the Soviets cease and explain any questionable or ambiguous behavior that could be camouflaging a secret buildup.

The Senate committee report gives due weight to the importance of knowing what the Soviets have in the way of strategic arms. This point cannot be overstated. It shapes the whole U.S. defense strategy.

The Carter administration plan for mobile missiles, for example, was designed not only to comply with the SALT II provisions against concealment. The goal of the elaborate technological exercise of creating and evaluating various alternative plans was to produce a mobile missile system which, if the Soviets deployed a similar one, would not make it possible for them to increase their nuclear arsenal secretly. The precarious stability of the nuclear age depends not only on an even balance of strategic strength but also upon mutual confidence that the balance exists.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report is the last piece of information needed by the Senate in making its decision on SALT II. Any further delays are unnecessary. The debate has been thorough and vigorous [though sometimes, as during the silliness over Soviet troops in Cuba, well off the point]. The argument has gone decisively in favor of ratification. No real issues remain in doubt. The Senate should move quickly to ratify the treaty.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 October 1979

More Confidence in SALT Monitoring Ability Cited

BY RUDY ABRAMSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said Wednesday that most members of the panel are more confident of the United States' ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the strategic arms limitation treaty than was indicated in a recent report.

Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) made the comment after he and Sen. Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) gave the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a closed-door briefing on the intelligence panel's findings.

In a summary report made public last week, the committee concluded that the SALT II treaty would make it easier for the United States to monitor Soviet weapons developments, but left it up to individual senators to judge from the complete report whether this country could adequately determine Soviet compliance with all terms of the treaty.

Bayh said Wednesday that most committee members are more confident of U.S. monitoring capability than the report indicated, but that a unanimous report has sought "to keep the Intelligence Committee out of the politics of SALT and to focus attention on the science of monitoring."

Senate sources said Wednesday, however, that the voluminous full report, which is under lock and key, raises specific verification problems not addressed in last week's public

summary report, nor in Bayh's briefing to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The sources said the full report concludes that Soviet compliance with terms of the protocol accompanying the treaty could not be fully verified. The protocol, which would run through 1981, would limit testing or deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, and would ban deployment of ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers (about 375 miles).

According to the sources, the report finds that the United States cannot adequately monitor missile production or mobile missile deployment, and that the loss of Iranian intelligence stations early this year will sharply limit the information available to the United States on new Soviet ICBMs.

Most of the arguments have been publicly made by critics during the public debate over the SALT II treaty in recent months.

Goldwater, a treaty critic, remarked casually several weeks ago that most of his concerns about the issue of verification had been removed.

Sources said he left the briefing of the Foreign Relations Committee to Bayh on Wednesday.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E4THE NEW YORK TIMES
14 October 1979

The Nation

SALT Prospects Are Linked to Missiles for Europe

The perceived uncertainty of Washington's leadership among the Western allies may, in the end, turn out to be one of the strongest arguments in favor of SALT.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt observed recently that the arms limitation treaty had been negotiated with the Soviets by three American Presidents; if it were rejected now by the Senate, he said, United States leadership "as regards the West as a whole" would suffer "a disastrous blow." President Carter emphatically agreed last week: "Some European countries," he said, "might very well turn toward the Soviet Union and put an anchor out to the East, and weaken in the process our NATO alliance."

That, essentially, was the argument used last week by the Administration in trying to convince such strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization supporters as Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, to vote for the treaty. But the defense argument has a further wrinkle — also nuclear, negative and vital. If Washington acutely disappoints its allies on SALT, what incentive remains for the Europeans to accept on their soil new medium-range American Pershing missiles as a counterweight to improved Soviet missiles that can strike Europe?

Addressing both the nervous Europeans as well as potential Senate converts to SALT, President Carter seemed to go out of his way to de-

nounce the Russians as militaristic, atheistic and totalitarian. He turned down Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's offer to pull out some missiles, tanks and troops from East Germany (it required the United States to drop its plan for basing Pershings in Europe). "In effect," Mr. Carter said, the Brezhnev proposal "is to continue their own rate of modernization provided we don't modernize at all."

Atlantic Alliance ministers are expected to decide on the missiles in December. National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, warned last week that their refusal to accept the Pershings could lead to political intimidation by Moscow, "at best and even war at worst." Bonn has agreed to take the new ground-based cruise and Pershing II missiles — if "a" West European neighbor follows suit. Belgium has said it would, subject to parliamentary approval; Dutch left-wingers are strongly opposed.

The Administration, meanwhile, tried to hurry the Senate toward action on SALT II. But Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Frank Church said ratification must hinge on a further Presidential affirmation that Soviet troops in Cuba "are not engaged in a combat role."

The Administration still was ducking a clear commitment on raising future defense spending by more than 3 percent (now planned), a price some key Senators set for their pro-SALT votes. Promising to submit the main points of 1981-to-1985 budget plans, Defense Secretary Harold R. Brown left open the possibility of new increases.

Senate majority leader Robert C. Byrd hopes to begin floor debate around Nov. 1. A sign of how close the call can be came in an closed-door committee vote on Friday; a motion to postpone action in the generally pro-treaty foreign relations panel was defeated, but by 10 to 5.

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The Baltimore Sun
15 October 1979

As the fortunes of SALT go, so also could the future of NATO

By HENRY L. TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Europe has slowly emerged as the arena for the next great foreign policy debate in the West once the fate of SALT II is decided.

In fact the debate already is under way. But its scope has been obscured by details, including the details of SALT, the strategic arms limitation treaty.

What is clear now is that SALT, once isolated on its own merits, has slowly blended into a greater debate, one embracing the response of the United States and its European allies to the growth of Soviet power.

Some linkage has always been apparent. But only now is it clear that what happens to the treaty in the U.S. Senate could shape European defense for years.

For if SALT is ratified, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears certain to station more powerful tactical nuclear weapons on the continent. If the treaty is rejected, a period of great uncertainty, at best, is sure to follow.

A good argument could be made that the psychology of governments should be otherwise. SALT, after all, has nothing directly to do with European defense. It is primarily an agreement by the superpowers on a ceiling—2,500 launchers each—to deployment of long-range nuclear weapons.

The terms of the treaty that do affect Europe are highly sensitive. Among other things, SALT prohibits for three years deployment of some shorter-range weapons that might be assigned to Europe.

To some, this might seem a good reason why NATO would be better off without the treaty. But as SALT II has developed it has become the key to orderly pro-

gression into SALT III, or some other negotiating vehicle that will come directly to grips with the Soviet arms that threaten Europe.

Moreover, SALT has become the symbol of American leadership, the centerpiece, as President Carter has described it, of his foreign policy. If SALT fails, the whole pattern of Mr. Carter's East-West and European policies will be in doubt.

The linkage between SALT and European defense policy actually reaches backward for years into the history of the NATO alliance. Its outlines became clear in May, 1975, when leaders of most of the 15 member countries met in Washington.

Confronting the steady growth of Soviet conventional and nuclear power in Europe, most of the member countries pledged a continuing 3 percent increase in budget commitments to the alliance. In the following months, their specialists looked for ways to neutralize the specific nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was putting into the field.

Two Soviet weapons were especially troubling: the SS-20 missile and the so-called Backfire bomber. Both hold special implications for Europe. The SS-20, a potent medium-range missile with three nuclear warheads, is stationed in the Western Soviet provinces, threatening all Europe. The Backfire, apart from its impressive size and speed, is highly sensitive politically: The United States tried, and failed, to get it covered as a strategic weapon in SALT.

Nothing NATO has available quite matches the political and military power of these weapons. But as SALT evolved, seeming to rule out some possible U.S. responses, it became clear that answers to the Soviet advantage had to be found.

They have been found, tentatively, in ground-launched cruise missiles and in a longer-range version of the Pershing, a 400-mile rocket now stationed in West Germany. Neither weapon is yet available, and ground-launched cruise missiles—essentially pilotless jet planes with warheads—would be proscribed for the first three years of SALT.

One result of all these political and military factors is the tight connection between NATO and SALT. For NATO plans to move well, SALT must move well.

If that happens, as the administration sees it, SALT will be ratified by the Senate well before the NATO council meets in Brussels in mid-December. Thus assured of Mr. Carter's leadership, the council would approve the placement of Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe as soon as they are available.

The question of confidence in Mr. Carter is no small matter. It may determine, in fact, which European members of NATO are prepared to accept the new missiles.

West Germany says it will accept them, as it has accepted less powerful nuclear weapons, but only if others do the same. The Netherlands, Belgium and Italy are all potential candidates, but their decisions will be influenced by interim political events.

At best, the decision will not be easy for any European leader. At worst, the disarray that would follow signs of impotence in Washington could make it impossible.

Mr. Carter recognized the danger directly Friday. In his strongest language on the subject, he warned that European allies might begin to drift, seeking their own arrangements with the Soviet Union, if the United States fails to produce SALT.

Opponents of the SALT treaty at home see the problem differently. Mr. Carter's leadership qualities, not SALT specifically, are the issue, they say. In fact, for better or worse, Europeans have come to equate the two despite some reservations about the details of SALT.

The Soviet Union already has set out to

exploit the potential split within the alliance. President Leonid I. Brezhnev clearly wants SALT—but equally clearly he believes it is possible to prevent NATO's deployment of new tactical nuclear weapons as a corollary.

His warnings in East Berlin a week ago are regarded here as the opening salvo in a propaganda campaign to keep that from happening. The appearance of those missiles, he said, "would radically alter the strategic situation on the continent and poison the international atmosphere."

At the same time, he announced the Soviet Union would withdraw up to 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from East Germany as a "concrete demonstration of the love of peace and the goodwill of the Soviet Union and its allies." American of-

ficials and most West European leaders regard the gesture as, first, a propaganda exercise and, second, a Soviet occasion for reducing unneeded power.

But some Europeans, on the evidence of press reports, took it seriously. Their reaction made it mandatory, if additional encouragement was necessary, that NATO meet its pledge to seek negotiations for reductions, even as it strengthens its forces.

The cumulative effect of months of maneuvering has been to leave orderly progress in NATO dependent on the strength of each link in a complex chain: If SALT succeeds, then the following links will be tested in turn.

If SALT fails, then a period of severe disarray, at best, is inevitable.

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The Baltimore Sun
15 October 1979

NATO chief calls for approval of SALT treaty

By CHARLES W. CORDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, commander of allied military forces in Europe, says approval of the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union is crucial to America's position as leader of the Western alliance and to both defense programs and future arms control efforts affecting Europe.

In an interview with *The Sun*, he said new nuclear missiles for West European defense are "essential for the future effectiveness and utility of the alliance."

An impending North Atlantic Treaty Organization decision on the missile modernization program "is just that vital," General Rogers declared.

He said Senate rejection of the SALT treaty could jeopardize allies' willingness to station the new weapons on their soil as well as attempts to negotiate limitations on East-West military forces confronting each other in Central Europe.

The strategic arms limitation treaty limits the intercontinental nuclear weapons in the superpowers' arsenals.

General Rogers, who succeeded Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., in the NATO post in July, called the modernization of so-called theater nuclear weapons "the most important issue before the alliance today." In the interview, during an official visit here from his headquarters in Belgium, he also touched on other "deficiencies" in defense that NATO seeks to correct.

The U.S. Army general was concerned especially about the ability of forces based in the United States to mobilize swiftly enough to deter or counter a Soviet thrust in Central Europe.

Though progress is being made, he is "not satisfied" with the manning or equipment levels, and in some cases the training, of units that would reinforce his formations in Europe. The manpower base for mobilization, he said, is inadequate "to provide replacements for combat casualties."

Here he was talking about a need to build up the nation's pool of trained reservists and the necessity, as military leaders see it, of advance registration of young men so the draft could be expedited in a conflict. "This is not an Army problem," the former Army chief of staff said. "It is a national problem. We have to find a solution."

American troops make up 25 percent of NATO's ground forces in Europe. General Rogers said 90 percent of his reinforcements in a war would come from the United States.

General Rogers described Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev's October 6 speech, on troop cuts and missile limits, as a "red herring" intended to frustrate necessary military modernization plans in Western Europe.

He said he was "frankly concerned" that the Brezhnev speech might "have some impact" in some Western European countries. But he believed President Carter's rejoinder two days later should overcome allied concerns and demonstrate that the United States is "fully committed" to the missile modernization program.

Mr. Carter said the Brezhnev proposal was designed "to disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves." The president urged that NATO go ahead with the missile modernization program.

The plan calls for stationing cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles in Western Europe, with range to strike targets in the western Soviet Union, and show Moscow that it has no "sanctuary," as General Rogers put it, for its SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers aimed at European targets.

"Surely," he said, "NATO does not want to put itself in the position that the Soviet Union decides for us what we need to deter the threat which the Soviet Union itself created."

From a military standpoint, the general said, NATO must have a spectrum of forces from conventional arms at the lowest level up to strategic nuclear weapons to deter war at any level the Soviet Union might contemplate.

In the middle of the spectrum, he said, a gap is developing because of the superior theater nuclear forces the Soviet Union is deploying. With the proposed new arms, there will be an allied deterrent against the Russian arms.

"And that is the name of the game—deterrence," General Rogers said.

The general was not called to testify in the SALT hearings, having just taken up his European post when they started. There were some senatorial suggestions that he had doubts about the treaty on military grounds.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1979

How to Resolve the Cuba 'Crisis': Views of the Candidates

By Richard Harwood
Washington Post Staff Writer

The "crisis" of Soviet troops in Cuba has receded quickly and quietly and is no longer prime time news.

But it remains an interesting episode for what it revealed about the impulses and attitudes of the presumptive candidates for president in 1980.

The Washington Post asked each of them how he would have dealt with the issue had he been in President Carter's shoes.

All who responded found fault with Carter's handling of the affair. Some criticized him for "backing down," others for being too bellicose. But their own prescriptions, for the most part, were mild in tone, cautious and unwarlike.

Republican John B. Connally, for example, has a reputation for "toughness." As president, he said, he would have "drawn the line on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba and the western hemisphere." But beyond that the only actions he recommended were postponement of the Senate debate on the strategic arms limitation treaty and a request to Congress for a 6 percent increase in the Pentagon budget.

None of those responding to The Post's inquiry suggested military action of any kind by the United States except Republican Rep. Philip Crane (Ill.) who proposed, as one option, a naval blockade of Cuba of the sort imposed during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Dissent from a different viewpoint came from Democratic Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr. of California. "The presence of 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba," he said, "does not appear to constitute a threat to this nation's security." The issue, he suggested, was distorted in Washington and no evidence was ever produced to show that "the Soviet military force in Cuba is either larger than before or armed in a different fashion. Without that evidence, the president's actions appear more a political hype for domestic consumption and are more provocative than productive."

"... As for Cuba, the United States must recognize that its revolutionary regime could be an example to other Latin Americans confronted by corrupt and repressive governments. The primary task of the United States

in the Americas is to support real democratic forces and tendencies so that the alternatives do not necessarily become Fidel Castro and his Soviet allies."

George Bush, a Republican, was also critical of Carter's handling of the issue. It should never have become, he said, "a public and potentially destructive confrontation."

Rather, said Bush, "the correct approach was to exert quiet but intense pressure; to inform the Soviet leadership that there could be no progress on the wide array of issues important to both sides until we were satisfied that the combat troops had been removed."

Howard H. Baker Jr. (Tenn.), the Republican leader in the Senate, deplored Carter's failure to "act firmly and decisively." His own approach, he said, would have been to seriously consider "suspending consideration of most-favored-nation trading status for the Soviet Union, imposing tighter restrictions on the transfer of high technology to the Soviets, freezing negotiations on limiting military deployment in the Indian Ocean, or declaring the 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreements on Cuba null and void..." He would not have postponed the SALT debate.

His colleague and fellow candidate, Republican Sen. Bob Dole (Kan.), disagreed on SALT. Dole would suspend debate on SALT, resume reconnaissance flights over Cuba, suspend the export of high technology items to the Soviet Union, defer any consideration

of most-favored-nation status for the U.S.S.R. and "increase our military presence in areas around the Soviet Union, including an enlargement of our forces in the Indian Ocean."

Republican Rep. John Anderson (Ill.), like Brown, criticized Carter for magnifying "out of proportion" the troops-in-Cuba issue. "It was a hasty judgment to insist that the status quo had to be changed.... Having created an unnecessary crisis, the president is to be commended for having then turned to calm and patient diplomacy to resolve it."

Like Crane, Republican Sen. Larry Pressler (S.D.) took a more bellicose line. He would have made the SALT treaty hostage to the removal of the troops; would have canceled computer technology sales to the Russians and would have expanded surveillance of both Cuba and the Soviet Union. He also would "make it clear that we would ultimately move towards an economic blockade."

Three of the presumptive candidates—former president Gerald Ford, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and former California governor Ronald Reagan—did not respond to The Post's request for a statement.

Soviet brigade in Cuba makes usual rotation

By CHARLES W. CORDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Russian brigade in Cuba, outwardly oblivious of the American show of strength at Guantanamo Bay, is sending soldiers home and replacing them with fresh troops from the Soviet Union under a long-planned fall rotation, sources here said yesterday.

As 1,800 United States marines wound up an all-day landing exercise last evening at the U.S. naval base on Cuba's eastern tip, Russian soldiers at the western end near Havana went on with their packing for homeward flights on the Soviet airline Aeroflot.

The troop rotation began in the past few days, the sources said, and seems in line with the normal pattern Moscow uses for replacing soldiers stationed outside the Soviet Union in the fall and spring.

Similar rotation by rail is under way for troop units in Central Europe, it was said.

The uproar here in September over the Russian brigade, culminating in President Carter's order for increased surveillance of Cuba and for the marine exercise, obviously caused no change in Moscow's rigid rotation schedule, the sources said.

They did not profess to know whether any Soviet observers were with Cuban troops, including reservists recently called to duty, in the Guantanamo vicini-

ty. Reports from the base said three Cuban tanks were maneuvering near there yesterday and there was work in the Cuban minefields which abut American mine barriers.

A Russian hydrographic ship, presumably rigged for electronic eavesdropping, was said to be outside Guantanamo Bay and a similar vessel, normally off the U.S. East Coast, was reported at Cienfuegos, the naval base on Cuba's south coast.

In response to President Carter's October 1 speech on Cuba, the sources here said, President Fidel Castro mobilized without publicity about 3,000 Cuban reservists in the Guantanamo area and others elsewhere.

The action put such a strain on the Cuban labor force in some instances, however, that most of the reservists were returned to civilian life by the time the marines landed yesterday.

The sources said some remained on active duty in coastal defense and anti-aircraft units.

The details now available on Cuban developments were indicative of the increased attention U.S. intelligence has been paying to the island since the administration's interest intensified in mid-summer with reports of the presence of a Soviet "combat brigade."

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Carter Said to Order Harder Line In Bid to Cut Cuban Role Abroad

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — The Carter Administration, whose policy toward Cuba has been based on efforts to normalize relations, has decided to switch to a concerted effort to discourage Cuba's military involvement abroad and to undercut its influence in the third world, officials said today.

They said the policy change, outlined in a directive recently signed by President Carter, also called for increased economic aid and sales of military equipment to countries in the Caribbean and in Central America to compete more effectively with Cuba for influence.

The directive was described as reflecting growing displeasure at high levels of the Government over Cuba's military intervention in Africa and elsewhere and its military ties with the Soviet Union.

The officials said Mr. Carter had ordered the State Department to consult with the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development to devise strategies for curbing Cuba's activities and isolating it politically. But they stressed that the directive did not authorize any attempt to undermine the Government of President Fidel Castro.

In a televised address Oct. 2, Mr. Carter announced several steps, including an increase in the United States' naval presence in the Caribbean, to react specifically to the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba and to encourage Senate approval of the American-Soviet treaty to limit strategic nuclear weapons.

Officials said Mr. Carter's policy memorandum, known as Presidential Directive 52, had been drafted after his speech and was meant to respond to the broader problems posed by Soviet military support for Cuba and its assertive policies in the third world.

Commenting on the directive, officials expressed doubts whether the steps it called for would lead to any significant change in Cuban activities.

These activities were denounced today by President Carter, who said at a town meeting in Dalton, Ill., a suburb of Chicago, that Cuba was "constantly interfering" in the affairs of other countries.

Asked why his Administration would not accept the fact that the Cuban Government was here to stay, Mr. Carter called Cuba a surrogate of the Soviet Union and said it was "the most highly militarized country on earth per capita."

"I think we've got to have a firm policy on Cuba," Mr. Carter said. "Until Cuba can bring their own troops back from unwarranted involvement in the internal affairs of other countries, until they release the hundreds and hundreds, even thousands of political prisoners they have in jail, we will not recognize Cuba."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
16 OCTOBER 1979

Cuban Crisis Mishandled, Insiders and Outsiders Agree

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

As Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.) arrived at the ornate Senate Caucus Room for a Foreign Relations Committee hearing at 10 a.m. last July 17, a senatorial aide pulled him aside to impart a fascinating tip.

"I've been picking up reports on a recent buildup of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, perhaps as much as a brigade," said the aide, whom Stone will not identify.

In response to the expected question, the aide announced, as Stone recalled it, that the information did not come from a classified official paper, and therefore "you don't have a classification problem" about sounding a public alarm.

In the course of the hearing, supposedly addressed to the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) on nuclear weapons, Stone pointedly inquired of the witnesses, retired members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the impact of the hypothetical Soviet introduction of "as much as a brigade of combat troops in Cuba.

The press corps perked up at this new element in the dull SALT story. Off the record and off camera, Stone also had a private exchange that morning with John Carbaugh, a staff aide to anti-SALT Sen. Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.).

Carbaugh had heard reports of his own about a Soviet combat force in Cuba. Within a few hours, Carbaugh passed his tip along to ABC Television, which began an independent investigation.

These small transactions in mid-July ballooned into a large-scale national and international controversy late in August, leading to a diplomatic confrontation with the Soviets in September and President Carter's televised address about Soviet troops in Cuba on Oct. 1.

Whatever the view of the importance or unimportance of the Soviet "brigade," whether insiders or outsiders to the Carter administration, whether Carter friend or Carter foe, nearly all those familiar with the details of this latest Cuban crisis agree that it was badly mishandled.

Accidents, miscalculations and, much more appalling to old hands, the seeming lack of any sophisticated calculation, contributed to the result, which was described by a British newspaper as "a self-inflicted technical knockout."

Among the other contributing elements:

- An administration still divided at the top on Soviet policy after 2½ years in office, even as the pending SALT II generates a national debate about the nature and intentions of the Russians.

- The present Washington fishbowl in which official secrets quickly leak or are leaked by contending factions, forcing premature announcements and decisions.

- Members of Congress and congressional aides who possess the knowledge, power, maneuver skills and, increasingly, the inclination to do their own thing in U.S. diplomatic and military affairs.

- The inherent ambiguity of the intelligence and misleading character of the term, "Soviet combat brigade," which created a widespread and erroneous impression that something fundamentally new and threatening had been found.

The results of all this—to create vast public concern and confusion, to endanger the strategic arms treaty, to jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations—did not emerge overnight. They developed step by step since Stone brought the issue to light on July 17.

Soviet troops in Cuba and U.S. intelligence awareness of them go back many years; but a July 12 report by the highly secret National Security Agency marked the beginning of a new and troublesome phase.

The NSA report suggested that a Soviet brigade organization, separate from known military advisers or training elements, had been present in Cuba for several years.

Although there was no firm conclusion and no reference to the word "combat," the report touched off alarm bells in high places and led to a new increase in U.S. surveillance of Cuba.

Only five days later Stone had his tip. After attracting the interest of the media at the morning hearing on July 17, the Florida senator took his inquiry to a closed-door Foreign Relations Committee hearing with top Pentagon and intelligence officials which, by coincidence, had been scheduled for that afternoon.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown and the chiefs of U.S. intelligence agencies gave "an equivocal answer but not a flat denial," according to Stone, and then told a secret impromptu hearing of the NSA findings up to that point. Stone made it clear he would take his suspicions, but not the details of the briefing, to television cameras waiting for him outside.

The committee leadership, concerned about the potentially explosive controversy, asked for and obtained a

public statement drafted by Brown and the intelligence chiefs on the spot to put the matter in perspective.

The statement issued in the names of Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) and the senior Republican, Sen. Jacob Javits (N.Y.), said there was "no evidence of any substantial increase" in Soviet military presence in Cuba over several years. It also said "our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion" that any "significant" Soviet forces, other than the long-known military advisory group, was present in Cuba.

The statement gave no hint of the intense internal study and debate on the issue, which only two days later, on July 19, produced a secret CIA finding that a brigade headquarters or structure, at least, was in Cuba separate from an advisory group.

The basis for this finding was simple and persuasive: Soviet officers and men had been overheard repeatedly to refer to a brigade headquarters, or "brigada." There was no agreement in this compromise finding, negotiated by CIA Director Stansfield Turner, on the organization, personnel strength or mission of the shadowy entity.

Turner was briefing Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance on the finding late on July 19 when they were confronted by ABC Television's inquiries.

Diplomatic correspondent Ted Koppel was informed that a "command structure" adequate for a brigade had been confirmed, but the charge of a brigade itself was rejected.

The next day Koppel broadcast a report attributed to undisclosed congressional sources that "a brigade of Soviet troops, possibly as many as 6,000 combat-ready men, has been moved into Cuba within recent weeks." He noted the administration denials.

Despite the new developments in intelligence and confirmation of the "command structure," the administration continued to use the cautiously worded denials of the July 17 Church-Javits statement, notably in a letter from Vance to Stone dated July 27.

When the letter became known it caused a furor among intelligence professionals. Some of them considered it "a lie" and determined to make sure that the true situation would reach the public.

Another step into the thicket came nearly a month later, after U.S. intelligence had obtained clear satellite photographs of Soviet troops acting as a unit, complete with tents, tanks and artillery, on field maneuvers at a pre-arranged time and place a few miles west of Havana's airport.

Based on the new evidence, the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center issued a coordinated intelligence finding Aug. 22 that the previously identified structure was a "Soviet combat brigade." Beyond the important conclusion, the choice of words was crucial in what was to come.

The word, combat, had not been used in the findings before, but there is no indication that its threatening connotations and political implications were appreciated, or even examined, at the time.

Intelligence officials later explained that the "Soviet combat brigade" was so described to distinguish it from a training outfit. Once the words had been repeated in internal documents, with wide circulation and even public statements, "we can't back off," an inquiring official was told.

In fact, there is no sign that the Soviet force in Cuba had ever engaged in combat, and no indication that its mission is to be prepared to do so. There is no airlift or sealift attached to the unit to permit speedy "combat" deployment. There is no plausible "enemy" for the small force to do "combat" against.

According to those who have examined the evidence closely, it is more accurate to say that the Soviet force appears to have some role other than

training and advising Cubans. (It also may have that role from time to time.) Even today, U.S. intelligence has not concluded what the real mission or missions are. Engaging in combat is not considered to be among the most likely possibilities.

The words, "Soviet brigade" or "Soviet nonadvisory brigade" or even "Soviet infantry brigade" would have been much more accurate, and much less alarming. But it was left to the sophisticated minds of the "wise men," the former high officials summoned to the White House on the eve of Carter's Oct. 1 address, to spot the semantic significance of the "Soviet combat brigade" and challenge it frontally. By then the damage had been done.

The coordinated intelligence finding of Aug. 22 presented the government with a hot potato at an awkward moment, with most top officials out of town or on vacation. The first inclination was to delay.

President Carter was informed of the finding Aug. 23 at he sailed down the Mississippi aboard a paddlewheel boat. Back in Washington, an inter-agency meeting of second-level officials at the White House concluded that the brigade reflected a long evolution rather than a sudden change in Cuba, and that it did not have a "short time fuse."

They hoped that major action could be delayed until after Labor Day, when Congress and the main administration figures would be back.

A telephone call from the Washington bureau of Aviation Week, a noted vehicle for leaks from the Pentagon and defense contractors, changed all that. On Thursday morning, Aug. 30, the magazine asked the State and Defense department press spokesmen about reports of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, and told the officials that a story on the matter was going to press that night.

The Aviation Week query touched off a near panic among high officials, but in fact it was a bluff. The magazine's information was considered neither solid enough nor important enough by its own editors to warrant publication in the issue that went to press that day. Lacking confirmation from the government, Aviation Week printed nothing about the Soviet brigade in its post-Labor Day issue.

Government officials, who assumed that Aviation Week was printing a complete version, decided to inform senior members of Congress immediately and to prepare an official announcement. This led to emergency calls late on Aug. 30 to eight ranking members of Congress, who were scattered throughout the world on the eve of Labor Day.

The decision by one of them, Frank Church, to make the news public in stark fashion set the terms of public dialogue. After informing Vance that he was going to make a statement—but not what he intended to say—Church summoned reporters to his living room in Boise and announced government confirmation of a Soviet brigade of ground combat troops in Cuba. Church demanded their "immediate withdrawal," and later said SALT II could not be ratified unless this were done.

In an effort to step back from Church's call for Soviet withdrawal, a negotiating objective considered impractical under the circumstances, Vance and the State Department fell back on the vague statement that, for the United States, "the status quo is unacceptable."

This was approved at a White House meeting Sept. 4 and put forward by Vance the next day in a press conference and by the president on Sept. 7.

No attempt was made to explain to the public until late in the affair that an unacceptable status quo could be altered by U.S. compensatory actions or that some situations which are unacceptable, in diplomatic language, persist nevertheless.

A powerful senator picked up the problem with the official language right away. When Vance completed a private briefing the day of his news conference, this close friend of the administration expressed surprise, in a tone of disapproval, of the "status quo" language.

It implies you are going to be able to do something about the Soviet brigade, the senator told Vance, thus setting up a public perception of failure if this does not happen.

The issue dominated the American press, was a major and growing impediment to the ratification of SALT II, and had been the subject of Church's announcement, a State Department announcement, Vance's news conference and a public announcement by Carter. Yet negotiations still had not begun with the Soviets. Vance was increasingly desperate for the return of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

The Soviet official was still in Moscow, where his father was dying in a hospital and his mother gravely ill in the same institution.

Despite the poignant personal considerations, Vance felt Dobrynin's presence essential to the chances, such as they were, for a diplomatic settlement. Messages were dispatched through the Soviet embassy in Washington and the U.S. embassy in Moscow, and finally an appeal was made by Vance direct to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Gromyko telephoned Dobrynin to ask him—but not order him—to return to accommodate Vance. The envoy was on the next plane, which took off shortly before the second of his parents died.

The Soviet position, which became clear on Dobrynin's return, had been foreshadowed by a message delivered by Deputy Ambassador Vasev several hours after Vance's news conference. The Soviets insisted that their force was a "training center" that had been in Cuba since 1962 and had not changed since in either the number of its personnel nor its function.

The Soviets were at the same time angered, puzzled and suspicious. They could not understand why the issue had suddenly emerged, and took the position that they had done nothing to cause this "manufactured" crisis.

Dobrynin, like his superiors in Moscow, proved unsympathetic. Either U.S. intelligence was so bad it did not spot the Soviet force in 17 years, or it was so slipshod that it failed to inform those at the top of the U.S. government—in either case no affair of the Kremlin, he said.

He asked two questions: Is the force a threat to the United States? Is it a violation of the previous U.S.-Soviet understandings about Soviet activities in Cuba? In both cases the U.S. answer was no.

In these circumstances the Soviets were willing to supply information about their Cuban force and later, in what they called a unilateral gesture to Washington, to supply certain "clarifications" about the role of their troops.

But they were unwilling to take any action to change the existing physical situation of the Soviet force on the ground, as suggested by the United States. And they have not agreed to do so in the future, though neither is this foreclosed.

In the midst of Vance's attempt to convince the Soviets to make at least face-saving concessions, an "or else" note crept into public utterances and private briefings at the White House. This generated confusion, which still persists, about retaliatory measures against Moscow for failure to remove or dissolve the brigade.

Presidential assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski, who hinted at retaliatory action on several occasions, took as his text a sentence in the presidential statement of Sept. 7: "We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns."

Brzezinski spoke Sept. 21 and on other occasions of "the principle of reciprocity" and of unspecified "consequences" for U.S.-Soviet relations if negotiations fail to settle the issue.

On Sept. 23 columnist James Reston of The New York Times, whose access to top officials is legendary, described a set of potential consequences apparently reflecting option papers under consideration.

These included "countermeasures along the borders of the Soviet Union," a stepup in U.S. propaganda and economic appeals to communist countries in Eastern Europe and even the Ukrainian minority within the Soviet Union, and an increase in U.S. "economic, technological and, particularly, military aid to Peking," Moscow's arch rival.

A battle raged within the U.S. government about countermeasures to be taken. Who won and to what extent is in doubt.

The U.S. compensatory measures announced in Carter's Oct. 1 address were limited to symbolic or nonmilitary displays in the Caribbean region, and increases in worldwide U.S. alertness or deployments which had previously been scheduled. The speech was devoid of anti-Soviet retaliatory measures.

State Department officials have told reporters that anti-Soviet options were not approved by Carter. These officials deny the existence of a "hidden agenda" of authorized retaliatory actions.

Hints from the White House run the other way. Some reporters have been told that the leaked announcement of Brown's coming trip to China flowed from U.S. displeasure about the Soviet brigade, and that the substance of Brown's dealings in Peking were likely to be affected. There is talk of three or four "associated measures" deliberately chosen but not announced at the time of the presidential speech. How much of this is substance and how much is smoke is still unclear.

It is easy to say, in hindsight, how the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba could have been more effectively

handled under other circumstances.

If the administration had been either silent or more candid in the early stages. If the intelligence had been more definitive, and the description of the findings more precise. If there had been time and the means for quiet negotiations with the Soviets before the issue became public. If congressional leaders had been quietly supportive rather than outspoken. If some public rhetoric had not supported hopes for an unattainable diplomatic settlement, and other rhetoric had not fed expectations, in the midst of the negotiation, of hard-line anti-Soviet action. If the whole thing had not developed while the top rank of official Washington, and the Soviet ambassador, were out of town.

What is impossible to say is whether any or all of this would have changed the final result in which the Soviet force, whatever it is, remains in Cuba and the U. S. government and public remain concerned and unsatisfied.

One certainty, in the opinion of veteran observers, is that the Carter administration's Cuban crisis was mismanaged. Worse than that: they fear that it was not managed at all.



The Washington Star
15 October 1979

Before Leaving U.S., Castro Tried to Soften His Image

By Peter Stoler
Time-Life News Service

NEW YORK — Fidel Castro returned to Cuba yesterday under heavy security and before he left the United States he attempted to soften his anti-American image.

In a dinner party that quickly became a press conference Saturday night, Castro defended Cuba's action in sending troops to Africa. But at the same time he insisted that his country is eager to bring its soldiers,

now active in Angola and Ethiopia, back home.

"Cuba is not interested in sending soldiers outside the country," said Castro. "We would be happy to bring them home. We don't want to send soldiers. We prefer to send doctors or construction workers."

The Cuban president also again denied that Soviet troops currently stationed in his country pose any threat to the United States. He declared that the function of the Russian unit had not changed in the 17 years it had been in Cuba.

"(President John) Kennedy knew

this," he said. "(President Lyndon) Johnson had to know this. (President Richard) Nixon had to know this. This dead body is being revised now after 17 years."

Castro made his remarks to a group of prominent news persons, who gathered at the Cuban mission to the United Nations for an informal dinner Saturday night.

The dinner itself was a spur-of-the-moment affair. It was put together when Castro met ABC news correspondent Barbara Walters, who had interviewed him in Havana; at the United Nations Friday and asked her to drop in Saturday night with some friends.

During the evening Castro joked about the tight security that his visit to New York had necessitated and indicated that the inconvenience it was causing was one of the reasons for his early departure.

The Cuban president also talked at length about his own childhood and revolutionary background.

Castro said that he had not come to the United Nations for a confrontation with the United States but to plead for international cooperation. "There is no alternative to peace and cooperation among countries; I am totally convinced of that," said Castro, reiterating his call for creation of a \$300-billion fund to aid underdeveloped countries.

He also defended himself against accusations of adventurism in Africa and the Caribbean, insisting that most of the Cubans sent abroad were advisers and technicians, not soldiers. He said that Cuba would consider withdrawing its combat troops from Africa as soon as the situations in Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were settled. "It's not our purpose to be there permanently," he said.

When asked about the presence of Soviet troops on Cuba, Castro insisted that the CIA had known about the troops, a remnant of the forces withdrawn following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for years. And he repeated that the Russian unit, which he referred to as "Construction Center 12" posed no threat to U.S. security.

But he also made it clear that Cuba would not bow to U.S. pressure to have the troops removed. "We like them being there. It's our desire," Castro said.

In response to other questions, Castro claimed that Cuba has been behaving "discreetly" in the Caribbean and has avoided actions that might embarrass President Carter. He also claimed that Cuba had pleaded with President Omar Torrijos of Panama not to seize the Panama Canal when treaty negotiations between his country and the United States appeared to have broken down.

Cuba, Castro declared, was trying hard to get along with the United States, but was frequently prevented from doing so by acts of "sabotage" in which his country was accused of actions for which it was not responsible.

Carter is getting bad advice where Cuba is concerned and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is the main reason, Castro said.

Those at the dinner included: Michael J. O'Neill, editor and executive vice president of The New York Daily News; Frank Mankiewicz, president of national public radio; Roone Arledge, president of ABC News and Sports; Henry Anatole Grunwald, editor-in-chief of Time Inc.; Katharine Graham, chairman of the board of The Washington Post Company; Ben Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post; Sally Quinn, reporter for The Washington Post; Lester Bernstein, editor of Newsweek; and Joe Gravit, Armstrong, president and editor-in-chief of New York magazine and publisher of New West magazine. A.M. Rosenthal, executive editor of The New York Times, was invited but did not attend.

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2 CONGRESSMEN VISIT CASTRO AND REPORT HE FAVORS U.S. TIES

But Dellums and Leland Say Cuban
Leader Adheres to Positions
That Irritate Washington

By EDWARD SCHUMACHER

Two Democratic members of Congress met with President Fidel Castro of Cuba for more than two and a half hours yesterday and reported that he stood firm against changing his stand on issues irritating to the United States Government but wanted, nonetheless, to improve relations.

Representatives Ronald V. Dellums of California and Mickey Leland of Texas said after the meeting, held at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, that Mr. Castro had not suggested any specific initiatives he might take but said that there should be diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana.

Mr. Castro, the two black Congressmen reported, adhered to his views, including support of independence for Puerto Rico and a contention that a controversy over Soviet troops in Cuba was a "sham" issue created by the United States.

Dellums Agrees With Castro

Representative Dellums said after the meeting with Mr. Castro: "If the United States can be in communication with the Soviet Union, and if the United States can be in communication with China, why can't it be in communication with a tiny nation 90 miles off the coast of Florida?"

The two Representatives who met with Mr. Castro said they had been invited by the Cuban Government in their role as members of the Congressional Black Caucus. They said Mr. Castro hoped that during his stay he could meet with other members of Congress sympathetic to Cuba.

The United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, two years after the Castro revolution that led

to expropriations of American properties and moves by Havana for close ties with Moscow.

There were indications early in the Carter Administration that the President might be prepared to improve relations with Havana. Any such inclinations faded when Cuba sent troops to take part in conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia.

President Castro arrived in New York early Thursday and spoke at the United Nations on Friday. The police said that they expected him to stay in New York through tomorrow night and possibly even longer.

Demonstrations against Mr. Castro yesterday were small compared with those on Friday, when almost 3,000 protesters marched from the United Nations to a point one block from the Cuban Mission, at the corner of 38th Street and Lexington Avenue.

About 50 demonstrators with a sound truck were gathered near the mission yesterday, frequently shouting, "Asesino!" or "Assassin!" This seems to have become their favored chant in recent days.

Representatives Dellums and Leland said that they met with Mr. Castro at a study in the mission. The Cuban revolutionary leader was in his usual green fatigues, they said, and was in an expansive mood, joking with them at times.

Representative Dellums said that their talks had dealt mainly with the economic problems of third-world countries, which formed the theme of Mr. Castro's speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

Food and Clothing Rationed

Mr. Castro spoke of Cuba's social and economic needs, the two Congressmen said, noting, for example, that food and clothing were rationed in the country.

Mr. Dellums said that he, Mr. Leland and Mr. Castro had been in agreement that 3,000 Soviet soldiers in Cuba "do not pose a threat to the United States."

Representative Dellums accused President Carter of "political shenanigans" and of being "provocative" by increasing American forces in the Caribbean and by planning military exercises at the Guantánamo military base in eastern Cuba.

The police said that Mr. Castro planned to be host at a diplomatic reception tonight at the mission, which he has left only once since his arrival. About 300 diplomats attended a reception at the mission Friday night for representatives of countries professing nonalignment, the police reported.

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13 October 1979Cord Meyer

Castro, the Sandinistas and U.S. aid

Believing it has a 50-50 chance to head off a takeover by hard-line Marxists in Nicaragua, the Carter administration plans to ask the Congress for \$75 million in additional economic aid for that beleaguered country.

This gamble on the hope that Nicaraguan moderates can be encouraged by economic aid to resist a Castroite dictatorship is stirring a skeptical reaction on the Hill. The unconditional assistance demanded by the Nicaraguan junta has little chance of approval. The burden will be on President Carter to prove that the funds will be cut off if the Sandinistas do not progress toward free elections.

Unreported by the American press and down-played by the administration, events behind the facade of moderation in Managua are contributing to the mounting congressional alarm. The Soviet brigade in Cuba may present no clear and present danger, but Castro's deepening involvement in the Nicaraguan political scene is viewed as a threat to all Central America.

The appointment of Diaz Julian Lopez as the new Cuban ambassador in Managua is evidence of Castro's

pervasive influence. During the civil war, Lopez served as Castro's chief intelligence officer in Costa Rica and supervised the transfer of Cuban arms and supplies to the rebels. He helped to negotiate the pact that unified the Sandinista command and he knows the Sandinista leaders intimately.

Although their presence is denied, Cuban military trainers are helping to train and indoctrinate the new Sandinista Peoples Army. One thousand Cuban teachers are arriving to help transform Nicaraguan students into revolutionary cadres. The Sandinista newspaper, *Barricada*, is filled with propaganda borrowed directly from the Cuban news service.

The pro-Castro trend is affirmed by developments in the labor field. Prior to Somoza's downfall, the AFL-CIO provided training to Nicaragua's largest labor federation (CUS) which was both opposed to Somoza and non-communist in orientation. When the civil war ended, the AFL-CIO sent in organizers to help the CUS expand and joined with other Western labor unions in providing relief supplies.

The Sandinista leaders responded by branding the CUS a counter-revolutionary puppet of the CIA and two months ago announced the formation of the Sandinista Confederation of Labor (CTS). Attempting to create a single united labor front under their complete control, the Sandinistas have sent CTS organizers with armed guards into factories to intimidate the workers and to forcibly eject freely chosen CUS representatives. As a result of these strong-arm tactics, the CTS claims rapid growth in membership. The drive is being assisted by a \$560,000 grant from East Germany.

Meanwhile, freedom of the press is being honored in the breach. The one independent newspaper, *La Prensa*, remains cautiously critical of the regime, but the TV network has become a government propaganda arm.

Abandoning even the pretense of a neutral foreign policy in his recent U.N. speech, Daniel Ortega, a member of both the governing junta and of the Sandinista National Directorate, aligned Nicaragua with Cuba and the Soviet Union

on every international issue. Calling for independence for Puerto Rico and U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, Ortega announced that his regime would not be responsible for past debts and demanded unconditional aid from the developed countries.

The one bargaining counter that the U.S. has left in preventing the imposition of one-party dictatorship is its ability to insist on free elections and respect for civil rights as a condition of additional aid.

By firmly insisting on the right of opposition parties to organize and on a specific schedule for early elections monitored by the OAS, the Congress can require the Carter administration to make its proposed aid dependent on a democratic process that might yet restore to the Nicaraguans the freedom they thought they had won by overthrowing Somoza.

When the U.S. and the OAS joined in forcing Somoza into exile, they assumed responsibility for establishing a more representative government. Financing the imposition of a police state is not the way to discharge that obligation.

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22 October 1979

Blackbirds over Cuba


Undetected by hostile radarscopes, a flock of Blackbirds began flying at 85,000 ft. over the Caribbean last week, their sooty titanium skins glowing cherry red from air friction as they hit top speeds in excess of 2,000 m.p.h. The planes were Lockheed's needle-nosed SR-71s on strategic reconnaissance missions that President Carter has ordered to monitor Soviet military activity in Cuba.

If any aircraft can determine the combat capability of the Soviet brigade on the island, it is the SR-71—the fastest, highest-flying and most elusive manned aircraft in existence. So fast does the sophisticated spy plane move that when a pilot starts a 180° turn over Cuba, he completes it halfway to Bermuda. By emitting ECM, or electronic countermeasure radio frequency signals, the Blackbird can efface its image from watching radar screens.

Stationed primarily at Beale Air Force Base in California, the SR-71s last flew over Cuba in November 1978 to help determine whether Havana's Soviet-supplied MiG-23 fighters had a nuclear capability. The an-

swer: no. U.S. strategic satellites are also used for surveillance. But when their vision is obscured by cloud cover, the job is given to SR-71s, which have cloud-penetrating infrared sensors and cameras that can take pictures at a scanning rate of 100,000 sq. mi. per hr., making it possible to monitor military targets anywhere in the world. Most important are

MARK MEYER



America's SR-71 spy plane in flight

the Blackbird's ELINT—electronic intelligence-gathering functions that are also known as “ferreting.” SR-71s can detect hidden objectives by interpreting electronic signals at extremely high altitudes. In addition, Blackbirds carry a long-range, side-looking radar (SLAR) that can spy deep into foreign countries without actually crossing their frontiers.

Moscow has been so concerned about the effectiveness of the SR-71s that it has repeatedly made attempts to shoot the planes down over Eastern Europe, North Korea and the Middle East with surface-to-air missiles. They have never made a single kill, but that could change. Entering the Soviet arms inventory is a new SAM called Gammon that the U.S. Air Force estimates has the ca-

pability of catching up with an SR-71. A major concern of U.S. defense authorities: if the Gammon is shipped to Havana, it could be bye-bye, Blackbird, over Cuba.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 23THE WASHINGTON POST
15 October 1979*Ray S. Cline*

History Repeated as Farce

President Jimmy Carter reached a new low in his TV performance as star of a little farce entitled "Shoot-Out With the Red Brigade in Cuba," story and music by the boys from All Thumbs Corral at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. It was a melancholy moment for the nation as our commander-in-chief humorlessly explained that the Soviet brigade was not there and yet appeared to our satellite camera stare, was not there again today because Leonid Brezhnev assured him it would not go away. On the basis of this impeccable logic, the president proceeded to wish the brigade away as an international issue, and he preached a lesson on the urgency of an arms limitation treaty involving cooperative measures with the Soviet Union.

For me, this moment seemed especially sad and humiliating. In 1962, as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I made the alerting call to McGeorge Bundy and early in the morning of Oct. 16 took to the White House the photographs of Soviet missiles in Cuba that began the drama of the "13 days" of that year. I was in the White House when President Kennedy made his electrifying TV address to the nation—Oct. 22, 1962. Kennedy had a real crisis, he sorted out his intelligence and his strategic priorities, and he courageously took the steps that forced the removal of Soviet strategic offensive weapons from the Caribbean. He did not consider the Soviet troops in Cuba an offensive force and did not ask for their withdrawal. This presidential action added immeasurably to American

defense Intelligence Agency went virtually blind in this region. Intelligence analysts with many other things to do got the signal that the White House attached no priority to fine points about Soviet forces in Cuba. Consequently, they did not keep up to date on reading the messages later discovered to have referred to the brigade. Nor, evidently, did they trouble to sift out the exact meaning of the flurry of Soviet activity that plainly accompanied Castro's shipment of Cuban proxy armies all over Africa and as far away as Yemen on the oil-rich Arabian peninsula.

Actually, a few thousand Soviet combat troops in Cuba are the least menacing of the many activities Moscow has been conducting in our Caribbean backyard. After the first Soviet venture into Angola in 1975, the Soviet military presence in Cuba and in the Caribbean expanded substantially in ways genuinely threatening to American security interests. Within four years the U.S.S.R. was flying long-range airborne reconnaissance missions to cover the Atlantic reaches, was deploying submarines in Caribbean waters and operating them from a base at Cienfuegos, and was manning large communications facilities both for military command and electronic intercepts of U.S. signals. Soviet air power now includes a fighter-bomber force with advanced-design MiG23s as well as transport planes to ferry Cuban troops wherever they are wanted.

Thus the non-crisis began when the Carter administration discovered what had been in Cuba all along. The president and his spokesmen panicked and misled the Congress and the public with assurances of no change in the status of Soviet forces in Cuba, then belatedly discovered that the troops had indeed been brigaded and were photographed in August 1979 on maneuvers with tanks and artillery. This fact, they thought, was a "smoking gun" of evidence, so they handed it to their dovish, pro-Castro friend on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Frank Church. With one quick look at his problems in getting reelected in 1980 in conservative Idaho, Church took the gun and shot Carter in the foot by demanding removal of the Soviet brigade. It was this self-inflicted wound that the president thought he could heal by a judicious application of prime-time TV.

Actually, of course, the Carter-Church crowd got it backward. They seemed to believe that a few thousand combat troops were a danger, if they maneu-

vered in Cuba but were acceptable if they were, as Brezhnev claimed, a "training center." It is exactly the fact that the Soviet Union is using Cuba as one vast training center for proxy armies and covert intervention forces that is causing a real strategic crisis in the Caribbean, in Africa, in the Mideast. This global assault on American interests and American friends abroad, passively acquiesced in by the United States, is what is destabilizing international peace and discrediting American foreign policy.

If President Carter had moved to meet this menace, he would at long last be facing strategic reality in a way that would hearten the American people and our allies. Instead, he gave us the baffling description of the little Red Brigade that is or is not there. This episode in presidential history is not crisis management; it is crisis mangling. It is small wonder our alliance partners watch in disbelief and dismay. How many real confrontation crises will the backroom strategic planners in Moscow calculate can safely be staged in the next 14 months? And will President Carter's men march up the hill and march down again, as they did in this case, without so much as a hint of concession from the Soviet Union?

The writer is executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

security and international prestige. How discouraging to see history repeated as farce.

The facts are that Soviet troops organized in combat units were in Cuba in strength in 1962 and that a number of those combat troops have been in Cuba ever since. After many annual troop rotations and a buildup of various kinds of Soviet military technicians in Cuba, the exact status of the Soviet forces became fuzzy. When Carter early in 1977 deliberately cancelled the traditional aircraft reconnaissance overflights of Cuba as a gesture of good will to Fidel Castro, the CIA and the De-

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
18 October 1979

Era of tighter output by oil nations forecast

By STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Department of Energy, in a new estimate of world oil supplies, predicted yesterday that there would be a major slowdown in the growth of production capacity by the major exporting nations, exerting new pressure on prices.

In a revised report to Congress, energy officials said they expected that new capacity would be about 10 percent less by 1985 than they had predicted in official estimates to Congress 10 months ago.

Actual production will be little, if at all, greater over the next five years than it was last year and will fall below even the most conservative estimates of demand by 1985, the report said.

"World oil prices may rise faster than the rate of inflation in order to balance world supply and demand," C. Roger Glassey, of the department's Energy Information Administration, told the House intelligence oversight subcommittee.

Mr. Glassey attributed the lower production estimates to revised calculations of the resources available and to new political changes, including instability in Iran and fears among leaders of some exporting nations that they may suffer the fate of the shah of Iran if they were to press too rapidly for economic growth spurred by sharp increases in oil revenues.

Other analysts also expect that the exporting nations may cut production to stretch out their resources and maintain higher prices.

In other testimony to the House subcommittee, headed by Representative Lee Aspin (D. Wis.), the Central Intelligence Agency also presented an equally gloomy outlook on world oil supplies, similar to its report on the world oil market issued last August.

Maurice Ernst, director of the agency's Office of Economic Research, told the subcommittee that over the next few years, any revisions in production levels by the leading exporting nations are "more likely to be downward than upward" because of the conservative oil policies they are pursuing.

Mr. Ernst mentioned not only the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries but also Norway and Mexico—two non-OPEC producers—that have indicated a desire to limit output.

His testimony reiterated the earlier CIA analysis that oil production in the Soviet Union, the world's largest oil producer, is likely to peak in the next year and then head downward.

Mr. Ernst said that by 1982 the Soviet bloc would shift from being a net oil exporter of a million barrels a day to a net importer of 700,000 barrels a day.

He raised the possibility that by then, the Soviet Union would turn to the world exporters for oil, which would exert new pressure on supplies and prices.

"Clearly there are very serious political implications in this development," Representative Aspin said. "The Soviet Union would be competing for the same oil we want."

The tight outlook for oil supplies was emphasized by Energy Secretary Charles W. Duncan, Jr., at a breakfast meeting with reporters.

Mr. Duncan said the leading oil importers must impose major conservation programs to reduce demand so that inroads can be made in the spot price for crude oil in the world market. The spot price is approaching \$40 a barrel, compared to the official OPEC ceiling of \$23.50.

He attributed the new round of price increases breaking the OPEC limit to the "big differential" between the ceiling and spot prices.

Unless there is a major unexpected disruption in production, Mr. Duncan said the outlook for oil supplies next year was "reasonably good," but he said it was "less certain" after that because of cutbacks in production and an expected end to the recession in the United States.

Mr. Duncan said that Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, told him at a luncheon Tuesday that his government would not decide until December whether to produce oil at a rate above its customary ceiling of 8.5 million barrels a day.

Other Saudi officials have said the current higher rate of 9.5 million barrels a day would be reduced in January. Saudi Arabia allowed the higher production after the cutbacks in Iran earlier this year, but the Saudi government is concerned that the higher rate might cause its economy to grow too rapidly.

Among other points, Mr. Duncan said that he would oppose for now making additions to the nation's strategic oil reserve, which now has only a 15-day supply, because the added imports would tend to raise world oil prices.

The cabinet officer also said he would favor raising from \$400 million to \$1.6 billion the amount available this winter to help low-income families pay their fuel bills, even if general revenues had to be tapped. The administration has said approval for supplying additional money would come only with passage of the "windfall profits" tax on oil companies.

In addition, Mr. Duncan said he wanted to end gasoline price controls and the accompanying allocation system, but that this step must be taken when it would have minimal impact on the rate of inflation.

In his testimony to the Aspin subcommittee, Mr. Glassey said that a new study on gasoline prices showed tentatively that by itself, decontrol "would not have a very great" impact on prices at the pump.

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NEW YORK TIMES
18 OCTOBER 1979

Oil-Supply Forecasts Are Bleak

U.S. Officials See More Gas Lines For Early 1980's

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 — Federal energy officials issued bleak forecasts today for oil supplies and prices. They predicted a probable return of gasoline lines in the early 1980's and a price tag as high as \$86 for a barrel of oil 15 years from now.

The pessimistic forecasts were made by officials of the Energy Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to a House subcommittee. They presented an outlook for another supply shortage in a few years as a world economic slowdown ends and drives up the demand for oil, coupled with a sharp cut in Soviet oil production.

"I don't know any expert who is optimistic," said Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, he headed today's hearing on world oil supplies.

Charles W. Duncan Jr., the Secretary of Energy, was not quite so gloomy about supplies in the months ahead, but he added that the nation was going through "a series of crises" over oil prices and supplies. Mr. Duncan told a group of energy writers that his short-term optimism was supported by the facts that Iran was still exporting 3.2 million barrels a day and that the Saudis had not decided to cut production, as was reported.

Meeting With Sheik Yamani

The Secretary said he met yesterday with the Saudi oil minister, Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, who said his Government had not yet decided to drop back to the so-called permanent output limit of 8.5 million barrels a day. The Saudis increased their output to 9.5 million barrels a day after domestic turmoil in Iran reduced production there.

Other oil industry sources said, however, that the Saudis would indeed reduce output next year, even though Sheik Yamani has opposed such a move. These sources said the minister's influence was eroding as members of the royal family in Saudi Arabia began to exert greater control over the country's oil policy.

Sheik Yamani, in a speech in Washington last night, reiterated Saudi pleas for a reduction in American oil consumption. He said a rise in worldwide demand for oil had driven up prices on the spot market to unrealistic levels.

Saudi Arabia sells much of its oil for \$18 a barrel, while the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries set a ceiling of \$23.50 a barrel for popular types of crude. In recent weeks some OPEC nations such as Libya and Iran have raised prices above the ceiling, and some oil has sold for as much as \$40 a barrel on the spot market in Rotterdam.

"I think we are losing control of everything," Sheik Yamani said in a speech to a group of geologists.

The pessimism on prices and supplies was expressed on a day when demonstrations against the oil industry were being held in several cities. One of them was staged at the American Petroleum Institute in Washington. Several of these protesters were in the audience when the analysts of the Energy Department and C.I.A. testified before the House subcommittee about world oil supplies.

Maurice Ernst, director of the C.I.A.'s office of economic research, said, "Although oil shortages have disappeared in recent months, they are likely to reappear during the upswing of the next business cycle — perhaps in 1981 or 1982."

He said that "the outlook for oil supply is dim," adding that exports from the Middle East "are more likely to be downward than upward."

Turning to petroleum production in the Communist bloc, Mr. Ernst said: "The developmental trends in the Soviet oil industry are unfavorable. In

the past year or two, Moscow had hoped to get large increases in production from the newer, smaller fields in west Siberia, but development of these fields is behind schedule."

When these and other Soviet supply-and-demand factors are considered, he went on, "we have the Communist countries as a group shifting from being net oil exporters of about 1 million barrels a day to net importers of 700,000 barrels a day."

Mr. Ernst noted, as other analysts have, that the Middle East is about the only place such quantities would be available and that this would have the further effect of increasing demand and driving prices still higher.

Where prices will end was the subject of testimony by C. Roger Glassey, assistant administrator of the Energy Department's Energy Information Administration.

Making a series of assumptions of the worst and best possible cases of supply and demand over the next 15 years, Mr. Glassey said the highest price his statisticians had calculated was \$86 a barrel in 1996 at the value of the dollar predicted for that year. This would be equal to about \$52 a barrel at the present value of the dollar.

Energy Dept. Now Expects Big Jump in 'Real' Oil Prices

By Ross Evans

Washington Star Staff Writer

The Energy Department, adopting the generally pessimistic outlook for world oil supplies espoused by the CIA, has drastically increased its estimate of how fast prices will rise during the next decade.

In a new estimate presented to Congress yesterday, the department projected that by 1985 world oil prices may rise by much as 50 percent in "real" dollars — that is, over and above the general inflation rate.

By 1990, according to what the department called its "most likely" predictions, "real" world oil prices will increase by at least 30 percent and perhaps as much as 90 percent.

Such increases would signal a dramatic trend in oil inflation. From the 1973 price explosion until this year's rapid increases, oil prices had remained roughly constant in real terms.

In addition to direct effects on consumer prices, the new estimate has far-reaching implications for President Carter's energy proposals now being considered by Congress, since the projected price increases are significantly higher than have been assumed until now.

For example, the revised projection implies that the amount of money involved in the proposed "windfall profits" tax is much greater than current congressional estimates. The Senate Finance Committee so far has assumed that real prices will increase during the 1980s by only 2 percent a year.

The Carter administration originally gave the committee a list of estimates for real price increases ranging for 0 percent to 2.4 percent a year.

Energy Department analysts revealed their new estimate at a House Intelligence subcommittee hearing called by Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., to compare their previous forecast of world oil trends with a CIA forecast released in August.

The declassified CIA estimate, based on a judgment that members of the OPEC cartel will constrain production during the early 1980s, projected that world demand will outrun supply by 1982. An Energy Department projection — prepared last December and released in July — assumed that OPEC production would increase to meet demand through the decade.

But the department analysts said yesterday that they had revised their previous estimate.

In line with the pessimism of the CIA forecast, the department officials said they now believe that OPEC production will increase only slightly because the cartel's governments are expected to restrain oil output.

"We see a changed attitude on the part of producing countries," said C. Roger Glassey, chief analyst of the department's Energy Information Administration. "That attitude may have been there all along and we just didn't see it."

Glassey said the department has cut its "most likely" estimate of OPEC production in 1985 by about 2.5 million barrels a day from the previous prediction. The new estimate — which ranges from 29.9 million barrels a day to 33 million — compares with OPEC's 1978 rate of 30.3 million barrels a day.

"For the near term, I don't think our estimate would vary greatly from the CIA's," a department aide said.

The August CIA forecast was repeated yesterday by the CIA's director of economic research, Maurice Ernst. He also testified before Aspin's subcommittee, but agreed to answer questions only in a 15-minute closed session of the panel.

"The gas lines and rapid increases in oil prices during the first half of 1979 were but symptoms of the underlying oil supply problem — that is, the world can no longer count on increases in oil production to meet its energy needs," Ernst said.

"Although oil shortages have disappeared in recent months, they are likely to reappear during the upswing of the next business cycle — perhaps in 1981 or 1982," the CIA economist said. "Consumers are already being forced to make adjustments, not only through higher prices and shortages but also through slower economic growth."

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WASHINGTON STAR
14 OCTOBER 1979

Severe Gasoline Shortage, Price Rise Predicted in '80

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

Severe gasoline shortages and higher prices are predicted for next year in a new intelligence report circulating among energy policy makers.

The assessment outlined in the report — prepared by an agency separate from the Department of Energy — is in direct conflict with the official DOE forecast that the economic recession will dampen oil demand and thus avert shortages.

The latest analysis cites two principal reasons for disagreeing with DOE's public posture:

- Historically, as in the period following the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, demand for heavy oil used by industry dropped, but gasoline consumption in the United States continued its steady upward pace. The report flatly predicts the same pattern for 1980-81.

- Oil producing countries are purposely tightening — for various reasons — production of light oil that is used by refineries to produce gasoline and jet fuel.

A third reason cited is the inability of U.S. refineries to substitute more abundant heavy oil for the scarcer light product.

"Strong demand for light oil products such as gasoline . . . and constraints on supply are likely to at least cause intermittent shortages of light oil products in (Western industrial) countries," the report states, adding that the United States is "most vulnerable" to shortages.

"This tight product situation will tend to maintain price pressures on crude oil despite prospects for an economic slowdown next year," the report said.

Another warning of gasoline shortages was made yesterday by

Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd.

"Without question, the gas lines will be back. All indications are that there is a clear likelihood that gas lines will return and that the price of energy will continue to go up."

Byrd did not say on what he based his prediction.

A top official of one of the major oil companies — Gulf — agreed with the grim outlook of the new analysis.

"We expect almost as serious a problem next spring as we had last spring," said Robert Baldwin, president of Gulf Oil Refining and Marketing, referring to the shortages that followed the political upheaval in Iran.

Agreeing that a shortage in light crude would be a major factor in the predicted shortages, Baldwin said that whether next year's shortages translate into gasoline lines "depends on demand."

In its prediction on the gasoline outlook, the intelligence report says that "demand will tend to increase sharply during the 1980 driving season as U.S. motorists attempt to resume normal driving patterns . . . even with further price hikes."

In another break with DOE's official predictions, the report says that

if its prognosis is correct, "consumption during the 1980 peak driving season would exceed this year's level by at least 800,000 barrels daily." DOE's estimate is for an increase of 250,000 barrels daily during the same period.

The analysis also says shortages of light oil are possible in Western Europe and Japan. But it points out that the United States consumes 52 percent of the light oil used by all non-communist countries. Those countries use 60 percent of the world's light crude production.

Besides a supply squeeze, the United States will also be hardest hit by increased prices because of the growing practice of oil producing countries to tighten light crude production, the intelligence analysis says.

"The price differential between light and heavy crude oils is expected to widen, reflecting the tightening light crude supply situation," the study states.

"The United States, in particular, will be hard hit because of declining domestic production of light oils and a very large demand for light products."

Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is the only country with an official policy regarding the ratio of light-versus-heavy-fuel production. By official decree, that ratio is 65 percent light, 35 percent heavy.

But several other countries — Iran, Venezuela and a non-OPEC member, Mexico — are requiring oil buyers to purchase a certain amount of heavy oil to get the more desirable light crude.

Analysts believe that some OPEC members, such as Iraq, are purposely dumping light crude on the spot market to move prices upward. Spot market prices are often used as a barometer by nations to test the kind of prices oil producers can charge.

Government analysts believe the recent price increases by Mexico and Kuwait are a direct result of the surge in the spot market in recent weeks. If the surge continues, they believe, it could mean a hefty official price increase by OPEC at its next meeting in December.

Current demand for gasoline appears to be down substantially from last year, the American Petroleum Institute reports.

API says that during August, the last month for which it has the figures, demand appeared to be off by about 8 percent.

"The major reason for the drop appears to be higher prices," an API spokesman said.

DOE's weekly petroleum watch last week said that gasoline supplied during the four weeks ended Sept. 28 was 5.6 percent below that for the same period last year.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1979**Jack Anderson**

Drivers Were Fed a Line on Gasoline

If you suspected that the Carter administration was lying about the reason for those infuriating lines at the gas pumps a few months back, you were right.

The official explanation, dished out by then-Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger Jr. and other Carter minions, was that the gas "shortage" was a result of disruption caused by the Iranian revolution and a subsequent drop in overall imports of about 2 million barrels of oil a day.

The truth, according to intelligence documents we've obtained, is this: not only was there no shortage, but the United States actually was importing more oil every month from January to July 1979 than it did in the same period of 1978. During the crucial first three months of this year, when the loss of Iranian supplies supposedly was making the gas lines inevitable, the United States was importing 250,000 barrels a day more than it had in the first quarter of 1978.

The facts which expose the administration's deceit are detailed in a secret CIA report in our possession. Coupled with an internal White House memo, the figures in the CIA report reveal that President Carter was playing politics with the frustrations of American motorists, trying to aim their wrath at foreign oil producers and away from Big Oil and the White House.

U.S. oil production in the first three months of this year was 150,000 barrels a day less than it was a year before, the CIA report shows. Domestic

oil production in the months before the gas lines averaged 8.55 million barrels a day, compared with 8.7 million barrels a day in the first quarter of 1978.

The 39-page CIA report, titled "International Energy Statistical Review" and dated Sept. 5, shows that world oil production in January, February and March was 60.2 million barrels a day, compared with the 59.9 million daily average for 1978. And in April and May, when Americans first began lining up for gasoline, world production had increased to 62 million barrels a day.

The CIA confirmed what was no secret: the Iranian revolution resulted in a dramatic drop in that country's oil production, from 5.2 million to 1.1 million barrels a day.

But that was more than made up by other oil-producing nations (with the notable exception of the United States). Saudi Arabia alone made up a huge chunk of the Iranian shortfall, increasing production from its 1978 daily average of 8 million barrels to 9.5 million.

Other nations that made their oil available to the United States were Mexico, Venezuela, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and even the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China. And American consumers eagerly bought it, to the tune of 6.5 million barrels of imported crude per day during the first quarter of 1979.

What consumers also bought was the Carter administration's myth that

the gas lines were all the fault of the greedy Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. An internal memo from the president's chief domestic adviser, Stuart E. Eizenstat, spelled out the political hay that could be made from the motorists' misery.

"We have a better opportunity than ever before," he wrote the president last June 28, "to shift the cause for inflation and energy problems to OPEC. . . . With strong steps we can mobilize the nation around a real crisis and with a clear enemy—OPEC."

If there had been a real crisis, such an administration ploy would be permissible political fun and games. But the CIA report shows there was no crisis, least of all one that could be blamed on OPEC.

"Eizenstat was taking deadly aim at all those dirty Arab so-and-soes in his memo, but they came to our aid," a congressional energy expert commented to our associate Dale Van Atta.

Another expert concluded, after being shown the CIA report: "There was no worldwide shortage and no shortage of imports. This is shocking, considering what Schlesinger was telling Congress at the time."

The real villains, it turns out, weren't the OPEC nations at all, but U.S. oil companies, which cut back production, and the Carter administration, which lied about it.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1979

On Capitol Hill

All 14 members of the House Intelligence Committee joined hands yesterday in introducing a broad-gauged bill that would make it a crime to disclose the names of CIA station chiefs or other U.S. intelligence operatives working overseas.

The stiffest penalties in the bill—10 years in prison and a \$50,000 fine—would be imposed on offenders, such as former CIA employees, who have had authorized access to classified information. Others, such as journalists, would face a year in prison and a \$5,000 fine if the government could show they intended "to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States."

Committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-Mass.) said he felt an overwhelming majority of Americans would agree that "unauthorized disclosure of the names of undercover intelligence agents is a pernicious act that serves no useful informing function whatsoever."

At the same time, he acknowledged that some provisions will be controversial. The bill, he pointed out, "could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources."

EXCERPT

—Richard L. Lyons
and George Lardner Jr.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS
6 October 1979

Bentsen Bill:

Preserving Agents' Cover

Sen. Lloyd Bentsen is trying to line up support for a bill that richly deserves it. The bill would crack down on former CIA employees who endanger the lives of CIA agents by revealing their identity.

We have seen such actions in the recent past, and they are despicable. Not only do they endanger the lives of the informer's ex-colleagues, but they undermine the intelligence networks that the free world desperately needs.

As Bentsen says, "these

reckless acts of renegade former employees are an attempt to prevent the United States from discovering information that, as the recent revelation of Soviet combat troops in Cuba demonstrates, can be vital to our national security."

Yet there is no law, at present, to punish such treachery. Bentsen's bill would hit the informer with up to 10 years' imprisonment. Considering the possible fatal consequences of the renegades' actions, that punishment is not unduly harsh.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
14 October 1979

MISSILE MAY LAUNCH DESERT BOOM TOWNS

Thousands of Workers Would Go
to Utah and Nevada to Build
Mobile Weapons System

CARSON CITY, Nev., Oct. 13 (AP)—Chaotic, boomtown growth looms on the desert horizon in Utah and Nevada as a result of plans for "man's largest project," the controversial MX missile system.

The boom resulting from the \$30 billion to \$60 billion project could mean as many as 125,000 to 150,000 new residents within a few years in an area that now has fewer than 60,000 citizens.

Ely, with 5,600 residents, is the biggest Nevada town in the area, and the largest Utah town is Cedar City, with about 15,000.

"Boom-and-bust" towns are nothing new to the arid region. Nevada mining camps literally sprouted overnight, turned into towns and then disappeared as gold and silver veins pinched out. But more than half a century has passed since the last "boomer."

With the MX, Nevada would get about two-thirds of the project's 4,600 missile silos. The one-third remaining would be situated in Utah. And 200 missiles would be kept somewhere within that silo network — a vast, underground system stretching west from south of Salt Lake City to near the Nevada-California border.

'Larger Than the Pyramids'

The magnitude of the project is described by a key Air Force supporter, Brig. Gen. Guy Hecker Jr., as "man's largest project, larger than the Great Wall, larger than the Pyramids, larger than the Alaska pipeline or the Panama Canal."

This would all be built in a 10,000-square-mile Great Basin region of hard, dry lake beds separated by craggy peaks or low, brown, tree-scarce mountain ranges.

From an airplane, one sees mile after mile of sand and rock, sagebrush, a sprinkling of aspen groves in mountains, and a rare spot of green where a farmer has found enough irrigation water. One can go for miles and miles and see only range cattle or wild horses.

The area seems so desolate that people, typically newcomers, make jokes about the "lunar" landscape. And many who love the seeming emptiness call themselves "desert rats."

State Senator Rick Blakemore, a Democrat in whose sprawling district nearly all of the Nevada MX installations would be situated, is worried about "what the human impact of the MX will be."

A Threat to Privacy

The Senator added: "Some people in my district tell me they moved here because they didn't want to be surrounded by a lot of other people. And they don't want the MX for that reason."

Mike Bourn, executive director of the White Pine County, Nev., Development Corporation, which has been trying to encourage development in the Ely area, thinks the explosive growth can be handled only with extensive Federal, state and local planning.

Money for schools and other services is a major concern, he says. He cites particular worry about police protection in Nevada, which is known for its glittering casinos and tolerates bordellos in some areas.

When citizens mention their fears, they talk of drastically increased crime, more pollution, water problems, cost-of-living increases and changes in the pace of life.

The water needs of the huge MX system would be so tremendous — an estimated 17,000 acre-feet yearly over a seven-year construction period — that United States Representative Jim Santini, Democrat of Nevada, has suggested new talks on tapping the big Columbia River system flowing through Idaho and Washington to the north.

Water From Under Dry Land

Mr. Santini said that more than 100 billion gallons would otherwise have to be pulled from beneath the nation's driest lands so that two million tons of cement could be mixed and for other water needs.

A University of Nevada professor, James Walker, who took part in a study of the impact of a proposed power plant that could be built at the same time as the MX systems, foresees "drastic" change.

"It's going to create a boomtown atmosphere," he said, and pointed to another source of worry for some. "They think they'll become the bull's-eye of the world."

Gov. Bob List of Nevada said that the big question about the project was "precisely what it would look like on the map."

The area closed off for the MX silos would total just 25 square miles. But security areas would involve several thousand square miles in Nevada alone, according to Congressional studies.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D-9NEW YORK TIMES
15 OCTOBER 1979Issue and Debate

Outlook on Deploying of the MX Mobile Missile

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 — In early September, President Carter made what many military and foreign policy officials believe was the most important decision affecting American strategic nuclear forces in a decade. He approved a Defense Department proposal to build a force of 200 mobile intercontinental missiles, known as the MX, that would be placed aboard a fleet of huge launcher vehicles designed to roam around the American Southwest.

The decision to endorse the Pentagon's \$33 billion plan was not an easy one, and White House aides acknowledge that, before Mr. Carter's action, the proposal for the mobile missile system had aroused an intense, year-long controversy within the Administration. Mr. Carter's primary aim in finally approving the MX, officials report, was to lessen the possibility that the Soviet Union, in the coming decade, could achieve the ability to destroy American land-based missiles in a "first-strike" nuclear attack.

However, it is clear that Mr. Carter's decision was also guided by a desire to win the support of Senate conservatives for the proposed strategic arms treaty with Moscow.

While the debate within the Administration over whether to proceed has come to an end, a wider controversy, involving the Congress and many non-Governmental experts on strategic issues, is only now getting under way. But pressures are building for Mr. Carter to reverse or modify his September decision.

Some critics of the MX contend that the Administration's plan for the missile is so costly and complex that it will never be built. Other opponents are worried that if the MX is deployed, it could undermine the stability of the American-Soviet nuclear balance. So far, the Administration has responded to these criticisms by stressing that it

is committed to moving ahead with its existing plan for the weapon.

The Background

In addition to long-range bombers and submarine-launched missiles, the United States, since the 1960's, has deployed a force of 1,054 land-based rockets in concrete underground silos. While the rockets have remained impervious to attack for 15 years, military analysts have continually worried that Moscow's deployment of highly accurate missiles could alter this. There is now a consensus in military circles that a new generation of missiles being introduced by the Soviet Union will give Moscow the ability to threaten American land-based missiles with destruction in the early 1980's.

In recent years, strategic experts have debated a number of alternatives for coping with the vulnerability of land-based missiles. Proponents of arms control suggest that the United States should abandon land-based rockets and place more reliance on bombers and strategic submarines. This course has been resisted, however, by the Air Force and by many Pentagon civilians who argue that American bombers and submarines could also become vulnerable at some point to Soviet attack.

Instead, the Air Force late last year asked Mr. Carter to approve a plan for protecting land-based missiles from a Soviet strike by shunting them among thousands of empty silos. The Air Force also urged the White House to authorize development of a new missile, the MX, that, for the first time, would give Washington the ability to threaten large numbers of Soviet land-based rockets.

In late May, Mr. Carter approved the Air Force's request for 200 MX missiles, each with 10 highly accurate warheads. But he objected to the idea of hiding the missiles among empty silos because he feared that it would complicate the monitoring of future arms control accords.

Finally, in September, Mr. Carter approved a modified approach to basing the missiles, known as the "race track." In this plan, each of the 200 new missiles would be hauled around separate circular roadways to be built in southern Nevada and Utah. In the event of a Soviet attack, the large vehicles carrying the missiles could be driven into any one of 23 concrete shelters on each roadway and launched. In this way, it is contended, Moscow would be able to count but not precisely locate each of the MX missiles.

For Revising Decision

Critics of the MX "race track" contend that the proposed system will be far too expensive and is unlikely to provide the degree of protection for American missiles desired by the Air Force. Some opponents also believe that construction of the missile roadways will pose serious environmental problems in the Southwest.

For example, Sidney Dreil, a Stanford University scientist who has advised several administrations on strategic matters, recently called the Air Force's proposed basing system a "Rube Goldberg scheme." At a meeting of the Arms Control Association, a private, prodismament group in Washington, Mr. Dreil argued that Moscow could threaten the MX in the coming decade by simply adding warheads to existing missiles so that it could attack every shelter around each MX "race track."

Rather than deploying the "race track," Mr. Dreil and several other experts have suggested that MX missile be put on a new generation of small submarines that would patrol in waters off the country's East and West Coasts. Unlike the Navy's existing, long-range missile submarines, the coastal vessels would not be nuclear-powered and, according to Mr. Dreil, they would be cheaper and cause less environmental disruption than the land-based "race track."

Another alternative would be for the United States to protect its existing force of land-based rockets by deploying anti-ballistic-missiles weapons, or ABM's. Although Moscow and Washington in 1972 agreed to severe limits on antimissile weapons, Steven P. Rosen, a researcher at Harvard University, has said that the treaty should be amended to allow both parties to defend their existing rocket forces with ABM's.

A third group of critics is not opposed to the "race track" basing design, but believes that the missile itself is much too lethal. These experts argue that by giving the United States the ability to destroy Soviet missiles, Moscow would be inevitably led to build a mobile system of its own, a step that would pose grave obstacles for Washington in verifying new arms agreements.

Against Revising Decision

Proponents of the Administration's "race track" proposal maintain that it is superior in almost every respect to the alternatives suggested by outside experts. Noting that the "race track" would be deployed in remote and sparsely populated areas of Utah and Nevada, Pentagon aides contend that a new fleet of coastal submarines would be far more damaging to the environment.

MX advocates argue that a new fleet would also be more vulnerable than the "race track." They contend that communications with the submarines could be disrupted and that Moscow, by detonating nuclear explosions in coastal waters, could destroy most small missile boats.

While many Pentagon aides favor a revival of the country's antimissile program, most believe that this is not politically feasible in the near future. Deploying ABM's to defend land-based missiles would require new negotiations with Moscow and this step, defense aides indicate, would probably be resisted by the Soviet Government as well as arm control advocates in the American Government.

MX proponents concede that less costly and elaborate schemes exist for basing a mobile missile than the "race track." But they insist that all of these alternatives would create verification difficulties for arms control. By spending extra money to insure that Moscow would be able to count American missiles, it is suggested that Washington is setting an example that the Soviet Union might follow if and when it decides to deploy a mobile rocket of its own.

The Outlook

Although the Administration is asking Congress this year for more than \$1 billion to begin work on the MX, the first of the 200 missiles would not be deployed until 1986. Thus, there is plenty of time for the MX decision to be thoroughly examined and perhaps altered.

However, the Administration is unlikely to review its plans for the MX in the near future. Mr. Carter urgently needs the support of conservatives on Capitol Hill for the arms treaty with Moscow and many promilitary senators are skeptical of Mr. Carter's commitment to proceeding with the MX. As a result, any sign that the Administration was reassessing its MX decision would be viewed by suspicious senators as a move to cancel the project.

In the longer term, several developments could lead Mr. Carter or a new President to reverse the MX decision. Technical problems in building the system would lead to excess costs that, in turn, could prompt Congress to cancel the weapon. Alternatively, Moscow, in future arms talks, might agree to limit its ability to threaten existing American missiles, making the MX program unnecessary.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
14 October 1979

Helms of the CIA: Invisible man

The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. By Thomas Powers. 393 pages. Knopf. \$12.95.

The writer on intelligence affairs faces many of the same difficulties as the intelligence officer. The information he receives may be wrong or incomplete or self-serving. Even if every bit of it is accurate, he may still be lacking that final piece: the last fact, that could change the picture's focus and meaning. Worse, he may not know there is anything missing at all.

Thomas Powers, in his introduction to this solid, insightful study of the Central Intelligence Agency and the man who headed it for seven crucial years, admits encountering a "chronic incompleteness" as he attempted to piece together his account of the CIA's activities over the years. In a fascinating passage describing the personality types who inhabit the shadowy world of espionage — types who are not of a piece, as might be imagined by an outsider, but who are often professionally and personally cool or even hostile to one another and whose clashes have shaped much of the CIA's history — Powers consciously or unconsciously gives an echo of his own difficulties in writing about them. Here is his distinction between the spy and the analyst:

"Whereas spies are obsessed with the missing pieces, the analysts are devoted to patterns. The spy (and the counterintelligence specialist, whose mentality is that of the spy cubed) is haunted by the possibility he has been denied the one clue which explains all. The analyst is convinced the pattern will always jump the gap."

While researching his book, Powers no doubt shared the spy's obsession with missing pieces; as a writer he certainly

was compelled to adopt the analyst's faith in patterns in order to synthesize what he had been able to learn. (There's no reason to think he found any occasion to identify with the third basic type he identifies, whom he calls the adventurers. Embodied by Allen W. Dulles, the only man who served longer than Helms as CIA director, the adventurers dominated the agency's early years. Their spirit was "aggressive, enthusiastic, and too often morally careless," Powers writes. "The adventurers thought of the world as being infinitely plastic; they thought they could do anything with funds and a broad okay from the top.")

Ultimately, of course, it is the analyst's role the writer must fall back on. His judgment and instincts must in the end fill in for the missing puzzle pieces, just as the reader has only his judgment and instincts to assess the writer's.

An example is the continuing question of who authorized CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. The record as established by Senate investigators and by his own researches, contains no documentary evidence to prove that the attempts were ordered by the Kennedy administration. Yet Powers, properly making an informed guess that would have been inappropriate for an official inquiry, speculates convincingly that the attempts would not have been made without presidential sanction.

Powers's researches were, of course, helped immeasurably by the flood of CIA secrets that has been released in recent years. The Senate report is only one book on a shelf that now includes several by disaffected CIA officers such as Victor Marchetti, Philip Agee, Frank Snepp and John Stockwell. The disclosures of recent years have given a far clearer picture than was ever available before of the agency's activities and methods.

The exposures help the investigator not only by their own mass of detail, but also because they prompted many loyalists to reveal additional facts that might better explain and justify agency actions. Helms and other past and present CIA officials obviously discussed matters rather candidly with Powers that they would never have spoken of if their adversaries hadn't done so first.

Indeed, Powers accumulated so much detail it occasionally overwhelms his ability to organize it. On the whole, though, the story is well told. Written with balance and with fairness, it may be the best single history of the CIA to appear so far. Powers is particularly good at explaining the attitudes and reasoning processes involved in the intelligence business; the passage quoted above on the differences between the spy and the analyst is one example, and there are many others.

The author's attempt to portray Helms, the first career CIA officer to rise to direct the agency and the man who bore the brunt of disillusioned criticism when the 1970s revealed past excesses, is less successful. Helms slides in and out of focus, never coming quite clear as a personality — though this isn't entirely the author's fault; clearly, a lot of people who knew Helms much better than Powers did couldn't make him out, either. What does emerge with some clarity — and not without some surprises for the reader — is a picture of Helms's beliefs and values.

Not only as director but throughout his career, Helms was the "pure" intelligence officer. He was on the other side from the flamboyant political operators, Powers reports, not because of any moral scruples but because he believed anything that made the agency visible would undermine its chief purpose: collecting other nations' secrets and protecting its own. It's ironic,

in a sense, that he stood in the target circle when critics zeroed in on agency excesses.

But in another sense Helms was a proper target. He symbolized not an intelligence agency out of control, but political leadership that had slipped off the moral rails. For Helms did the bidding of his political superiors even when it ran contrary to his own judgments on what would be in the agency's or the nation's interests. Helms remained convinced, even when he himself was faced a charge of perjury before a Senate committee (he finally pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of failing to testify "fully and completely"), that he had behaved properly and honorably throughout. Powers demonstrates persuasively, though not without sympathy for Helms, that the real issue of his career was political misuse of the CIA — misuse which Helms not only did not prevent, but did not even try to resist.

ARNOLD R. ISAACS

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
7 October 1979

To Helms, nothing hurt —if it remained secret

THE MAN WHO KEPT SECRETS: Richard Helms and the CIA. By Thomas Powers. Knopf. \$12.95.

By Daniel Schorr

"THEY do not tell anecdotes about Helms; there aren't any...."

"Helms said nothing at all (during a CIA post-mortem on a disastrous covert operation against Sukarno in Indonesia), just nodded his head...."

Helms "said nothing (when the National Security Council met, on President Eisenhower's instructions, to plan the overthrow of Fidel Castro) but ... listened carefully, often inspecting his carefully manicured fingernails...."

Helms was sometimes observed, while presiding over the U.S. Intelligence Board, discussing developments in the Communist world, "staring dreamily into space...."

WHO, AND WHAT, is Richard Helms, who tiptoed so lightly through 30 years of the CIA's history, yet left such heavy footprints that he was banished to Iran by President Nixon, became the prime target of congressional investigation of his agency's misdeeds, and eventually had to plead-bargain his way out of a perjury investigation?

The question is raised but never fully answered in this diligent but inconclusive biography of one of the most elusive Americans of modern times. Thomas Powers talked to every willing witness who had dealt with Richard Helms, but they didn't know much about him, either. In the end, "the man who kept secrets"—from the public, from Presidents, from Congress—succeeded in keeping his secret from his biographer.

Powers' arduous effort to pierce the veil of ambiguity and disingenuousness that surrounds his subject is fascinating. A good circumstantial case is advanced that, unlike his reputation, Helms was more a master bureaucrat than master spy—cautious, plodding, attentive to administrative detail, protecting his agency's and his own flank.

Helms emerges from these generally sympathetic pages as a product of his time and the secret institution he served. Thus, he worked on high-risk covert operations when ordered to, but tried to put brakes on them. Under White House and Pentagon pressures, he tampered with intelligence reports on Vietnam to meet political requirements. In disputes

between his subordinates, he ducked making decisions. His own principle seemed to be serving his masters and avoiding collisions with higher authority.

And—oh, yes—making sure that everything stayed secret, for nothing was harmful as long as it remained unknown. If there was a Helms mystique, it was that what remained hidden did not exist. To keep his secrets, Helms would dissimulate or, if necessary, lie under oath. Once secret-keeping became a way of life, it was easy.

BUT HOW, THEN, can one rely on anything written about Helms—even the extent of his cooperation in this biography? For example, Powers writes that the former CIA chief "surrendered four long mornings" to be interviewed. But when I asked Helms about it, he scoffed that he had spent little time with the writer, had talked to him only to make technical corrections, and had given him no information of substance.

Indeed, the internal evidence of the book is that most of Helms' personal contributions took the form of denials and repudiations—just as with more official interrogators. The only direct quotation of any substance from Helms is his disavowal of the suggestion in John Ehrlichman's roman a clef, "The Company," that the former CIA chief blackmailed Nixon into suppressing evidence of his complicity in an assassination by threatening to expose Watergate.

"I never blackmailed Nixon in any form, manner or kind," Helms is quoted, "And I'd like that to be very clear. And nobody can prove anything to the contrary because nothing to the contrary ever happened."

The vehemence of the disclaimer reminds one of how emphatically—and how narrowly—Helms denied, in 1975, that the CIA had been "responsible" for assassinating any foreign leader. It turned out, in the report of a Senate committee, that the CIA had been directly involved in several abortive plots, and indirectly involved in seven real assassinations, even if not specifically "responsible" for a successful murder.

BUT LACKING congressional subpoena power, Powers is left to surmise what really happened between Nixon and Helms—that, perhaps, "Ehrlichman only embellished on the fears of Nixon, who felt so threatened by what Helms knew that he assumed a threat where no threat was made."

Well, perhaps, but who knows? One puts down this book—filled out with an excellent, if not always pertinent history of the CIA and its transgressions—with a deeper understanding of what makes Helms a riddle, but not with the answer to

Daniel Schorr broke the news about CIA involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders when he was a CBS correspondent in 1975, and a year later handed a secret House intelligence committee report on the CIA to the Village Voice. He is now a National Public Radio commentator.

CONTINUED

Powers writes that "war corrupts, and secret war corrupts secretly." He might add, "And secrecy itself ultimately corrupts." For I suspect that Richard Helms could not tell the truth about himself if he wanted to.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 118NEWSWEEK
22 OCTOBER 1979**THE MAN WHO
KNEW TOO MUCH**

THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS. By Thomas Powers. 393 pages. Knopf. \$12.95.

Graham Greene can relax. This history of master spy Richard Helms by a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist is not one of those works of fact that rival cloak-and-dagger fiction. Rather, it is an intelligent collection of mostly well-told tales about the CIA—its cold-war origins, oddball personalities, plots against Castro, connections with Watergate—culled from: private interviews, public records (the Rockefeller Commission, a special Senate committee, the Pentagon papers) and previously published works about intelligence and Watergate by more than 80 authors. Instead of derring-do or dramatic deductions, Powers provides the bureaucratic background—or at least as much, he acknowledges, as those who know are willing to tell.

ILL FIT: Helms is not an easy subject. The man who kept the CIA's secrets under Congressional questioning—and pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges as a result—remains a mystery himself. Powers says that Helms was always dubious about the value of covert operations and secret fiddling, yet the record shows his name connected with just about every controversial CIA project that has come to light—

secret drug-testing, mail-opening, at least one plot against Castro, political interference in Chile and help for Richard Nixon's White House plumbers. The urbane Helms also enjoyed the loyalty and respect of many colleagues and a Who's Who of influential men about Washington. But most of the personal details that Powers produces make him seem curiously ill fit for sensitive intelligence work—slow to reach hard decisions, quick to compromise with powerful opponents, a passer-on of other people's papers and a promoter of incompetents. Perhaps this is the kind of man who succeeds in a modern intelligence establishment—or perhaps there is still more to Helms than we know.

Few anecdotes about the man exist, another serious problem for the author, and those that do add little to Helms's image. After Lyndon Johnson promoted Helms to deputy director in 1965 (making him the first career CIA officer to rise that high), he invited him to a dinner at the LBJ ranch; at the table, Sen. Eugene McCarthy twitted

the twenty-year veteran of intelligence work. Did he know the wine being served? Helms did not. The sauce on the dishes? Sorry. The flower in the centerpiece? No, again. "McCarthy nodded in a knowing manner, and remarked that James Bond would have done better."

BORED: More seriously, Powers suggests, Helms as CIA director was not precisely suited to those high councils where intelligence intersects with national policy. Says Powers, "He knew all there was to know about operating a secret intelligence agency, but he was bored by arguments over precedence in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, or the exact characteristics of some new Soviet missile. Participants in meetings of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) would sometimes notice Helms, USIB's chairman, staring dreamily off into space... His relative lack of interest made him vulnerable at the National Security Council."

Powers did talk with Helms—and this version of his career will probably have to stand until Helms writes his own. For one thing, Helms furiously denies the notion (put about in a novel by Nixon aide John Ehrlichman) that he blackmailed Richard Nixon into making him U.S. ambassador to Iran. But Powers speculates that Nixon, typically, might have presumed such a threat and discussed it with Ehrlichman. Powers also dismisses the suggestion that the CIA itself hatched the Watergate plot to topple Nixon, and he concludes that the agency's comic-opera campaign to assassinate Castro was carried out under orders from John and Robert Kennedy. If Helms had ever attributed the Castro plot to the Kennedys, Powers writes, "he not only would have been the target of some extremely caustic comment, but from that day forward he would have lunched alone."

Once the CIA's dirtiest secrets—its so-called "Family Jewels"—were out, Powers says, Helms felt isolated and confused. Why was he suddenly being blamed for practices accepted for a generation by the powerful few who knew about them? He despised the new CIA director, William Colby, for spilling so much in hopes of restoring the agency's credibility, and he thought Frank Church and some other senators on the CIA's trail were showboating hypocrites. Surely, Helms believed, the senators knew the need for dark deeds, the pressure for them from the highest levels of government—and the need to keep things secret.

CURTAIN OF ILLUSION: In the end, Powers concludes, Helms kept the CIA's secrets to protect himself, salvage what he could of public trust in the CIA and maintain that curtain of illusion essential to intelligence operations. But the times had changed enough so that Helms could not go unpunished; he eventually was fined \$2,000 and sentenced to two years in jail (suspended). Powers sees a proper public revulsion at the "callous, reckless and offhand" use to

which the CIA has been put in the past. But he has the sophistication to wonder whether—after all the shouting, charter-rewriting and Congressional watchdogging is done—things will ever be very different.

DAVID M. ALPERN

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 84NEW YORK MAGAZINE
22 October 1979Books/Taylor Branch
**THE STEALTH
OF NATIONS**

“... Powers brilliantly understands the CIA on its own terms, but he ducks the chance to question its need for secrecy...”

The Man Who Kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA, by
Thomas Powers. Knopf, \$12.95.

Snarled myths are the lure of the spy world, so it is no wonder that a thorough investigator like Thomas Powers finds himself addressing a fundamental question: If a tree falls in the forest without a witness, is there any sound? “The CIA would say no,” writes Powers. “If you can hide the evidence and keep the secrets, then you can write the history. If no one knows we tried to kill Castro, then we didn’t do it.”

Acting on this premise, the CIA has played with our history since World War II. Chroniclers of the Cuban missile crisis, unaware that CIA operatives were trying to kill Castro before, during, and after the emplacement of the Russian missiles, passed their ignorance along to the public, creating what Powers calls “a child’s history.” This is one of his most penetrating themes, and he is well aware of its ironies—how Americans, so historically aware of themselves as “the last, best hope of mankind,” seem to be losing their sense of historical destiny just as they are discovering an ugly subterranean level in their own past.

Powers’s book reads like the first draft of a major work in the new field of secret history. The scope is staggering. Powers has to create the CIA, outline its growth in the national-security apparatus, sketch the CIA leaders and detail their rivalries, and then take us over the vast territory from the Marshall Plan to Watergate. Nothing winds up quite as it seemed before. The author evaluates the secret element with skill (though I do think some CIA racism sneaks into his breezy account of the 1964 events in the Congo). His characters are not yet as vivid as the ones in Nixon’s tapes or Shakespeare’s tragedies, but Powers does elevate the child’s history to at least college level.

Having done all this in one volume is a remarkable achievement that

Taylor Branch, a former Washington columnist of Esquire and Harper’s, is at work on a novel.



would have satisfied most writers, but Powers is an ambitious man. He intertwines his biography of the CIA with one of Richard Helms, its former boss and personification. This literary device might have succeeded in rendering the institutional tale more human, but Powers only keeps telling us that Helms is taciturn, official, and removed—the complete bureaucrat. With all his diligence, Powers has failed to unearth a single significant anecdote about Helms, nothing with a heartbeat. The title of the book is apt: Helms kept the secrets from Powers as well.

Although Powers lays out the record of Helms’s unsavory deeds, he offsets this by disfavoring his rivals, such as William Colby and Lyman Kirkpatrick, and by favoring his allies, such as James Angleton. He pronounces that Colby “junked counterintelligence” by firing Angleton, which is like saying that the Mets could have “junked baseball” by telling Willie Mays he couldn’t play anymore. Helms benefits from a rather artificial distinction between the headstrong “bad” CIA leaders, like Allen Dulles, and the “good” ones, like Helms, who prefer “quieter forms of coercion.” This distinction allows Powers to claim that Helms was “skeptical” of every CIA idea that led to scandal, though he was complicitous in most and downright opposed to none.

In the end, Powers ascribes a certain nobility to Helms’s steadfast devotion to secrecy itself, to secrecy “from inception to eternity.” Although there is

no major episode in his book to make anyone, hawk or dove, thankful for this kind of secrecy, Powers resigns himself to the need for it, and thus for people like Helms.

Far less sure of the CIA in principle than in factual description, Powers falls back on spy clichés: that an intelligence service is “as close to a nation’s vitals as a vault is to a bank’s” and “like a missile system controlled by a single button.” He justifies the CIA with the old saw that “a President needed more choices than the dispatch of a white paper or the Marines.” This last is sloppy, for it implies that a president would have no such choices without the CIA, when in fact he has hundreds. It also implies that the choices lie in one graded continuum of response, when the CIA option is different in kind because of its inherent secrecy. When the question of “national security” intrudes, we wind up being urged to support the president blindly. Powers expresses this royalist way of thinking in appropriate banalities: “The President is the sun in the CIA’s solar system . . . the Central Intelligence Agency and its director serve the President alone.” The president is “the one man entitled to an honest answer.”

Elsewhere Powers is the tough old *Rolling Stone* CIA critic laboring brilliantly and successfully to understand the CIA on its own terms. But clichés and fatalism substitute for argument over such fundamental issues as how much secrecy is actually required for the safety of the nation and to what extent secrecy corrupts the precarious democratic process by which citizens are supposed to check the selfish interests of those in government. He concludes that the CIA is “one of the fatal facts of modern life, like taxes, prisons, and armies,” and he seems resigned to the fact that no one of significance is even questioning the need for a huge bureaucracy built on Helms’s secrecy. Powers, apparently still in conflict, ducks the opportunity to be the first such person. Having detested the child’s history enough to devote years to its revision, he leaves us no choice but to remain children.

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14 October 1979

An American Spy Story

THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS

Richard Helms and the CIA.

By Thomas Powers.

393 pp. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. \$12.95.

By JOHN le CARRE

RICHARD HELMS gave the best 30 years of his life to the spy business. He joined the Central Intelligence Agency's precursor, the Office of Strategic Services, in 1943 during World War II. He attended the C.I.A.'s birth in 1947, became chief of operations of its clandestine arm in 1952, and finally head boy in 1968, at the age of 53 its first in-house director. As Thomas Powers rightly says, nobody else's career, not even that of Allen Dulles or William Colby, offers us quite such "an ideal pathway through the secret history of the last 30 years."

As chief of operations in the mid-1950's Helms oversaw the running of spies out of Berlin at the height of the cold war, controlled "networks" in the Soviet Union (such as they were, and they were very, very few). He ran the agency's spies in the Congo, he survived the shooting-down of the U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960 and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. He presided over the C.I.A.'s massive involvement in Vietnam, the secret war in Laos and the notorious Phoenix pacification program. When the agency came

under attack for its activities in Southeast Asia, Chile and the United States, Helms answered for it before Congressional committees. He weathered revelations of the agency's covert financing of the National Student Association, cultural magazines, labor unions and church groups.

His very durability, if nothing else, is impressive. Lyndon Johnson appointed him, Richard Nixon dismissed him in 1973 but gave him the United States ambassadorship to Iran. In the four years he held it, he made 16 trips to Washington, on 13 of them testifying before official bodies of investigation. In all, he testified on more than 30 occasions, for a total of more than a hundred hours. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found Helms's name on papers covering just about every project in which it took an interest. When a human guinea pig in the C.I.A. drug-testing program killed himself, Helms was at the heart of the cover-up. He knew about the plot to kill Patrice Lumumba, he was officially responsible for at least one aspect of the attempt to get the Mafia to kill Fidel Castro. He accommodated the White House plumbers when they needed spook equipment for E. Howard Hunt. It took the last snares of Watergate to bring him down. In December 1977 he pleaded no contest to a charge of lying to the Senate about the C.I.A.'s opera-

tions against Chile's Salvador Allende in 1970. He got a two-year jail sentence (suspended) and a \$2,000 fine, which his former associates paid for him.

According to where you stand, Helms is a hero, a victim, a monster of the secret state, or a nice American guy doing a decent job for his country and getting kicked in the pants for it. Mr. Powers has the wit to stand nowhere, and in consequence has given us a splendid spy story, the best I have read for a long time, and all the better for being nonfiction. He tells us as much about the Presidency as he does about the C.I.A., and he leaves me scared stiff of both. An English novelist is not at first glance the natural animal to appraise his work, but on the other hand what Mr. Powers offers us is so admirably restrained that it positively cries out for the wayward attentions of the fiction writer.

We British stand in awe before such American acts of self-exposure. If Mr. Powers and his subject had been English, and he had written with the same frankness about our secret service, naming names and operations and even foreign agents, neither he nor his book would have seen the light of day for a very long time indeed. His trial would have been held largely in camera, he need not even have been fully advised of the grounds for the charges against him, and God help the press if they tried to beat the court's restrictions on reporting. For company, in the long years to follow, Mr. Powers would have had the English equivalents of Messrs. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, Philip Agee, Frank Snepp, et al., and almost anyone else who had dared to blow the whistle on Whitehall's very large intelligence machine. Within the

United States intelligence community, this British state of affairs is regarded with naked envy. Only Britain's most radical journals call seriously for public accountability of our intelligence agencies, and not even they would suggest that our secret servants should be hauled bound and shorn before some hastily assembled Parliamentary kangaroo court in order to receive the flail of an uneasy public conscience. Our only nonfiction spy literature of any note is a grudging trickle of revelations from the 1939-45 war, much of it the "Man Called Intrepid" sort, laughed out of court by serious historians. So it's not surprising if we British should contemplate your political revelations as if they were our own. "If this is you without your make-up," we ask ourselves, dry-mouthed, "what on earth do we look like without ours?"

Richard Helms had very little experience of the world before he set out to put it right, but what he had was in retrospect spectacular. Unlike most C.I.A. men of the early days, who smelled quite as richly of class privilege as their British counterparts, he was neither moon-eyed nor high-born. He graduated not from Harvard, Princeton or Yale, but from Williams College and was voted the man in his class most likely to succeed. The year was 1935. His ambitions were journalistic and he became a wireman with United Press in Berlin. We may say, then, that he was ferreting out information from the start. With a bunch of other journalists, he interviewed Hitler and underestimated him as a menace, which hardly distinguishes him from older and wiser colleagues. Ambition counseled him to give up U.P. for a desk job with The Indianapolis Times, but in December 1941, when the United States entered the war, he joined the Navy, was commissioned and, after a spell in the Operations Department in New York plotting Ger-

John le Carré is the author of "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold," "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy," "The Honourable Schoolboy" and other novels. His new novel, "Smiley's People," will be published in January.

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man submarine activity, he was recruited by his old Berlin bureau chief to the newly formed O.S.S. He hesitated, not sure whether the horse was strong enough to carry him to the top, which is where he wanted to be. When he accepted, Richard Helms effectively said goodbye to the overt world for the rest of his active life.

Mr. Powers makes much of Helms's early commitment to secrecy. Helms, whatever he became later, was an intelligence man pure and simple, committed to the need not to declare, to the need to put things back in their right place when you've read them. For Helms, says Mr. Powers, secrecy was not just second nature, it was his element, the very basis of his personality. Yet secrecy is not a constant. It has many forms, many reasons, and many effects upon the practitioner. What did it mean to Helms? Secrecy can isolate, it can unite. It can unite particularly those who despise the charade and puff of politics, which secret servants almost invariably do. For the inadequate it is a source of superiority; for the lonely, of kinship with a magic circle of fellow insiders; for the vain it is a means of impressing; and for the voluptuaries, a thing to be shared, no fun without a partner, and the agency, as Mr. Powers describes it, had its share of them. Within a secret department, secrecy is also money: Helms never strayed too far from advancement's path.

The young Helms seems to have entered the state of secrecy like a novice taking vows of chastity. He embraced it as a noble vocation that suited both the mood of the times and his own; it was renunciation and acceptance both at once. We should try to understand this when such timid night-animals of espionage are dragged from their chosen obscurity and made to stand up and account for themselves under the glare of television lights, almost for the public sport. Exposure violates them exceptionally, it is a breach of the contract they have made with themselves and with society. An outsider can hardly appreciate their private rage. One who can, however, is Daniel Schorr, the television reporter who on April 28, 1975 received the full blast of Helms's pent-up spleen in a stream of obscenities delivered into his face while they stood directly outside the Vice President's office. Helms,

"suffused with livid anger," called Schorr a killer for his part in publicizing the C.I.A.'s efforts to assassinate foreign leaders. To this day, Helms apparently remains unrepentant, and quite unconscious of the irony.

Helms's first experience of intelligence work, therefore, was acquired in the war against Hitler, where the enemy was clear and terrible, the aim his unconditional surrender, and where any method, however lawless and extreme, was justified by its results. Not necessarily, then, the ideal education for a "peacetime" intelligence officer. It was a time also when the occupied countries of Europe had to be shored up by the American liberator, when intervention was greeted with open arms by the oppressed. Later in his life, Helms would look in vain for such enthusiasm on the part of "liberated" countries. Helms was also a natural part of that seamless transition from the war against Hitler to the war against Stalin. Indeed, in Mr. Powers's account, there seemed scarcely to be a change at all, since the O.S.S. (those of it who were not left-wing sympathizers) was often as busy outflanking the Communists as rallying resistance against the Germans.

With the postwar expansion of the C.I.A. (bitterly opposed by J. Edgar Hoover) Helms was in on the ground floor of one of those companies-with-a-future he had always been looking for. Anti-Communism was Washington's boom industry; it could only grow. History did the rest. We see Helms at this stage nurturing his reputation quietly — central to everything but seldom leading, unspectacular but sound, intent upon his own career, yet suffering his setbacks with apparent fortitude. His enemies — though the "good soldier" would surely deny he had them — were fittingly characterized by the qualities he lacked. One of these was the dashing Richard Bissell, whom Helms called "wonder boy." An anarchic administrator with no use for Helms's abilities as a staff officer, Bissell masterminded the U-2 program and — with the Bay of Pigs invasion — his own professional destruction. Helms, the intelligence man, skeptical of covert action, calmly watched Bissell's rocket as it rose, wavered and plummeted into the Cuban night. He disapproved of the whole messy operation, but as a loyal officer

he gave it his support. When it aborted, he got Bissell's job, managing exactly those covert operations which he by temperament so disliked. In the chagrined atmosphere of the Bay of Pigs post-mortem, everybody seems to have told John McCone, the new director, that Richard Helms, the high priest of the quieter way, was the man most likely to succeed.

Yet as Helms himself drew nearer and nearer to the Presidential sun, the wax on his own wings began to get distinctly tacky. What the Kennedys had wanted from the Bay of Pigs they wanted even more after it had failed: "Get rid of Castro." What was Camelot if it couldn't swat a few Hispanic flies in its own backyard? Of all forms of covert action, assassination is the most extreme, and as such Helms claims to have distrusted it the most. Not on moral grounds, of course — he speaks with contempt of avoiding "the soggy mass of morality" — but on the plain professional grounds that it doesn't work, it's insecure, it's a blind date with the future. I confess there are two intelligence jobs I definitely would not wish to take on. The first is calculating the political consequences of assassination; the second is looking after a successful assassin once he's done his job. Will guilt set in? Will he be assailed with an overwhelming desire to confess? Or will he simply content himself with blackmailing his masters? Assassinating the assassin gets you nowhere. You just start all over again.

Helms might see this clearly, believe it passionately, persuade others. He might even know, deep down, that covert action was all too often a brute substitute for intelligence failure. But as his time of power approached, he learned to recognize that he must cut the agency's cloth according to the idiosyncrasies, impatience and egregious self-interest of every President he served. If that meant riding roughshod over his own purist professional instincts, he would do it. How he did it, why, and the price he paid, are the subject of this book.

Helms was a loyal servant, better than many in that trade, I suspect, with loyalty galore to invest if only he could earn it back with interest. He could probably have run a legitimate intelligence service as well as

anyone, but the service he took over had for too long embraced a whole bunch of activities that had nothing to do with the intricate business of collecting and distributing accurate secret intelligence, and frequently ran counter to it. Under the chaotic pressures of political Washington, Helms had to run wars, hunt out domestic "Communists" and play court procurer for Presidential dirty tricks. It is no coincidence that several of the C.I.A.'s crudest "covert" operations occurred in areas where it was bereft of good intelligence sources, for instance Cuba and Vietnam. In the Washington of Mr. Powers's book, if you can't deliver the intelligence, then you'd better deliver the action, because the barons are not going to stand around. It is not Helms's fault that he had to write his own charter or, in effect, determine what controls and what pecking order he would accept. He was too keen to survive, too impressed by power, too willing to abandon the professionalism that had won him his job. Yet any man so determined upon serving, as Helms was, will be prey to cruel human limitations. It would have taken a different and probably a worse director than he to survive the outrageous pressures of living in a state of day-to-day hysteria with the Presidential circle, and the only decent interpretation of William Colby's indecent rush to Tell All is that he was trying to say just this to Washington and the world at large.

The kiss-off, as they say on Madison Avenue, is at least funny. After his four years in Iran, Helms returned to Washington to set up a one-man consulting firm for Iranians wishing to trade in the United States. It did not flourish. The Iranian revolution took him completely by surprise.

Thomas Powers is a former Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for United Press International and the author of "Diana: The Making of a Terrorist" and "The War at Home." He is not in the wrecking business. He tells us much of what Helms did. He tells us almost nothing of his affections, beyond his keen sense of loyalty to the agency. He gives us a patriotic bureaucrat, and a man of determined plainness, who loved his service and his country and preferred to obey "one President at a time" rather than puzzle over the fine

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print of the Constitution. Helms's virtues — their willed simplicity — he suggests were the cause of his downfall.

Yet the author's loyalty to Helms also disturbs him: there are nagging "buts" and "I wonder's." I mean no disrespect to Mr. Powers's achievement when I say that his quarry eludes his ultimate definition. Indeed this is half the fascination of the book, as Mr. Powers probably knows. His Helms remains to the last page a blank face moving through a crowded room. It is left to each reader to chalk in the features.

Do we like Helms? Well, almost. Does Mr. Powers? Yes, but. Would Helms care whether we liked him or not? Funnily enough, yes, I think he would, for there is a touching inadequacy about him that Mr. Powers documents almost incidentally: such as a mysterious servility, which Nixon cruelly played on, and which amounts at times to a deliberate self-effacement unbecoming in the head of a vast service, a ducking of personal responsibility. ("We are the executive not the legislative," Helms liked to plead. Alas, too often the agency was both.) Such as a fatal habit of "letting things ride" against his own better judgment. Such as a prickly incapacity to handle men of colorful persuasiveness, like Bissell. Such as a strain of self-pity, most in evidence when he appeared before his inquisitors in the investigative committees.

For here is yet another level in this many-layered book: as Mr. Powers tugs gently at the mask, he reveals not so much mystery as banality in depth, and the familiar expression of an injured subordinate who insists that he was only doing his duty: "If you wanted to survive, you learned to understand that you did what you were told when you didn't understand." That argument got nobody anywhere at Nuremberg, except to the gallows, and Richard Helms should have known better than to use it in the most democratic nation on earth. Nor, however much he may like to believe it — however much he acted it — was Helms a subordinate. He was Field Marshal of the whole huge secret army, and if he didn't understand his orders, who could? Run the C.I.A. for Richard Nixon and still insist you're Everyman, and you are definitely riding for a fall.

At which point, state my own interests, or lack of them, in the question of the C.I.A.'s present dismal plight — highlighted, even as I write, by its apparent failure to identify a unit of Soviet troops who have been living unnoticed for several years 90 miles from the American mainland. There is a plethora of books around just now that either knock the agency or defend it, and like Mr. Powers I am repeatedly asked which side I am on. Curiously enough, I find myself closest to the view that Helms in his younger days represented within his own house, if to precious little effect. Namely, that sound and accurate intelligence-gathering is a crucial activity of any modern government, and that this is what the C.I.A. should be getting on with.

Three fatal ills have brought the C.I.A. to its knees; four, if you take gross overmanning as a malady in itself. Any one of them would have been enough to do the trick. The first is its disgraceful history of ill-considered, mismanaged "covert" intervention, often in areas where American interests were scarcely involved, where there was no independent information available to the Administration, and always on a scale so subtle that it could not be hidden even if it was denied: Tibet, Angola, the Congo, Indonesia, Guatemala, Chile, Laos, Vietnam, to name a few. Quite apart from the agency's reputation, such adventures have done more to discredit the Western cause than they have ever done to advance it. Lord knows what riches the United States might now be harvesting if the C.I.A. had put the same effort into supporting third-world economies that it put into destabilizing them.

The second fatal ill is the agency's preposterous position in the Washington hierarchy, which makes sane control of its operations impossible so long as it remains within the private duchy of the President and at the mercy of every fashionable wind that blows through town. But let me once more put on my British hat. The British Secret Service is at least a service. Its customers are the Crown's Ministries, who say what intelligence they need; the Secret Service then does its best to bring it in for them. It is accountable to ministers, who are therefore in equal measure themselves accountable for its good behavior and for the sensible use of its facilities. Constitu-

tionally, it is incorporated as an additional resource available in the last resort for the unofficial pursuit of government policy, but principally for collecting secret intelligence. In practice, therefore, its targets are determined for it by mixed committees of the armed forces, the civil service and selected Parliamentary representatives, and any private adventuring would incur the righteous wrath of its masters, whose striped posteriors are held firmly to the line by cabinet.

Yet the C.I.A. to this day poses like a drawerful of unaccountable money in the Presidential desk, a constant temptation and, by its very scale and secret lure, crying out to be deployed. It can undertake operations in defiance of the State Department and the military, even in competition with them; it functions in an atmosphere as capricious and fast-changing as Madison Avenue; at its worst, it has written its own briefs, rubber-stamped them with tame committees put there to control it, and gone out on the rampage with disastrous results — not least to its own legitimate intelligence-gathering activities, which often require far more time, patience and discretion than "covert action" will allow for.

Its third fatal ill, which is thrust upon it, is the American political romanticism that one moment espouses openness at any price, and the next revels in the high alchemy of secret panaceas and swift, unconventional, totally illegal solutions. Helms was a victim of both these moods; his distrust of them did nothing to protect him.

As a postscript, let me add that Mr. Powers quotes Helms as not just disliking "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" but detesting it. I can forgive him this rather more easily than I can his admiration for the works of Howard Hunt. His reasons, apparently, are that I had "undermined the very bedrock of intelligence," by which he means trust, and the faith of men in the meaning of their work. Well, well, maybe he's right. It's just that, remembering whole secret armies left on the Laotian hillside to rot, and reading Mr. Powers's portrait of agency rivalries, I find myself sighing for the homely simplicity of my fictional betrayals. ■

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MISCELLANEOUS

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THE WASHINGTON POST
18 October 1979

Carter Advisers Split on Morocco Arms Debate

By William Branigin
Washington Post Foreign Service

Key members of a top U.S. policy-making body are urging President Carter to approve the sale of new American weaponry to Morocco to help King Hassan II fight insurgents who are waging a desert war for control of the disputed Western Sahara.

According to administration sources, a Cabinet-level Policy Review Committee wound up a session Tuesday sharply split over proposals to meet Hassan's request for armed OV10 Bronco reconnaissance planes and Cobra helicopter gunships to combat guerrillas of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. The guerrillas have carried out several attacks in recent months against targets in Morocco.

The sources said, however, that there was a consensus not to recommend sending U.S. experts to train Moroccans in counterinsurgency techniques, a proposal made in Washington as part of a list of options.

The policy debate basically revolves around the question of how far the United States should go in trying to prop up Hassan, a pro-American monarch whose damaging war with the Polisario guerrillas risks undermining him domestically and putting him on the path of the deposed shah of Iran.

Government sources said members of the policy committee—representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense and State departments—were unable to agree on a single recommendation and are to present option papers to the president, who will decide the administration's policy on the issue. A decision to sell King Hassan the arms he wants could face objections in Congress, sources said.

If adopted, a policy to meet the king's requests would mark a departure by the United States from its carefully maintained neutrality in the dispute over the sparsely populated but mineral-rich Western Sahara.

In any case, recommendations at the meeting by representatives of the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the joint chiefs to sell Morocco weapons provides a key indication of administration leanings on an issue that poses a foreign policy dilemma

and has created divisions within the government.

The State Department and its subsidiary body, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, are reticent about the sales, the sources said. The sources said CIA's position tends to buttress arguments against the sales.

The proposed arms sales are intended to show support for a longtime ally and to demonstrate to other countries, notably Saudi Arabia, that the United States will stand by its friends, sources said.

On the other hand, the sales would risk damaging U.S. relations with Algeria, an important OPEC member which supplies 9 percent of U.S. oil imports, the sources said. The sales also could alienate countries in the Organization of African Unity, which voted at a recent meeting in favor of self-determination for the Western Sahara despite Moroccan objections.

The policy dilemma is similar in some respects to that faced by the administration when another longtime U.S. friend, the shah of Iran, was fighting to stay in power last winter. Repeated statements of strong U.S. support for the shah contributed to anti-American feeling in Iran and left Washington with little influence there when he was overthrown.

The administration faced a similar quandary when Sandinista guerrillas began to make gains against the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza. Some analysts believe Washington may run up against such dilemmas in other countries where the durability of pro-American leaders is in question, notably in Zaire and the Philippines and perhaps eventually in Saudi Arabia.

In the present policy debate, the CIA is understood to take the position that the new U.S. weaponry would do King Hassan little good, because his main military problems cannot be solved by equipment. Fearing a coup attempt amid signs of increasing disaffection in the Moroccan military, the king has mired himself in a losing battle by limiting communications among his commanders and thus reducing flexibility in moving his forces, the sources said.

This also is understood to be the

view of the State Department's African section.

National security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and the State Department's Near East bureau are said to favor the sales to Morocco, emphasizing their alarm over Polisario guerrilla raids into Moroccan territory.

Currently the U.S. policy is to sell Morocco some weapons, such as air defense systems and transport helicopters, but not equipment particularly suited for use in the Western Sahara. Washington previously sold Morocco F5 fighter aircraft, which have been employed recently in the desert war despite an agreement limiting their use to internal defense.

The disputed 105,000-square-mile territory, previously called the Spanish Sahara, was ceded by Spain to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. But the Polisario Front, which claims to represent the territory's 80,000 inhabitants, soon launched a guerrilla war aimed

at acquiring independence for the region.

Mauritania, its economy badly hurt by the war, signed a peace agreement with the guerrillas in August, relinquishing its claim to the southern third of the Western Sahara. Morocco, which had held the northern two-thirds, then extended its claim to the entire territory in a move that made its already overextended forces and supply lines more stretched and vulnerable than ever.

In addition to its phosphate riches, the Western Sahara is believed by some experts to contain oil shale and the world's largest reserves of uranium. Morocco, which already ranks as the world's largest exporter of phosphates, is eager to become a producer of the potentially more valuable energy source.


Alarmed by the intensifying Polisario attacks on Morocco and King Hassan's increasingly precarious domestic position as the war drained his

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economy, the Carter administration told Congress in July that it wanted to change its policy on arms sales to Morocco. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved easing the restrictions by a narrow majority, but did not make clear what specific weapons it would agree could be sold.

In the House, significant opposition to a change in arms sales policy was expressed. Some congressional opponents cited improving relations with Algeria, noting that American firms have won more than \$6 billion in contracts there since the early 1970s and that the Algiers government has taken positions opposed to the Soviets on several issues.

Opponents of the proposal to sell Hassan the equipment he wants have said there are other ways to show support for him than to identify the United States with an issue that appears likely to rebound against Washington in the future and alienate other U.S. friends in Africa.



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ON PAGE 65-68

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 October 1979

Preview '80

Bush's Theme: Time for Insider in White House

Businessman, lawmaker, spy chief, diplomat, party boss—he's been all those and now is fighting for the role of GOP presidential nominee.

After three years of a self-proclaimed "outsider" President, George Bush is banking that American voters are ready for an experienced hand in the White House.

The 55-year-old Bush is offering knowledge gained under fire in key government posts at home and abroad as his main asset in an admittedly uphill campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.

Bush's statement that "I believe I've had more national and international experience in more areas" than any other candidate is hard to dispute. His job résumé reads: Member of Congress, Ambassador to the United Nations, second U.S. envoy to the People's Republic of China, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and national chairman of the Republican Party. Campaign advertising pointedly ticks off each of those roles in promoting Bush as "a President we won't have to train."

Kudos for capability. Amid Ford's "cabinet massacre" in late 1975, Bush returned to the U.S. to head the Central Intelligence Agency. Professionals in the agency were wary of his political background. But, in the words of one career intelligence officer: "He did his job without fanfare and with some skill. Some think Carter made a mistake by not permitting him to stay on, despite their party differences."

Where Bush Stands On the Issues

Inflation: "The economy is in the worst mess since the Great Depression." A balanced budget is a must in the first 100 days of a Bush administration, with a "veto club" held over Congress if necessary. Growth of federal spending and federal regulations should be halted.

Tax cut: Taxes should be cut by 20 billion dollars in 1980—half for individuals and half for business—with emphasis on encouraging saving and investment. Future taxes should be indexed to offset inflation.

Energy: Prices of oil and natural gas should be decontrolled, starting immediately. "Our ability to obtain crude oil from the Persian Gulf is going to hinge upon our willingness to bolster our defenses and strengthen our alliances."

Cuba: "We ought to get those Russian troops out of Cuba." Cuban policy has been part of overall vacillation by the Carter administration that makes the U.S. look doubtful and insecure while the Soviets move forward.

SALT II treaty: Carter's version of the arms-limitation pact is "seriously defective." Higher defense spending should not be a trade-off for ratification. Steps to produce a manned bomber and the cruise and MX missiles as well as to beef up the Navy would "send a signal to Moscow."

Intelligence: It is a mistake to trust the Soviets. As director of the Central Intelligence Agency, "my concept of leadership was rebuilding morale and strengthening intelligence while seeing to it that the rights of all Americans are guaranteed."

China: The Carter administration "blindly accepted" Peking's terms for improving relations without demanding a peaceful solution for Taiwan.

Education: Creating the Department of Education will "only add red tape and regulations to the process of education" and invite more federal controls in local schools.

Draft: A national registration of young people may be necessary before consideration of resuming the draft.

JACKSON CLARION-LEDGER (MISS.)
30 September 1979

Support needed for FBI and CIA

The Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, a private research organization located in St. Louis, Missouri, has called for the re-establishment of Congressional committees to investigate subversion and terrorism in this country.

"That there should be no fact-finding in the area of security is irrational," the foundation says in its report. "Not knowing the truth is dangerous since fact-finding is the most important element in the legislative process."

To combat what it calls inadequate intelligence gathering by the CIA and the FBI, the foundation wants to bring back agencies such as the House Committee on Internal Security and the Subversive Activities Control Board.

"That the FBI and the CIA have come under vicious attack during the past decade goes without saying. That their intelligence gathering abilities may have been damaged because of domestic legal and political harassment has not become apparent until recently.

Would we have known sooner that Soviet combat troops were in Cuba had the CIA not been distracted by unreasonable criticisms here at home? Only CIA officials, we suspect, will ever know the answer to that question.

What we can know with certainty, however, is that this country needs a strong FBI and CIA. With international terrorism and domestic subversion flexing new muscle,

it is imperative that our intelligence organizations operate at full strength.

Whether the FBI and the CIA would be strengthened or weakened by the creation of new Congressional investigative committees is debatable.

Let's face it: Legislators, even those with the best of intentions, leave a lot to be desired as investigators. In the past, government secrets — through the use of both official and unofficial leaks — have flowed through Congressional committees like water through a sieve.

And, should such committees be re-established, is there any way to guarantee that its members — who must stand for re-election every two or six years — would be able to conduct top secret investigations without injecting politics into the process? We think the temptations would be great.

While we are in agreement with the Mindszenty Foundation that something must be done to keep a tight rein on subversion in this country, we would prefer to have it done by dedicated, career-minded professionals rather than politicians.

If given the proper public support, a strong FBI and CIA are more than adequate to keep a watchful eye on terrorism and subversive activity.

Let Congress make the laws. Let someone else enforce them.

LONG BEACH INDEPENDENT (CA.)
25 September 1979

Congress ponders how to hire spies who are loyal, competent

What Washington calls the "intelligence community" turns out to be about as much of a community as Los Angeles. It's sprawling and uncoordinated.

A subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee found strange inconsistencies in the methods used to screen out security risks among persons who apply for jobs with the CIA, the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Agency.

And when one agency decides an applicant is risky, it may neglect to tell the others. One result of the present system, the subcommittee said, is that there have been a number of espionage cases involving persons with top security clearances.

A committee report, released Monday, urges the White House to consider setting up a single agency to handle security investigations for all prospective employees of intelligence agencies.

As might be expected, the CIA apparently does the best job of screening employees. But even its methods aren't foolproof. One CIA employee was convicted last year on espionage charges.

The CIA likes lie detector tests.

Some other agencies don't use them. The subcommittee noted that the accuracy of the polygraph has never been adequately demonstrated. The panel called on the CIA to conduct a study of the accuracy of lie detector evaluations.

That might be a help, although even lie detector proponents concede that the machine is only as good as the person who interprets the graphs it makes. And no one contends that the best interpreter is immune to error.

Its continued use in intelligence employee screening is probably justified, so long as the agencies never rely on it as their primary reason either to reject or accept an employee.

More important is that a genuine system be developed for screening applicants at all the agencies, and that the system be used uniformly.

The FBI could probably handle the task, but jealousies and disagreements might make that solution unacceptable to some of the intelligence agencies. The best way to get the job done would be to take the subcommittee's advice and give it to an agency created for the purpose.

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ON PAGE 3A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
16 OCTOBER 1979

National and International News in Brief

The Soviet Union accuses an American reporter of ties with U. S. intelligence.

The newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya accused Kevin Klose, Moscow correspondent of the Washington Post, of "zealously singing the same tune with the CIA." It criticized a dispatch Klose had written about Soviet oil production, an article that quoted CIA officials as saying that oil production in the Soviet Union had peaked and that by 1982 it would be necessary to import about 700,000 barrels of oil a day. The Soviet newspaper accused Klose of "juggling figures which he invented."

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ON PAGE 10

THE BOSTON GLOBE
15 October 1979

US/WORLD NEWS IN BRIEF

Soviets accuse US reporter

MOSCOW — A Soviet newspaper yesterday accused the Washington Post's Moscow correspondent of distorting facts in claiming that the Soviet oil industry is facing a crisis and also implied he worked for the CIA. The daily Sovetskaya Rossiya charged that Kevin Klose, who has been based in Moscow since June, 1977, made his facts up "out of thin air" in a Sept. 1 article, which was inspired by a CIA report predicting serious problems for the Soviet oil industry. Klose dismissed the charges, saying the main point of the article was Soviet refutation of the CIA report.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-9THE WASHINGTON POST
16 OCTOBER 1979

OSS Vets: Gunpowder and an Elephant on the Burma Road

By Wendy Law-Yone

Special to The Washington Post

Memories were rampant, cussing was contagious. "Damn," said Carl Eifler, "I haven't used profanity in years, but now that I get near this group the old brain pattern is kicking off and I'm swearing away."

Veterans of Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (precursor of the CIA) retreated to the Sheraton-Carlton Saturday night to recall the dear dead days of WWII when women were gals, intelligence-gathering was not yet a dirty word and war meant patriotism.

"This outfit had more fun than any other I know of," said "Wilkie" Wilkinson, one of the earliest recruits in this unit of guerrilla fighters.

Veteran Norm Larum told about shooting an elephant — not in the conscience-stricken tones of George Orwell, but with sheepish chuckles over the magnitude of both victim and weapon. This was a crazed bull elephant that had sent half the population of a village up into the trees, and Larum killed him dead (as the insect-spray ads say) with a bazooka. ("I'd always wondered what a bazooka shell would do to an elephant.")

So went the stories: Full of ack-ack and ammo ("I fired back a snooper-doooper" . . . "It sounded like the Fourth of July on Battery Park. . .") until the Crystal Room of the Sheraton-Carlton fairly reeked of gunpowder.

"Now, gunpowder," said Bill Cummings, a 101 veteran whose family had been agricultural missionaries in Burma, "was made by the Kachins from distilled urine. In the rainy season, they would urinate through the bamboo floor of their houses. Come the dry season, they'd scoop up the deposits and let the stuff leach down through a bamboo-leaf filter until it turned into sodium nitrate. Together with pounded-up charcoal, this made the black powder they used in their old muskets."

The Kachins were the partisan tribesmen of Northern Burma trained by 101 to drive the Japanese to distraction. These tribesmen were fierce and loyal fighters, and devisers of a peculiar method of counting enemy heads: Snipping off the ears and later dividing them by two.

It was early 1942, and the news from the CBI (China-Burma-India) Theater was bad. The Japanese had

penetrated Burma from the south, and had cut off the Burma Road, the main ground route and supply line for the allied war effort in China. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell had taken "a hell of a beating," and now the object was to prepare for the reopening of the Burma Road.

To do this, a special unit was needed, a group of parachutists, demolitionists, radio officers and other daredevils who would have to operate behind enemy lines in what Britain's Gen. William Slim called "some of the world's worst country, breeding the world's worst diseases, and having for half the year at least the world's worst climate." Gen. "Wild Bill" Donovan, head of OSS, gave the order to form the clandestine unit, and the rest is 101 history. It was history that culminated in the recapture of Burma, which Churchill once likened to "munching a porcupine, quill by quill."

The last commanding officer of 101, Gen. "Ray" Peers, was making the rounds on Saturday in high spirits. He had been autographing (and selling like hot rice cakes) his latest book, "The My Lai Inquiry"—pleased, he said very pleased by the reviews so far. Peers was not the only literary figure at the reunion. Dick Dunlop, another Burma veteran, had just come out with a new account of 101 history, "Behind Japanese Lines," and also was doing a brisk trade.

Preserving history, in one form or another, appears to be a popular pastime for the veterans, who came mostly from California. Some are real-estate agents, one is a silversmith, another is studying Medieval Welsh.

There was even a psychiatrist from Aberdeen, Scotland Bill Brough. He was a 101 medic who had been a conscientious objector until one day, in what was "one whale of a firefight" with a Japanese patrol, a wounded Kachin ranger he was trying to rescue was shot off his back. That was the straw that broke the pacifist's back: Brough took up a rifle and turned out, said Peers, to be "one of the best soldiers to fight that war."

Saturday night's banquet of some 200 people included veterans and their families, along with many retirees from the CIA sporting "George Bush for President" buttons. However, "we're really a mixed crowd politically," said one. "Some of these people are Connally supporters. Go ask Anna Chennault, for example."

But Republican Anna Chennault, widow of Flying Tigers commander Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, and guest speaker for the evening, had other things to talk about.

Covering an expanse of issues ranging from her romance with Gen. Chennault to criticism of Fidel Castro's recent visit to the United States, Chennault went on to defend the Vietnam war ("It was not wrong that we supported the war in Southeast Asia; the only thing wrong was that we allowed it to get into political football") to denounce normalization of relations with China as "a marriage of convenience" and to regret the loss of America's confidence ("It's still the best country in the world; let us not apologize for America").

At one point in her speech, Chennault asked, rhetorically, "Where are all the heroes now?"

The heroes were there in abundance, if a little fatigued from two days of reuniting and reminiscing. Still, once a hero always a hero.

"Like this," said Carl Eifler, 101's original commanding officer, as he pulled out his ID-card folder and flashed a citation: "International Order: Old Bastards."

"Never runs out?" asked the wife of an old war buddy, sweetly.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
8 OCTOBER 1979

Spy plot in Jamaica

The plan for an anglophone Cuba

By ROBERT MOSS

ACCORDING to a defector from the Cuban secret service, the *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI, who now lives in Florida, it has been a long standing ambition of President Castro and his Soviet mentors to convert Jamaica into "an anglophone Cuba."

The instalment of a one-party Socialist régime closely aligned with Cuba and the Soviet bloc is, by this account, only one element in the design.

It is hoped that one day, under Cuban tuition, the Jamaicans could assume the same kind of surrogate role in English-speaking countries in Africa (and the Caribbean) that the Cubans have played for the Russians in the former Portuguese colonies.

The current behaviour of Sr Ulises Estrada Lescalles, the recently appointed Cuban Ambassador to Kingston, suggests that this plan may not be quite as far-fetched as it sounds.

Vicious attack

Late last month, Sr Estrada called a Press conference in the course of which he launched a remarkably vicious attack on Jamaica's most influential newspaper, the courageously outspoken *DAILY GLEANER*, and on the opposition Jamaica Labour party.

Their offence had been to call attention to Sr Estrada's past activities as one of Havana's leading specialists in subversive intelligence operations, which were first disclosed in this column on Sept. 3.

Significantly, Sr Estrada was flanked (on his left) at this Press conference by Sr Carlos Dias, who has been identified as the present station chief of the DGI in Kingston.

Sr Estrada told the Jamaican Press that he regarded criticism of his intelligence activities as tantamount to a declaration of war.

"It is in the spirit of the Cuban revolution," he declaimed, "that if war is declared by anyone, the Cuban revolution will accept the challenge and, as Fidel said, when Cubans are asked to fight they fight with all seriousness."

While he was unable to answer the charges that had been levelled against him, Sr Estrada explained ominously, they would be dealt with by "many comrades abroad."

Sr Estrada's attacks on the *DAILY GLEANER*—which had come under fire from Sr Alfonso Hodge, a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party, for alleged CIA-junk not long before—and on Jamaica's main opposition party were widely interpreted in Kingston as a crude attempt to intervene in local politics.

Several influential organisations, including the Jamaican Chamber of Commerce and the Manufacturers' Association, have now demanded that Sr Estrada should be declared *persona non grata* and sent packing.

It is recalled that it did not take Mr Michael Manley's Government long to expel the American Ambassador when it took exception to remarks he had made shortly after the 1972 elections brought the People's National party (PNP) to power.

However, it is clear that the Cuban Ambassador was justifiably confident that no public gesture made by him would disrupt the intimate relations that have been established between the Castro regime and the Manley Government.

Decisive proof

Yet the choice of Sr Estrada as Ambassador to Kingston was, in itself, decisive proof of the Cubans' determination to push Jamaica further towards the Marxist camp.

Sr Estrada is a career intelligence officer who has worked with both the DGI (set up under the supervision of Alexander Shitov, a senior KGB officer and since 1971 a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Soviet secret service) and the Department of America, which exercises primary responsibility for subversive operations in the Western hemisphere and answers for the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party.

In 1968, Sr Estrada was one of a party of five Cuban intelligence officers who were dispatched to southern Lebanon to advise the PLO. This was not merely a training mission: the Cubans actually fought with Fatah units on the battlefield.

The assignment of these Cubans to the PLO in 1968 was mentioned by the DGI defector Orlando Castro Hidalgo in 1971. However, this is the first time any of their identities have been made public. The head of the Cuban team in which Sr Estrada served was Carlos Chain Soler, whose career began in the Cuban security police, the Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (DES).

Passive vehicle

Today, Chain Soler holds the post of Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which makes him Sr Estrada's nominal boss.

Chain Soler's main function is to ensure that the Cuban Foreign Ministry serves as a passive vehicle for secret service directives. (DGI regulations now require, for example, that a spy who is to be assigned abroad under diplomatic cover must spend six months at the Foreign Ministry learning his "legend.")

Prior to his posting to Kingston, Sr Estrada served both as DGI station chief in Cairo—a very senior assignment in Nasser's day—and as deputy head of the Department of America whose present chief is Manuel Píñero Losada, the former DGI director.

There is widespread confusion about the respective roles of the DGI, whose chief is the pro-Moscow hardliner José Joaquín Méndez Cominches, and the Department of America.

When the shake-up of the DGI took place in 1970/71 under the watchful eye of KGB General Vitaliy Semenov, Píñero Losada was moved sideways to take charge of an organisation that was specially created for him, partly because the Russians were not convinced that he was totally trustworthy.

Since then, a second specialist organisation responsible to the Central Committee—the Department of Africa—has been set up, under the leadership of Osmany Cienfuegos.

According to Western intelligence sources, there is no competition in the field between the DGI and the Department of America. They share their field officers, many of whom come from the same stable in any event.

A man like Sr Estrada in Kingston has worked for both intelligence organisations in the past and today, as Ambassador, is clearly in overall command of the entire Cuban subversive network in Jamaica.

Key assignments

There are more than 5,000 Cuban technicians and "civilian" advisers in Jamaica, nearly all of whom received military training (and in some cases, intelligence training) prior to their postings.

One of their key assignments is to recruit Cuban agents of influence at all levels of Jamaican life.

Within the top-heavy Cuban Embassy in Jamaica—the largest on the island—three-quarters of the "diplomats" are believed to be professional officers of the DGI or the Department of America.

But Cuba's involvement in operations to influence Jamaican politics extends far beyond this. Through instructors stationed in Jamaica, and through courses provided in Guyana and Cuba itself, the Cubans are seeking to politicise Jamaica's internal security forces.

The ruling PNP is building up the Home Guard, which already outnumbered the regular police force, as a political militia (loyal to itself) which is establishing units in villages throughout the island on the model of Cuba's Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.

Against this backdrop, it is perhaps less than surprising that the PNP Government has espoused a pro-Soviet (or at least pro-Cuban) line during recent foreign policy crises.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
16 October 1979

VIP

By Maxine Cheshire

Writing in the current issue of Inquiry magazine on the death of former CIA analyst John Paisley, the Washington Assassination Information Bureau's Jeff Goldberg quotes Paisley's wife as saying "privately" that her husband "served as a CIA contact for Nixon's White House 'Plumbers'." Maryann Paisley's attorney, Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., confirms his client told him that, adding "that's all she knows ... all her husband ever told her." Adding to the intrigue, another source working on the mysterious Paisley death says that the name of a White House Plumber was found in one of Paisley's address books, along with a telephone number that can only be dialed on the "scrambled" network that links the CIA, the White House and other sensitive phones.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-1The Washington Star
15 October 1979 |

The Ear

FOLIAGE FOLLIES . . . The CIA's been busting with pride over its super-secret niche nestled over there in Rösslyn, Ear hears. Imagine, then, darlings, how it twitched when Plaza Grove, a nearby hip plant shop, whizzed out its Big Sale flyer to the neighbors. On the back, a map pinpointed *all* the local landmarks: Hyatt House, Xerox, Drug Fair — and "CIA," friskily illustrated with a slick little guy in cloak and dagger. Several well-groomed men in dark blue suits glided in to the Grove next day, Ear's plantperson reports, moving oddly among the Weeping Figs and Chinese Palm Fans. *Nobody* said 'Do you have anything for bugs, heh-heh?' They all just cleared their throats, clutched their pockets, and glided out again. Ear, which has been eyeing the

Liddy novel dubiously, got *quite* a frisson out of this one.

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MOROCCO

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ON PAGE A-19NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1979

ESSAY

The Road
To
Morocco

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — When President Carter changed his mind and decided to sell offensive arms to conservative King Hassan of Morocco, it marked the end of the Andrew Young era of United States diplomacy. At a White House newly awakened to political reality, the third world no longer rules the roost.

Morocco is a conservative Arab monarchy on North Africa's West Side, closely allied to Saudi Arabia. When Spain gave up some uranium-rich territory in North Africa four years ago, Morocco laid claim to it but so did a guerrilla force called the Polisario, supported by Libya, Algeria and the Soviet Union.

When King Hassan made his move, the guerrillas bloodied his nose; now the Polisario is attacking Morocco and the King needs our help — Cobra helicopter gunships and Bronco armed reconnaissance planes — in order to survive.

In the Andrew Young era, he didn't have a chance. The Organization for African Unity, along with radical Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization, supports the guerrillas. The C.I.A., sensitive after missing the fall of the Shah, has been warning of Hassan's vulnerability. Early this summer, Mr. Carter's budgeteers cut arms sales to Morocco from \$45 million down to \$30 million. King Hassan looked like a loser.

Then Saudi Arabia began making noises behind the scenes. Our State Department, which customarily fears any efforts to "prop up right-wing regimes," was split between its Middle East department, headed by Harold Saunders, which wants to accommodate the Saudis, and the Africa corps, headed by Richard Moose, who heeds the call of the Andy Youngs.

On Tuesday, Oct. 16, the "Policy Review Committee" met in the White House to thrash out what to recommend to the President. Cyrus Vance tilted slightly toward the Saudi view, recommending only a minor increase in help to King Hassan (which — at State — is high hawkishness). Zbigniew Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown pressed for providing the offensive weapons Hassan needs — not to "win," but to be strong enough to negotiate for an autonomous region

tial decision was therefore needed.

That night, the Moroccan ambassador to the U.S., Ali Bengelloun, gave a dinner party welcoming Saudi Arabia's new ambassador, Faisal Algeilan, and his wife, Nuha. Present were three U.S. senators, Mr. Brzezinski, and C.I.A. Deputy Director Frank Carlucci. The new Saudi envoy, responding to a toast, stressed the closeness between the two kingdoms, and made it clear that his Government hoped the United States would be more helpful in supporting Hassan. That was mother's milk to Mr. Brzezinski.

The Saudi ambassador was moved to point out the importance of U.S. support because an editorial in The New York Times that morning had urged "no arms for Morocco's war" because "no American interest is at stake."

At stake is America's credibility in the eyes of governments who try to resist radical, Soviet-supplied, Arab-financed, third-world-supported takeovers. King Hassan is one of the few friends that Egypt's Anwar Sadat has in the Arab world; he helped arrange the first trip to Jerusalem; he will get help from Sadat in his fight to stay in power; and though he takes his Arab-world signals from the Saudis, Hassan is the one most likely to end the Arab isolation of Sadat for the sin of dealing with the Israelis.

With this in view, the new, 1980-model Carter — mindful of Saudi wishes, hopeful of getting some support for the Camp David accords from the Arab world — decided to overrule the Moooses and send out the Cobras and Broncos. The first bite will be within the \$45-million limit, but supplementals will soon take it to \$200 million, which the Saudis will pay for out of their change pocket.

The last vestiges of the Andrew Young set let out a howl. George McGovern fretted in the Senate, and Stephen Solarz (Democrat of New York) — head of the African subcommittee in the House — complained that the aid to Hassan "will encourage intransigence rather than flexibility." (Mr. Solarz is an anomaly: he represents much of Brooklyn, but aligns himself with the most anti-Israel third-worlders. His constituents don't complain.)

Although Representative Solarz threatens to launch a resolution of disapproval to block the arms transfers, that's just talk: such a resolution would have to be passed in both houses, and would surely be turned down in the Senate Foreign Relations Mideast subcommittee headed by Richard Stone, Florida Democrat. Mr. Stone, a strong Israel supporter, has long pressed for more aid to the conservative Arabs of Morocco.

The central issue was whether an ally would be encouraged to negotiate by being made strong or being made weak. For a change, strength won out. In the words of the Bob Hope-Bing Crosby favorite, "Like Webster's dic-

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24 October 1979

W. Sahara

Arms to Morocco?

By KAREN GELLEN

The intense debate among top Carter administration officials over U.S. policy toward Morocco's Western Sahara war is at an impasse.

A closed top-level Policy Review Committee meeting Oct. 16 on granting King Hassan's urgent request for sophisticated counterinsurgency materiel was deadlocked, according to congressional sources. The issue was then thrown directly into President Jimmy Carter's lap for resolution.

The debate reflects the larger foreign policy dilemma facing the U.S. after Iran, Nicaragua and the unworkable Camp David Mideast agreements. On the White House agenda is how best to keep the pro-Western Moroccan government in place, while doing minimal damage to overall U.S. interests in the third world.

One view in the State Department and Congress is that the Western Sahara's Polisario Front is clearly winning the war, on both the military and diplomatic fronts. King Hassan's intransigence is bankrupting and destabilizing Morocco and, according to this argument, discrediting one of the few significant U.S. friends in Africa and the Mideast.

Congressional and administration opponents of more aid argue that greater U.S. arms to the increasingly desperate king may embolden him to strike at Algeria, which supports Polisario and provides a refuge to some 100,000 displaced Saharan civilians. Such a move would engulf Northwest Africa in war, with a direct U.S. involvement.

Short of this, any further action by Washington to back Hassan would perhaps irrevocably disrupt improving U.S. relations with Algeria, a prestigious third world state and an important producer of natural gas and oil.

These arguments inside the government received a boost on the eve of the expected decision from the influential New York Times, which published a strongly worded editorial counseling against the new aid and urging that the U.S. "remain neutral."

WASHINGTON'S SHAM NEUTRALITY

Although the U.S. is officially "neutral" on the war, since Morocco's 1975 invasion of the neighboring former Spanish colony it has been Rabat's principal arms supplier. This role was evident in the battle for the key Saharan town of Smara earlier this month, where Polisario fighters destroyed three U.S.-made F-5 fighter planes (Guardian, Oct. 17).

Morocco's banner inside Congress and the administration, meanwhile, is being carried by the same forces whipping up the "Soviet combat brigade" in Cuba issue—Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.), Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Their argument is that to be a credible superpower, the U.S. must "stand by its friends."

Hassan, they point out, has served U.S. interests well by sending troops against a popular uprising in Zaire in 1976 and 1977 and by helping set up talks culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Thus they argue that Hassan be "rewarded," even though he later reneged on Camp David and broke relations with Cairo. In the latter case, reconciliation is already in the works, with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat pledging to "support Morocco 100% to the end" in the war.

Egyptian arms have already been captured by the Saharans in the field and Polisario charges that Sadat's gesture may be a mask for another U.S. weapons pipeline to Morocco.

Those advocating a decisive U.S. political and military stand on behalf of Rabat also say, with a somewhat tortured reasoning, that beefed-up aid will actually enhance the chances for peace in the region. If Hassan's back were not so clearly pressed to the wall, they say, he would not "lose face" by pressing for peace.

This view, however, is contradicted by the Moroccan king's steadily more bellicose acts, the latest being the annexation of the part of the Western Sahara given up this summer by his defeated partner, Mauritania. In the light of several recent significant and humiliating military setbacks, Morocco has also renewed longstanding threats to attack Algeria.

So the aid package proposal—which includes counterinsurgency OV-10 "Bronco" planes, advanced methods of pinpointing guerrilla positions and which augments \$45 million in U.S. arms already on the way—now sits on Carter's desk.

CONTINUED

In order to build its case, Rabat has spent more than \$1 million in public relations and lobbying efforts in Washington since last spring, Africa News (AN) revealed last week.

"The campaign, the largest by any African government," AN reports, "parallels in size the highly publicized South African Information Department's activities at their 1976-77 peak."

MOROCCO'S MILITARY FIASCO

These efforts have been undercut on Capitol Hill, however, by intelligence reports accurately depicting Morocco's impossible military situation: "U.S. intelligence has rarely been so united on a question such as this," a State Department official told the Christian Science Monitor. "The consensus in the intelligence community is that King Hassan and his army are in deep trouble. To give more weapons will not solve the problem."

While Carter ponders this dilemma, the Polisario Front continues to move from one stunning military victory to another. The battle for Smara, the occupied Western Sahara's second-largest town, inflicted more than 1200 deaths on the already demoralized Moroccan forces.

The fighting there sparked resistance actions throughout the remaining occupied towns including El Aiun, the Saharan capital. In El Aiun, which visitors have described as a virtual concentration camp for the civilian population, Saharans distributed pro-Polisario leaflets and emblazoned the walls of the town with slogans such as, "Viva Smara!" and

"Long live the Saharan People's Liberation Army!" The people of the Moroccan-held capital, Polisario reported, "have moved from passive resistance to open, active struggle. They are now on the offensive."

The 3-day battle at Smara had been preceded by a massive Saharan strike at Lebouirate, in southern Morocco, where nearly 600 Moroccan soldiers were killed and 92 were taken prisoner. It was a "massive defeat for Morocco," a correspondent on the scene for the British paper The Observer reported. "Both Lebouirate and the surrounding hills within a 20-mile radius were so heavily fortified as to make the area virtually impregnable to anything short of a nuclear attack."

As the garrison, 70 miles inside the Moroccan border "was meant to be the main bulwark of defense against attacks from the south," reporter Shyam Bhatia noted that Polisario was terming Lebouirate "Morocco's Dien Bien Phu," a reference to the 1954 military battle that led to France's withdrawal from Indochina.

And just prior to Lebouirate, there was a standing battle at Bir Ezaren, a garrison town which bordered the Moroccan- and Mauritanian-held sections of the Western Sahara. Although Morocco accompanied its annexation of this southern portion with the influx of 15,000 additional troops, it sustained 400 dead and watched a staggering 175 of its forces taken prisoner in the battle at Bir Ezaren.

POLISARIO SUCCESSES

"The military successes of the guerrillas cannot be doubted," a correspondent for the British Financial Times noted earlier this month. "Even Morocco admits them. In a 1000-mile journey with a Polisario mobile column from the frontiers of Algeria to the shores of the Atlantic, from the edge of Morocco to the borders of Mauritania, the guerrillas appeared to control almost all the territory."

"The only Moroccan presence outside the small area it still controls," reporter Richard Trench continued, "were prisoners and dead." In addition, Polisario's U.S. representative, Madjid Abdullah, told the Guardian: "Bir Ezaren, Lebouirate and Smara are just the beginning of strong military action against the Moroccan aggression. More and more, Morocco's own territory will become the battlefield of the Saharan war. Morocco's Vietnam will be transported inside Morocco."

This year of military defeat for Morocco has been matched by decisive setbacks on the diplomatic front. This week, the UN Decolonization Committee—which has long been on the record for Saharan self-determination—will again take up the issue.

This year's UN discussion is expected to result in an even stronger resolution in the General Assembly than in previous sessions, coming as it does after both the Organization of African Unity and the Nonaligned Nations Summit firmly backed the Saharan cause.

Also, Polisario can now cite 34 countries—20 of them African states—which have officially recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic which it leads. In addition, nearly 100 nations have recognized Polisario as a liberation movement representing the aspirations of the Saharan people.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 October 1979

U.S Shifts Policy To Allow Sale of Arms to Morocco

By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration yesterday announced its willingness to sell counterinsurgency weaponry to Morocco's embattled King Hassan in an effort to encourage negotiations with guerrillas he is fighting for control of the mineral-rich Western Sahara.

A high State Department official said the government had agreed to meet the king's request for OV10 Bronco armed reconnaissance planes and Cobra helicopter gunships to help a longtime ally fend off intensifying attacks on Moroccan territory by Algerian-backed Polisario Front guerrillas, who are fighting to turn the disputed Western Sahara into an independent Arab state.

The State Department official said the decision to sell weapons to Morocco, which was a major shift in Carter administration policy, would be linked to achieving a negotiated settlement of the dispute. It was not immediately clear, however, how this linkage could be effected.

The announcement immediately ran into opposition on Capitol Hill. Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, issued a statement castigating the decision as "compatible with neither our principles nor our interests."

The statement also warned that the arms sales "will encourage intransigence rather than flexibility" by King Hassan and "will prolong the war rather than shorten it."

Solarz had earlier written to President Carter after a fact-finding tour of the northwest African region, advising him to maintain the existing U.S. policy of not selling Morocco weapons especially suited for use in the desert war.

Solarz predicted that the administration would face a tough fight in Congress to win the required approval of the sales.

The issue of selling the weapons to Morocco, and thereby involving the United States in the dispute, also has been a divisive one within the administration.

A high-level Policy Review Committee meeting last week was unable to agree on a single policy to recommend to President Carter, and each of several government bodies participating presented its own option paper to the president for a decision.

His decision apparently reflected a desire to demonstrate that the United States will stand by its friends abroad despite reverses in that policy regarding Iran. Saudi Arabia has been encouraging Washington to help King Hassan in his fight against the Polisario guerrillas and has indicated that it will finance the arms purchases.

Administration officials indicated that the government would be willing to supply about six of the OV10 Broncos, an unspecified number of Cobra helicopters equipped with advanced TOW anti-tank missiles and other equipment such as armored personnel carriers and trucks.

The State Department official said Washington would "have to provide Morocco with more than token equipment" to strengthen King Hassan's hand enough to promote a negotiated settlement. The official added that it was up to the United States to see that the king did not use the weapons to pursue "a military solution," which U.S. intelligence reports have said would be difficult, if not impossible, for King Hassan to impose.

The administration also indicated that the weaponry it proposes to sell Morocco would not be sufficient to turn the tide militarily in favor of Morocco, even if the Moroccan army were better organized to fight the desert guerrilla war.

"We feel Morocco now has a self-defense problem because of numerous attacks from the Sahara into its territory," the State Department official said.

He said a 1960 agreement with Morocco limiting the use of U.S. weaponry to internal defense would remain in force, but indicated later that the administration would relax its interpretation of the agreement to allow Morocco to use the new arms "in parts of the Sahara."

The official said details governing Morocco's use of the weapons remain to be worked out. But he said the United States did not expect Morocco to carry its fight to Algerian territory, as some hardline Moroccan military men have suggested in advocating "hot pursuit" to clean out Polisario strongholds across the Algerian border.

The official also said the U.S. decision did not mean that the administration was recognizing Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara.

Despite the sales, the U.S. official said, the administration does not intend to become a party to the negotiations that it hopes will ensue to solve the Western Saharan conflict.

So far King Hassan has expressed a willingness to negotiate with Algeria on the issue, but not with the Polisario guerrillas. The State Department official said the administration would contact the king shortly, but declined to say whether the United States would encourage him to deal directly with the Polisario, which is also supported by Libya.

At stake in the conflict is a sparsely populated stretch of rock and sand that is believed to contain valuable deposits of uranium and oil-shale as well as phosphates. The Polisario Front claims to represent the estimated 80,000 inhabitants of the Western Sahara, which was ceded to Morocco and Mauritania by Spain in 1975. Mauritania renounced its claim to the territory in August because the war was crippling its economy.

In his statement, Solarz acknowledged that "Morocco has been our friend," but added that "friendship does not obligate us to support a war that can't be won a cause that is not just."

While the administration's newly announced policy may please a few nations that would like to see Morocco prevail militarily, it will alienate many more countries that believe the people of the Western Sahara should be given the right to determine their own future, the statement said.

Solarz warned that instead of strengthening King Hassan, the arms sales may eventually undermine him by encouraging him to "continue waging an unwinnable war and diverting resources that could best be used to solve real social and economic problems."

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24 October 1979

Soviets Scramble for New Fuel

Oil Production Falls Below Expectations

MOSCOW (AP) — For a nation that claims to have no energy problems, the Soviet Union is scrambling feverishly to find new sources of fuel.

The discrepancy escapes most Soviet citizens, who have limited access to any but information provided and approved by the government. The official line, of course, is that energy reserves are sufficient; indeed plentiful, and that if the Western world is suffering from gas lines and home heating woes, it is a natural consequence of capitalism.

But there is a contradiction in this message, betrayed by frequent items in the government-controlled press that trumpet new Soviet discoveries for squeezing energy from uranium, coal and its by-products, and most recently, the atmosphere itself.

Part of the propaganda is defensive. In July, the CIA released a report predicting that Soviet oil production had peaked and that the nation would be a net oil importer by 1982.

That brought an icy rejoinder from the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee, which said, "The CIA deliberately and grossly distorts the situation and statistical data. There is no energy or oil crisis in the U.S.S.R. Quite the opposite, the U.S.S.R. has a vast fuel and energy potential which has especially grown in recent years."

The official Tass news agency joined in, saying: "The energy crisis in the West, which is not infrequently presented as an inevitable evil of our days, has not affected the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries."

That would have come as news to delegates at this summer's meeting of the COMECON, the Communist bloc equivalent of the Common Market. Delegates were told that the Soviet oil production for the first five months of 1979 had fallen 435,000 barrels short of expectation.

The effect of such a shortfall will eventually be felt in the Soviet Union, but other satellite nations may have to pay the price first.

Radio Prague, preparing Czechoslovak consumers for the worst, said: "We all know the difficulties the Soviet Union has with oil production. It would be immoral to demand that the Soviet Union alone bear these costs and demand continued supplies of cheap oil."

Non-aligned nations felt the pinch as well. The Soviets informed a Japanese fishery that relies on Russian petroleum exports that they would be cut by 20 percent, a decision almost certain to cost Japanese jobs.

It is perhaps to avoid similar embarrassments that the Soviets are moving rapidly to exploit other energy sources. Minister of Power and Electrification Pyotr Neporozhny said in a recent interview that by the year 2000 "fuel and electricity needs are likely to be met mainly through the accelerated development of thermal neutron power plants with a view of going sometime between 1990 and 2000 to plants with fast neutron reactors."

With no dissent from anti-nuclear power groups to hinder nuclear development, the Soviet economy may well be reliant on atomic power before the 21st century.

Russian scientists, however, are exploring other areas of energy production as well, and each new find is loudly heralded.

Tass recently announced that the Ukrainian Physiology Institute had found a way to run automobiles on hydrogen instead of gasoline.

"We developed a method of chemically binding hydrogen with metal," a scientist was quoted as saying. "It is sufficient to have one cubic decimeter of the combination of metal with hydrogen for a 250 to 310-mile

run of an automobile. The driver will receive at a filling station a small plate, place it in a special compartment of the engine and start it."

For a country on the verge of introducing solid fuel for automobiles, the Soviets have shown an inordinate interest in oil pipelines. The 25th Party Congress ordered 21,700 miles of new pipelines laid from the production centers of Central Asia to the consumption centers in Europe.

"The truth," said one Western analyst in Moscow, "probably lies somewhere between the dark picture painted by the CIA and the business-as-usual attitude in the Soviet press."

"The Soviets are facing a period of uncertainty from an energy standpoint. They don't know whether they'll be facing long lines at the gas pumps like Americans experienced this year, or even if there'll be any gas in the pumps when they do line up."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 70TIME
29 OCTOBER 1979

More Woes on the Oil Front

Protests at home and a price revolt in OPEC as Saudi power wanes

In Concord, N.H., it took the form of an automobile "honk-in" outside Jimmy Carter's re-election campaign office. In Nashville, a 500-lb. pig with BIG OIL painted on its side was led to city hall to munch slops from a dish labeled AMERICAN WEALTH. In Washington, D.C., elderly citizens bused in to join a picket line outside the American Petroleum Institute.

In more than 100 cities and towns in 35 states last week, hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of demonstrators joined in the biggest protest ever against what the country is targeting as "Big Oil." They voiced fears of a winter of low temperatures and high fuel costs, passed out "Big Oil Discredit Cards" and waved banners declaring, "I don't want to freeze in the dark." For most, the principal peeve was not gasoline prices or petroleum industry profits but the 60% rise in the cost of heating oil in the past 2½ years.

Whether justified or not, the Big Oil protest, which was sponsored by a number of diverse labor and political groups, came at an odd time. As it happened, the most visible oil price gougers last week were not the oil companies but some of the more militant price hawks in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Iraq, Libya and Iran all announced boosts of 10% or more in the overall cost of their crude, and other producers seem likely to follow suit. What really alarmed oil consumers was that the Libyan and

Iranian rise, like that announced by Mexico a week before but unlike those announced by Iraq or earlier by Kuwait, broke through the \$23.50 per bbl. price the cartel set in June as a "ceiling" for at least six months.

This early piercing of the OPEC lid came despite an attempt by Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, to keep the lid on. Last July, Saudi officials announced that they would raise their daily oil production

during the remainder of 1979 from 8.5 million to 9.5 million bbl. Not so long ago, such an increase would have prevented unilateral price hikes. No longer. The rules of the oil game have changed.

The essential problem, as the Saudi Oil Minister Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani admitted during a visit to Washington last week, is that OPEC has "lost control" of price levels. It is now up to the oil-consuming nations to limit price increases by curbing demand. Yamani's point is well taken. The only reason that Libya and Iran have been able to lift prices so much so soon is that, despite an international agreement earlier this year to curb imports, demand for oil continues to grow at a time when Iran's internal problems and lack of technical expertise threaten supply cuts at any moment. In the first eight months of this year, oil imports by Japan, Italy, West Germany and France increased by between 5% and 13.2%. Though U.S. consumption has fallen somewhat, the country's imports have also risen, though only by 1%.

Yamani argued that the U.S., the largest oil consumer, must make new efforts to expand its own domestic oil reserves while simultaneously curbing consumption. The nation's reaction to the energy problem up to now, he insisted, has ranged from "panic" to "almost absolute apathy"; he urged "drastic action" that might even include some form of rationing. Yamani further warned that harsh steps taken now



Saudi Arabia's Sheik Yamani
A call for "drastic action."

CONTINUED

would not necessarily prevent further OPEC oil price increases next year, but that a continued failure to cut demand would be "an economic catastrophe."

The latest price rises are not the only bad news to come from the cartel this month. In recent weeks, it has become known that several major oil producers, including Dubai and Qatar, are moving to end several large long-term supply contracts so that they can sell their crude on the spot market in the Dutch oil port of Rotterdam, where prices have far outstripped OPEC levels; they have risen from \$33 per bbl. a month ago to \$40 last week. At the same time, Kuwait, Nigeria, Algeria and Venezuela have announced further oil production cutbacks, ranging from 10% to 25%, next year. The basic aim: to keep supplies tight and prices high if and when worldwide demand slumps because of a broad economic slowdown in the consuming countries.

The implications of the escalation in prices and tight supplies are ominous. Last week studies by both the CIA and the Department of Energy forecast a return to shortages in the U.S. in the early 1980s. Another prediction: a rise in the basic OPEC price of crude to \$86 per bbl. by the mid-1990s. Even in the immediate future the outlook is grim. Testifying before Congress last week, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker warned that "the success of the anti-inflationary effort is very much bound up in what happens to energy. Our economy is vulnerable. Our security is vulnerable."

The dismal outlook was spelled out in blunt terms last Thursday by Jimmy Carter. Addressing delegates to a national energy conference, the President warned that "in the future, supplies are going to be shorter and prices are going to be higher." He added: "My own judgment is that OPEC is probably producing at a max-

imum level, and the tendencies are toward reduced production."

This tight balance means that the consuming countries can do little but swallow further price increases and almost nothing at all to ward off the possibility of future shortages. Last week the Senate approved and passed to the House Carter's stand-by gasoline rationing plan, which now seems certain to become law; even so, it can only be used in times of severe shortages. The President also agreed to support congressional moves to grant funds to help middle- and lower-income people pay their higher energy bills. A plan approved by the Senate Finance Committee last week would extend tax credits for high home heating costs to 9 million families with incomes of \$22,000 a year or less; they would get an average credit of

\$62 a year, though it would be available only to homeowners using high-cost heating oil or natural gas from Canada or Mexico.

The main concern in Washington now centers on just what will happen at the oil cartel's next price meeting, to be held in Venezuela in December. Last week the current president of OPEC, the Oil Minister for the United Arab Emirates, said that he personally would prefer that there be no formal increase, but it seems much more likely that the militant producers will push through some rise, perhaps to the \$25 or \$26 level.

As worrisome as the price situation is the fact that the OPEC countries are once again speaking openly of wielding the "oil weapon" for geopolitical purposes. In his Thursday address, Carter buttressed a call for greater emphasis on conservation with a warning that the U.S. must be able to protect itself from nations "like Libya, who in time of crisis cut back on production for political punishment, or harassment, or perhaps even blackmail."

In fact, the cutback weapon was being waved last week by other, more influential, OPEC governments. Iraq's President Saddam Hussein said in a Baghdad speech that the Arab world is "threatened by fragmentation more than ever before," and declared that the threat of a new oil embargo would remain the Arabs' chief weapon against their enemies. Yamani himself did not hesitate to drop some hints of a direct link with U.S. Middle East policy. Said he: "If we have peace in the area, you will be amazed at how many beautiful and healthy results you can get from that, including in the field of oil." Translation: the cost of crude oil will increasingly be reckoned in terms of diplomatic cooperation as well as dollars. ■

A calendar for the inflation-worm

19 NOVEMBER 79						
SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1 Heat	2 Heat	3 Heat
4 Heat	5 Heat	6 Heat	7 Heat	8 Heat	9 Heat	10 Heat
11 Heat	12 Heat	13 Heat	14 Heat	15 Heat	16 Heat	17 Heat
18 Heat	19 Heat	20 Heat	21 Heat	22 Heat	23 Heat	24 Heat
25 Heat	26 Heat	27 Heat	28 Heat	29 Heat	30 Heat	

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **37**NEWSWEEK
29 OCTOBER 1979

... then they'll finally agree to help the old and poor with the winter fuel bills, then bureaucrats will write the checks, then they'll give them to the Postal Service to deliver, and by then it'll be summer...

Oliphant © 1979 Washington Star

THE NEXT OIL CRUNCH

I think we are losing control of everything.
—Saudi oil minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani

Not too long ago, Saudi Arabia dominated the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—and, through it, determined the shape of the world oil market. But as Sheik Yamani warned last week, that time is gone. In the past fortnight, as prices on the volatile spot markets soared to nearly twice the official OPEC limit, five cartel members announced unilateral increases in their own oil prices. And last week, Libya broke the \$23.50-a-barrel ceiling established at the OPEC meeting just last June. "OPEC has lost control over pricing," says John Lichtblau of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation in New York. "OPEC was founded to put a floor on oil prices, but today the question is of a ceiling—and it looks as if it can't function this way."

The apparent free-for-all within OPEC is bad news for the U.S. and other major consuming nations. The cartel seems bound to raise the official price of crude, perhaps by as much as 15 per cent, at its next regular meeting on Dec. 17 in Caracas. By the beginning of next year, the average retail price of home heating oil in the U.S. could be as high as 90 cents a gallon—nearly twice what it was last January (chart, page 38). Higher fuel prices not only mean higher inflation rates for America, they also will cut sharply into the nation's purchasing power—adding to the likelihood of painful recession. And though current stocks of heating oil and gasoline seem adequate, they may not stay that way much beyond the coming winter. "We are living today in an era of great fragility in the supply of energy," CIA director Stansfield Turner

said last week. "It is easy to predict some form of turmoil [in the Mideast] that will upset the supply of energy."

The possibility of a major supply crunch early next year seems to worry Congress far more than the prospect of higher energy prices. To spur production and encourage conservation, Congress has gone along with President Carter's decontrol of oil prices—a politically unthinkable act not long ago. Congress is also moving closer to passing the windfall-profits tax, earmarking at least half of the multibillion-dollar proceeds for synthetic fuels, mass transit and tax credits for conservation. The move in Congress reflects the belief that the public, while angry over high fuel prices, is far more worried about supply disruptions. That was the message of last summer's gasoline lines, experts say. And it was echoed again last week when a nationwide series of rallies called by a coalition of union, consumer and senior-citizens groups known as the Campaign for Lower Energy Prices drew surprisingly small crowds.

CHANGES: The worrisome outlook for oil supplies is in large part the result of recent and profound changes in the global oil trade. For one thing, Saudi Arabia no longer has much power to exert a moderating influence over the rest of OPEC. In the past, Saudi Arabia could hold the price line by flooding the market with increased production from its vast crude reserves. But at a rate of 9.5 million barrels a day, the Saudis are already pumping at close to capacity. Then, too, the leverage of such OPEC "hawks" as Libya and Algeria has been buttressed by America's need for their "light and sweet" low-sulfur crude.

At the same time, there has been a major shift in trading patterns. Five years ago, the

world's twenty largest oil companies accounted for 80 per cent of all free-world oil trading. Acting as middlemen with the ability to swap supplies among themselves on a global scale, they were able to maintain an efficient worldwide flow of crude. Since then, however, OPEC has attempted to break the oil companies' control of the international pipeline by barring the swap arrangements that they had used to keep the system in balance. As a result, the companies' share of the trade has slipped to about 50 per cent—and much of the slack has been taken up by speculators and small traders operating in the spot markets of Rotterdam, Singapore, London and the Caribbean. "This shift," says Energy Department analyst John Treat, "drives prices up and makes the oil markets more susceptible to panic and uncertainty."

It also provides an irresistible temptation to oil producers. In recent months, Algeria, Nigeria, Iran and

Iraq have all been diverting crude to the spot markets, where they can sell it for far more than OPEC or oil-company contracts would allow. Iran, which now sells nearly a quarter of its daily output on the spot markets, is perhaps the worst offender. Last week, British Petroleum was forced to buy more than 7 million barrels of crude at spot prices ranging from \$35 to \$40 a barrel. According to U.S. sources, Iran also threatened to cancel its 1980 BP contracts if BP refused to buy some Iranian crude at spot prices.

On top of everything else, the continuing

Los Angeles rally: Tiny turnout

A. Ace Burgess—Ace's Angels



CONTINUED

NATIONAL AFFAIRS


political instability in Iran and Iraq has created what Yamani calls a "psychological climate" of extreme nervousness over the supply outlook. Uncertain about how much oil they will be able to purchase tomorrow, oil companies, traders and speculators are buying all they can today—pushing up prices even further. Not even the prospect of a recession holds any promise of a break in prices. The oil exporters have learned to adjust their production to the ripples in world demand—and with spot prices soaring, they no longer need high-volume sales to produce big revenues. Unlike the last recession, which effectively

ity—are still there . . . The chances of having gas lines next year are pretty high because the chances of something going wrong in the oil market are pretty high."

But over a period of years, the energy legislation now threading its way through Congress could encourage both conservation and domestic production. In broad outline, if not precise detail, Carter may well get most of what he wants. Price controls are dead, and last week the Senate Finance Committee finally approved a windfall-profits tax that would raise nearly \$142 billion in revenue over the next decade. Under the Senate plan, about \$70 billion would be used for energy subsidies for low-income families, \$22 billion for energy tax credits

AN EXPENSIVE WINTER AHEAD

There should be enough heating oil available this winter now that the industry has replenished the worrisome low stocks on hand last spring. But prices will be nearly twice as high as they were a year ago.



cut oil prices for two years, the coming one is likely to do no more than allow OPEC members the luxury of keeping more of their oil in the ground.

At the moment, the U.S. enjoys an adequate supply of fuel. Stocks of crude, home heating oil and gasoline are all higher than they were a year ago, and seem sufficient to get the nation through the winter without any major difficulty. But the higher prices will hurt. Experts reckon that just the oil-price hikes announced so far in 1979 will knock at least 1 per cent off real economic growth this year and next, while at the same time adding at least 1.5 per cent to the annual rate of inflation.

'KNIFE EDGE': In the short run, there's little anyone can do about prices or supply. "We're really on a knife edge," says president Robert W. Baldwin of Gulf Refining and Marketing Co. "All the factors that caused last summer's gas lines—limited supplies of crude, limited refinery capac-

ity and \$15 billion for mass transit. The committee bill would have to be reconciled with a House-passed version raising \$273 billion.

Congress is also close to giving its approval to an energy-mobilization board that would provide so-called fast-track procedures to speed the development of alternative energy sources past regulatory roadblocks. And it seems likely to appropriate funds for a major synthetic-fuel program—though one with considerably less money and independence from Congress than Carter had originally proposed.

It will be 1990 before much synthetic fuel is produced, and energy conservation is also a long-term process. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. will have no choice but to continue to rely on imported oil—and that may well mean another oil crunch before next summer.

ALLAN J. MAYER with JOHN WALCOTT, HENRY W. HUBBARD and WILLIAM J. COOK in Washington and bureau reports

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CARIBBEAN

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE VA-19WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1979**Jack Anderson**

U.S. Studies Leftist Turn by Jamaica

We have warned in past columns that Cuban President Fidel Castro is working with his Soviet mentors to undermine neighboring regimes throughout Latin America. Now State Department experts have secret evidence of precisely this danger in the sun-blessed, troubled island of Jamaica, just south of Cuba. This follows leftist gains in nearby Grenada and Nicaragua.

U.S. intelligence sources report that Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley has been making use of Soviet and Cuban intelligence agents. The disturbing result: he has moved his government sharply to the left in the past year.

The possible drift toward another communist triumph in the Caribbean has caused a major brouhaha at Foggy Bottom. It is the subject of a series of secret memos to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.

One confidential memo warns that Manley has "a fairly well-established record of increasingly intimate contact with Soviet KGB personnel in Jamaica." A possibly innocent reason for Manley's ties to the Soviet secret police is suggested in another State Department memo: He may be using the KGB as a counterweight to the real or fancied operations of our Central Intelligence Agency.

The memo explains: "While Manley's KGB contacts are disturbing, his paranoia about the opposition in his own country and possible activities by the CIA is well known. He may simply be looking to the KGB as another source of information on these activities."

But this comforting spy-versus-spy theory is not borne out by a couple of recent developments. One was a visit to

Cuba by Manley's foreign minister, P.J. Patterson, in the course of which he endorsed Castro's position on everything from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo to the Camp David accords.

Then Manley himself appeared at the meeting of "nonaligned nations" in Havana a few weeks ago. In his address, the Jamaican prime minister not only paid elaborate tribute to Castro but also spoke favorably of the new leftist government in Grenada and of the Puerto Rican independence movement.

In other words, State Department analysts fear that Manley may be cuddling up to the KGB for ideological reasons. They have one hope for the situation — that Manley may have left his supporters behind when he turned left, and may no longer be in control of his own party. They predict that he couldn't win an election held today, but unfortunately the next election isn't required until 1981.

As for the U.S. response to a Jamaican defection, our reporters Bob Sherman and Ron McRae have learned that the likeliest reaction would be reduction in the massive agricultural aid. Another aid program has been stalled in Congress, and Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.) has asked for a General Accounting Office audit of the grants given to Jamaica.

If the administration decides on the drastic step of aid cutoff, it would reverse the position laid down by the State Department in an economic report just one year ago. "U.S. assistance strategy should support Jamaican efforts to recover from the present economic crisis, correct structural weaknesses that contributed to that crisis and con-

tinue its economic and social development with full participation of its poor majority," the classified report advised.

Meanwhile, the Jamaican question and the way it is handled may provide a clue to the winner of the long-smoldering policy feud between Vance and the president's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski seeks an uncompromising anti-Soviet line in the Caribbean, while Vance favors a less doctrinaire, more flexible policy.

For now at least, it looks as if Brzezinski has President Carter's ear.

The author of the memos on Jamaica, Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Viron Vaky, has quietly resigned. William Bowdler, a Brzezinski protege, will replace him.

Boren's Boondoggle — An unpublished General Accounting Office report rips into a provision in Medicare-Medicaid legislation pending in the Senate, charging that it would strip the federal government of controls it now has over U.S. funds used to reimburse nursing home operators.

The measure is being pushed by Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.) as a way of saving money. But the GAO auditors found that the savings would be minimal at best.

What really bothers the GAO is that the Boren provision would allow states to revert to variations of the old system that paid nursing home proprietors a flat fee for services to Medicare patients. This let unscrupulous operators spend as little as they could get away with on their patients, and pocket the money they saved by shortchanging their patients.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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NICARAGUA DEFENDS REVOLUTION

By HARRY FRIED

Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge and junta member Moises Hassan claimed recently to have proof of current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activity in Nicaragua.

The CIA has been accused of working with both extreme right-wing and ultra-left-wing forces in order to destabilize and lower the international prestige of the revolutionary Government of National Reconstruction.

On the ultra-left, Borge pointed to the Popular Brigade of Anti-Somoza Combat Militia (MILPA) and the Worker's Front as organizations which refuse to respect the Sandinista-led revolutionary process, demanding instead an immediate and total radicalization.

Borge added that the ultra-leftists "objectively are being manipulated by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, and infiltrate the Nicaraguan revolution disguised as Trotskyists." Last month, the Sandinistas deported about 100 foreign Trotskyists who had entered Nicaragua following the Sandinista victory in July.

"The extreme left sees this as a bourgeois revolution and that the real revolution has still to come," explained Carlos Nunez Tellez, a member of the 9-person Sandinista National Directorate. "But our program is clear."

The Government of National Reconstruction is neither communist nor socialist, Borge and other Sandinista leaders have pointed out. At this point, it is committed above all to pluralist democracy and the reconstruction of the country.

Rather than simply "decree" socialism, "the deepening of the revolution will advance in conformity with the needs of the country," Borge commented.

"We feel the private sector has an important role to play in the reconstruction," said Bayardo Arce Castano, "but the private sector is as bankrupt as the rest of the nation. It needs our financing and will receive it if it follows three basic rules: one, it must seek to generate maximum employment; two, it must use to a maximum our own raw materials, and three, it must minimize our new foreign indebtedness."

The Sandinista Front, which views the current phase of the revolution as popular democracy as opposed to bourgeois democracy, is known to favor an eventual transformation to socialism. In fact, with the nationalization of all the properties of Somoza and National Guard officers, 40-60% of the national wealth has been appropriated by the state.

Top priority is still defense of the revolution. Of some 5000 National Guardsmen taken prisoner after last July's victory, all but 1200 have been released.

A number of those released, however, then slipped out of the country to then carry out armed attacks against the government. The Sandinistas then moved to tighten the release of the remaining prisoners, who will now all be brought to trial.

In addition, a 300,000-member militia is being formed to replace the National Guard. The militia will be organized on a mass level—in every factory, every neighborhood, and every rural area.

PROLONGED ECONOMIC CRISIS

On the economic front, the outlook is grim. The major obstacle to massive reconstruction is the slow pace of international aid. With most of the nation's capital investment destroyed by desperate bombardments during the final days of the war, and the national treasury practically emptied by Somoza and his associates, the Nicaraguan people took over a financially crippled state apparatus.

Aside from the material destruction and empty treasury, Somoza had built up an unusually large external debt of approximately \$1.5 billion. Most of this money was borrowed during recent years to finance Somoza-related business and the repressive apparatus. It is now owed by

the Government of National Reconstruction to various international creditors, in particular U.S. private banks and U.S.-controlled international agencies.

To meet payment deadlines, the government would have to take out further loans which would only serve to deepen Nicaragua's already critical financial dependence. In this context, Commander Daniel Ortega of the Government of National Reconstruction told the UN Sept. 29 that Nicaragua is unable to pay the debt.

"We want to preserve the honor of our country," said Ortega, "but we simply do not have the money to pay now."

CONTINUED

QUESTION OF DEBT

"We are not morally obligated to pay, but as part of the international community we must pay legally acquired debts," Ortega later told a press conference. "We are examining the whole question of debt. We will not pay for Somoza's arms or fraudulent debts that went straight into foreign bank accounts. Others we recognize, but this is different from having the ability to pay."

"In December, \$600 million falls due. Those who loaned it knew it was going directly to Somoza and knew at the time of the loan that he couldn't pay it back," Ortega continued. "This foreign debt is thus an international financial obligation and we need a moratorium on repayment—this is what we are now ready to negotiate."

In outlining the government's policy toward future loans, Ortega said that the Sandinistas would not take any loans on hard terms or "with ties to any foreign political model."

"We have received loans, for example, like the one from the Inter-American Development Bank on Sept. 15, which are fully adaptable to our own model of development," Ortega continued. "This is a 40-year loan with interest of 1% for the first 10 years and then 2% for the rest. It will be used to develop agriculture and livestock on Nicaragua's North Atlantic Coast."

The gravity of the financial crisis is apparent when examining the material conditions that people now confront. In the northern provincial capital of Esteli, for example, 15% of the population was killed in the liberation struggle. All but one of the city's 20 factories was destroyed, every commercial enterprise was destroyed and unemployment stands at 85%.

While Esteli was perhaps hardest hit of all Nicaragua, the rest of the country faces similar problems. Nationwide unemployment is estimated at 60%.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

NEW YORK TIMES
24 OCTOBER 1979

Venezuela, in O.A.S., Says U.S. Overreacted on Russian Troops

By JUAN de ONIS

Special to The New York Times

LA PAZ, Bolivia, Oct. 23 — Venezuela charged before the Organization of American States here today that the United States had overreacted to the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba with "an excessive demonstration of force" in the Caribbean.

Expressing a view shared by several countries in the Caribbean area, Venezuela's Foreign Minister, José Alberto Zambrano, said the landing of 1,800 marines at the United States naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, last week was an unfortunate move that undermined the credibility of Washington's judgments in the eyes of its allies. He said it was difficult to characterize the situation resulting from the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba as "an authentic crisis."

The United States military exercises and closer surveillance of Cuba were defended, however, by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance as moves designed to make sure that Soviet troops there "would not threaten the security of any nation in this hemisphere."

He said peace in the hemisphere required not only negotiated settlement of conflicts between countries but also the removal of tensions and injustices within nations that create "opportunities for outside interference."

U.S. Credibility Questioned

The Venezuelan Foreign Minister said in his speech before the ninth General Assembly of the O.A.S. that as a result of the United States exercises the nations of the area appeared "to the eyes of the world as subject to military tutelage."

"Excessive demonstration of force, in

a situation difficult to characterize as an authentic crisis, compromises the credibility of the United States, which has the immense responsibility of maintaining world peace," he added.

Mr. Vance, in his address, said that "peaceful and democratic change within nations is vital to the security of the hemisphere."

He said he welcomed the recent overthrow of right-wing dictatorships in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Looking at Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto of Nicaragua, Mr. Vance said the United States "will join with others in the hemisphere to support your efforts to build a democratic and equitable Nicaragua."

Meets Bolivian Leaders

In an effort to strengthen the shaky Bolivian Government under Walter Guevara Arze, an interim President chosen by Congress after elections in July ended 12 years of military rule, Mr. Vance met today with this country's principal political and military leaders.

Mr. Guevara's two months as President have been marked by conflicts with Congress, where rivalries between parties have prevented formation of a majority. The threat of a military coup is the main topic of political conversations now.

Mr. Vance, who returned to Washington tonight, conveyed President Carter's hope for political cooperation among party leaders and military restraint in order to consolidate Bolivia's return to elected government as an example for other countries under military rule, such as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.

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24 October 1979

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The Government of National Reconstruction is neither communist nor socialist, Borge and other Sandinista leaders have pointed out. At this point, it is committed above all to pluralist democracy and the reconstruction of the country.

Rather than simply "decree" socialism, "the deepening of the revolution will advance in conformity with the needs of the country," Borge commented.

"We feel the private sector has an important role to play in the reconstruction," said Bayardo Arce Castano, "but the private sector is as bankrupt as the rest of the nation. It needs our financing and will receive it if it follows three basic rules: one, it must seek to generate maximum employment; two, it must use to a maximum our own raw materials; and three, it must minimize our new foreign indebtedness."

The Sandinista Front, which views the current phase of the revolution as popular democracy as opposed to bourgeois democracy, is known to favor an eventual transformation to socialism. In fact, with the nationalization of all the properties of Somoza and National Guard officers, 40-60% of the national wealth has been appropriated by the state.

Top priority is still defense of the revolution. Of some 5000 National Guardsmen taken prisoner after last July's victory, all but 1200 have been released.

A number of those released, however, then slipped out of the country to then carry out armed attacks against the government. The Sandinistas then moved to tighten the release of the remaining prisoners, who will now all be brought to trial.

In addition, a 300,000-member militia is being formed to replace the National Guard. The militia will be organized on a mass level—in every factory, every neighborhood, and every rural area.

PROLONGED ECONOMIC CRISIS

On the economic front, the outlook is grim. The major obstacle to massive reconstruction is the slow pace of international aid. With most of the nation's capital investment destroyed by desperate bombardments during the final days of the war, and the national treasury practically emptied by Somoza and his associates, the Nicaraguan people took over a financially crippled state apparatus.

Aside from the material destruction and empty treasury, Somoza had built up an unusually large external debt of approximately \$1.5 billion. Most of this money was borrowed during recent years to finance Somoza-related business and the repressive apparatus. It is now owed by

the Government of National Reconstruction to various international creditors, in particular U.S. private banks and U.S.-controlled international agencies.

To meet payment deadlines, the government would have to take out further loans which would only serve to deepen Nicaragua's already critical financial dependence. In this context, Commander Daniel Ortega of the Government of National Reconstruction told the UN Sept. 29 that Nicaragua is unable to pay the debt.

"We want to preserve the honor of our country," said Ortega, "but we simply do not have the money to pay now."

CONTINUED

QUESTION OF DEBT

"We are not morally obligated to pay, but as part of the international community we must pay legally acquired debts," Ortega later told a press conference. "We are examining the whole question of debt. We will not pay for Somoza's arms or fraudulent debts that went straight into foreign bank accounts. Others we recognize, but this is different from having the ability to pay."

"In December, \$600 million falls due. Those who loaned it knew it was going directly to Somoza and knew at the time of the loan that he couldn't pay it back," Ortega continued. "This foreign debt is thus an international financial obligation and we need a moratorium on repayment—this is what we are now ready to negotiate."

In outlining the government's policy toward future loans, Ortega said that the Sandinistas would not take any loans on hard terms or "with ties to any foreign political model."

"We have received loans, for example, like the one from the Inter-American Development Bank on Sept. 15, which are fully adaptable to our own model of development," Ortega continued. "This is a 40-year loan with interest of 1% for the first 10 years and then 2% for the rest. It will be used to develop agriculture and livestock on Nicaragua's North Atlantic Coast."

The gravity of the financial crisis is apparent when examining the material conditions that people now confront. In the northern provincial capital of Esteli, for example, 15% of the population was killed in the liberation struggle. All but one of the city's 20 factories was destroyed, every commercial enterprise was destroyed and unemployment stands at 85%.

While Esteli was perhaps hardest hit of all Nicaragua, the rest of the country faces similar problems. Nationwide, unemployment is estimated at 60%.

NATIONAL REVIEW
12 October 1979

Cuban Mess

The brute facts are as follows. The Soviets have had thousands of "advisors" in Cuba for twenty years performing various functions. Recently, however, changes have been made in structure and mission. The new Soviet presence involves not a "brigade" of two to three thousand combat troops, but up to ten thousand. They are involved in coordinating with and training Cuban troops in jungle warfare. This is a logical next move in the Soviet imperialist enterprise. Such warriors will show up in Rhodesia, Nicaragua, or anywhere else deemed vulnerable. The Administration has known about all this since December 1978 but, at that time, chose to . . . forget about it.

No doubt the Administration feared for SALT II if this business saw the light of day. Ineptly, the Administration assumed that it wouldn't surface. But the lapse goes far beyond SALT considerations. It involves a whole set of assumptions about Soviet intentions, assumptions that involve technology and grain transfers to the Soviets, and have as their premise Soviet "restraint."

Unbelievably, though the Administration plainly knew what was going on as early as December, nothing was done until last March, when the CIA was asked for more information. Within a few weeks, the White House had the bad news. Soviet combat troops were being rotated through Cuba for aggressive purposes elsewhere. Detente was as dead as the Helsinki accords on human rights.

Opening itself to imminent political rape, the White House again said nothing. Political ineptitude on this scale is surely unprecedented.

Not much time had elapsed before Senators Stone and Church did their thing. Church, now in a tough re-election fight in conservative Idaho—he is widely considered "gone"—re-feathered himself as a hawk on Cuba. The interests of Church and Carter have ceased to coincide. Senator Stone comes from Florida, which has a large Cuban population. Carter desperately needs Florida, as early as the state caucuses next month. Does anyone at the White House have any overall conception of the dynamics of the issue, either in national presidential terms or in its world arena significance?

Apparently not. The Soviets have protected their options. They can continue to use Cuba as a training center, preparatory to projecting their power imperially over palm and pine. Or they could be "magnanimous." They could be nice to the crippled Carter, conducting a cosmetic withdrawal as a peace-SALT move. For that, Carter would have to pay a price.

By its stunning ineptitude, the White House thus managed to place itself at the mercy of both ambitious Democrats at home and the mortal enemies of freedom abroad.

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Change in the Caribbean?

By WILLIAM BEECHER

WASHINGTON—Whistling in the graveyard? Seeking the silver lining in the hurricane clouds? Wishful thinking? Perhaps. But some ranking American planners, even as President Carter and certain of his top advisers fret about Cuba being built into a base for increased subversion and outright aggression in the Western Hemisphere, feel Castroism may not be as much of an immediate threat as it's painted.

They concede that the winds of change—social, political and economic—are mounting ominously in the Caribbean, Central and South America. Unemployed and underemployed young people particularly are angry about the greedy hold that small numbers of families have over their countries and are turning to drugs, radicalism and rebellion.

The tiny nation of Grenada fell in a leftist coup, aided, though apparently not inspired, by Cubans. Then more recently came Nicaragua. It was Administration concern about the backstage Soviet-Cuban role in the Nicaraguan civil war that spurred Zbigniew Brzezinski to order an intensive intelligence review of what was going on in Havana. And that turned up the presence of a Soviet mechanized brigade, triggering domestic and international shock waves.

Dismissing the ensuing confrontation as contrived, because the brigade had been in place for three years, the Soviet Union refused to disband the unit or cooperate in a face-saving solution.

Embarrassed politically, but more frightened of the consequences of allowing the crisis atmosphere to jeopardize the SALT II treaty, President Carter came up with a new form of an old solution: a regional containment policy. Shades of John Foster Dulles.

The American fleet in the Caribbean will be beefed up, he said. Surveillance over Cuba will intensify. A special task force headquarters will be established in Key West to draw up contingency plans in case Russian or Cuban military forces should attempt to intervene in any Latin country. And economic aid, he added as a seeming afterthought, will be stepped up to help backward nations stave off Communist domination.

Privately, most analysts concede there was more bluster than muscle in the President's countermeasures. But potentially the most important measure was judicious application of increased aid, trade and political cooperation.

"Nicaragua is the key," one top planner declared. "That a social revolution was past due is beyond dispute." The historic question is whether the government that evolves in Managua will preserve central elements of democracy instead of aping the Cuban model. If it does so successfully, it will send a message through the region: You don't have to supplant a dictatorship of the right with a dictatorship of the left."

A debate is under way within the Administration to try to come up with an enlightened, though relatively inexpensive, aid package. The United States also is encouraging countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands to expand their economic activities in places like Nicaragua.

Those officials who say the economic horse belongs in front of the military cart do not minimize the Soviet-Cuban threat to exploit targets of opportunity wherever they can find them.

Moscow and Havana, they agree, must somehow be persuaded that continued "adventurism" could become costly. They believe the Soviet brigade was established in Cuba, not because of an Russian plans to intervene directly in Latin America, but because of Fidel Castro's growing nervousness that, as his forces intervened in creasingly around the world, Uncle Sam might lose patience and start making threats.

In early May, before the intelligence community discovered the Soviet brigade, the CIA did a classified study of Cuban activities which concluded: "Havana's approach to events in Central America... reflects a far more sophisticated and selective revolutionary doctrine than that which guided Cuba's actions during the 1960s. Cuba clearly believes it has a stake in preserving its improving image with many governments in the hemisphere and wants to avoid provoking a US counterresponse."

Concludes one planner: "If we can export labor-intensive industries into the region to sop up the social discontent of the young, and provide real hope of improvement and change, that would be a lot more important than 100 Marine Corp. exercises at Guantanamo."

William Beecher is The Globe's diplomatic correspondent.

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SALT

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
25 October 1979

Panel stalls on Glenn's SALT reservations

By HENRY L. TREWHITT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, inching the SALT II treaty toward full Senate debate, stalled yesterday over proposals by Senator John H. Glenn (D. Ohio) to guarantee American access to sensitive information on Soviet missile tests.

Mr. Glenn offered two reservations as preconditions for Senate ratification of the treaty.

One would require the Soviet Union to broadcast telemetry (technical data about missile performance) during all tests of long-range missiles. The other would require the Soviets to give advance notice of all such tests.

The second, especially, is attractive to some members of the Senate. As negotiated, the treaty does not require advance notification on tests conducted within national boundaries, thereby excluding most Soviet tests. The United States, on the other hand, conducts most tests over international waters.

Mr. Glenn offered his reservations in a form that would require formal acceptance by the Soviets, while not amending the treaty itself. Administration officials promptly objected, however, that the reservations were the equivalent of a so-called killer amendment that the Soviet would not accept.

A test missile may be programmed to beam data on speed, course and other factors back to ground controllers. The United States counts on intercepting and interpreting uncoded telemetry data to make certain that the Soviets are not testing some new missile forbidden by arms control treaties.

SALT II, the strategic arms limitation treaty, forbids any action that impedes verification, but does not require positive telemetry on all tests.

After airing Mr. Glenn's proposals briefly in public, the committee closed its hearing yesterday to consider secret data. Unable to agree, even in private, it scheduled another secret session for today.

In the end, Senate aides speculated, the two reservations might be defeated by the same majority coalition of Democrats and Republicans that has defeated all changes in treaty substance so far by margins of 8 to 7 and 9 to 6. But the attractiveness of Mr. Glenn's proposals, appeared as an omen for future debate in the Senate, where approval will require a two-thirds majority, or 67 votes.

The committee had no such difficulty with two direct treaty amendments proposed by Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R.; Tenn.). They would have required abandonment by the Soviet Union of its 308 heavy SS-18 missiles, for which the United States has no equivalent, or termination of the SALT treaty at the end of 1981, four years early.

The committee voted 9-7 against the proposals after Lloyd N. Cutler, the White House counsel, pointed out that the United States had no desire for such missiles. These proposals, he said, were killer amendments.

SALT II would limit the United States and the Soviet Union to 2,250 strategic launchers each. Measured against the nuclear plans of the two superpowers, the treaty has taken on political meaning rivaling its significance for the strategic balance.

It is first a test of Mr. Carter's power with Congress. Both Moscow and Washington treat it as a vital link in East-West relations. It has become, moreover, a symbol of American standing within the Western alliance, a critical precondition for strengthening the alliance and for subsequent East-West negotiations.

Most speculation now suggests the treaty will be accepted by the Foreign Relations Committee without fatal reservations.

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Sen. Glenn Weighs Scrapping of SALT Amendments

by Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

Sen. John Glenn, a key figure in the Senate SALT II debate, said yesterday he is considering Carter administration pleas that he not press for new Soviet concessions on the issue of treaty verification.

Glenn, an Ohio Democrat, has proposed two conditions to Senate ratification of the arms pact. Both concern U.S. ability to verify Soviet compliance with provisions of the treaty.

Glenn, a former astronaut, has made himself an expert on the verification issue. His views could influence his colleagues in light of the Senate Intelligence Committee's failure to issue a formal, categorical endorsement of U.S. verification capability, for which SALT supporters had hoped.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee went behind the Capitol's toughest security barriers yesterday to discuss the technical problems related to Glenn's proposals. A further closed session was planned today.

In the meantime, administration officials have been trying to find a formula to satisfy Glenn's concerns without requiring the Russians to formally agree, because they believe that would present grave difficulties.

Yesterday, Glenn left the door open to such a solution, saying he wanted to think the issue over. "I wouldn't want to lock myself in one way or the other at this time," he said.

The Glenn proposal that could attract the most Senate support is a non-technical one that would require the Soviet Union to inform the

United States before it tests its intercontinental missiles.

U.S. monitoring capability has been impaired by the loss of ground stations in Iran, which were able to peer electronically on the missile test site in southern Russia. Notification of single missile tests that will take place within the boundaries of the Soviet Union is not required by SALT II, but would help the United

States monitor missile characteristics that are controlled by the treaty.

The second Glenn proposal is aimed at an agreement that would prevent the Soviet Union from encoding data radioed to Soviet ground stations from the test missiles. Such encoding would deny the United States the ability to electronically eavesdrop on the missile test data.

SALT supporters have been intently watching Glenn and Sen. Edward Zorinsky, D-Neb., as potential swing votes on SALT. Yesterday, Glenn voted with the majority when the Foreign Relations Committee voted 9-6 against amendments proposed by Sen. Howard Baker of Tennessee, the Senate Republican leader. Zorinsky voted with Baker.

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A Taste for Tampering with Treaties

New York.

IN 1803, LORD HARROWBY, the British foreign secretary, rejected the King-Hawkesbury Convention after the U.S. Senate had voted its consent, subject to deleting an article of the treaty negotiated to set the northwest boundary of the United States. Lord Harrowby bitterly denounced the Senate's practice "of ratifying treaties with exceptions to part of them."

President Theodore Roosevelt, faced with Senate amendments to several arbitration

By Thomas M. Franck

conventions, wrote Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge that, "We had better abandon the whole business rather than give the impression of trickiness and insincerity" the last-minute amendments would create.

President Woodrow Wilson gave up his cherished dream of a League of Nations under American leadership rather than accept changes tacked on by Senator Lodge and his followers.

Just last year the British turned down a tax treaty with the United States after it had been doctored by senators.

The Senate's practice of making amendments or adding "understandings" to treaties after the end of formal negotiations undoubtedly disturbs those with whom the United States would seek understandings. No other country in the world has a system that permits its legislature to open a second round after the parties have hammered out an agreement. When the British or the French sign a treaty with us, the text you see is the text you get.

This practice of senatorial editing goes back to 1794, and it is instructive to note its origins. In negotiating the Jay Treaty with Britain, President Washington for the first time did not follow his previous practice of securing the advice of senators before and during negotiations. The Senate responded by amending an article of the agreement when the treaty was submitted for the senators' consent.

The Constitution clearly calls for the Senate to give both "advice" and "consent" to treaties—two separate functions. But as presidents stopped asking for advice, the Senate insisted on having its say when it could, at the consent stage.

In recent years, strong presidents increasingly preferred to negotiate in secret, then bully senators into accepting their *faits accomplis* in the name of national security. At the same time, chief executives developed the short-cut of making "executive agreements." This device, not mentioned in the Constitution, came to serve the same purpose as treaties except that executive agreements were not submitted for the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.

In the last two years, however, the presidency has made a genuine effort to return to the intent of the Constitution, seeking the ad-

vice of Senate members during negotiations. Especially during the talks on the future of the Panama Canal, the recent Geneva Trade Negotiations and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets, key senators—in the fairly accurate words of a senior White House aide—have been "consulted to death" and, in many cases, have been invited to participate as congressional advisers in the talks themselves.

In the instance of the SALT talks, the presidential negotiators have been particularly responsive to senators' advice.

- At the urging of Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, a treaty provision was renegotiated to permit the sharing of cruise-missile technology with our Western European allies.

- When the Soviets began to use code in radio transmissions from flight-tested missiles, Senator John Glenn of Ohio insisted on getting a prohibition on telemetry encryption added to the draft.

- Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland, in discussions with the Russians as well as with American SALT negotiators, held out for agreement on a "data base" to which parties must provide figures on their own strategic offensive forces.

- Senators Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire, John C. Culver of Iowa and Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, all members of the Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Research and Development, prevailed on the negotiators to alter the expiration date of a key protocol. They wanted to make sure that the Soviets' obligation to reduce their missile armory, in 1982, would be carried out before the United States had to decide whether to renew its three-year pledge restricting the range of sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. Senator Dennis DeConcini was also able to extract from the White House a commitment that this three-year ban would not constitute a "precedent" for extending it.

CONTINUED

- Senator Gary Hart won quiet presidential backing for an "understanding" requiring Senate consent before the cruise moratorium could be extended.

- Senator Hart also held out for a change that exempts certain gyroscopic guidance technology (in which the United States has a lead) from treaty provisions restricting the upgrading of missiles systems. On the other hand, he and several other senators prevailed on the administration to narrow the definition of the treaty's "New Type rule" which limits variations in systems characteristics.

Perhaps the most important senatorial input had to do not with the terms of the treaty but with a collateral matter. In October, 1977, the Soviets had tested their new SS-19 missile, proving that it could deliver warheads with such precision as to be able to destroy our concrete Minuteman missile silos. Enemies of SALT had been quick to point out that the agreement will permit the Soviets to deploy up to 10 independently targeted warheads on as many as 820 intercontinental missiles, thereby theoretically authorizing enough Soviet fire power to take out the entire U.S. land-based missile system in a single "first strike." Senators Robert Byrd, John Stennis, and Sam Nunn—all three considered "crucial" by White House SALT strategists—told President Carter that if the treaty was to have a chance in the Senate, there must be a public commitment to a new U.S. weapons system able to match or exceed the new Russian capability. Last June 8, Mr. Carter responded by announcing a decision to build the new MX mobile missile with three times the throw-weight of Minuteman and with a capacity for 10 independently targeted warheads.

These and other examples illustrate the remarkable revival of a senatorial role in advising on the substance and tactics of treaty negotiations. It remains to be seen whether the revival of the "advice" function will succeed in dissipating the Senate's taste for tampering with the text at the "consent" stage of treaty ratification.

This week the SALT II Treaty narrowly survived an attempt in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to change the terms governing so-called "heavy missiles." Had the change been adopted by the Senate, the White House said, the treaty would have had to be renegotiated with the Soviets. If the SALT treaty manages to pass without such "killer amendments," that will be a clear sign that the new system of co-determination and better liaison is having its intended effect.

Thomas Franck writes on international law. His latest book, "Foreign Policy by Congress," will be published next month.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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25 October 1979

Byrd Predicts Senate SALT Action in '79 But Says Energy Bills Will Come First

By ALBERT R. HUNT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd plans to take up the major energy bills before the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty but predicts the Senate still will act on SALT this year.

In an interview, the West Virginia Democrat denied recurring rumors that he will hold the "windfall profits" tax hostage to finishing SALT. The tax on additional revenues oil companies will get from the decontrol of domestic crude-oil prices and separate nontax energy legislation will dominate Senate activity in the first two or three weeks of November, he indicated. Then, SALT will be considered. This schedule, he acknowledged, leaves little time for action on any other major measures this year.

"My one-two-three-four priorities have never changed," Sen. Byrd declared. "They are the two energy bills, the (three) remaining appropriations bills and SALT."

SALT Endorsement

Sen. Byrd is expected officially to endorse SALT at a news conference today. Although the Majority Leader's active support is an essential plus for the treaty, it still faces an uphill struggle to win the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification.

On the energy bills, Sen. Byrd hoped each could be completed in a week to 10 days. Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long (D., La.) yesterday said that panel's version of the windfall profits tax won't be ready for full Senate action until around Nov. 5. Yesterday, the Senate Energy Committee completed its legislation, which includes steps to spur production of synthetic fuels and conservation measures. But the bill won't be ready for floor action until the end of next week. Thus, it seems almost certain the Senate can't complete these energy measures before Thanksgiving.

The Senate Energy panel added a complication yesterday when it voted 10 to eight to require concurrence of both houses of Congress if the President wants to impose oil import quotas. Although this provision probably will be considered separately and sooner, possibly even this week, the outcome remains in doubt.

Unconvinced on Chrysler

Sen. Byrd's timetable probably dooms most other legislation this year, including the so-called Illinois brick legislation, which expands the rights of consumers to sue anti-trust violators. This is likely to produce a filibuster by opponents.

Similarly, any help for ailing Chrysler Corp. may have to wait. Sen. Byrd noted that time could be made "for emergency measures if necessary" but added: "I'm not personally convinced yet the federal government needs to help Chrysler."

Overall, he acknowledged that most other legislation will have to be considered within the next week or so or wait until 1980. "We've got a gap but it isn't much of a gap and it isn't going to last long," he declared.

Sen. Byrd also indicated that he thinks SALT could be resolved in the Senate before Christmas. He wants to avoid putting the treaty over until next year when it would encounter even more turbulence from election year politics.

But the treaty still faces a tough fight despite the strong support Sen. Byrd will offer today. The Foreign Relations Committee probably will approve the treaty within the next week or so, but proponents concede they aren't anywhere near the 67 votes needed for full Senate ratification.

There have been several razor thin votes in the committee this week that defeated some "killer amendments," changes that, if adopted, almost surely would cause the Soviet Union to renounce the treaty. But the Majority Leader insisted those votes don't necessarily spell trouble for the pact on the floor. "You can overreact to that," he said, the "real issue in the Senate is whether the treaty will get the two-thirds for ratification."

Sen. Byrd clearly believes ratification has a real chance, though he doesn't disguise his dismay over White House handling of the issue. In particular, he believed the marked decline in support for SALT shown by public opinion polls is due to the "pseudocrisis" of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, and that the situation was "totally mishandled by the administration." Nevertheless, he thinks that issue is subsiding.

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WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1979

Baker Loses Another Round on SALT

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday rejected another effort by Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. to send the SALT treaty back to the negotiating table after a theatrical debate between Baker and presidential counsel Lloyd N. Cutler.

For the second successive day the issue before the committee was the 308 "heavy" intercontinental ballistic missiles that SALT II (like SALT I) permits the Soviet Union to maintain, though the United States is denied the right to build equally enormous weapons.

Baker yesterday offered two more amendments aimed at these missiles, after losing an 8-to-7 vote Tuesday on a proposal to allow the United States to match them.

Cutler, chief administration spokesman in the Foreign Relations Committee's markup proceedings on the treaty, then stepped out of the relatively passive role he has been playing and sharply challenged Baker's position.

Addressing the minority leader (and undeclared candidate for president) directly, Cutler said, "It may be, Sen. Baker, that you will have the privilege

to conduct [the] negotiations for SALT III," implicitly inviting a future President Baker to see what he could to negotiate away the Soviets' heavy missiles, which are a central part of their arsenal.

"But I respectfully submit," Cutler went on, "that it would be beyond even your capability to negotiate [reduction or elimination of the 308 heavy missiles] as part of SALT II." Noting that the joint chiefs of staff had specifically rejected reopening the negotiations on SALT II, Cutler went on: "It would be a very heavy responsibility for anyone voting for your amendment to reject that military judgment and substitute your own..."

Replied Baker: "This nation is in grave peril in my judgment because you did a bad job in negotiating this treaty," allowing the retention of "these most monstrous of all weapons," the Soviet heavy missiles. Baker said he couldn't wait for SALT III to solve this problem, adding that it was a "bugaboo" argument to contend—as Cutler did—that SALT could be lost entirely by adopting amendments like Baker's.

In another development yesterday, informed sources said a backstage effort to produce a new consensus on a Senate declaration demanding significant reductions of strategic arsenals in any future SALT agreement had run into difficulty.

Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) had asked Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), George McGovern (D-S.D.) and others to work together on this issue, but Moynihan and McGovern are so far apart at present that no progress has been made, the sources said.

According to an aide to McGovern, he is now seeking support from other senators for a proposed Senate declaration demanding future reductions that McGovern hopes to offer to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee next week.

The idea of demanding substantial reductions in SALT III appeals to senators at both ends of the political spectrum. Byrd and the White House hope that a consensus position will emerge on this issue and on some kind of declaratory commitment to increased defense spending, and that this combination will help persuade the needed 67 senators to vote for SALT II.

Yesterday's Baker amendments were both defeated by identical 9-to-6

votes. John Glenn (D-Ohio), who had voted with Baker Tuesday when he proposed granting the United States the right to match the Soviet heavy missiles, voted against him yesterday.

The first amendment Baker offered yesterday would have required the Soviets to dismantle their 308 heavy missiles by the end of 1981, and reduced accordingly the SALT II limits on ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. The second would have required the United States and Soviet Union to negotiate an agreement by the end of 1981 to make those same reductions later, or the SALT II treaty would lapse at that time.

Ambassador Ralph Earle, the chief U.S. SALT negotiator, said Baker's preoccupation with the heavy missiles was misplaced, adding that "if every Soviet SS18 [heavy missile] sank into the sea tomorrow," remaining Soviet weapons could pose what amounts to a comparable threat to the United States.

Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the committee, indirectly accused Baker of playing politics with his amendments. Church said of one Baker proposal, "This is an amendment without a military purpose."

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2 MORE AMENDMENTS OF ARMS PACT LOSE

Modifications Proposed by Baker
Were Aimed at the Elimination
of Soviet Heavy Missiles

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today rejected two amendments to the strategic arms limitation treaty that would have required the Soviet Union to dismantle its most powerful missiles.

The changes, proposed by the Republican leader, Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, were defeated 9 to 6. One of the amendments would have required the dismantling of the 308 Soviet heavy-missile launchers. A second would have canceled the treaty if no agreement on dismantling was reached by 1982.

The committee chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, and spokesmen for the Administration said the proposals would cause Moscow to refuse to ratify the treaty. Senator Church said that if such changes were not defeated the committee "might just as well shut up shop."

Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who yesterday supported a Baker amendment giving the United States the right to match Soviet deployment of heavy missiles, voted against today's changes.

Byrd Expect to Announce Stand

The majority leader, Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, is expected to announce his support of the treaty, perhaps at a news conference scheduled for tomorrow. The Republican whip, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, said today that, while he might vote for a modified treaty, he would vote against the present text.

Later today the Foreign Affairs Committee went into closed session to hear officials explain their objections to proposed modifications designed to facilitate treaty verification.

Proposals introduced by Senator Glenn and by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, would prohibit practices that impede the collection of signals from missiles during flight tests.

Senator Glenn's proposal is in the form of an "understanding" and would require Soviet assent. He said in a telephone interview that the Administration was asking him to make changes in the wording and to cast the proposal in different form to avoid the need for Soviet assent.

Senators Glenn and Lugar also proposed changes requiring prior notice of test flights within Soviet territory.

Election politics intruded into the discussion today. Lloyd N. Cutler, White House counsel, said the elimination of the Soviet heavy missiles had long been a goal of United States Presidents and remained a legitimate objective for the next arms treaty.

"It may be, Senator Baker, that you will have the high privilege of conducting that negotiation," Mr. Cutler said, alluding to the Senator's Presidential aspirations, "but it would be beyond even your capability to negotiate that as part of SALT II."

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SENATE PANEL, 8-7, DEFEATS AMENDMENT PERILING ARMS PACT

SOME WORRIED BY CLOSENESS

Modification by Baker Would Have
Given U.S. the Right to Match
Russians' Heavy Missiles

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee narrowly defeated today a so-called killer amendment to the strategic arms limitation treaty that would have asserted a legal right by the United States to match the Soviet deployment of heavy missiles.

The proposal, offered by the Republican leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, was defeated by a vote of 8 to 7. Three Democrats, John Glenn of Ohio, Richard Stone of Florida and Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska, voted for it.

The treaty allows the Soviet Union 308 launchers of heavy ballistic missiles that can lift much greater payloads than any American missiles. United States officials have said that American strategic doctrine does not call for such heavy missiles, but the Baker amendment was designed to assert the right to build them if the United States ever changed its policy.

Some See Worrisome Development

The closeness of the vote and, especially, the signal sent by the three Senators from the broad ideological center of the Democratic Party was described by Senate sources as a worrisome development for treaty supporters.

Final approval will require a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Amendments and other reservations may be adopted by a simple majority.

Amendments like the one proposed by Senator Baker could be important weapons for treaty opponents. If any amendments that significantly alter the treaty terms are enacted, the Soviet Union may either reject the treaty or demand equivalent concessions from the United States.

Most opponents of the treaty doubt that they can push through an amendment like today's that might ultimately prove the treaty killer. But they have expressed the hope that a series of close votes on amendments on the Senate floor will frustrate enough members to provide additional votes needed to block the treaty as a whole.

Senator Stone seemed to lend some va-

lidity to that expectation at today's committee meeting when he remarked in a rising voice that, if the protreaty leadership persisted in taking what he called a "stubborn" line against amendments, the treaty may be narrowly defeated, "and maybe more than narrowly."

Senator Baker seemed to be mildly elated by the close vote in the committee, which had been thought more favorable to the treaty than the Senate as a whole. He said he now believed that there was "an excellent chance" that some sort of amendment on the heavy missile issue would be approved when the treaty reaches the floor.

Treaty supporters, according to Lloyd N. Cutler, a White House counsel, did not agree that the vote had any fatal significance. But Administration officials said a similar amendment might be defeated by only three or four votes on the floor. The officials think there is an even clearer danger posed by several proposals that would limit the Soviet Union's freedom to encode signals from missiles undergoing test flights or would dictate some of the Soviet test-flight procedures.

Senator Baker told the committee that he was "perfectly aware" that the United States had no interest in heavy missiles, but he said it should insist at least on the legal right to have them.

Mr. Cutler told the committee that the amendment would not give the United States any advantages. He said the Russians would either consider it nonnegotiable or use it to extract other concessions from the United States.

Senators supporting the treaty noted that it reduced the danger posed by the

Soviet heavy missiles by limiting each missile to 10 nuclear warheads. But Senator Glenn countered that the existence of the missiles, which might be modified to carry up to 40 warheads each, gave the Soviet Union a potential ability to "break out" of the treaty with a sudden increase in warheads.

The Foreign Relations Committee is expected to vote tomorrow on other amendments by Mr. Baker, including one that would cut to 150 the number of heavy missiles permitted to the Soviet Union and another that would cause the treaty to be abrogated if elimination of such weapons had not been negotiated by 1982. These amendments may be defeated by a slightly larger margin than today's vote.

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ON PAGE A-3

THE WASHINGTON POST
24 October 1979

Baker Amendment to SALT Pact Rebuffed

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

An attempt by Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) to alter the strategic arms limitation treaty substantially failed by a single vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday.

Three Democrats joined Baker and three other Republicans to vote for the proposal, which Baker said yesterday had only symbolic significance, and which he had described last June as "a movement in the wrong direction."

Treaty supporters said the Baker amendment would effectively kill SALT II. A combination of six Democrats and two Republicans voted to defeat it.

Also yesterday, Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) threatened to bring SALT II up on the floor before the Senate considers the "windfall profits" tax on oil companies, a move that would disrupt the Senate's schedule but perhaps improve the chances of a vote on SALT II this year.

Baker's proposal was to permit the United States to build and deploy 308 "heavy" land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to match the Soviets in this category. Baker admitted, however, that the United States does not want this type of weapon and would not build it even if permitted to do so by the treaty.

Last June, when Baker first announced that he was opposing SALT II as written because of his concern over heavy missiles, among other issues, he was asked if he would favor the sort of amendment he proposed yesterday. Baker replied that he would not, that such an amendment would be a "movement in the wrong direction" because it would further the arms race, not reduce superpower arsenals.

Yesterday Baker said he still preferred eliminating the Soviet Union's heavy missiles, but would favor the approach of his proposal as better than nothing.

The Soviets' 308 heavy missiles are much bigger than anything the United States has ever built or even contemplated. The first SALT agreement on offensive arms and then SALT II permit the Soviets to maintain these rockets, the heart of the Soviet Union's land-based force, while prohibiting the United States from acquiring them.

The Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations justified this exception for the Soviets' heavy missiles as simply a reflection of the status quo for which the United States is compensated in other provisions of the SALT agreements. But Baker said yesterday that the exception was a one-sided provision that contradicted the Senate's instructions, given when SALT I was approved, that SALT II should give the United States strategic nuclear forces that are "not inferior" to those of the Soviet Union.

Baker said he was sure that a firmer negotiating position would have persuaded the Soviets to give up some or all of the SS9 and SS18 rockets, which are the most formidable weapons in their arsenal.

Presidential counsel Lloyd M. Cutler, speaking for the administration, said that Baker's proposal, if adopted, would lead to reopening the SALT negotiations, and would require the United States to make new concessions to the Soviets. This, said Cutler, was too high a price to pay for a

change in the treaty that Baker acknowledged was only symbolic.

Last week, the chairman of Baker's undeclared presidential campaign, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), warned the Foreign Relations Committee against approving "cosmetic" changes in SALT II, then claiming that it had taken a tough position. Cutler picked up Lugar's language yesterday, saying of Baker's heavy missile proposal: "If there ever was a cosmetic amendment, this is it."

The three Democrats who voted for Baker's proposal were John Glenn (Ohio), Richard Stone (Fla.) and Edward Zorinsky (Neb.).

Byrd suggested the possibility of considering SALT before the "windfall profits" tax at a breakfast for congressional leaders at the White House yesterday. Byrd has been trying, without success so far, to get unanimous consent for a time agreement that would limit the SALT debate.

Senate leaders apparently hope that the threat of losing their long Christmas and New Year's recess will be enough to get action on SALT this year, but that schedule remains problematical.

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ON PAGE 1

WASHINGTON REPORT
SEPTEMBER 1979

Governor Clements Speaks on SALT II

A large number of very distinguished authorities have testified on SALT II before the Senate Armed Forces and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Few if any statements exceed the one presented by Governor William Clements of Texas, former Deputy Secretary of Defense. The statement by Governor Clements is clear, forceful, and authoritative.

We recommend it to all *Washington Report* readers. Editor.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I am pleased to be with you today. I am honored and I am grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to appear before your Committee and to share with you my views concerning the proposed SALT II Treaty. I consider the issue of Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty to be the single most important thing to have come before the Senate and, in turn, before the American public for the past many years. Why? Because we are talking about the very future of our country. You are voting on the very framework of our national security. We may well be deciding when and how the next world crisis will occur. We may well be setting the stage for an atomic confrontation between the United States and Russia.

In my judgment, all of the necessary ingredients are present today to create such a situation in the early 1980's. We in the United States are in greater danger today than we were in December 1941, after Pearl Harbor.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I was Deputy Secretary of Defense for four years beginning January 1973 and ending January 1977. During those four years I was a member of the National Security Council and was also a member of all six subcommittees of the National Security Council. The record will show that there were no SALT discussions within the National Security Council or its subcommittees in which I did not participate. Only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had a similar position of being a member of the National Security Council and also a member of all of the subcommittees. During my four years at the Department of Defense I was associated with two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, first with Admiral Thomas Moorer and later with General George Brown. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I understand the process of the SALT negotiations, and I further believe that I understand the national interest of the United States. I assure you that I do not appear before you today in a partisan role. I speak to you as an interested American who feels deeply that this SALT Treaty is not in the best interest of our nation.

First of all, three points.

One, I am strongly in favor of nuclear arms limitation treaties. I have spent untold hours over a four-year period in the Department of Defense working on proposed SALT agreements. The record is clear that I support a proper SALT treaty.

Two, I was a strong advocate of the Vladivostok Accord. I was the most vigorous proponent for putting a ceiling on nuclear weapons. I strongly

advocated equal aggregates with freedom to mix which I think must be the underlying principle of any SALT treaty.

Three, I will give you my assessment of this proposed SALT II Treaty in the context of the world geopolitical situation as I see it today, and the relationship of that geopolitical environment to our foreign policy, as well as, how our national security is affected. I will not dwell on the technicalities of the weapons systems, although I am prepared to do so in the question and answer period.

In my judgment, there is no more complex issue to be considered in this country than the SALT Treaty. It is not well understood within our government and certainly not by the public. Not only are the American people confused, but so are our allies. Too much has already been written about throwweight, MIRVs, launchers, encryption, missile systems, mobile systems, SLBMs, ICBMs, and so forth. It is impossible for the American citizen to understand the technology and complexities of this Treaty. Truly it is an educational process that takes years, and there are few experts in this field. I am of the opinion that the technicalities of SALT are so overwhelming that they become a smokescreen that works to the disadvantage of public understanding.

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Today I would like to try to condense the issues in a straightforward, understandable way. First, I will give you my reasons for being opposed to the Treaty. Second, I will speak briefly on some of the systems in an overall judgment. And, finally, I will suggest options for your consideration.

Geopolitically, the United States today finds itself with enormous responsibilities to the free world but without the means of meeting those responsibilities. There has been a definite deterioration in our military capability, present and future, during the past two and a half years. Considering the status of our existing programs, I forecast that it is inevitable that the timeframe of 1981-1982 will be years of crisis for us in the United States with regard to our foreign policy and national security. If we do the things which we should do between now and 1982, we may forestall a confrontation with the Russians, but we must take positive action now.

Our allies sense this future crisis, and today they are wavering in their support of the United States.

Those of us who have access to foreign intelligence from various sources know that in NATO all is not right, and Germany for the first time since World War II is making overtures to Russia. Japan is seeking closer ties and accommodations with China and has lost confidence in our policy of providing a nuclear umbrella for Japan. The countries of South America are no longer confident of their security relationships with the United States, and even Mexico is seeking accommodation with Cuba and Mr. Castro.

The Middle East is in turmoil with an ominous cloud hanging over the entire region. Consider the situation today in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Israel, Lebanon. Do you detect any comforting signs? Do you find anywhere peace and tranquility? I don't. To the contrary, I find nothing to reassure me, only signs of more trouble, more unrest, turbulence, war, revolution, terrorism, and consequently trouble for the United States. This region is literally a powder keg that could explode any time and bring on World War III. Some of our staunchest allies in the Middle East

have lost confidence in the United States and are now seeking other relationships for their security. I refer particularly to Saudi Arabia. On the basis of my twenty-five years of continuous experience in the Middle East, I must say that conditions are worse today than ever before, and I have never seen American prestige so low.

In Africa, Cuban troops are in many countries causing strife, turmoil, and revolution. I remind you that Southeast Asia is not at peace. That witch's cauldron is boiling worse than ever; and China is once more talking with the Russians and seeking some degree of cooperation.

This geopolitical perspective is disheartening, but it is supported by facts. These are all bad signs for us in the United States, but unfortunately they are all good signs for the Soviets. We must recognize our problems and then seek solutions. We in America are not interested in cosmetic half-truths that have no relation to the real world and offer no help in arriving at acceptable solutions for the American people.

In the geopolitical world, this SALT II Treaty will further destabilize the relationship with our allies. We will lose credibility. This Treaty will be destabilizing because our allies will question our basic strengths, our determination, and our military capability. In questioning, they express their lack of confidence in us.

We are indeed the world's strongest nation with military capability only a part of the matrix. The strength of our nation consists of many things: our freedoms of speech and religion, our educational system, our free enterprise system, our great industrial base, and, finally, our military capability. But it is our military capability that is falling behind, and that is what is fundamentally wrong with this SALT Treaty. We are making an

accommodation to the Russians in this Treaty. For example, this Treaty allows the Soviets to proceed with their programs through 1985 just as they had planned to do. For the Russians, nothing changes, and basically no restraints are imposed. The Soviet Union for all practical purposes is now on a war footing with serious dislocations in their agricultural programs and industrial development, and with impending energy shortfalls. These internal dislocations within Russia could be the root cause of a crisis situation in the early 1980's that would make a foreign adventure attractive to the Soviets and bring on confrontation with us.

In all probability, they cannot significantly increase their defense spending more than the fourteen to seventeen percent of their gross national product that they are now spending. In absolute constant dollar terms, they have consistently outspent us on their military programs during the past many years; and, as you know, there are in-depth CIA and Department of Defense studies that prove this. We in the United States are not yet up to the maximum allowed delivery systems under the SALT I agreement, even when we count the mothballed B-52Ds that, you know, cannot fly. Therefore, the failure to ratify this Treaty as submitted will really not change the substance of the military relationship between Russia and the United States to any significant degree. We are where we are in any event.

To the contrary, ratification of SALT II will have a dramatic pacifier effect on both the American people and our allies, as did SALT I. We were lulled into inaction, and when I say "we," I mean the American public, our allies, and our elected representatives. SALT II will codify the United States' current position militarily, which is less than parity with the Soviets, and concede superiority to the Soviets while cosmetically and improperly giving the illusion to the American people of "well done."

In summary, SALT II boils down to the Administration requesting a vote of confidence for its foreign policy and strategic arms policy for the past two and a half years. I say, no. Let me briefly review some of those policies which have been in my judgment catastrophic

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B-1s— Production canceled by President Carter without Soviet compensation.

for the United States.

One, a nuclear fuel policy that antagonizes our friends and allies, such as Germany, Brazil, Japan, and others.

Two, the cancellation of the B-1 bomber as it was entering production without any quid pro quo from the Soviet Union. This clearly disturbed our allies, and it hurt the morale of our armed forces, and upset the American people.

Three, the delay of the MX-ICBM program to a significant degree, from an all-out effort to what now amounts to vague support for a nebulous concept which, at best, will be a decade away. We have literally broken the momentum of this new missile program which is so important to our strategic forces.

Four, the delay of our cruise missile development to the point that we now have our sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and our ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) held in abeyance for many years to come. Again, we have broken the momentum of these programs. These cruise missile programs incorporate our highest technology and our greatest potential in a current weapons system. Holding in abeyance our operational deployment of SLCM and GLCM is wrong and concerns our NATO allies.

Five, the delay of the development of the Trident II missile program which would have vastly expanded the operational areas of the Trident submarine system. The purpose of building the Trident submarine was to equip it with the Trident II missile, having a range of plus-or-minus 6500 miles. By shelving the Trident II missile program, we have literally aborted the Trident submarine system.


Six, the emasculation of the Navy shipbuilding program. I worked for

over three years to bring forward a Navy shipbuilding program that would give us in 1990 the Navy that we need to maintain sea control, totalling plus-or-minus 580 ships. The Administration's current proposal will give us plus-or-minus 300 ships in 1990, or about half of what was programmed, and less than half as far as capability is concerned. Collectively these actions undermine our military capabilities, and they are perceived in that light worldwide.

All of this must be considered in the context of our failing foreign policy that disturbs, confuses, and confounds our historic allies. The view around the world is that we have lost our direction, at the very time that the third world countries and our historic allies are feeling enormous pressures from the Soviets.


Let me add one more factor that has to be considered, and that is energy. I maintain that energy is indeed linked to our foreign policy and to our national security, and therefore energy is inevitably linked to the SALT Treaty. The fact that we are importing fifty-one percent of our oil requirements is in itself sufficient to prove the point that the logistical line of support coming out of the Middle East is unacceptable in terms of national security. We are vulnerable. Our dependence on imported oil to the extent of fifty-one percent is destabilizing in itself and could cause a confrontation with the Soviets.

We know that Saudi Arabia, with its enormous reserves of oil, is important to our national security and our economic well-being. Today it is one of the most sensitive areas in the world. I said earlier there is an ominous cloud



Energy is linked to SALT Treaty

hanging over the Middle East, and it is primarily of our doing. Our foreign policy and our national security, which are two peas in the same pod, cannot tolerate for long the energy policies that we now have in this country.



Air-Launched Cruise Missile, not yet in U.S. inventory.

Let's be honest with ourselves and with the American people. The foreign policy issues which I have mentioned, as affecting our allies and the third world countries, are all rightfully linked to SALT. Why should we accept on one hand a world that is like a turbulent sea with the waves being made by the Soviets, and on the other hand pursue a policy of accommodation with the Soviets on SALT? This doesn't make sense. I forecast that this will be a policy of disaster, and we will come to a crisis of confrontation sometime early in the 1980's where we will have to make decisions in a crisis environment without the military capability that we must have. We will be in the impossible position of being the recognized leader of the free world without the necessary military strength to back up that position. We will be negotiating from weakness, not strength, and this is an impossible posture to maintain. We must never negotiate except from strength. Only the strong will survive. History tells us this. Only the strong can be free, and yet only the free can be truly strong.

Now, what do we do about this problem? We must not ratify this treaty as presented.

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So how do we make it acceptable? My suggestions, recommendations, are:

One, SALT II allows the USSR to keep 308 heavy ICBMs, that is the SS-18, while the USA is not allowed any. Solution: allow each party to have either 308 heavy ICBMs or 308 mobile ICBMs of design choice.

Two, SALT II does not count the USSR Backfire bomber. Solution: insist the Backfire bomber must be counted as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle.

Three, SALT II Protocol prohibits deployment of GLCM and SLCM systems prior to 1982 and limits the range. Solution: replace the Protocol with a letter similar to Mr. Brezhnev's Backfire letter, stating that the United States will deploy GLCMs and SLCMs with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers in 1982, but not before 1982.

Four, SALT II Protocol does not allow mobile ICBM launchers, but does not properly define the term which clearly impacts on our proposed MX system. Solution: allow each side 308 multiple-aim-point ICBMs.

Five, SALT II allows encryption of telemetry by either side. This compounds the problem of verification. Solution: amend Article IV, Second Common Understanding, and change it to prohibit encryption of telemetry.

Six, SALT II has raised serious questions of verification. Solution: include in the Treaty "on-site inspection for both parties."

Mr. Chairman, under today's circumstances my recommendation to this Committee is that the Senate amend the proposed SALT II Treaty to reflect the six provisions as outlined above and reopen negotiations with the Soviets with respect to these six items. With these recommendations included as amendments to the Treaty and/or Protocol, I would fully support it, provided that the Senate also would declare itself in support of the necessary strategic programs to enhance our position vis-a-vis the Soviets. These reinstated programs with constancy of purpose between now and 1990 will maintain our military strength, enhance our strategic systems, and give a clear signal to all the nations of the world, our allies and foes alike, that we will never accept a position of weakness. Such a commitment by the Senate will involve an additional plus-or-minus \$25 billion per year for the next several years, but in making this investment we assure ourselves that we will avoid the crisis of confrontation that otherwise is probable in the early 1980's.

Mr. Chairman, let me again thank you and the members of this Committee for your time, attention, and invitation to appear.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-23NEW YORK TIMES
23 OCTOBER 1979

IN THE NATION

NATO
And
SALT

By Tom Wicker

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's meeting in December gives the Carter Administration a strong new argument for the ratification of SALT II, which is in doubt in a Senate that still seems to see peripheral problems more clearly than it does the treaty itself.

At the December meeting, NATO will decide whether to proceed with plans to modernize its nuclear defenses with a new generation of American missiles. And the Administration is pointing out to undecided senators that all the Western European nations have said that they will not agree to deploy the new weapons unless SALT II is ratified.

The reason is clear. The Soviet Union, deploying its accurate new SS-20 missile with three warheads, already has increased the number of warheads it aims at Western Europe from just under 2,000 to about 2,100. The Defense Department projects that this will rise to about 3,250 by 1985. Confronted with this menace, the NATO allies are anxious to get on to SALT III, which would deal with the limitation of nuclear weapons in the European theater.

But without SALT II, there could be no SALT III. As Malcolm Toon, the retiring U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, put it the other day, Senate rejection of the current treaty would cause "rather substantial deterioration of [Soviet-American] relations" and shatter the arms limitation process between the superpowers.

Thus, a Senate vote against SALT II could turn out to be a vote against modernization of NATO nuclear forces. But if, on the other hand, the Senate ratifies the treaty, opening the way to SALT III, there would be all the more reason for the allies to accept the new American weapons (572 ballistic and cruise missiles). They would be an important "bargaining chip" in forthcoming SALT III talks.

Without the new missiles, the allies would be able to give the Soviets very little incentive to enter into a nuclear theater limitation. With them, it might be possible to negotiate a limit on the number of warheads each side deploys for use in the European theater.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany has even argued that in the three or four years that would be required before the Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles could actually be deployed, negotiations might produce some agreement that would make it unnecessary to go through with full deployment. NATO would only be making "statements of intention" at the December meeting, he said.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, has clearly been seeking to forestall a NATO decision to deploy the new weapons. In a speech and in later letters to the allied governments, President Brezhnev has offered to reduce the number of Soviet troops, tanks and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe if NATO rejects modernization of its nuclear forces in Western Europe. He has also threatened retaliation if modernization proceeds.

Mr. Schmidt said he interpreted these efforts to be, in effect, a statement by the Soviets that "we want to bargain." Therefore, he said, a NATO decision to deploy the new weapons should be accompanied by efforts to start negotiations for theater arms limitation.

All this adds up to a difficult argument for SALT critics to refute. So, for only one example, is the fact that without the limit of 10 warheads per missile that the treaty would impose, the Soviets could put so many warheads on their giant SS-18 missiles that not even the mobile MX missile system could be made safe.

But despite the practical necessity for ratification that such points as these underscore, the Senate continues to be in strange doubt about the treaty. Senator Cranston of California, the majority whip, estimated the other day that only 32 senators were firmly in favor of ratification — 35 less than required for a two-thirds vote. Only 13 were firmly against ratification, he said, with 34 needed to defeat the treaty. So 55 senators, in Mr. Cranston's judgment, had not made a firm decision.

His analysis disclosed the irrelevance of most of the barriers to ratification. Three main groups had to be satisfied, he said, before the treaty could be approved — those who objected to the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, those who believed defense spending had to be increased, and those who worried that "the SALT process seems to produce more and more weaponry of a strategic nature in the hands of the Soviet Union and of the United States."

It's difficult to see how the last argument justifies voting against SALT II and interrupting the SALT process; and the first two have no relevance at all to strategic arms limitation, whatever their intrinsic merit. The question of verification, which Mr. Cranston said still troubled some senators despite Administration assurances, at least goes to the fundamental value of the treaty, which too many of those 55 undecided senators seem to ignore.

By the best estimates, when the treaty comes to the Senate floor, scarcely a month will be left before the crucial NATO meeting. Maybe that will focus attention finally on the treaty itself, rather than on side issues and political posturing.

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ON PAGE A-1

THE BALTIMORE SUN
23 October 1979

Kremlin appears to adopt linkage tactic, tying SALT accord to arms for NATO

By HENRY L. TREWITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—To the dismay of the administration, the Soviet Union is beginning

The Dutch will be the first to debate proposed NATO nuclear missiles....A4

to hint that upgrading of NATO's nuclear weapons would circumvent SALT II, the pending strategic arms limitation treaty.

Soviet leaders, an administration official said, appear to be adopting a form of the strategic linkage that they previously have deployed in the West. The point is aimed directly at America's NATO allies.

The Europeans in NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have said modernization of the alliance's nuclear arsenal, while necessary, would be politically difficult, perhaps impossible, unless SALT II is ratified by the United States Senate.

So far, specialists in the administration report, Soviet spokesmen have hinted only indirectly at reverse linkage. But the thread is clear, one official says, in the intense, direct propaganda campaign against NATO modernization.

It is a new weight in a delicate political balance. There is no possibility of early resolution, not until the fate of SALT be-

Analysis

comes clearer, and in the meantime the potential for a decisive political stroke up-setting present calculations is high.

Do the Soviets mean that if NATO nuclear upgrading follows SALT II ratification they then may challenge SALT? No one here knows for sure. But SALT's managers are trying to keep as much procedural distance between the two subjects as they can arrange while reassuring NATO.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, preparing SALT for general Senate debate, affirmed 14-0 yesterday its understanding that the treaty does not prohibit continued cooperation with allies in nuclear and nonnuclear weaponry. The committee simply stated that as the conclusion of the U.S. government, however, refusing to make it a reservation subject to Soviet approval.

Three senior American officials are touring Europe to soothe the allies and trying to build the framework for the NATO modernization program. They are David B. Aaron, deputy national security adviser to the president, Reginald Bartholomew, director of politico-military affairs for the State Department, and David E. McGiffert, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Presumably they also are attempting to prepare the allies and control the consequences in case the Senate rejects SALT, a serious possibility. If all goes well, the modernization program will be adopted at the annual NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels December 13-14.

Most of the 15 NATO governments agree officially that the alliance needs longer-range tactical nuclear weapons to offset the threat to Europe from the Soviet SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber. So far tentative planning calls for emplacement of 572 Pershing-2 rockets and ground-launched cruise missiles on the Continent during the middle years of the 1980s.

West Germany, NATO's frontline member in case of Soviet attack, says it is willing to accept the new weapons from the United States. But it says at least one other continental nation must do so as well, with Belgium as the most probable participant.

The administration here would like to persuade others to join in. That is part of the current Aaron, Bartholomew, McGiffert mission. But the decision is politically difficult for all the Europeans.

The alliance as a whole agrees that the decision must be accompanied by an arms-control offer if it is to be accepted by the European publics. And more and more the Europeans have linked it with the ratification of SALT II as a symbol of American leadership and of superpower readiness to control intercontinental weapons.

European political leaders have been visiting Washington, quietly but nervously checking on SALT's prospects. Publicly they support the treaty. Privately they use superlatives—a "disaster," one said—to describe the effect if it is rejected.

American officials know that some of the Europeans' support for SALT as a precondition for a NATO decision is less than enthusiastic. Nonetheless it is now a fundamental element of NATO political strategy.

SALT's prospects meanwhile remain highly uncertain. It could be rejected or ratified before the NATO meeting. On the other hand, the possibility that a decision either way will drift into 1980 is growing.

"This situation is developing nuances within subtleties," an American diplomat said. "Some of the allies see in it vestiges of the neutron bomb flap."

The remark referred to President Carter's uncertainty before he decided in April, 1978, against deployment of the low-explosive, enhanced-radiation nuclear weapon in Europe. Other specialists compared the present situation with that of the mid-1960s, when the United States tried unsuccessfully to organize a multi-lateral nuclear force (MFL) for NATO.

"Both of these affairs had to do with confidence in American leadership," a State Department official said. "It doesn't help at all that they represented to some extent an abandonment of responsibility by the allies themselves."

Meanwhile the Soviet Union is campaigning hard against the NATO plan. President Leonid I. Brezhnev on the one hand has promised to withdraw 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from Eastern Europe and invited renewed negotiations. On the other, he has warned Western Europe of severe but unspecified consequences if it accepts new nuclear weapons.

The administration welcomed the token withdrawal as a symbolic gesture. But about Mr. Brezhnev's further warning, a senior State Department official said, "I think what they'd like to do is stop theater nuclear forces dead in their tracks, with all the fallout that would have."

Since Mr. Brezhnev set the tone two weeks ago, Soviet newspapers and radio have continued to campaign bitterly, blaming the United States and suggesting that Europeans are Washington's innocent victims. Now, American analysts say, they are seeing and hearing more often the implication that new weapons for NATO would upset the strategic balance, violating the specific objective of SALT II.

What does it mean in practical terms for SALT if the treaty is ratified? "We obviously don't know," a State Department official said. "It may be pure propaganda and it may not."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4-10THE WASHINGTON POST
23 October 1979

Panel to Consider SALT Amendments Requiring Notice Before Soviet Tests

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a week of essentially predictable votes on the provisions of SALT II, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday began discussion of proposed amendments that could significantly alter the treaty.

The new amendments, all of which relate to U.S. capability to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT II, probably will be voted on later this week. Committee sources speculated yesterday that pro-treaty forces will have problems blocking the amendments.

The amendment that has the most apparent appeal will be proposed, perhaps in differing forms, by Sens. John Glenn (D-Ohio) and Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.). Both Senators propose eliminating from the treaty, in effect, a provision that would allow the Soviet Union to conduct most of its tests of land-based missiles without notifying the United States in advance that the tests were about take place.

The treaty provision that both senators want to amend is one of a handful that Carter administration officials acknowledge apply unequally to the Soviet Union and the United States. In effect, the provision requires the United States to give the Soviets advance notice of all its land-based missile tests, while allowing the Soviets not to give notice on most of their tests.

Before the loss of American listening stations in Iran—which could pick up the radio transmissions from Soviet test flights moments after blast-off—this distinction was not regarded as significant. But the various intelligence-gathering techniques now under consideration to make up for the loss of the Iranian posts could all be vastly more effective if the United States had prior notification of Soviet tests.

The provision in question requires prenotification of all single ICBM launches by either country "except for single ICBM launches . . . which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory."

American test launches all leave U.S. national territory, landing at sea, but the Soviets' most-used test range goes from Tyuratam in southern Russia to the Kamchatka peninsula near Alaska, all within Soviet territory.

Glenn and Lugar yesterday announced their intentions to address this matter with proposed amendments later in the week. Carter administration officials met among themselves and with the committee in closed session yesterday to discuss these and related proposals.

Earlier yesterday the committee voted unanimously to adopt a declaration that nothing in SALT II will prevent the United States from continuing to help NATO countries with conventional and nuclear military assistance. The vote on this reservation, offered by Sen. Charles H. Percy, (R-Ill.), was 14 to 0.

The committee made this, in effect, a declaration of Senate attitudes. Before the 14-0 vote, it rejected two attempts to make this statement a formal reservation to the resolution of ratification that the Soviets would have to explicitly accept or acknowledge.

Lugar and Glenn were allied on this issue also, arguing that the United States should make the Soviets acknowledge this U.S. position to avoid any misunderstandings in the future. Administration officials and several other senators responded that it was a bad precedent to suggest to the Soviets that they have any say in U.S.-NAIO relations, and further that the United States had made clear its in-

tentions during negotiations with the Soviets.

During the negotiations, the Soviets had pressed for a "non-transfer" clause that might have precluded U.S. transfer of potentially strategic weaponry to the NATO allies, but the United States would not accept this. Instead, the treaty contains a "non-circumvention" provision declaring that neither side will circumvent its provisions "through any other state or states, or in any other manner." The United States contends that this only declares an obvious fact of international law and has no consequences for U.S.-NATO relations.

An attempt by Lugar to force the Soviets to accept formally the U.S. in-

terpretation of the non-circumvention clause failed in the committee, 10 to 4. Glenn then suggested that at least the Senate give the Soviets formal notification of the U.S. position, but this was beaten, 8 to 6. The issue is likely to come up again on the Senate floor.

Glenn has a package of six proposed amendments related to monitoring the treaty, though he may not introduce them all. One would require both countries not to change the methods by which they send information on rocket test flights back to earth. Another would require them to agree with each other before encoding any of the radio messages ("telemetry") transmitted to earth by a test rocket.

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21 October 1979

The Phony Debate on SALT, And the Symbolism Behind It

By Ronald Steel

THE COMIC OPERA imbroglio over the "discovery" of the Russian soldiers in Cuba has, if nothing else, dramatized the phoniness of the SALT debate.

The debate is phony in the sense that it is not about the things either its advocates or its opponents claim. Liberals have tried to sell the treaty as a step toward a more peaceful world; conservatives as a device by which the Russians can dominate the world. It is neither.

SALT II is not about arms reduction and mutual trust, on the one hand, nor about nuclear blackmail and strategic advantage on the other. Praised for what it cannot achieve and vilified for what it does not attempt, the treaty has been oversold by some and deliberately distorted by others. The general public hardly knows what SALT II is about — and with good reason, for its meaning has become almost entirely symbolic.

First, let us clear away some underbrush. On its most pragmatic level SALT II is neither a panacea nor a giveaway. It is simply a deal that both superpowers consider to their mutual advantage. It will allow each to continue dissuading the other from attack without going bankrupt in the process. By so doing it makes it easier for both, under the umbrella of a nuclear standoff, to keep their allies in line and to intervene guardedly in the fringe areas

of the Third World. SALT II, like a cartel's decision to divvy up markets in the name of price stability, is basically an arrangement to compete at a tolerable cost.

In one sense, nothing much will change if SALT II is ratified by the Senate. The Soviets will keep their army in Eastern Europe, just as we will keep ours in Western Europe. They will continue to meddle in Asia and Africa, just as we have been doing for decades; and they will send their ships into distant waters to demonstrate, like us, that they are supposed to be taken seriously. Client states will be rewarded with cash and hardware; neutrals will be wooed with the same. The great power game will go on pretty much as before. SALT will simply free some resources for other, though not necessarily less lethal, purposes.

But if SALT II will not end, or even appreciably slow down, the arms race, it can prevent it from speeding up. It will reduce the pressure on both sides to build weapons that will not make them any more secure — only a good deal poorer. In this sense it stabilizes the arms race by accepting the fact that, in the nuclear arena at least, both sides are equal. The quest for nuclear supremacy is ephemeral. Both sides have learned that the hard way. SALT II is an attempt to keep the potlatch within tolerable limits.

The arguments against SALT are two: first, that it will give the Russians a military advantage; second, that it will affect the ability and the willingness of the United States to defend its vital inter-

ests. These are serious objections if they can be sustained. They cannot. The current treaty, as the summer's Senate hearings conclusively demonstrated to all who were willing to listen, does not prevent the United States from building any weapons it seriously desires. This includes the multi-megaton Amtrak monster, the MX mobile missile, to which President Carter has given the green light. On the other hand, the treaty does put restrictions on the Soviets, such as limiting the number of warheads they can place on their giant MIRVed missiles. Without the treaty there would be no reason for the Soviets to accept such restraints.

So much for the military argument against SALT — one which even the treaty's most vehement opponents are now downplaying. Instead, they are concentrating on what is essentially a political, and even a psychological, objection to the treaty. SALT, they maintain, could sap the nation's "will," soothe it into sloth and indolence, even, in the frenzied imagination of The Wall Street Journal's editorialist, allow the Russians to believe they could safely invade Long Island. SALT, in other words, even if harmless in itself, could lull us into a false sense of security.

This is, to be sure, a bit like arguing against fire insurance on the grounds that it would encourage homeowners to build bonfires in their bedrooms. But to meet this supposed danger the treaty's opponents, having shifted their line of argument, now demand a 5 percent across-the-board military buildup as the price for SALT.

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Perhaps such a buildup is necessary — at least for the purposes they have in mind. Perhaps not. In either case it should be debated on its own terms. With regard to SALT it is totally irrelevant. One's adolescent son may or may not need a Porsche to impress his chums and shame his rivals. But its relevance to his willingness to finish high school is tenuous indeed.

Thus it is that the arguments against SALT seem very odd — odd, that is, until one realizes that they are not about SALT at all, but about the perception and the uses of American power. As Ben Wattenberg wrote so revealingly in *Outlook* a few weeks ago: "SALT may not be the ideal trolley car to board in order to pursue other demands. But it happens to be the only trolley car coming down the track right now."

Those "other demands" involve a big increase in non-nuclear forces, including aircraft carriers, a fleet in the Indian Ocean and an expanded army based on a reinstitution of the draft. To what end this military buildup? Here the scenario becomes vague. But clearly the objective is to regain to capacity, and the will, to intervene militarily in the Third World. Angola yesterday, Nicaragua today, perhaps the Persian Gulf tomorrow. There is no phrase more objectionable to SALT's critics than "no more Vietnam," and none they are so eager to see expunged from the American political vocabulary.

The Carter administration's willingness to build the MX missile and to approve a 3 percent increase in the military budget is designed primarily to assuage SALT's critics. Thus the treaty, whose virtues are hardly overwhelming, carries a very high price tag — one so high, in fact, that several Senate liberals are threatening to vote against it. The problem with the MX is not only that it is exorbitantly expensive — an estimated \$30 billion at a time when Congress can find money for little else except its own raise — but that it is a first-strike weapon. The MX in effect undercuts the central premise of arms control: that the emphasis must fall on deterring nuclear war rather than "prevailing" after one. With the MX wagging the tail of SALT, the way is now open for adoption of the strategy that SALT's opponents have favored all along: a counterforce capacity and the ability to fight "limited" nuclear wars. Ideally these opponent

would like the MX and the arms buildup without SALT. But if they get them, SALT itself will become irrelevant — irrelevant because it is innocuous.

□ □

Thus it can be seen that the furor over SALT is phony because the treaty is not the problem. It is not so important in itself to merit the agitation it has provoked. Its significance is almost entirely symbolic.

Conservatives and liberals may both be reading more into SALT than it deserves. But when one is desperate, one takes whatever trolley car comes along.

Conservatives see it as an escalator to a non-nuclear military buildup and an end to the "no more Vietnam" syndrome. Liberals think it will slow down the nuclear arms race and allow the United States to concentrate on its economic priorities. They may both be reading more into SALT than it deserves. But when one is desperate, one takes whatever trolley car comes along.

SALT is, of course, symbolic in one other sense. It ratifies Soviet military equality with the United States and acknowledges that in this realm we are no longer the undi-

puted Number One. SALT did not, of course, create this condition. But by acknowledging the undesirable, it seems to sanction the intolerable: that Americans live in a world they cannot control and are confronted by adversaries they cannot intimidate through force of arms. Pax Americana was a nice ride while it lasted, but it is now over.

SALT II — which was, after all, initiated by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger — is a victim of bad timing. It comes in the wake of the defeat in Vietnam, reversals in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, the collapse of the shah of Iran, the triumph of OPEC and the collapse of the dollar to the status of a funny-money currency. That none of these events had anything to do with the supposed "decline" of American military power does not make their impact any less disturbing. People are anxious. They do not like a nuclear arms race, but neither can they abide seeing events slip out of control. Conservatives play on these anxieties. They talk about "national will" and "power" as though they were talismans that would make everything right again.

Whether or not SALT II ultimately clears the Senate, it has already — like the Panama Canal treaty last year — been inflated out of all proportion to its significance. The symbol has become everything. Its ratification may not achieve much, but its defeat would be a stunning victory for those, seething with an unfocused frustration and resentment, who seek to rekindle the Cold War.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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22 OCTOBER 1979

The Missiles of Europe

If you think you understand the basic issues of SALT II, you may be ready for the diplomacy now unfolding over the nuclear balance in Europe. This, too, concerns a Soviet-American arms race, but it turns on the psyches of the Western allies, all of whom are actors in the drama and the smallest of whom may turn out to be decisive. Unless the United States ratifies SALT II, this European contest can end badly for the West. Beyond that, nothing about the matter is either simple or clear.

The problem arises from two strategic realities. One is the lingering doubt in Western Europe that the United States will ever risk devastation of its territory for the defense of the allies. If Cologne were to be overrun or under nuclear attack, would America strike Kiev knowing that it would thus put Chicago on the line? If, as the United States insists, the answer is yes, then the NATO alliance must face the second question: why are the Russians nonetheless upgrading and even enlarging nuclear forces aimed only at Western Europe and already outnumbering NATO's?

Britain and France have their own nuclear weapons. The best allied forces defending Europe are American submarine missiles subject to SALT limitations and an unlimited force of aircraft based in Britain. Most other allied land missiles and nuclear bombers cannot reach Soviet targets. So with the Russians aiming still more modern and mobile SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers at Western Europe, NATO began talking about a balancing force. It is now thinking of about 600 American mobile missiles to be aimed at Soviet targets, mostly from West Germany.

It would take at least three or four years to start deploying these American weapons in Europe. Even then they would remain under strict American control.

But they would be symbolically NATO's and could complicate Soviet military planning.

The Russians certainly seem worried by the prospect. They have now tried to head off NATO's approving this course at its December meeting. If NATO will pass up new medium-range weapons, Mr. Brezhnev offers to dismantle some of the Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe. For good measure, he also intends to pull back 20,000 of his 400,000 troops from East Germany. The Soviet interest in negotiation, at least, is promising. But unless it decided first to acquire new missiles, NATO would have little to bargain with. The danger is that if the talks drag on, NATO would be getting weapons it does not really need but that its generals would not again want to relinquish.

A further complication is the problem of where to deploy new missiles. West Germany wants them, to help preserve the European balance, but it does not want to acquire the appearance of a nuclear power. So it says it won't accept any missiles unless one other nonnuclear European nation also takes some. That's a tough assignment for a shaky Italian government. Belgium can't agree unless Holland does and Holland's parliament is reluctant. Mr. Brezhnev is playing on some tender nerves.

What should the United States do? If it presses for a NATO decision, it will be accused of dictating to its allies. If it waits for them to decide, they probably won't and will appear to be buckling under Soviet pressure. Perhaps the best outcome would be a clear but extended timetable for deploying new missiles in Europe combined with a NATO offer to negotiate some or all of them away in SALT III. The allies are having difficulty agreeing even on that much. It will be impossible unless the United States first accepts SALT II.

ARTICLE APPEARED
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22 OCTOBER 1979

Sen. Percy and SALT II

With the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considering proposed SALT II treaty amendments, Sen. Percy's recent remarks on the subject were more than well timed. They were also well considered.

Sen. Percy said he would vote for SALT II if two understandings about it were accepted by the Senate: first, that the treaty's three-year protocol could not be extended without Senate approval and, second, that the U.S. can continue to share defense technology with NATO.

These understandings are useful ones. They are not amendments, like those proposed by some of Mr. Percy's colleagues, which are designed to kill the treaty but relieve its Senate opponents of the awkward necessity of a formal vote against nuclear arms control. They serve to clarify a passage in the treaty that seems ambiguous to some and to reassert the point that international agreements limiting weapons of mass destruction require the participation of the U.S. Senate under the Constitution.

Sen. Percy's assessment that SALT II's limitations on strategic nuclear weapons are "modest but real" was fair and accurate. SALT II is not a cure for the tensions of the nuclear age. Its terms do not eliminate the United States need to remain militarily strong. SALT II simply adds some stability and restraint to an area of international affairs where uncertainty and excess can lead to cataclysm.

SALT II does not end the need for arms control negotiations. Its very modesty invites discussion of a more comprehensive agreement. Its provisions are effective for limited periods of time. It will have to be strengthened and renewed.

But first it must be ratified. The process of negotiation toward future stability—coupled with a due regard for the present and future strength that will deter the Soviets from war—is the best guarantee against a disaster that could destroy everyone's hopes for the future.

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NEW YORK TIMES
22 OCTOBER 1979

Colby Urges the Senate To Approve Arms Pact

William E. Colby, former director of Central Intelligence, urged the Senate yesterday to approve the nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union.

"I think we should ratify the SALT II agreement now because, in our relationship with a hostile Soviet Union, we are better off with the agreement than without it," Mr. Colby said.

He conceded that the agreement was less than ideal from the American viewpoint, but asserted that it would prevent a

full-scale arms race and would provide some measure of limitation to Soviet weapon development.

Mr. Colby made his remarks in a speech at a conference on the treaty held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. The conference was sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, a private nonprofit group.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979

Some Europeans See Carter's Linking SALT to NATO as Hurting Alliance

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Oct. 20—Last Monday, Franz Ludwig Stauffenberg, a lawmaker from Bavaria's conservative Christian Social Union Party and a member of the parliamentary defense committee, picked up the morning newspaper and read a quotation from President Carter.

Carter, the paper reported, had told a group visiting the White House that if the U.S. Senate rejected the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) that "some European countries might very well turn to the Soviet Union and put an anchor out to the East" and wreck the NATO alliance.

Carter's remark angered and annoyed Stauffenberg, who then submitted questions for the Bonn government to answer for the record. His questions brought into focus the growing concern among some Europeans that it is not the alliance but American leadership that is threatening to unravel.

Stauffenberg wanted to know if the Bonn government knew which European government had given Washington the impression that it might lean to the East. His aim, Stauffenberg said later, was to clear the air and establish that West Germany's ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are independent of the fate of the SALT II ratification process.

On Wednesday, the government sent its answers to Stauffenberg's questions.

Without relating them to Carter's speech, the federal government said "There is no reason whatsoever to link the loyalty of members of NATO, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, to the SALT ratification process." Case closed.

The exchange received virtually no public notice here. Inquiries to high officials in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's office and the Foreign Ministry produced similarly brief explanations.

Carter's remarks, they said, were viewed in Bonn as purely for U.S. consumption. In short, the President

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could say anything he felt he needed to say to get SALT ratified and not worry about West Germany getting excited. Even some members of Stauffenberg's own conservative coalition privately criticized him as "not too clever" in risking criticism of Carter at this crucial time.

Yet Stauffenberg, in his lonely outrage, may have a point that will survive long after the treaty's fate is settled.

The idea that NATO might unravel if SALT is not approved has become a principal theme for the Carter administration during the past several months. But Stauffenberg finds its use publicly by the president to be "alarming, counterproductive and simply not sensible," precisely the kind of thing, he says, that can weaken the alliance. Over the long run, he says, the thing that might threaten NATO most is a lack of long-term confidence in U.S. leadership. A statement such as the one the president made, Stauffenberg says he believes, is a perfect example.

Unquestionably every West European allied leader desperately wants the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT II pact. They do not want a new Cold War, or policy of allied confrontation

with the Soviet Union. They want to go on to SALT III and the question of nuclear arms in Europe.

The thirst of the West Europeans for good relations with the Soviets also is both palpable and understandable. They live very close to the Soviet Union, with its huge army just over the East German border. They have relatives in the East whom they like to visit, and business that they like to transact.

On the other hand, America's allies in Europe are not ready to jump into bed with the Soviets. NATO is, after all, an alliance among nations with similar values. It is not just a political-military pact.

The alliance is never likely to unravel willingly, nor are its members likely to "put an anchor out" to the communist-bloc life style and concept of restricted human rights that Europeans understand better than most Americans.

The problem is to keep the NATO alliance from self-destructing, from becoming so cynical that it becomes weak and easily intimidated. Combating this requires skillful leadership.

The episode in the Bundestag last week, and the reaction of the Bonn government, can be viewed two ways. It can be seen as a very sophisticated understanding of domestic U.S. politics by the West German government and of the need to be cool and not challenge Carter's assumptions about European attitudes because the main goal is to get SALT II approved.

The second way is the more cynical view expressed by Stauffenberg, that Carter is toying with fundamental Western unity and saying things that do not help the more distant challenge.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 October 1979

Despite Meandering Hearings, Significant Work on SALT

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a flight of senatorial rhetoric, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) has likened the treaty under consideration—SALT II—to the Treaty of Versailles, but the scene in the paneled Senate hearing room hardly confirms the grandeur of Church's comparison.

There has been little drama in the Foreign Relations Committee's formal "markup" of the strategic arms pact. Some vociferous senatorial posturing, yes; and a few sharp words, but the general atmosphere during five days of hearings last week has been flat, often dreary, usually boring. This may be a great event, but even great events must fit into conventional proceedings.

In fact, the outcome of the committee's work will be significant. The treaty seems assured of approval by

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at least eight of the 15 members, but if it gets no more than eight or nine votes its chances on the floor are poor. Eleven "ayes" on Foreign Relations would be a reasonably good omen for SALT, though not conclusive.

The process of a markup is largely mechanical. The committee is working through the treaty article by article, discussing the import of each, often raising potential loopholes or ambiguities, and considering possible amendments to the treaty or reservations that might clarify or change it.

An amendment to the treaty itself would require reopening negotiations with the Soviet Union, an outcome the Carter administration fervently hopes to avoid. The Senate can also add reservations or "understandings" to its resolution of ratification. The president would have to incorporate these into the formal American "instrument of ratification" that the Soviets would have to accept before the treaty could come into effect. There can also be lesser understandings that simply spell out an American interpretation of one or another provision and which the Soviets would not have to accept formally.

Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) may be having more fun in the great SALT debate than any other senator. Just 36, just beginning his second term in the Senate, Biden is a clever and ambitious politician, one who talks to his friends about running for president one day. The Foreign Relations Committee's SALT hearings have brought more attention to Biden than anything he has done previously as a senator.

What has drawn attention to him has been Biden's eagerness to do battle with the only active presidential candidate on the committee, Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.). Baker has taken the position that SALT II must be radically altered by amendment or he will not support it.

In July, Baker went after administration witnesses at the initial SALT hearings, trying to dramatize weaknesses in the treaty. Biden—whose turn to question witnesses before the committee usually comes right after Baker's—in turn went after the minority leader, challenging his criticisms. Despite a tendency toward long-windedness, Biden seemed to get the best of these exchanges. After a few days Baker stopped coming regularly to the hearings.

This week Baker has begun offering amendments to the treaty, and Biden is again disputing him. At one point Baker challenged his colleagues to have the courage to change the treaty even if it upsets the Soviet Union: "I, for one, am not put off by the thought that what we do here has to be submitted to the Russians . . . If we start out by saying that we are not going to change anything because we are afraid it will upset the Russians, we are never going to do any good with this treaty."

Biden had an answer for this line of argument:

"There is no reluctance on my part . . . to tell the Russians that they must agree to certain things. The distinction that I would like to make in light of the characterization the senator from Tennessee just made is that we only should do that when it serves our national interest . . . This [Baker proposal under consideration] does not serve our national interest."

At the press table, where the Baker-Biden show is now anticipated as good theater, reporters smiled.

who criticized Chairman Church for failing to control the meandering hearings. This angered some on the committee who felt it was the administration whose act left something to be desired.

Lloyd N. Cutler, the Washington lawyer who recently signed on as counsel to President Carter, is the chief administration spokesman in the hearings. It falls to him to reiterate the arguments initially made in July for the treaty's provisions. Cutler is a lawyer, not a politician, and his inclination is to jump right past political rhetoric to get to the heart of a matter.

When Baker proposed an amendment that would significantly alter the treaty by forcing the Soviets to count their medium-to-long-range Backfire bomber under the limits of SALT II, Cutler did not recall any of the administration's arguments about why Backfire had been left out of the treaty. Instead he jumped to the immediate problem that he thought approving Baker's amendment would create: it would reopen negotiations with the Russians, he noted, and he proposed to explain in a secret session why this would be bad.

Several senators, particularly Charles Percy (R-Ill.), Church and Biden, were taken aback. Why a secret session? Why don't you make the arguments about Backfire? Percy and Biden actually made some of them for Cutler. Then Cutler had a chance to explain in a closed-door session what the United States expected the Soviets to demand in return if the Senate required the counting of Backfire.

By the end of the week Cutler seemed more comfortable with the rhetorical posturing that comes naturally to members of the Senate. He joined right in.

A confidential poll of senators would probably reveal a widespread feeling that one of the most eager rhetorical posturers in that body is Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla.). Stone's colleagues do not find him especially popular or effective, but he is an accomplished performer. In the SALT hearings, he has returned repeatedly to issues connected with Cuba, whose

One newspaper account of the first week's markup sessions quoted anonymous Carter administration sources

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THE WASHINGTON POST
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former citizens make up a large part of his constituency.

This week the issue that animated Stone was Soviet G-class submarines, old and noisy diesel-powered subs that were excluded from SALT I and now again from SALT II. The Soviets station them in the Baltic and Pacific, according to the Pentagon. These subs "are cruising our waters," Stone declared dramatically.

Weren't they last seen near the United States (in Cuba) in 1974, an administration official asked Stone. "Nineteen-seventy-four is not now," the official added.

"Now that is a little bit cute," Stone replied sarcastically. "I am not saying that they are offshore today.

I am saying that their range is such and their mission is such that they can and they have done that."

Other senators noted that it would violate Soviet-American agreements about Cuba to base the G-class subs in Cuba in the future, but Stone was not convinced.

On the Foreign Relations Committee, Stone, John Glenn (D-Ohio) and Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.) will cast the votes of greatest concern to the White House. Without the support of all three, SALT's prospects will be endangered.

The markup continues Monday. Final action seems possible next week, but more likely a week or two later.

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COLBY/HELMS DEBATE

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ON PAGE A-2WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 OCTOBER 1979

Focus

Ex-Agency Bosses Debate How Public CIA Should Be

By Robert Pear
Washington Star Staff Writer

Two former CIA directors have expressed sharply conflicting views of whether the agency should increase or cut back the public dissemination of its findings through "sanitized," unclassified reports.

William E. Colby strongly endorsed the trend of releasing such reports, while Richard Helms said he saw no purpose in it.

The stream of political, economic and military reports publicly released by the CIA has been steadily increasing — from just a few a year in the 1950s and 1960s to 15 reports in 1972 to 62 last year.

Past and present CIA officials, as well as members of Congress, are trying to add up the costs and benefits of publishing such unclassified reports, which represent a minuscule fraction of the agency's total intelligence output.

Colby, who served as CIA director from 1973 to 1976, said yesterday that CIA publications help build a better public image for intelligence by drawing attention to the agency's intellectual activities as a counterweight to its James Bond espionage image.

Testifying before the House Intelligence oversight subcommittee, headed by Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., Colby said he would encourage the CIA to release periodic intelligence estimates much as the Federal Reserve Board regularly releases money supply data. Colby said he would even go so far as to release satellite photographs of Soviet missiles and other military equipment, which is discussed daily in American debates over defense and foreign policy.

However, Helms, who served as CIA director from 1966 to 1973, warned that the agency risks being drawn into a political crossfire when it publicizes its findings.

Helms firmly opposed public dissemination of CIA reports, even in expurgated form, saying, "The job of the CIA is to advise the president and the National Security Council, to stay out of the limelight and be quiet."

"I just don't see the merit in this

public relations campaign," Helms added. "I don't see what it gets, what it buys."

The CIA publishes a wide range of basic reference materials — reports such as "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments" and the "National Basic Intelligence Factbook" — as well as unclassified, analytical reports on subjects such as the Soviet gas industry and international terrorism.

In August the CIA issued a generally pessimistic report on world oil supplies, forecasting that world demand would outrun supply in the early 1980s. The study also reiterated the CIA's view that the Soviet Union, the world's largest petroleum producer, would soon have to start importing oil.

President Carter cited a similar prediction, made in 1977, to bolster his argument that the United States must declare the "moral equivalent of war" in the energy field. Russia's entrance into the world market as a buyer, he said, would further tighten oil supplies.

CIA oil estimates, used in this way, have become a focus of controversy, prompting Aspin to look at the agency's publications policy in general.

The problem, in short, is that readers of CIA reports often suspect that the agency is trying to influence events when it disseminates information.

John J. Hicks, deputy director of the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, acknowledged such suspicions, but tried to allay them.

"Some people think we deliberately time our issuances to support administration policy," he said. "Some assume our reports are official U.S. government policy. Others think we are active proponents of policy positions. Still others think we are trying to derail administration policy."

"To all these charges, I respond that it is not and never has been our intention to make headlines or to engage in domestic policy debates."

Hicks said the CIA had occasionally delayed the release of a report that undermined the position of the administration in power, but never, he said, were reports totally withheld for that reason.

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
23 October 1979

Former CIA director Colby suggests agency leak some data to keep public informed

Washington (Reuter)—A Former Central Intelligence Agency director, William Colby, said yesterday the espionage agency could keep the public better informed by leaking unclassified material that is too sensitive to be published officially.

Mr. Colby, who ran the CIA during parts of the Nixon and Ford administrations, offered the unorthodox proposal in arguing the agency should conceal only genuine national security secrets.

In congressional testimony, however, Mr. Colby said there is information—such as spy satellite photos or a CIA finding that a friendly chief of state “was a corrupt, drunken buffoon”—whose official release would cause a diplomatic furor.

“This problem is not insoluble because the basis for the reaction lies primarily in official attribution of the information to the American government,” Mr. Colby said in testimony before a House of Representatives intelligence subcommittee.

The answer, Mr. Colby said, is to release such information unofficially through intermediaries—a practice commonly known in Washington as “leaking” and one usually condemned by intelligence officials.

“A number of potential private intermediaries exist to whom the material could be made available; who could reproduce it without official attribution,” he said.

He added that friendly congressmen, scholars and others could also be tapped “to

provide the substance of information to all those with the need to know but to minimize its international diplomatic impact.”

In other cases, Mr. Colby said, censored CIA foreign economic reviews, such as reports on the Soviet agricultural situation, would cause less controversy if they were published under the aegis of other government agencies. He suggested documents like these could be put out under the name of the Agriculture Department.

On that point, Mr. Colby's view was shared by Richard Helms, another former CIA director who testified in favor of maximum agency secrecy and against the publication of even censored intelligence reports.

In those cases where the agency feels it would serve the national interest to circulate certain information, Mr. Helms said, “I'd let the material be issued by somebody else,” such as the State or Commerce departments.

The two men testified separately at hearings into the question of whether the CIA ought to be issuing public reports on such controversial subjects as the world oil outlook. It has been publishing more and more such reports in recent years.

Although he advocated camouflaging the CIA's role as the origin of some types of information, Mr. Colby also said there are other areas where formal agency attribution lends authority and should be used. He cited the periodic oil reports as an example of that.

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 OCTOBER 1979

Helms and 2 Successors in Clash On Publishing of C.I.A. Reports

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22 — The question of whether the Central Intelligence Agency should enter the marketplace of information pitted Richard M. Helms, a former Director of the agency, against two of his successors today.

The issue — whether the C.I.A. should publish its reports and analyses of current political and economic trends — was raised by the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee, whose chairman, Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, opened a hearing on the issue with the question: "Where does information stop and influence begin?"

The first witness, John J. Hicks, testifying on behalf of Stansfield Turner, the current Director of Central Intelligence, said that from 15 reports and studies released to the public in 1972 the volume of agency releases grew to 62 in 1978 and to 61 so far this year.

Materials Were 'Sanitized'

Mr. Hicks, who is deputy director of the agency's national foreign assessment center, said that most of the reports had been drawn from classified materials that were subsequently "sanitized" for public consumption. He said that the agency benefited from the release because "It facilitates our exchange of

ideas with people in academia and in the business world."

In rebuttal, Mr. Helms, who headed the agency from 1966 to 1973, said that he firmly opposed release of the agency's studies to the public.

Mr. Helms, in response to questions, said that he felt careful reading of the unclassified reports by hostile intelligence agencies could reveal sources and methods employed by American intelligence collectors.

This position was strongly contested by William E. Colby, who headed the agency from 1973 to 1976. "This is a practice I encouraged while I was Director of Central Intelligence," he said, "and I continue to believe that the agency should provide this service."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 October 1979

Colby-Helms Feud Goes Public at Hill Hearing

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms and his successor, William E. Colby, carried their bitter, personal feud into the open yesterday by sharply disagreeing on what public activities the CIA should be permitted or directed to undertake.

The forum for their conflicting views—which even included the exact mission of the agency—was a hearing of the subcommittee on oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

The two men, once close colleagues, had to testify separately because Helms refused to be in the same room with Colby, according to a committee member.

Helms publicly has accused Colby of damaging the CIA by turning over agency records in 1973 and 1974 to administration and congressional investigators. He is particularly bitter that information from Colby launched the Justice Department investigation into the allegation that Helms committed perjury before a Senate committee when testifying about CIA activities in Chile. He later pleaded "no contest" to two misdemeanor counts of failing to testify fully and accurately before the committee.

Yesterday, the focus of their attention was the future role of the CIA, although the immediate subject for discussion was whether the intelligence agency should declassify and release to the public its reports and analyses.

Helms, the traditionalist, argued "this agency [CIA] wasn't established to keep in touch with the public." He said he hoped it would return to the old days when its activities were secret.

Colby took the reverse tack. "The

modern American intelligence community simply cannot be treated as a traditional spy service whose very existence was denied by the monarchs it served," he said.

To Colby, the CIA has a mission to "know what's going on in the world around us" and the responsibility to pass on its information to "the entire American government," including the Congress as well as the president. At times it could go even to the American people.

To Helms, however, the agency's mission is "as staff to the president" and no more. "Its job is to advise the president and the [national security council] . . . stay out of the limelight and keep quiet."

Helms agreed "times have changed" but added that he is still "a bit old-fashioned."

Rep. John Rhodes (R-Ariz.) referred to Helms' views in questioning Colby by tactfully attributing them to "one of your predecessors. . . ."

But Colby, who entered the hearing room only moments after Helms' departure, snapped his response to one question with a barb that indicated he knew the source.

"Many would like to go back to the zero secret game," Colby said, "but they haven't caught up to what the new information game is all about."

Helms argued that published reports by the CIA would not help the agency's standing with the public. "I don't understand why it adds to [the agency's] credibility to put out such things," he said, adding that it would involve the agency in politics and could "give insights to the Russians that they would be delighted to have."

Colby, on the other hand, said "the

agency needs to do a better job of educating the public" because "an informed public is an essential element of any national policy." For Colby, the intelligence concept of "need to know" as a criteria for allowing someone access to information "compels the wide distribution" of declassified CIA material.

Colby went so far as to suggest that satellite photographs of Soviet missiles and other military systems eventually should be made public, because the government already releases other basic data about those weapons.

One of their basic disagreements came over the CIA providing material in response to inquiries from the press.

Helms said that he believed agency officials "simply don't provide the information," when asked, but his answer left out officially authorized leaks that occurred when he was at the agency.

Colby criticized that technique by which CIA once gave classified information "to those favored journalists given background briefings."

In its place, Colby suggested that the CIA find a way to release "news item" information, such as finding the so-called Soviet brigade in Cuba, in a way that would permit such subjects to be "presented in their true proportions, and minimize the excess rhetoric from various sources which characterized the [recent] incident."

On one aspect of releasing basic CIA information, the two former directors seemed to agree: Economic, industrial and agricultural statistics developed by CIA should be made public through other executive departments.

Perhaps the sharpest difference between the two on what was called the "post-Watergate CIA" was drawn on a question about how to handle CIA information that undermined a presidential policy.

Helms told the subcommittee: "I don't believe a CIA director should give information that could be used to oppose" an administration policy. If he were asked for such information at a congressional hearing, Helms, with his own past clearly still on his mind, said, "at that point a director prays."

When asked the same question, Colby quickly responded that the information should be given out "even if it doesn't support . . . policy." If it is good information, Colby said, "hopefully it will help change the policy."

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BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE
21 October 1979

CIA: Cubans increase troops in Third World

By Juan J. Walte
United Press International

WASHINGTON — The number of communist troops and military advisers in the Third World grew 60 percent last year to more than 51,000, primarily because of Cuba, according to a CIA report.

The intelligence agency said most of the increase was due to Cuba's military presence in Africa and the Mideast, which it said increased from 21,850 in 1977 to 38,650 in 1978.

In general, the CIA said in the report published last week, "The number of communist military related personnel in the less developed countries rose by 60 percent in 1978 to 51,400 (from 32,795 in 1977), largely because of a 16,000 increase of Cubans in sub-Saharan Africa."

The bulk of Cubans moved into Ethiopia before and during the spring 1978 Horn of Africa war against neighboring Somalia. The number of Cuban military men in Ethiopia increased from 100 in 1977 to 16,500 in 1978, the report said.

A rise also was reported in the number

of Cubans in Mozambique, from 100 in 1977 to 800 in 1978. In addition, the CIA said, there are 150 Cuban military advisers in Equatorial Guinea, 200 in Guinea, 140 in Guinea-Bissau, and 485 in other African nations.

The largest Cuban military contingent outside its borders is the 19,000 men in Angola, according to the CIA.

Cuba's military presence in the Mideast reportedly more than doubled, from 500 in 1977 to 1,150 in 1978, with the sharpest rise in South Yemen, from 350 in 1977 to 1,000 last year.

The remainder of the Cuban military personnel in the Mideast, some 150, are in Iraq. The CIA report indicated they have been there since 1977.

Of the 51,400 communist military personnel in Third World nations last year, 38,650 were Cubans, 12,070 Soviet or Eastern European and 680 Chinese, the CIA said.

The countries where they were stationed included Morocco, Mali, Guyana, Peru, North Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

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NEW YORK TIMES
21 OCTOBER 1979

Soviet Cuts Arms Aid in Favor of Economic Pledges

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20 — Soviet-bloc military aid commitments to less developed countries dropped sharply last year, while pledges of economic aid soared to unprecedented levels, a tally published this week by the Central Intelligence Agency showed.

The largest increments in economic assistance were Soviet credit commitments of \$2 billion to Morocco to develop the Meskala phosphate deposits over the next 30 years, and of \$1.2 billion to Turkey

for steel, aluminum and power plants.

The C.I.A. analysis, drawing on information received before March, showed that even though pledges of new military aid fell to less than half of those in the previous year, deliveries of Soviet-bloc military equipment on the basis of earlier commitments set a record of \$3.8 billion in 1977.

The study issued by the agency's national foreign assessment center also showed that overseas military involvement by the bloc remained at a high level, with over 50,000 troops and military tech-

nicians in 19 countries. More than 75 percent of these were Cuban soldiers in Angola and Ethiopia.

The Soviet bloc, or "Socialist community of states," as it calls itself, consists of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Cuba.

Several Factors Mentioned

The fluctuations, which the American analysts described as among the sharpest in the last 25 years, were attributed to "rapidly changing political conditions in recipient countries" and "long periods required for implementing economic aid and for absorbing military equipment."

Putting a dollar value on Soviet export prices in terms of the prevailing ruble exchange rate, the analysts concluded that in 1978 the Soviet bloc countries committed \$5.2 billion in economic aid, principally to African and Middle Eastern countries, but also to Asian and Latin American ones. This represented more than a fivefold increase over the \$800 million pledged in 1977.

By the same measure, bloc military commitments fell from \$5.6 billion in 1977 to \$2.2 billion last year.

The study said that a decline in arms transfers frequently followed "heavy sales years," but added: "However, the recent sales declines also may signal a movement of some major customers into alternative arms markets which could affect future Soviet sales levels."

The C.I.A. figures did not make a clear distinction between Soviet arms sales, which were sizable and were paid for in hard currency in the case of oil producing countries, and grants to poor countries such as Ethiopia and Angola.

However, the new figures indicated that as a whole, the Soviet Union and its economic and military partners were approaching United States levels of economic assistance and military transfer. In the 1978 fiscal year that ended a little over a year ago, the United States committed \$6.8 billion in foreign economic aid and \$3.2 billion in military assistance. Military sales amounted to about \$8 billion.

The patterns emerging from the agency analysis showed that the bulk of the vast new Soviet aid pledges were directed to North Africa and appeared to be focused on retaining long-term raw material sources of supply. Thus Morocco was committed under its 1978 agreement with the Soviet Union to pay for the development of phosphate production.

Algeria and Libya, both endowed with oil and gas reserves, received considerable Soviet-bloc assistance in the form of municipal construction projects, manufacturing plants and agricultural machinery.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
22 OCTOBER 1979

Soviets Expected to Build Military Edge, Study Says

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Soviet Union's military programs have been larger than those of the U.S. in recent years, and a continuation of the present trend will increase the Soviet lead in armed strength, a new congressional study says.

The study says economic problems have meant a slow improvement of living standards in the Soviet Union and may also cause a slowdown in military growth. But despite the failure in meeting promises to consumers, western analysts contend the Soviet armed forces will continue as the priority for funding.

The 1,532-page study, "Soviet Economy in a Time of Change," was issued today by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Compiled by the Library of Congress's senior expert on Communist economics, Dr. John P. Hardt, it is part of an annual series that examines the Soviet, Chinese or East European economy every three years.

A paper in the study, written by Abraham Becker, reports widely varying estimates of Soviet military spending in 1975. The official Soviet figure is 17.4 billion rubles (\$25.5 billion). Outside estimates range from the CIA's 50-60 billion rubles (\$73.5-88.2 billion) to a Chinese figure of 69.4 billion rubles (\$102 billion) and a high of 71.4 billion rubles (\$105 billion) calculated by William T. Lee, a leading American critic of the CIA estimates.

These figures produce estimates of the military burden on the Soviet economy that range from the CIA's 11-13 percent of their gross national product — double the U.S. level — to as much as 19-20 percents.

Becker noted a Soviet commitment to a "war-fighting" capability rather than sufficient weapons for deterrence.

While dollar or ruble comparisons are difficult, he wrote, "there is little question that the aggregate of Soviet military programs . . . are larger in size than those of the United States, and have been so for most of this decade." Although the

Carter administration is committed to increasing defense spending, "many observers doubt that U.S. military expenditures in aggregate will achieve a sustained real rate of increase of as much as 3 percent annually because of the pressures of competing domestic U.S. interests," he wrote.

(In another study, the CIA said a sharp drop in Soviet arms sales overseas in 1978 may signal the beginning of a shift by buyer countries toward other sources and adversely affect Russia's future in foreign military trade.

(Soviet military sales, which averaged about 3 billion a year from 1973-76 fell to \$1.8 billion in 1978 from a record \$5.2 billion in 1977, the CIA reported.

(Foreign deliveries of previously promised Soviet arms — reflecting the record arms sales pledged in 1977 — rose to \$3.8 billion last year and was Moscow's most important export to the Third World.)

The congressional study says that energy, especially oil production, is one of the problems the Soviets are expected to face. CIA contributors foresee a significant decline in oil output; this has been a controversial CIA opinion for several years. Others write that the loss of oil export income could hurt the Soviets' ability to import grain and machinery.

J. Richard Lee and James R. Lecky of the CIA's Office of Economic Research wrote that Soviet oil production is likely to stop growing next year and begin a steady decline in the early 1980s from the 1978 world record production of 11.43 billion barrels.

Inadequate Soviet exploratory drilling has left a declining ratio of oil reserves to production, and future discovery prospects are, in remote areas requiring long, costly development, the two wrote.

A number of other specialists have denied the seriousness of the situation and the resulting CIA prediction that the Soviet Union, which now earns half its foreign exchange from energy exports, will become an energy importer by 1985.

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"THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS"

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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25 October 1979

The CIA's saddest 'secrets'

Joseph C. Harsch

I have just been reading with fascination and shock a new book just out on the history of the CIA. It is called "The Man Who Kept The Secrets," meaning Richard Helms, who was head of the agency from 1966 to 1973, but that is a misnomer. It is in fact the story of the CIA from its origins in the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) in World War II down to the present. It is the first broad account I have yet seen of the whole story. It is objective, neither for nor against. It is not an "exposure" of alleged misdeeds, nor is it a "gee whiz, ain't they wonderful" story about spies. It just tells the story.

The shock to me in reading the story is to find out how many failures there were. We all know about the Bay of Pigs. I did not know until reading this book that there was also an operation back during the "cold war" era when the CIA thought it was in touch with a Polish underground organization. But there was no real Polish underground. Those were Soviet agents playing a successful cat and mouse game with Allen Dulles's overeager neophytes in Washington.

Then there was an air-drop operation to Ukrainian nationalists holding out in the Carpathians for a short time after World War II was over. Nothing came of it. And time and time

again teams of agents equipped with radio transmitters were air dropped into China. Sooner or later they all disappeared, some of them after being abandoned.

Many critics of the CIA have fastened on such things as domestic spying on American citizens and use of drugs on unsuspecting persons during experiments. Such improprieties have long since, supposedly, been stopped. I trust they have been. But such positive misdeeds do not shock me in the way that the discovery of failures does. I had long supposed that on balance the CIA had more successes than failures. It had its successes, although two of its earliest successes seem to have gone sour. The first spectacular success was the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and the return to power of the Shah. The sequel is painful. The second success was the overthrow of the left-leaning regime in Guatemala in 1954. Col. Carlos Castillo-Armas was set up by clandestine US guns. Guatemala still lives in a state of political instability, perhaps more precarious now than ever.

Against those two successes, both apparently of doubtful long-term value to the United States, must be set up a long series of spec-

tacular failures running from the Bay of Pigs disaster to the enormous investment in operations connected with the Vietnam war. They included use of mountain tribesmen in Laos and Vietnam who were recruited, used, and eventually, for the most part, used up. There are not many survivors.

Worst of all, to my mind, is the account of the effort of specialists and experts in the CIA to get the Pentagon and the White House to accept realistic figures about enemy military strength in Vietnam. Obviously, people down at the lower levels of the CIA knew the score with remarkable accuracy. But it took the shock of the Tet offensive to make it possible for Mr. Helms at the top of the CIA to be able to tell the White House what it did not want to hear.

Until Tet, Pentagon and White House operated on the assumption of a maximum enemy troop strength of 270,000. The CIA experts had long before reached the conclusion that 500,000 was a more realistic figure. The experts, and Mr. Helms, tried to get the figures changed. They could not, until Tet shook the White House to its foundations. Lyndon Johnson finally faced reality, and soon thereafter announced he would not run for reelection.

There is not much use in a big and expensive intelligence operation in Washington if the White House will not listen to what the experts have to tell them about enemy strength, or weakness.

The blame is not so much with the CIA itself as with those who insisted on trying to misuse it for domestic political ends. Most of the CIA's failures resulted from pressure from the White House to do things which were beyond its capacity, or attempted against its better judgment. The truly great successes seem to have been more or less accidental. One voluntary Soviet defector or supplier of information from within the Kremlin is worth a thousand attempts at subversion from the outside.

The most useful source of information the CIA ever had in Moscow was a volunteer, Oleg Penkovsky. But no amount of money or experts in Washington can manufacture an Oleg Penkovsky. They just happen.

The main conclusion I draw from the book is that President Carter was abundantly correct in telling Admiral Stansfield Turner to rebuild the CIA. It also needs to be protected from pressures on it from the outside which have caused it to do a lot of foolish things.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
24 October 1979

The Murky Core of the Spy Business

By DAVID IGNATIUS

"Let's get on with it."

According to Thomas Powers in his new book, "The Man Who Kept the Secrets," that phrase was characteristic of Richard Helms, former director of Central Intelligence. The pragmatic Mr. Helms, as his biographer makes clear, had little use for spy fantasies. And if the CIA director's pragmatism makes him appear, in retrospect, something of a bureaucrat, it also helped him remain a sane and reasonable man in a business that drove many of his colleagues to distraction.

Anyone who has tried, like Mr. Powers, to plumb the murky depths of the spy

The Bookshelf

"The Bureau: My Thirty Years

in Hoover's FBI"

By William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown.
W. W. Norton & Co. 286 pages. \$12.95.

*"The Man Who Kept the Secrets:
Richard Helms and the CIA"*

By Thomas Powers. Alfred A. Knopf.
333 pages. \$12.95.

world is likely to come to a similar view. Let's get on with it. The conundrums of intelligence are so strange and seductive that they leave the investigator unprepared for the greatest secret of all: At the core of intelligence—instead of the hard rock of fact—there often is only the vaporous mist of uncertainty.

A CIA agent disappears in Vienna, and four years later, an attorney working almost full-time on the case, with abundant help from the CIA, is still uncertain whether the man is dead or alive; whether he's in the hands of the Russians, or somewhere else.

Another former CIA agent sits nervously in his living room, chain-smoking, as he insists to a reporter that no matter what Soviet defectors may have told the CIA about him, he isn't a Soviet double agent. Is he lying? It takes months to realize that nobody at the CIA or the FBI really knows.

Such intrigues of espionage, and the bureaucratic infighting that inevitably accompanied them, swept up many of Mr. Helms's fellow intelligence officers. Frank Wisner, for example, was a fabled CIA officer who directed the agency's clandestine service during the 1950s. Between Mr. Wisner's jaunts abroad to help topple governments, his wife would host the most elegant dinner parties in Washington. Mr. Wisner worked himself into a nervous breakdown, and he finally killed himself with a shotgun in 1965.

The intelligence business, and the infighting, also took a toll on William Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan headed the FBI's coun-

terintelligence operations for many years, rose to become the No. 3 man at the Bureau, and finally left in 1971 after a bitter feud with then-director J. Edgar Hoover. Mr. Sullivan's mental torments are clear between the lines of "The Bureau," a book he drafted before his death in a hunting accident in 1977.

Mr. Sullivan's book spills some secrets about the spy business, such as his suspicion that the Russians placed a penetration agent within the FBI's New York office. And Mr. Sullivan apparently spilled many more, in conversations with reporters, names and events came bubbling out of him from that murky core of intelligence—all tinged with the venom of Mr. Sullivan's hatred for his former boss, Mr. Hoover. To read Mr. Sullivan's book is to see a thoughtful man humbled by the need to avenge past injuries to his pride and justify his every action—even at the cost of revealing the secrets he struggled so long to protect.

Not so Richard Helms. His conduct, at the CIA and in retirement, seemed to echo that terse advice of the Duchess of Windsor: "Never explain; never complain." He let others travel the world during the agency's glory days, running secret armies and organizing coups. And he let others wrangle over what Mr. Powers calls the "epistemological" questions of intelligence—the study of how we know things about the enemy.

Mr. Helms was a manager. He saw his job as taking the heat—for Presidents and the dirty work that lay behind their grand international designs, and for the sometimes-crazy schemes of his subordinates at the CIA. Richard Helms protected them all.

This managerial commitment to secrecy ultimately got Mr. Helms into serious legal trouble. In 1970, he had been ordered by President Nixon to prevent, by whatever means necessary, the election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile; when questioned about the resulting covert campaign by a Senate committee in 1973, he lied. Later, in the new world of government ethics that had been created by Watergate, Mr. Helms pleaded no contest to a criminal charge stemming from this false testimony.

Mr. Powers takes a basically sympathetic view toward the CIA. He believes that the U.S. needs a spy service, and that a spy service is useless unless it can protect its secrets. Thus his respect for Mr. Helms, who surely must be flattered by the title Mr. Powers chose for his book.

Mr. Powers writes with the precision of a former wire-service reporter, but he's also capable of stunning, lyrical passages about some of the agency's great characters. His book is a pleasure to read, and it

is without question the best introduction to the CIA (whose brief, 30-year history is encompassed almost completely within Mr. Helms's career) that has yet been written.

Mr. Sullivan's meandering book, in contrast, should be skipped. It adds a few new details to the history of Mr. Hoover's autocratic regime at the FBI, but little to a reader's understanding of why such terrible things were allowed to happen. (The answer, in part, is surely that for decades, men like Mr. Sullivan were afraid to speak out.)

In assessing Mr. Helms and his role as the protector of American Presidents, Mr. Powers reaches two important conclusions. First, he argues that in the few instances where the CIA attempted to assassinate foreign leaders, it did so on orders from U.S. Presidents or with their knowledge. Second, he contends that Richard Helms was fired by President Nixon in 1973 because he refused to allow Mr. Nixon to use the CIA to cover up the Watergate scandal. Mr. Powers offers considerable evidence to support these arguments; but interestingly, none of it appears to have come from Mr. Helms himself. The former CIA director, it seems, is still keeping the secrets and protecting Presidents—even at the cost of his own reputation.

Mr. Ignatius writes about intelligence matters for the Journal's Washington bureau.

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PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
15 OCTOBER 1979

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Knopf announces two author tours:

Thomas Powers ("The Man Who Kept
Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA")
will be in Boston October 22-23, New
York October 24-25, Philadelphia Oc-
tober 26, Washington, D.C., October
30-31, Chicago November 1-2, San
Francisco November 5-6 and Los An-
geles November 7.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979

Our Good and Faithful Servants

THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: Richard Helms and the CIA. By Thomas Powers. Knopf. 393 pp. \$12.95

By RICHARD HARWOOD

IN THE PROCESS OF SHEDDING illusions over the past decade or so, we Americans have fallen into an unattractive habit of scapegoating.

I quote from a recent book review by John Kenneth Galbraith:

"In the space of a few months in 1950 and 1960, [Allen] Dulles, as head of the CIA, showed himself to be a master of disastrous ineptitude. In those months he sent Gary Powers over the Paris Summit, helped overthrow the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. . . and was the man in charge of the organization that was responsible for perhaps the greatest foul-up in our history, the Bay of Pigs."

Dulles did it. Or J. Edgar Hoover. Or some other wretch who must suffer for our sins. It is the devil theory of history or, as someone has said of the CIA, the notion that rogue elephants unaccountably appear in our happy land to bring shame to us all. It is hard for us to accept the possibility that such men and institutions have, in fact, been our good and faithful servants and that we have been their witting sponsors.

This impressive book by Thomas Powers addresses that possibility. It persuades me, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Central Intelligence Agency, by and large, has been a most careful servant of the American government and, by extension, the servant of us all.

In 1948, as the agency was being put together, its covert action unit was given a charter by the National Security Council. It authorized "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements

in threatened countries of the free world." There was another stipulation. These activities should be carried out in such a way "that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

This was a charter for dirty tricks. I suspect that if it had been put to a national referendum at the time, it would have met with the overwhelming approval of the American people.

It is clear, in any event, what Harry Truman and his Security Council expected of the agency, and it is clear from the evidence Powers assembles that those expectations were shared by every subsequent president of the United States. The covert interventions in Iran, Guatemala, the Congo, Chile, Cuba, Laos and elsewhere were not impulsive cowboy operations by mad agents. They were the deliberate policies of the American government.

When it comes to the assassination plots against foreign leaders, such as Lumumba and Castro, the question is a bit stickier. The Church Committee investigated those matters four years ago and came in with a verdict of case not proved. But the circumstantial evidence Powers assembles persuades me that the CIA was not acting on its own.

As Powers writes, "talk about killing was commonplace" in Washington in the 1950s and 1960s. A West German general came to Allen Dulles, Richard Helms and others in 1952 with a proposal (which was rejected) for the assassination of Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader. At a State Department meeting in the mid-'50s, the subject was Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, of whom Dulles said: "If that colonel of yours pushes us too far, we will break him in half." In November 1960, Undersecretary of State Livingston Merchant asked his colleagues of the Special Group overseeing covert operations if "any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel; Raul and Che-Guevara." Their demise, he suggested, would leave Cuba "leaderless and probably brainless." Later in that decade, Robert Murphy of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, asked why the CIA hadn't killed Ho Chi Minh as a solution in Vietnam: "Ho is the problem, isn't he? Can't you fellows do something to get rid of him?"

CONTINUED

THE WASHINGTON POST
21 October 1979

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The most damning illustration of White House involvement in affairs of this kind was the Kennedy Administration's determination to get Castro. The common view is that Richard Bissell, who directed the CIA operation at the Bay of Pigs, was fired because that ill-conceived adventure failed.

"But this was only part of the explanation," Powers writes, "the public part, in fact, while the private part had to do with Bissell's continued failure to make progress in getting rid of Castro."

Bissell and others in the CIA were under constant and extreme pressure from the president and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy, to "get off their ass" and "do something" about Castro. That was the whole point of Operation Mongoose, in which Robert Kennedy was a prime mover. The details Powers assembles about this operation are fascinating; the reader can decide for himself who knew what.

The subtitle of this book is "Richard Helms and the CIA." But it is only incidentally about Helms and his fellow secret-keepers. Mostly it is a masterful portrait of an agency and its managers and of their relationships to the governments they served. Powers, who won a Pulitzer Prize as a wire-service reporter, spent hours with Helms and other celebrated CIA figures. Why they talked to him at such length and with such candor is hard to say. But they did, and they have given Powers the materials for the finest book I have yet read on the CIA. The agency's managers do not always or even frequently appear in a flattering light. They were often amoral and servile. But, I think, more often than not they represented in thought and action the purposes of the governments that employed them. They found it hard to say, "No," to presidents and cabinet secretaries.

In a sense, they were bootlickers, fascinated and intimidated by the presidency, like other bureaucrats of the federal establishment. "The primacy of presidents," Powers writes, "is the great fact in the CIA's daily round. If the president does not trust or value the Agency's product, then the paper it produces ceases to have weight in government councils and it might as well unplug its copiers, because it is only talking to itself. The first duty of the [director of Central Intelligence], then, not by statute but as a matter of practical reality, is to win the trust, the confidence, and the ear of the president."

And to keep the secrets. Above all, to keep the secrets.

"On May 10, 1967, Helms went to the White House to give Lyndon Johnson the answers to the questions he'd been asked seven weeks earlier. The only account of that meeting is Helms' own. He says he described the [inspector general's] conclusions and that Johnson said:

"Then you were not responsible for Trujillo." "No." Correct answer. "Dien?" "No." Correct answer. "Castro, he's still alive, okay." At the same meeting Helms also told Johnson about the mail interception program "and some other things that were going on." Johnson's response to that was equally laconic; he just nodded and said something along the lines of, "But be careful, don't get caught." "

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MISCELLANEOUS

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1979

U.S. Checking Disappearance of Ex-K.C.I.A. Chief

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 — The Justice Department has begun looking into the disappearance of the former director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Hyung Wook, who was a key witness in Congressional and Justice Department investigations of the Korean scandal two years ago.

Mr. Kim dropped out of sight in Paris about two weeks ago, according to a family spokesman. He was close to finishing a book intended to expose the inner workings of the South Korean Government and had been urged by K.C.I.A.

agents to refrain from publishing it, the spokesman said.

Officials in the Justice Department said they had started to determine the facts on Mr. Kim's disappearance from a variety of sources who know him. Depending on those facts, they said, the department will decide whether to open an investigation, ask the French police to expedite their inquiry or take some other action.

Mr. Kim was among the army colonels led by Park Chung Hee, then a major general, who came to power in a military coup in 1961. He headed the K.C.I.A. from 1963 to 1969 and became perhaps the second most powerful man in South Korea.

He fled in 1973 after a break with President Park.

Congressional Testimony

Mr. Kim, who is 54 years old, testified before a Congressional committee in 1977 that he had helped arrange funds for Tongsun Park, a South Korean businessman, to be spent on influencing members of Congress. Mr. Kim also identified other South Korean agents of influence to the Justice Department and in press interviews.

He said later that the South Korean Government had tried to prevent his testimony, first by offers of safe conduct back to Korea and then by threats of kidnapping or assassination passed through unnamed intermediaries.

At the time of his testimony and later, Mr. Kim condemned President Park's rule and urged that he resign. Although Mr. Kim said he sought no political position in Korea for himself, other Koreans in the United States said they suspected that he might try to rally support among Korean exiles here.

A spokesman for his family said that Mr. Kim was writing a book, to be published in Korean, English and Japanese, that would disclose how President Park came to power and has retained power, and the inside story of how the Government in Seoul operates today.

The spokesman also said that the K.C.I.A. had frequently sent agents posted in the United States to see Mr. Kim in the last six months in an effort to prevent him from publishing the book, adding that Mr. Kim had resisted those pressures.

Mr. Kim, a wealthy man with sources of income he has declined to identify, left for Paris early this month for a vacation, but without the bodyguard who usually accompanies him. The family spokesman said he did not know why the bodyguard had been left behind.

About a week later, Mr. Kim disappeared without leaving any known clues. His absence was reported by the management of his hotel, where he left his clothes and luggage and did not check out.

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ON PAGE A6

NEW YORK TIMES
25 OCTOBER 1979

'No One Is Dying,' Cambodian Declares in Moscow

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Oct. 24 — Pen Sovan, Defense Minister of the Soviet-supported Cambodian Government in Phnom Penh, said in an interview published in the Communist Party paper Pravda today that "no one is dying of hunger in our country."

Mr. Pen Sovan, who was apparently interviewed during a stopover in Moscow on Oct. 12, said that talk of the threat of starvation for two million Cambodians was an invention by "Western and Peking propaganda."

Humanitarian aid from the West now, Mr. Pen Sovan's interview asserted, was largely a cover for illicit military assistance to surviving enemies of the new Government in the Cambodian jungles along the border with Thailand.

The interview charged that the American Central Intelligence Agency had infiltrated "various diversionary groups" loyal to the former leaders Lon Nol and In Tam into the country and said that 50,000 such "bandits" and soldiers of the ousted pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime had been killed in the dry season that ended in June.

Mr. Pen Sovan acknowledged that

there had been a threat of famine but that it no longer existed. He praised the Soviet Union and its allies for coming to Cambodia's aid with over 200,000 tons of food since the new Phnom Penh regime was installed by Vietnamese troops Jan. 7, but added, "We don't hide the fact we need help."

The Pol Pot Government, Mr. Pen Sovan said, had murdered, tortured or wounded three million people in its four years of existence. It destroyed all 350 hospitals that had existed in the country before 1975, killed all but 69 of its 683 doctors and pharmacists and laid waste to the national economy, according to the interview.

Now, Mr. Pen Sovan said, the Government "controls the whole territory of Cambodia, with four and one-half million people, and is taking effective measures for a quick normalization of the situation."

Aid to 'Counterrevolutionaries'

Alluding to the efforts of the United States and international relief agencies to increase deliveries of food and medicine to the civilian population in the contested area along the border with Thailand, Mr. Pen Sovan charged:

"In the month of September the republic received 41 tons of supplies from international organizations, but through Bangkok, according to the international press, more than a thousand tons of products were delivered to surviving counterrevolutionaries and 'refugees.'"

The publication of the interview came 12 days after Mr. Pen Sovan left Moscow, at a time when wide publicity is being given to efforts by United Nations agencies and United States senators to increase aid to the people of Cambodia. The assertions were seen here as a way for the Soviet Union to convey the impression of having done much more a great deal earlier, and Mr. Pen Sovan was quoted as saying, "We will never forget this solidarity."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-2WASHINGTON POST
25 October 1979

The Federal Diary

By Mike Causey

Carter Headache: Parking Space Flap

President Carter, the nation's best-known supervisor, is learning some interesting things about the sensitivity of the Washington portion of his far-flung federal bureaucracy. Things he has learned:

- He can cut their pay raises and survive.
- He can call bureaucrats names without risking impeachment.
- He can take the "E" out of HEW.
- He can question their pension program.
- He can reorganize them dizzy.
- But he runs into trouble when he starts messing with their parking spaces.

Beginning Nov. 1, presidentially-ordered free federal parking ends here and in other government centers, from Alaska to Key West. And the people here—20,000 drivers and many more federal riders—are flipping out.

Petitions protesting paid parking, some with several thousand signatures, have been sent to newspapers, radio-TV stations and the White House. Lawsuits testing the legality of charging federal workers to park on federal property are being drafted. Charity boycotts have been organized to protest the new rates that will start off between \$10 and \$45 per month and then, in two years, reach regular commercial fees.

Even the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, an Annapolis colleague of the president, felt compelled to ask for an exemption from paid parking for his people, on grounds that the CIA is remote and hard to reach by bus. He got the exemption, but most other freebie parking will end Nov. 1.

The emotion (and reasoning) behind the parking protest has surprised many, and infuriated some. It has angered federal workers who say it is another anti-bureaucrat blast from the White House, a move that will doom some car pools and cut into the pocketbooks of lower-paid civil servants.

The nonfederal sector of this federal city is equally up in arms. People say they pay anywhere from \$30 to \$90 per month for the dubious honor of handing over their cars to parking lot attendants whose judgment, and depth-perception, often leave much to be desired. So welcome to the real world, say the pro-paid parking people.

Whichever side of the fence you may be on, it is safe to say the parking flap has generated more noise, heat and anger than anything Carter has done to, or for, the bureaucracy, since he walked up Pennsylvania avenue from the Capitol swearing in.

There were protests here, to be sure, when Carter set a 5.5 percent limit (later raised to 7 percent) on federal pay raises. But that was nothing to compare to the parking uproar.

Boycotts of the Combined Federal Campaign have been organized at HEW, Navy (the town's two biggest employers) and other federal agencies. Most of the uproar is coming from workers in suburban areas where transportation by car often is a must, and local commercial parking is non-existent.

Friday the protest will come to the White House. By chartered bus, by federal workers taking a half day of vacation. Two groups—both from suburban Maryland—have been issued picketing permits by the U.S. Park Police. They plan to bring 700 people to picket the president over paid parking.

The Free Parking Underground at one local Navy installation hopes to organize a road-jammer Nov. 1. It is encouraging all drivers to show up with a \$20 bill to pay their new 65-cents-per-day-rate.

Government drivers and car pool members say the paid parking is unfair in a city where public transportation leaves much to be desired. They claim it will wreck car pools (especially as agencies experiment with varying hours shifts). And they predict that residential areas will be overrun with people who drive part-way and take the bus, or simply to avoid paying for parking. Many claim that expensive, new bureaucracies already are springing up in government to handle parking fees, assign and stickers.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 15CHICAGO TRIBUNE
24 October 1979Bob Wiedrich

Polish spies steal firms' secrets

COMMUNIST POLAND is stealing a fortune in scientific and technological secrets from American firms under the guise of fostering East-West trade relations.

Polish intelligence officers, operating under diplomatic cover in Chicago, have spent years attempting to build a network of spies planted in key American industrial posts to loot the kind of proprietary information that will enhance their country's economy.

At the same time, the intelligence operations are saving the Polish regime millions of dollars in research and development costs that would otherwise be necessary to develop the same sophisticated products in Poland.

And, according to counterintelligence experts, the thefts also are giving communist industry an unfair and illegal competitive edge over American businessmen throughout the world.

TO ACCOMPLISH these ends, the highly skilled Polish Intelligence Service constantly works to recruit agents — both Polish citizens, permanent registered aliens, and American citizens of Polish descent — to carry out its dirty work.

In addition, American officials know that Polish government funds have been used to gain control of American business firms, both here and elsewhere in the United States.

And American counterintelligence experts now are convinced that some of these firms are being used to cover the operations of Polish communist spies assigned to pirate scientific and industrial secrets from other companies.

"We know that the Polish government has bought out several industrial firms in the Chicago area," said Aloysius A. Mazewski, president of the Polish National Alliance and Polish American Congress.

"THEY BRING in their own people as salesmen. Then the salesmen travel from factory to factory, stealing the secrets.

"We've been wrestling with this problem for the last 12 years. We're against members of the Polish-American community socializing with the Polish government representatives here.

"We frown on those citizens who open doors to let these people in to widen their intelligence operations. I've been preaching that for years.

"There are several businesses where we know the Polish communist government has made substantial investments.

"Some of our people are naive enough to think that that kind of investment is as far as it goes. But it doesn't. It is only the beginning."

THE POLISH Intelligence Service officers — those directly employed by the communist regime — operate behind the facade of diplomatic functionaries at the Polish Embassy in Washington and at

consulates in Chicago and other major cities.

They control agents who have been recruited largely on Polish soil to infiltrate American business firms in search of industrial goodies to send home.

It has been estimated that 40 per cent of all Iron Curtain country diplomats have some affiliation with their intelligence services.

And the highest concentration of communist Poland's industrial espionage reportedly is located in Chicago because of its large Polish-American population.

TWENTY YEARS ago, Polish intelligence operations focused more on contacting influential American Poles to persuade them to accept the communist regime.

However, now that detente has become an established fact between the U.S. and most of Eastern Europe's satellite countries and the Soviet Union, Polish intelligence has diverted its efforts to the wholesale theft of American technology.

To accomplish that, the Polish Communists have attempted to recruit Polish nationals immigrating to the United States. Others who have become targets of their intelligence schemes are Americans of Polish descent returning to Europe on visits.

Cultural exchange programs involving students, visiting professors, or businessmen also have provided a prime ground for recruiting agents to operate on American soil.

IN SOME instances, Polish Intelligence Service officers are known to have used threats against the safety and livelihoods of relatives remaining in Poland to force recent immigrants to do their will.

In certain instances, recruited agents have been dispatched to America to be "buried" for as long as five years, while they established themselves as citizens. Only then were they "activated" to begin industrial spying operations.

With stolen technology, East European countries have flooded Western markets with some products to the detriment of American companies.

"They can beat the Americans with cheaper labor and production costs," an official said. "Several U.S. companies already have felt the adverse economic impact of such tactics."

PROPRIETARY information is a manufacturer's secret about how he designed, developed, produced, and maintains a product. Simple examination of the product will not divulge such secrets. Under burgeoning East-West trade, communist countries can legitimately purchase such information. But stealing it is cheaper.

So unless it ever becomes cheaper to buy technology than to steal it, the highly professional and aggressive Polish Intelligence Service can be expected to keep on trying.

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ON PAGE A-12

THE WASHINGTON POST
24 October 1979

Ex-CIA Counsel Made Consultant In H-Bomb Probe

Anthony Lapham, former general counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency, has been hired as a special consultant to the Justice Department's inquiry into possible criminal violations stemming from publication of articles on the theory of the hydrogen bomb.

Philip B. Heymann, head of the department's criminal division, said yesterday that Lapham was asked to join attorneys examining the case because of his expertise in national security issues. Lapham was the CIA's top lawyer for three years until he resigned in May.

The review was started last month when the department announced it was dropping efforts to stop Progressive magazine from publishing an article about the theory of the H-bomb because the essential secrets already had been exposed in another publication.

Lapham said yesterday he expects to need about a month to review the files on the department's civil suit against the Progressive and the article containing similar information, which was published in the Madison, Wis., Press Connection.

Some department officials think it unlikely that the review will lead to any criminal charges. But the Department of Energy has been pushing for the criminal investigation, in part because its experts believe government scientists exposed classified material by helping the two writers in the case.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-8NEW YORK TIMES
24 OCTOBER 1979

Issue and Debate

*Missiles for Europe Now,**or Talks With Moscow First?*By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 — The question whether a new generation of American nuclear missiles should be spread across Western Europe has emerged as the hottest issue confronting the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Carter Administration, in an effort to shore up the credibility of American security guarantees in Europe, has presented NATO with a plan that calls for the deployment of nearly 600 medium-range missiles on the territory of several allied countries in the mid-1980's. The plan has stirred debate in Western Europe and has become a new source of friction in relations between Washington and Moscow.

Under the plan, two new types of rockets, the ground-launched cruise missile and a longer-range version of the existing Pershing missile, would be based in Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Both missiles would have a range of more than 1,000 miles and would give the United States the ability, for the first time, to hit targets in the Soviet Union from Europe.

Although NATO military authorities have approved the Administration's missile proposal, many European legislators, particularly in West Germany and the Netherlands, have suggested that the plan be deferred until an effort has been made to get Moscow to agree on limitations for Soviet and American nuclear forces in Europe. This position was bolstered earlier this month when Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, called for arms talks and announced Moscow's willingness to begin reducing missile forces aimed at Western Europe.

The Administration is on record as supporting negotiations with Moscow on European nuclear forces, but American officials argue that the alliance should not begin new talks until after NATO has agreed on deploying the new missiles. The Brezhnev offer, they contend, was meant to forestall a formal decision by the alliance in December to produce and deploy the weapons.

The debate, then, is between those who want a missile deployment decision to precede arms talks with Moscow and critics of the new rockets who want negotiations to come first.

The results of this debate will affect not only the future nuclear balance in Europe but also the prospects for future arms-control accords with Moscow. The issue has become bound up in the debate in the Senate over the nuclear arms treaty and is widely seen as a test of the Administration's leader-



U.S. Navy Photo

A ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile during test in Point Mugu, Calif., this year.

The Background

Since Moscow first deployed about 600 medium-range missiles against Western Europe about 20 years ago, NATO governments have debated the need for a matching response. In the early 1960's, for example, the Kennedy Administration proposed that a fleet of missile-equipped NATO vessels, called the "multilateral force," be built. Later in the decade, NATO military commanders pressed for the deployment of medium-range rockets on the soil of West Germany and other allied countries on the Continent.

None of these proposals were adopted. This was owing, in part, to the reluctance of some European governments to participate in an arms program that posed a direct nuclear threat to the Soviet Union. But the main reason NATO decided against medium-range missiles in the 1960's was the belief that any imbalance in medium-range nuclear forces in Europe was

more than offset by an American lead over Moscow in intercontinental-range systems, such as heavy bombers and submarine-launched missiles.

However, the Soviet Union in the last decade has succeeded in catching up with the United States in intercontinental strategic forces. At the same time, Moscow has begun to modernize nuclear forces directed against Western Europe, deploying such systems as the mobile SS-20 missile and the bomber known in the West as the Backfire. These developments have focused new attention on the basic question, first raised by President Charles de Gaulle in the early 1960's, of whether the American threat to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe is still credible.

To reassure Europeans on this point, the Administration is proposing that 572 medium-range systems — 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 rockets — be deployed on European soil. Unlike the old "multilateral force" concept, the missiles would be entirely under the command of American military commanders. Under the Administration's plan, once NATO agreed to accept the missiles, American negotiators could begin to discuss possible limits on medium-range forces at the next round of the strategic arms talks.

The Argument For Deployment

Proponents of the Administration's missile plan make three arguments. First, they contend that a serious imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in medium-range nuclear strength is emerging and that this disparity could leave the alliance open to political blackmail by Moscow.

Second, Administration officials contend that without NATO's endorsement of the missile proposals, Washington would have little leverage over Moscow in future arms-control talks. Moscow, they maintain, would have no incentive to limit its own forces unless the alliance seemed determined to upgrade its arsenal.

Finally, some officials suggest that a failure by the alliance to agree on modernizing missile forces would create deep doubts in Europe over the competence of American leadership. By staking out a strong position in favor of new missiles, Mr. Carter and his top advisers, officials report, want to avoid a replay of the neutron bomb affair last year, when strains in alliance relations resulted from the President's last-minute decision not to produce the nuclear warhead.

The Argument For a Delay

Opponents of approving the Administration's missile proposal contend that Moscow's edge in nuclear power in Europe has been exaggerated. While noting the Soviet advantage in medium-range missiles, they note that there are more than 7,000 nuclear weapons in Western Europe, including about 500 American aircraft and 150 British and French submarine-launched rockets able to reach Soviet territory.

Critics of the missile plan also point to a recent study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research group in London, which concluded "that something very close to parity now exists between the theater nuclear forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." In military usage, "theater" is a major area of warfare, in this case Europe.

Citing this conclusion, Klaas G. De Vries, chairman of the defense commission of the Dutch Parliament, has suggested that NATO find out whether Moscow would agree to limits on the weapons before it starts a missile program. Mr. De Vries argues that a decision to place new American missiles in Western Europe would only lead Moscow to step up its own modernization efforts.

Finally, while Mr. De Vries and other critics acknowledge that American leadership in NATO has been called into question in recent months, they believe that this has little to do with the military situation in Europe. They suggest that Mr. Carter's capacity to offer leadership in the West has suffered from his political weakness at home, particularly his inability to gain approval of Congress for an energy program and the new arms treaty with Moscow.

The Outlook

Despite the arguments of private analysts, there does seem to be a growing consensus in NATO that the United States needs to match Moscow's new emphasis on improving medium-range nuclear forces. At the same time, officials believe that in order to gain the support of European parliaments for such a step, NATO will have to couple a deployment decision with an arms-control offer.

Accordingly, at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels in mid-December, the Administration hopes to gain formal approval for both its missile plan and an arms-control proposal that would be put before Moscow next year.

But the Administration's effort to link a deployment decision with an arms-control offer could run into trouble. As in the case of the neutron bomb last year, widespread public opposition to the new missiles could lead some governments to reassess their support for the plan. Another possibility is that the Administration could fail to gain Senate approval of the arms treaty with Moscow, an outcome that could increase Soviet-American tensions and would leave many governments wary of initiating new military deployments.

The Administration has tried to take advantage of this situation by telling supporters of NATO in the Senate that a failure to approve the arms treaty could jeopardize new missiles for Europe and throw the alliance into crisis. So far, Senate foes of the treaty have rejected this argument, saying the Administration was making a "self-fulfilling prophecy."

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
23 OCTOBER 1979

Chile Emissary Offered DINA Men To Prosecutors in Letelier Case

Doubts on Testimony Killed Plan for 'Trade'

By Robert Pear
Washington Star Staff Writer

A Chilean emissary offered earlier this year to turn over to the United States two of the three Chilean secret police officers who had been indicted here in the conspiracy to murder Orlando Letelier.

But lawyers in the U.S. Attorney's Office said they turned down the offer after concluding that the third officer, Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, was not prepared to tell the full truth as a witness in court.

The hitherto untold story of the emissary's offer emerged yesterday in interviews with Assistant U.S.

Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., who prosecuted the Letelier case, and others in the departments of Justice and State.

They identified the emissary as Frederico Willoughby, whom they described as a newspaper commentator and former press secretary for the president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. Willoughby, now back in Chile, could not be reached for comment.

Barcella said that Willoughby denied he was an official representative of the Chilean government but "made certain assurances to us which are more than an individual, acting in an individual capacity, could guarantee."

* Letelier, a Cabinet minister and ambassador to the United States during the Marxist administration of President Salvador Allende, was killed with his American assistant on Sept. 21, 1976, when a bomb blew up the car in which they were riding to work.

Three Cuban exiles were convicted in February on charges related to the killings. But Chile's Supreme Court has denied a U.S. request for extradition of the three Chileans, Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former chief of DINA, the secret police agency; Col. Pedro Espinoza Bravo, former DINA chief of operations; and Fernandez, a secret police agent at the time of Letelier's murder.

Under Willoughby's proposal, Barcella said, Contreras and Espinoza would have been turned over to the United States for trial and, Fernandez would have voluntarily testified. As part of the proposed bargain, the United States would have dropped its request for the extradition of Fernandez, and he would have been allowed to return to Chile after testifying here.

Barcella quoted the emissary as saying that Fernandez would change his story and "tell the truth," saying he did all that he did on orders of the other two secret police officers.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
23 October 1979

Jack Anderson

Vance-Brzezinski Rift an Ill-Kept Secret

One of the worst-kept secrets of the Carter administration is the friction between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and the president's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Everyone in the administration passionately denies the rumors of a Vance-Brzezinski conflict. But high-level sources have confirmed the rift. Brzezinski, obviously bucking for the kind of power that his predecessor, Henry Kissinger, enjoyed under Presidents Nixon and Ford, repeatedly overrules Vance's more pragmatic approach to international problems by pushing the kind of hard line favored by Kissinger.

"Whenever Dr. Brzezinski has a problem, he thinks, 'What would Henry do?'" a top official told us.

The most recent surfacing of the Vance-Brzezinski policy feud involved the government of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet and its responsibility for the brutal assassination of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier in Washington three years ago last month. One of the convicted hit men in that brutal murder, expatriate American Michael Vernon Townley, testified that he wired Letelier's car with explosives on orders from the head of Pinochet's secret police, Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras.

Brzezinski persuaded Carter to get tough with the Chilean dictatorship, demanding that the Pinochet regime extradite Contreras and two other secret police officials for trial in the United States.

Vance privately opposed the Brzezinski hard line, pointing out that as a practical matter no country is likely to extradite the head of its secret police on a murder charge. It would be as if the

United States agreed to ship the director of the Central Intelligence Agency to a foreign country to stand trial for illegal undercover activities carried on by U.S. spooks.

Vance argued that we couldn't reasonably expect more from the Chilean government than a face-saving disciplinary action against Contreras, who was forced to resign from his army post. In his usual button-down style, he urged that any demand for extradition be low-key enough that the inevitable rejection would not lead to a complete rupture of U.S.-Chilean relations.

But Brzezinski felt that the notoriety surrounding the Letelier murder, and public outrage at the idea that foreign agents could assassinate someone on the streets of the national capital with impunity, made a tough stance mandatory. So the demand for Contreras' extradition was made publicly, and when it was rejected by the Chilean supreme court, Carter was forced to recall our ambassador to Chile, pushing relations with the Pinochet regime to the breaking point.

The Letelier murder may be the cause of still more problems in U.S. relations with other Latin American countries. We have persuasive evidence that the assassination was planned and carried out as part of a secret "Operation Condor," an international murder ring run by a secret consortium of half a dozen South American dictatorships with headquarters in Chile.

We have pursued the Letelier case from the outset, after an anguished appeal to us from Michael Moffitt to help him find the murderers. His young wife, Ronni, was killed in the remote-controlled blast along with Letelier as the

three of them drove along Embassy Row in the morning rush hour. Michael Moffitt was sitting in the back seat of Letelier's car and miraculously survived the explosion.

We were able to identify the suspects, who later were charged with the crime. Now we are able to reveal that other South American military regimes were aware of the plot to kill Letelier, as part of "Operation Condor."

Contreras, the head of Condor, contacted his counterpart in Paraguay, Benito Guanes, in July 1976, two months before the assassination. Calling himself "Condor One," Contreras asked Guanes ("Condor Three") for two Paraguayan passports with which his hit men could enter the United States with diplomatic status.

Guanes agreed, sources told us, but for some reason the two assassins never picked up their Paraguayan passports, using Chilean passports and false names to enter the United States at a later date.

Instead, the Paraguayan passports were provided by the obliging Guanes to two other Chilean secret agents, who used them to come to Washington and act as a diversion for the two actual assassins.

The Paraguayan Connection and Operation Condor may well be another test of President Carter's handling of foreign relations and of the continuing rivalry between Vance and Brzezinski.

Footnote: A spokesman for Vance admitted he had taken a "vigorous position" on the extradition issue, but refused to discuss specifics. Brzezinski's office had no comment.

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NEW YORK TIMES
23 OCTOBER 1979

6 CZECH DISSIDENTS ON TRIAL IN PRAGUE

They Are Charged With Subversion
in Antiregime Declarations

PRAGUE, Oct. 22 (Reuters) — Six Czechoslovak dissidents went on trial today on subversion charges.

The six, including Vaclav Havel, the playwright, are members of the self-styled Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted, established last year to investigate alleged injustice and abuse of power by the state.

Three defendants — Dana Nemcova, psychologist; Jiri Dienstbier, journalist, and Vaclav Benda, computer programmer — pleaded not guilty to the charges, which carry a penalty of up to 10 years in jail.

Otta Bednarova, journalist, refused to plead on moral grounds, according to sources in the courtroom. The two others — Petr Uhl, engineer, and Mr. Havel — have yet to enter their pleas.

The defendants were seized in May after their group had circulated a strong critique of the Czechoslovak economy charging governmental corruption. It was the latest of a series of statements denouncing the Czechoslovak system.

The trial, one of the biggest of its kind in Eastern Europe since the signing of the 1975 Helsinki agreement on human rights, began with the chief judge expelling Mr. Uhl's wife from the courtroom.

The judge had told her that she could take notes of the proceedings only with the permission of the court, the sources said. When she asked for permission, she was told to keep quiet and not to interrupt the hearing, they added. After an exchange with the judge, he ordered her removed. Witnesses said she had been dragged screaming across a courtyard with both arms held behind her back and then detained in a police guard room.

Western diplomats and reporters were turned away from the courthouse.

Vlasta Chramastova, an actress who is a signer of the Charter 77 rights manifesto, was detained with her husband outside the building and led away by the police. About 25 young sympathizers who were standing on a corner opposite the courthouse were also taken away.

The indictment linked the accused with subversive centers abroad by saying that much of the material produced by their group had appeared in the periodical *Listy*, published in Rome by Jiri Pelikan, an émigré, and in the quarterly *Svedectvi*, published in Paris by Pavel Tigrid, another émigré. The defendants were said to have been financed and guided by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

The committee's statements have also been used for attacks against Czechoslovakia by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, the indictment said.

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'Paperclip': Some Nazis' Ticket to U.S.

Jack Anderson

In the nightmare that was Nazi Germany, the most unforgivable criminals were the men of science who put their skills and knowledge at the service of Adolf Hitler and his insane genocidal theories.

Trained to serve humanity, they should have had a better grasp of right and wrong than the homicidal, moronic thugs of the SS who did the actual butchering. Yet it was German scientists who developed the mass-murder techniques the SS used, and who performed unspeakable "experiments" on Jews, Russian prisoners-of-war and other helpless victims.

Ironically, the politics of the Cold War gave these scientists the best chance of any Nazi criminals to escape punishment for their actions. Their expertise was a salable commodity in the East-West competition that sprang up before the ashes of defeated Germany were even cool.

Suppressed government documents detail an outrageous program, code-named "Paperclip," under which hundreds of Nazis—including alleged war criminals—were welcomed into the United States with no regard for their past service to Hitler. The still-secret documents were turned up by Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), whose Judiciary subcommittee is looking into "Paperclip" and related programs.

The intent of the "Paperclip" program was to recruit German scientists and technicians before the Soviets snared them. Ostensibly, strict background checks were to be run on the recruits and their families to make sure no war criminals were given sanctuary in this country.

In fact, however, the secret documents indicate—and other sources have confirmed—that in many cases no security checks were made. This laxity by federal authorities enabled Nazi criminals to settle in the United States, secure from prosecution for their atrocities. A few of these scientists have been accused of performing experiments on Jews, sources told our associates Gary Cohn and Jack Mitchell.

In some cases, derogatory information on a particular scientist-recruit was simply overlooked because the government considered him too valuable to risk going to the Russians—or to a de-Nazification court.

"'Paperclip' was a calculated, cumulative effort by the U.S. government to bring some of the worst kinds of Nazis into the United States regardless of their backgrounds," a congressional investigator told us after examining the suppressed documents.

A less extreme view was given by another knowledgeable source, who said the intent of the operation was benign—to expedite the clearance of needed scientific talent—but the way it was carried out was a disaster. "It was an error of judgment," he said.

Whether "Paperclip" was deliberately used to smuggle known Nazi criminals into this country, or was merely bungled, the fact remains that federal authorities violated immigration laws in their zeal to recruit the German scientists.

One restricted document, for example, states: "Frankly, we reached the conclusion that, as a matter of fact, they are being brought here as civil-

ians without regard to the immigration laws."

When one government official suggested that the German scientists should be permitted to come here only on regular visas, he was quickly overruled on grounds of "expedience," the documents show. Hundreds of scientists and their families, some with neither passports nor visas—and some with well-documented ties to Nazi activities—were ferried to the United States on troop ships carrying American GIs home for discharge. Others were brought to Canada and Mexico and sneaked into the United States.

In one instance cited in the documents, an American escorting officer pulled a gun and threatened a government official who questioned the propriety of allowing a group of German scientists into the United States.

Once in this country, the German scientists were given lucrative jobs in American industry. Some even received security clearances to work on sensitive defense projects.

The suppressed "Paperclip" files raise disturbing questions about a report last year by the General Accounting Office, which concluded that there was no widespread conspiracy to obstruct investigation and prosecution of Nazi war criminals.

The GAO report did acknowledge that the CIA, the FBI and the Defense and State department had arranged for suspected Nazis to gain refuge here, and then used them as sources of information. But the GAO report played down this use of war-crimes suspects by U.S. agencies.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1WASHINGTON STAR
20 OCTOBER 1979

U.S. Probing Moscow on Nuclear Limits

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

Showing interest in Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev's nuclear limitations proposal for Europe, the United States has asked Moscow how the proposal would apply to Soviet SS-20 missiles.

A senior State Department official said last night that several questions had been given to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin about the proposal.

Once the Soviet proposal is clear, the NATO allies will give coordinated replies to letters Brezhnev sent to leaders of NATO nations. The letters repeated arms control proposals made in a speech in East Berlin Oct. 6.

Three senior U.S. officials are now in Europe beginning preliminary discussions on replies to the letters.

The senior State Department official, who talked with reporters yesterday on condition that he not be identified, said it remained to be seen if the Soviet Union has a fallback position from the original Brezhnev terms. He implied that the Kremlin might be prepared to modify its original proposal.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet

Union is "prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union as compared to the present level, but, of course, only in the event no additional medium-range nuclear means are deployed in Western Europe."

The main medium-range "means" that the Soviets now have are the new mobile SS-20 missile and the supersonic Backfire bomber. They are superior to most nuclear systems now deployed by NATO, which has done little in recent years to improve its medium-range systems.

Brezhnev also offered to withdraw 20,000 troops and a thousand tanks from East Germany without requiring any balancing Western reductions. This has been greeted by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance as a positive proposal.

But the proposal on medium-range nuclear weapons met skepticism here, even hostility, because it seemed to be a trick.

President Carter said Oct. 9 that "it is not quite as constructive a proposal as at first blush it seems to be." What he is offering in effect is to continue their own rate of modernization as it has been, provided we don't modernize at all.

Yesterday the senior official listed the questions that have been asked the Soviets.

One was whether Brezhnev meant that the existing number of SS-20 missiles would be frozen. Western intelligence estimates say between 100 and 120 are now deployed in the western Soviet Union. New SS-20s are being deployed at a rate of about five a month.

The second question was whether the number of SS-20s would be reduced. These new missiles have three highly accurate warheads. They are replacing inaccurate single-warhead old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

Western analysts are therefore worried that even with a reduced number of missiles the Soviet Union could continue to increase its capability of destroying West-European

targets. But if the number of SS-20s is reduced, then the threat to NATO might be smaller.

The third question was where SS-20s would be deployed under the proposal. They have enough range to reach West European targets from Asian areas of the Soviet Union east of the Ural Mountains, but Brezhnev only talked about limitations in Western areas.

The U.S. questions dealt with possible fishhooks that one has to look at, the officials said.

The way the offer was presented by Brezhnev, it was "sort of a rabbit for a horse that's being suggested," the official added. "It's not attractive at this point."

As the Soviet proposal is now understood, he said, it has the purpose of stopping a tentative NATO plan to deploy in Western Europe 572 new American missiles that could reach targets in the Soviet Union. The plan is intended to offset the Soviet buildup of SS-20s and Backfire bombers.

Countries like the Netherlands, where the missiles might be placed, have been uncertain on whether to accept them. Brezhnev is felt here to have been playing on their fears of exposing themselves to nuclear retaliation.

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29 OCTOBER 1979

PERISCOPE

ANOTHER CIA LEAK

The Central Intelligence Agency is investigating the leak of a highly secret memo that fell into the hands of agency critic Philip Agee. The eighteen-page document, written by former CIA director William Colby and titled "Perspectives for Intelligence, 1976-1981," was printed in the latest issue of the Covert Action Information Bureau, a publication that specializes in revealing the names of CIA operatives. Although the document contains no major revelations about American intelligence operations, the agency is particularly worried because it originally was sent anonymously to a British publication called The Leveller. Anonymous mailings of stolen documents is a tactic that has often been used by the KGB, the Soviet espionage agency. The theft of the secret document therefore raises a specter that has long haunted the CIA: a KGB spy within its own ranks.

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SOUTH KOREA - THE MAJOR STORY

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1 November 1979

Seoul Assassins Reportedly Tried To Draw Army's Chief Into Plot

By HENRY SCOTT STOKES

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, Oct. 31 — Kim Jae Kyu, then head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and alleged killer of President Park Chung Hee of South Korea last Friday, attempted to draw the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, into the plot after the assassination, according to Korean and Western sources here.

Instead, General Chung, who has emerged as martial law commander and the most powerful figure in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, ordered the arrest of the intelligence chief after an intense battle of wills that appeared to have lasted several hours.

Mr. Kim arranged for an aide to bring the key general to dine at a restaurant close to the intelligence agency's "safe-house" where the agency chief supposedly shot President Park and five presidential bodyguards with help from agency gunmen.

Rushes to the Restaurant

The intelligence chief then rushed to the restaurant, the sources said, and tried to involve General Chung, who had heard shots but apparently had no idea what was going on, by urging him to declare martial law but without telling him an inconceivable truth: that the head of state, who had ruled South Korea since 1961, was shot dead.

What follows is a detailed reconstruction of this struggle compiled from Western and Korean sources.

Fusillades of M-16 fire and pistol shots came from the safe-house, just outside the compound of the President's Blue House in northern Seoul, and were heard by neighbors including the representa-

tive of the Holy See, Archbishop Luciano Angeloni.

Two cars rushed out of a steel gate to the building, a small and nondescript structure where President Park used to meet the head of the intelligence agency, the most powerful man in the country after the President, for private sessions away from the busy, open Blue House.

Kim Jae Kyu was in the first car driven by a chauffeur assigned to him, and behind came the second vehicle carrying agents and bodyguards for the intelligence head. The party included the agency protocol chief, Park Sun Ho, and a private secretary, Park Hung Ju.

The cars sped to a nearby restaurant where "J.K.," as Mr. Kim was known to friends, leaped out shoeless and rushed inside to find General Chung, who was dining in the agency inn with the chief political officer of the agency, Kim Chong Sop, at the invitation of the agency chief, who promised to join them.

During the dinner, General Chung had also heard the firing and was surprised, the sources said, asking his companion what the sound was. But the intelligence agency's political officer apparently showed no surprise or special interest. And their meal had continued.

'We Must Leave'

The sudden appearance of "J.K.," shoeless because he had rushed out of the safe-house without pausing to put on shoes always removed in a traditional Korean setting, was startling. He was disheveled and drank noisily from a big water kettle, crying out, "Let's go, we must leave."

General Chung, urged by the intelligence chief, agreed to leave at once by

car and Mr. Kim asked his driver to go to the agency building on Namsan, one of the agency's main centers in Seoul from which political surveillance has been carried out for many years.

The bodyguards followed in the second car, and during the ride Mr. Kim told the general that "something has happened to the President" without explaining further, and he asked General Chung to declare martial law.

The general knew nothing about the slaying of the President, these sources said.

Not Prepared to Agree

The Army Chief of Staff, who automatically becomes martial law commander in South Korea in an emergency, had come to the restaurant at the suggestion of the intelligence chief in the first place, and he was not prepared to agree to a second suggestion from Mr. Kim.

General Chung proposed instead that the two men go to Army headquarters in Seoul, where there is an emergency button to order martial law inside a bunker beneath the headquarters and close to American Eighth Army facilities at Yongsan.

Mr. Kim agreed and the car turned from Namsan, a steep mountain overlooking central Seoul and crowned by a television mast, toward the lower Yongsan section where service buildings of both Korean and American armies are crowded together.

General Chung, arriving in the command bunker, called Defense Minister Ro Jae Hyun, a former full general like "J.K." and intimately known to the intelligence chief, and Mr. Ro proposed when he came that the party shift to the Ministry of National Defense.

The Defense Minister was not told by Mr. Kim of the President's death and the intelligence chief continued to keep the

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secret to himself in a way that seems in retrospect astounding, these sources said.

The group of men used an underground passage to get to the Defense Ministry close by, with the agency bodyguards all entering the bleak 10-story building together and going to the Cabinet officers' rooms.

Mr. Kim, a solidly built 53-year-old man with a heavy chin, who served as intelligence head from 1978, had so far revealed only that "something grave has happened to the President," not recounting that Mr. Park was dead, according to these sources.

The three principals, Mr. Kim, Defense Minister Ro and Army Chief of Staff Chung, who all have reputations for moderation by Korean Army standards, were friends and to some extent critical of President Park's repressive domestic policies, though the President had promoted them.

Asks for Cabinet Session

Once in the Defense Minister's room, the door was closed and Mr. Kim's bodyguards stayed in an anteroom, while he told the others that he wanted a Cabinet session called.

Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah, who was at the Blue House, summoned there by the Presidential chief of staff, Kim Kye Won, arrived shortly, followed by other Cabinet officers. The arrivals passed through the anteroom, where the Prime Minister was surprised to see the agency guards with their weapons out.

The Blue House chief of staff, Mr. Kim, was another "moderate" high in the Park Government and also a former general. He had taken part in the dinner of four men at which the intelligence chief allegedly shot the President, his chief bodyguard and close adviser, Cha Chi Choi, and left his friend, the chief of staff, un-

scathed. The Blue House chief of staff is said to have escorted the President's body to an army hospital and to have kept the matter confidential there. He was detained yesterday as a suspect in the case.

Shortly before the Cabinet meeting began in a conference room down a corridor from Defense Minister Ro's suite, Kim Kae Won, a round-faced man with a high forehead, consulted briefly with General Chung and reportedly then told him that both Mr. Park and Mr. Cha were dead, urging the general to follow any lead by the intelligence chief.

Intelligence Chief Uses Rank

Kim Jae Kyu had told the general that the armed forces sided with him, using his very senior rank to press the point on General Chung but still, according to these sources, without telling him what happened.

The general, a 53-year-old man who owed his promotion in part to pressure from the intelligence agency and also to a reputation for integrity, decided to arrest his benefactor.

General Chung ordered military policemen to burst in on the anteroom, where Mr. Kim, the intelligence chief, and his men were waiting.

Just before he was pushed into a car, he reached for a concealed gun his escort had overlooked and was cut down with a karate chop. He went for a second, smaller concealed weapon, said to be a Mauser, and was checked again.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 November 1979

Mystery Veils South Korean Army's Role in Park's Death

By William Chapman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 31—The role played by the South Korean military on the night of President Park Chung Hee's assassination has emerged as the biggest among many mysteries still surrounding the murder.

Sources with access to facts in the continuing investigation are inclined to doubt that there was military complicity in the murder.

But Seoul's busy rumor mill is fed with reports that some military leaders were approached shortly after the killing with a plea by the alleged assassin to seize the moment and take quick control of the government.

In one account derived from government sources, Gen. Chung Sung Wha is reported to have been near the scene of the murder and to have met with the accused killer, Kim Jae Kyu, shortly afterward.

Gen. Chung is the Army's chief of staff who since the assassination has emerged as martial law commander and is regarded as the most powerful man in the group of civilian and military leaders now making day-to-day decisions.

An investigation supervised by his martial law command has reported that Kim, who was director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, killed Park in a KCIA dining room Friday night.

The official accounts published so far say only that Kim was later arrested by military authorities, but they give no explanation of his activities immediately after the slaying.

A more complete report was scheduled to be published two days ago but has been delayed for unexplained reasons. Martial law authorities, assisted by civilian prosecutors and national police, are conducting the investigation.

In the account widely accepted by well-informed South Koreans, these events took place immediately after the shooting.

Kim met with Gen. Chung in a house near the KCIA compound. They are known to have been good friends and originally were scheduled to dine together that night. Instead, Kim was instructed to have dinner with Park on that evening.

As Chung and Kim rode in an automobile toward a different KCIA headquarters building, Kim asked the general either to declare martial law immediately or to mobilize certain military forces to take control of the government.

Instead, Chung insisted that they go to a military headquarters, either to Army headquarters or to the Ministry of Defense. After they arrived, Kim was detained and ultimately arrested pending an investigation.

It is known that an emergency cabinet meeting was held at the Defense Ministry at 11 p.m., about 2½ hours after the president had been shot. Out of it came the order placing almost the entire country under martial law.

One source said this week that it was merely coincidental that Chung was present on that evening and in touch with Kim. This source said that at first Kim did not acknowledge that he had been involved in the assassination and that it was not until another person present during the shootings began to talk that the military officials and cabinet ministers were aware of Kim's direct involvement. That person was said to be Kim Kae Won, chief secretary to the president and the only one in his entourage that night to survive the shootings.

This source, who has access to government information on the circumstances, said he had been informed that Gen. Chung had not been involved in the plot.

"There is no reason to think that he was a coconspirator," he said.

These sources also said there is still no clear explanation of Kim's motivation in killing the president. The government's public accounts say he was angry about past accusations, made against him by Park and his chief bodyguard, and that Kim feared dismissal as part of a major government shakeup.

Meanwhile, the military authorities today continued their drive to take control of the institution that the accused murderer once headed, the KCIA.

Reliable sources said that at least 80 KCIA officials and personnel have been held for questions to determine whether they had participated in the plot. Besides Kim, five of his personal associates in the agency have been interrogated.

Many other KCIA agents have been displaced by Army counterintelligence agents, leaving the once-powerful intelligence and counterespionage apparatus in disarray.

There were signs today that the military leaders intend to relax the martial law rules imposed at 4 a.m. on the morning after the shooting.

The martial law command announced that South Korea's normal four-hour curfew will be reinstated in eight rural provinces. A six-hour curfew, running from 10 p.m. to four a.m., had been imposed after the assassination. Seoul and other metropolitan areas will remain under the six-hour curfew.

Several cabinet members and military authorities continued their daily meetings and for the second day met at the residence of Choi Kyu Hah, the former prime minister who was automatically elevated to acting president after Park's death. There was no announcement concerning what was discussed.

It was announced that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance will head the U.S. delegation to Park's funeral on Saturday. He will be accompanied by Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke and several congressmen, the announcement said.

The government has not issued formal invitations for heads of state to attend the funeral but missions from about 15 countries have indicated they will come to Seoul. Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan is the only head of state expected to attend.

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
1 November 1979

Details on Park Death Raise Questions Of Possible Role by Korea Army Chief

By NORMAN THORPE

Special to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SEOUL—What was South Korea's army chief of staff, Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, currently martial law commander, doing in a building belonging to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency the night President Park Chung Hee was shot to death in another KCIA building nearby?

That question looms largest as details of President Park's murder emerge slowly here. It is a sensitive question, but it is being asked with growing urgency by foreign diplomats and South Korean observers. Information currently leaking out suggests that on the fatal evening Gen. Chung was more deeply enmeshed in events inside the presidential compound than has been reported so far.

No one here is prepared yet to say Gen. Chung was part of an assassination plot, but the more the details leak out, the more observers here are pondering the possibility. "The obscure thing," a diplomat here says, "is who the hell are all the players, and what the hell did they think they were doing?"

Questions Particularly Important

The questions about Gen. Chung are particularly important because the martial law commander and other army officers are moving quickly into the vacuum of power left by the President's assassination. This means they can profoundly influence Korea's future in the coming months and even years. Unless full details are known, there will always be doubt about whether this power fell into their hands—or whether they seized it.

It's uncertain whether these details will be disclosed. Many facts are being withheld by authorities, and the man who heads the combined investigation command looking into Mr. Park's killing is another army general. Nonetheless, it was learned from authoritative sources that Gen. Chung's movements on the night of the shooting put him near the man the government says shot President Park, Kim Jae Kyu, director of the KCIA. And in the hours after the shooting the two spent considerable time together before Gen. Chung had Mr. Kim arrested.

Official accounts say President Park was shot to death while at dinner with three aides in a KCIA house in Kungjong-Dong, a neighborhood near the Blue House, as the presidential mansion is known. Also there were Kim, KCIA director, later charged with the killing; Mr. Park's chief bodyguard, Cha Chi Chul, who died in the shootout, and the president's chief secretary, Kim Kae Won, who escaped unharméd. The official account says nearby KCIA agents killed four other presidential bodyguards and wounded a fifth.

From here, the official account follows President Park. It says that the presidential secretary drove him to a nearby army hospital but that at about 7:50 p.m., before they arrived at the hospital, Mr. Park died. Official accounts don't elaborate on the presidential secretary's movements or those of other key officials.

Chung in House Nearby

Authoritative sources say, however, that when the assassination occurred at 7:35 p.m., Gen. Chung and a KCIA security director, Kim Chang Sob, were together in another KCIA house close by, where they heard the fatal shots. Gen. Chung went outside and met KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu, who told him that there had been an accident and that the president had been killed. They immediately got into a car together and left. It is uncertain whether Kim Chang Sob joined them.

The KCIA director's first inclination, sources say, was to drive to KCIA headquarters. But Gen. Chung said he had to go to military headquarters to command his troops and persuaded Mr. Kim to alter course en route. Some reports say they first stopped at army headquarters across the street from the Defense Ministry, but this isn't certain. They apparently arrived at the Defense Ministry between 8 and 9 p.m.

There they went to a command bunker, to which they called No Jae Hyun, defense minister. When they told him of the president's shooting, he decided to summon the cabinet to the bunker and declare martial law. Official accounts say the cabinet meeting began at 11 p.m., but sources say it might have begun about an hour earlier.

Chief Bodyguard Blamed

In any event, authoritative sources say the presidential secretary, Kim Kae Won, eventually joined the meeting of cabinet and defense officials. Until then, sources say, officials there had thought Cha Chi Chul, chief bodyguard, killed the president. KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu, who was at the meeting, hadn't confessed his role in the killing. Just what he did say about Mr. Park's death hasn't been learned.

According to an official explanation, but one that still hasn't been released, Gen. Chung also had attributed the killing to Cha and hadn't suspected Kim Jae Kyu. But when Kim Kai Won, chief secretary, arrived, he quietly told Gen. Chung Kim Jae Kyu was the assassin. Gen. Chung then told Defense Minister No.

This created tension. Kim Jae Kyu had been followed to the Defense Ministry by seven to 10 of his KCIA bodyguards, who were in the bunker. Gen. Chung and Mr. No knew any attempt to arrest Kim Jae Kyu would likely cause a gun battle and bloodshed among top government officials.

Gen. Chung or Minister No proposed that the bunker was too crowded and that the meeting should move to a conference room upstairs in defense headquarters. Gen. Chung, meanwhile, secretly ordered a subordinate to arrange Kim Jae Kyu's arrest.

Kim Separated From Guard

While the group was moving to the conference room, sources said, army officials told Kim Jae Kyu there was a message for him and managed to separate him from his bodyguard so he could be arrested without violence. It was probably between midnight and 1 a.m. Saturday. The cabinet then finished planning for the following day.

Most of these details haven't been released publicly, although additional official clarification is expected soon. They also aren't complete, but raise many questions.

Most demanding is the question of why during President Park's assassination was Gen. Chung in another KCIA building probably less than 100 yards away. Sources said the official version has it that Gen. Chung and Kim Jae Kyu had agreed to meet that Friday evening for dinner. At 4:40 p.m. Friday, however, chief bodyguard Cha called Kim Jae Kyu and told him to expect the president for dinner at 6 p.m., the official story says.

In theory, this should have upset the plans of Gen. Chung and Mr. Kim to dine together. But what happened next is unclear. Did Mr. Kim purposely fail to cancel his dinner with Gen. Chung, thereby luring the army chief of staff into possible complicity? Or did Gen. Chung know the dinner had been upset by President Park's plans but decide to go anyway, expecting to see Mr. Kim after his dinner with the president? Or was Gen. Chung there as a coconspirator?

Conspiracy Evidence Lacking

Absent so far in any account is any evidence Gen. Chung was a conspirator. But if he wasn't, say a number of diplomats and others looking into the matter, his presence near the killing demands an explanation. The absence of an official, public explanation, they say, increases their suspicions.

These details also don't explain why Gen. Chung failed to get a precise account of the president's death from Kim Jae Kyu. They don't explain why Gen. Chung and Mr. Kim might have stopped together at army headquarters before going to defense headquarters. And they don't explain anything about Kim Jae Kyu's discussions with military and cabinet officials before his arrest.

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The details also obscure the reasons Kim Kae Won, presidential chief secretary, has been arrested and stripped of his title. This implies Kim Kae Won might have been involved in the plot or might know something that is being suppressed. Although he was at the dinner where President Park was killed, his actions during the killing haven't been disclosed.

Motive Is Murky

Also murky is the motive for the assassination. Sources say they understand that Kim Jae Kyu, as KCIA director, was deeply concerned about severe civil disturbances in the southern cities of Pusan and Masan in mid-October. He apparently interpreted these as indications of President Park's growing unpopularity and decided the Park government was bound to fall, sources said. There are indications he thought he could succeed Mr. Park, they said. This contrasts with the official explanation of Kim Jae Kyu's motive, that he had fallen out of Mr. Park's favor and feared losing his job.

The army's continuing investigation of the KCIA is focusing on this question, sources said. Some think that before being told the president was coming to dinner, Mr. Kim had conspired with other KCIA officials to assassinate him. When the opportunity came, he decided to act on it, they say. Even as KCIA director, he usually wasn't told where the president would be, sources said.

It is possible army investigators will announce President Park was assassinated in a KCIA coup attempt, they said.

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31 October 1979

Murder Inquiry Widened in Seoul; Park Aide and Many Others Held

By JAMES P. STERBA
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Wednesday, Oct. 31 — South Korean military investigators disclosed yesterday that they had widened their investigation into the assassination of President Park Chung Hee by formally detaining Kim Kye Won, chief of the presidential staff, and a "large number of other suspects."

The investigators implied that the assassination plot may have gone beyond Kim Jae Kyu, director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and his aides, who allegedly admitted having shot down the President, his bodyguards and others at a private dinner last Friday night.

Although no military officers have been implicated in the killing, usually reliable Korean sources said yesterday that Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, the Army Chief of Staff, was nearby when the shootings occurred and drove Kim Jae Kyu to the Armed Forces Headquarters afterward. Hours later, General Chung was appointed martial law commander and he has, in effect, been running the country since then. Mr. Kim was arrested.

40 to 50 Others Being Questioned

The Martial Law Command said that 40 to 50 other people were being questioned, but it did not implicate any military commanders. While one low-ranking K.C.I.A. officer described the military's interrogation as "quite gentlemanly," other sources said the agency had been, in effect, neutralized by the military with most bureau chiefs replaced by military caretakers.

A Western diplomat yesterday described the K.C.I.A. as "a rather demoralized outfit." The organization got a new leader as Choi Kyu Hah, the Prime Minister and acting President, named Gen. Lee Hi Song, the army's Deputy Chief of Staff, as acting Director.

William H. Gleysteen Jr., the United States Ambassador, told American reporters here that innuendos in South Korea and charges from North Korea that the United States was involved in

President Park's death were "baloney" and "rubbish."

[In Washington, the Carter Administration has instructed Ambassador Gleysteen to encourage the army to continue the "constitutional" posture it has taken since President Park's death. Page A10.]

In a post-assassination atmosphere that has been remarkably subdued, the Martial Law Command yesterday relaxed curfews in farm villages and allowed military and commercial trucks to move about in cities until midnight, two hours beyond the curfew for civilians.

United States officials in Seoul stressed that they would like to see a continued solidity on the part of various South Korean groups during the period in which there is a leadership vacuum and that they hoped a new government would evolve that was as broadly based as possible.

There was, however, some apprehension on the part of diplomatic observers that following the official mourning period and President Park's funeral on Saturday what one specialist called the "maturity" exhibited thus far might break down into renewed factional disputes and social unrest.

The military's Joint Investigation Headquarters of the Martial Law Command emphasized its investigation of what may have been a broader assassination plot by distributing to heavily censored local newspapers photographs depicting Kim Jae Kyu, the intelligence agency chief, and Kim Kye Won, the presidential secretary, who is a former head of the K.C.I.A., being interrogated. Kim Jae Kyu was shown handcuffed, with puffy eyelids, while Kim Kye Won was shown sitting neatly facing questioners from behind a desk.

Death Initially Called an Accident

Military authorities said initially on Saturday that President Park had been killed by accident. On Sunday, they changed their explanation to say that the K.C.I.A. chief had shot the President in a premeditated plot. Their statement today implied the possibility of a broader conspiracy.

"Kim Jae Kyu and his ring have been placed under emergency detention and are undergoing around-the-clock questioning."

"Chief Secretary Kim Kye Won is also being subjected to intensive questioning and has been since Saturday."

"Investigators have also requested the presence of a large number of other suspects for intensive investigation."

"The Martial Law Command will report additional facts as soon as they are available."

Although the key question among puzzled diplomats and many Koreans is what role senior military leaders had, if any, in the plot, General Chung's presence near the intelligence agency compound's dining room at the time of the shooting was believed by several Korean and Western analysts here to have been coincidental.

Precisely where General Chung was on Friday night is not known. Some Korean sources place him at a nearby restaurant at the time of the killings, having expected to eat with Kim Jae Kyu but eating only with aides after Mr. Kim was requested at the last minute to dine with President Park.

Another reliable source believed that General Chung was waiting inside the K.C.I.A. compound but outside the dining room when the murder took place.

In any case, Kim Jae Kyu reportedly said after the incident only that President Park was dead, not that he had killed him. In fact, according to this source, it was not until yesterday that Mr. Kim reportedly acknowledged his shooting of the President.

According to investigators, it was Kim Kye Won, the presidential secretary, one of the four men at the dinner table and a witness to the shooting, who, hours after the murder, recounted what had happened. Cha Chi Chol, the President's chief of bodyguards, was the fourth person at the dinner and was also slain.

While Kim Jae Kyu was on his way with General Chung to the Armed Forces Headquarters, Kim Kye Won helped move Mr. Park's body to a nearby military hospital where the President was pronounced dead.

A Version That Is Given Credence

One version of events that Korean and diplomatic sources say they believe is that Kim Jae Kyu tried to draw others into his plot after he had killed the President. He reportedly sought, after arriving at Defense Department Headquarters, the placement of commando troops from Inchon, a nearby coastal city, in Seoul, a declaration of martial law and the resignation of the Cabinet. General Chung was said to have humored Mr. Kim in order to get him into the Armed Forces Headquarters, where he was disarmed and arrested.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1THE WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1979

South Korean Military Filling Power Vacuum Left by Park

By William Chapman

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 30 — The assassination of President Park Chung Hee has left a political void that is being filled more completely by the military with each passing day of martial law.

Martial law commander Gen. Chung Sung Wha has assumed a particularly prominent role.

The military presence is visible although not especially obtrusive. Soldiers are stationed with automatic weapons in public buildings, and tanks are scattered on a few side streets. But of greater significance than these public displays that began with the imposition of martial law Saturday are the more recent happenings.

The martial law command has taken custody of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and its once-powerful political apparatus—from the top level down to the lowly agents who once spied on dissidents for Park.

Gen. Chung's pictures appear in the best positions in Korean newspapers that are censored by his censors. Officers of his command are in charge of the assassination investigation and control what is publicly known about the slayings. Friday night, of five of Park's bodyguards and the president.

Today, Chung made his first public appeal for confidence in the work of his command. He asked for deep understanding and wholehearted popular support of the martial law command as it tries to overcome the difficulties, and he urged the people to demonstrate their patriotism, dignity and determination in the crisis.

Earlier appeals had been made by Acting President Choi Kyu Hah, who is widely regarded as a figurehead and whose position seems to become less substantial each day. He presides over a group of military and civilian leaders—Chung, two other military officials and four or five cabinet ministers.

Choi's government today formally named Lt. Gen. Lee Hui Sung, 54, deputy Army chief of staff, as acting director of the KCIA, replacing Park's accused assassin, Kim Jae Kyu. Lee will remain on active military duty under Gen. Chung's command.

The group investigating Park's murder, meanwhile, announced today that "many" persons have been detained in connection with Friday's slayings.

Among them is Park's top aide Kim Kae Won, who escaped unscathed from the room where the killings occurred. He was the only one unharmed, aside from the accused killer Kim.

Whether Chung, the Army chief of staff, has dreams of personal power is the leading question in Seoul today. But as one well-informed Korean observed the other day, the question is somewhat misplaced. Chung's ascent was inevitable under the circumstances, he said, because no other power center was left when Park was killed by his KCIA Chief.

Under Park, no potential political successor was permitted to build a power base. His two parties in the National Assembly were directed by men who took orders from him. His prime minister, Choi, was a largely ceremonial figure. Of the two main opposition leaders of the 1970s, one was imprisoned and is still under house arrest and the other was expelled from the assembly on Park's orders.

In that vacuum, the Army was bound to flourish. It is the most prestigious institution in South Korea, relatively untainted by divisive personal politics. No one yet knows what its ambitions are for the future but the speculation is fascinating for its ironies. Some regard it as a liberalizing institution that may—if it decides to surrender power—pave the way to a more open political system.

Curiously, the greatest nervousness over the military's ascent seems to be found among conservatives in Park's own Democratic Republican Party, who never before worried much about authoritarian rule. It is sending out signals to foreign reporters that it would be unwise for Americans to tolerate a military rule for long.

The working assumption is that civilian elections will be held within 90 days of Park's death, in accordance with the constitution. The big question then becomes: what kind of election will it be?

The present, indirect method was embodied in the 1972 constitution, which permitted Park to seek unlimited terms of office. It provided for a National Council of Unification to be elected by voters every six years for the sole purpose of choosing a president.

Reflecting Park's suspicion of partisan politics, it excluded from membership on the council anyone who belonged to an organized political party. The result was a tame, easily manipulated organization reflecting Park's wishes.

Some want to jettison the old system completely and adapt direct election of the president. Before Park's death, that was the battle cry of opposition leader Kim Young Sam, who expected to take it up again when the political season resumes after Park's funeral on Saturday.

If the old system is retained and the military keeps hands off, the selection of a new president would become a contest for support within the Unification Council that elected Park last year. In that event it is likely that two long-time associates of Park would be the front-runners—Kim Chong Pil and Chung Il Kwon.

Both would be expected to carry on Park's foreign and domestic economic policies. Whether either differed seriously with Park on the issues of human rights and political dissent is not known to outsiders.

Kim, 53, is a former Army general who is married to Park's niece and who masterminded the 1961 military coup that brought Park to power.

He was director of the KCIA for two years in the early 1960s and then resigned his military title to organize the Democratic Republican Party, which has ruled the unicameral legislature ever since against a vocal but largely powerless opposition.

He resigned in 1968 after an argument over presidential politics with Park, and some observers felt he had wanted to succeed the president. After two years of inactivity, he returned as the chief advisor to the ruling party at Park's suggestion. He subsequently served two years as Park's prime minister, a largely ceremonial post.

Chung, 61, is a former military leader with considerable experience abroad. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Staff College and studied at Harvard under Henry Kissinger. He served as South Korea's ambassador to both the United States and France.

He has been foreign minister, prime minister, and speaker of the national assembly, reflecting Park's wishes.

Chung is said to be highly regarded by the Army but lacks a strong political base within the ruling party, even though Park had him named as its chief adviser.

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ON PAGE A-13

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1979

U.S. Envoy Issues Denial Of Complicity in Slaying

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 30—The U.S. ambassador to South Korea categorically denied today that there had been any American involvement in the assassination of President Park Chung Hee.

Ambassador William Gleysteen said that certain statements and "innuendos" were being made about possible American complicity in the plot. "Those are baloney and rubbish," he told reporters.

He cited specifically a North Korean Radio broadcast that he said sought to link him and the accused assassin in a meeting last Friday, the day of the killing.

Gleysteen said he had not seen the man, former Korean Central Intelligence Director Kim Jae Kyu, for several weeks before the night of the assassination in a dining room at the KCIA.

[In Washington, the State Department announced that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance will head the American delegation to Park's funeral, UPI reported.]

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A18

THE BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1979



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A7

THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1979

Tass Says U.S. Planned Assassination of Park

By The Associated Press

The Soviet press agency Tass accused the United States Central Intelligence Agency yesterday of having directed the assassination of President Park Chung Hee of South Korea.

In a dispatch datelined Tokyo, Tass said that Mr. Park was killed because he had become "too odious a figure even for Washington."

The Soviet agency offered no evidence for the allegation, except to say that "shortly" before President Park was killed last Friday, the United States military commander in South Korea, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., "urgently flew to Washington." Tass charged that the assassination was carried out "by the South Korean secret police acting directly under guidance of the U.S. C.I.A."

There was no official United States comment on the Tass charge.

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ON PAGE A1-12

THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1979

TOP SEOUL GENERALS SEARCH FOR ACCORD ON A NEW PRESIDENT

CONSULTATIONS HELD QUIETLY

Aide Says Forces Will Play a Role
in Deciding How to Fill 'Power
Vacuum' That Park Left

By HENRY SCOTT STOKES

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Tuesday, Oct. 30 — Leaders of South Korea's armed forces met here last night after curfew began at 10 o'clock to work toward agreement on a new leader to replace President Park Chung Hee.

Informed sources said the unpublicized meeting at the Ministry of Defense was one of a series of consultations among senior generals. There was also a Cabinet meeting yesterday afternoon with Choi Kyu Hah, the Prime Minister and acting President, presiding and high military men in attendance.

They included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Kim Chong Hwan, and the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, who has been martial law commander of South Korea since Saturday. All the senior Cabinet members were present except Justice Minister Kim Chi Yul.

A 'Power Vacuum' Noted

"The tragic death of President Park has left a power vacuum in South Korea and the armed forces will play a role in deciding who will fill it as our new president," an official said.

Mr. Park, according to a Government announcement Sunday, was killed Friday in a premeditated plot by the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Jae Kyu. Mr. Kim is under arrest and is being interrogated.

Korean analysts said they did not expect that the military leaders' preferences for president would be announced before the state funeral of President Park on Saturday. They expressed the belief that senior officers would keep the substance of their consultations secret after a decision had been reached.

But they said that the armed forces wanted to work out a consensus on the succession to the stern Mr. Park, who had ruled South Korea since 1981, as soon as possible for national security reasons, given the greater strength of the North Korean army and the aggressive record of the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung.

The agenda at last night's secret meeting of the generals, it is believed, also included the formidable question of how a new leader was to be chosen. Under the present Constitution, drafted seven years ago by Mr. Park, the new President is to be chosen within 90 days by the National Conference for Unification, an electoral college of more than 2,500 members created by Mr. Park.

The National Conference is packed with Mr. Park's supporters, and thus any candidate the generals choose would have to be acceptable to the Korean establishment. But the generals might also require any such candidate to pledge in advance to work for a more liberal constitutional system that de-emphasized presidential powers.

Such a course might favor two former Prime Ministers, Kim Jong Pil and Chung Il Kwon.

Alternatively, the generals might continue to hold de facto power over the country until a new Constitution providing for a return to popular democracy has been written.

No Provision Made for Successor

According to analysts here, however, nearly every possible candidate has one liability or another and, since Mr. Park made no provision for his successor, the generals may find themselves deadlocked and eventually turn to a safe career bureaucrat, such as acting President Choi, who has no political base.

The armed forces leaders appear to have time in which to reflect on their decision this week. The streets of Seoul and other major cities are calm, there are no reports of troop movements in North Korea, and the shock of Mr. Park's assassination has not led to demonstrations anywhere in this nation of 39 million.

"We are all reflecting on the meaning of this event for us," said one Korean. "It's one of the colossal happenings of modern Korean history, like the end of World War II or the start of the Korean war or the April student uprisings in 1960."

Suh Ki Won, spokesman for Mr. Choi, said after the three-hour Cabinet session that "the meeting affirmed that the people remained tranquil amid devout condolences for the late chief executive."

'Firm Defense Posture' Stressed

Mr. Suh said the men at the meeting had concluded that life was continuing almost as normal in South Korea "largely owing to the firm defense posture and effective performances of the Martial Law Command."

But those at the Cabinet session were thought not to have considered the succession to Mr. Park, Koreans said. The issue is apparently too delicate to be brought up in such a forum, especially before Mr. Park's state funeral.

The Korean press is meanwhile under heavy military censorship and analysts had little evidence to show which way the wind was blowing on the succession questions beyond these bits of evidence:

Justice Minister Kim, a hard-liner, has not been seen in public since the death of Mr. Park and was not at the Cabinet session. His absence may suggest that the armed forces want to avoid the excessive repression that caused unrest in the last three months of Mr. Park's regime.

The Ministry of Defense twice postponed and finally canceled a briefing today on the assassination, and analysts saw this as a sign that the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Chon Too Hwan, 47 years old, and other army men disagreed on what findings should be announced.

The ruling Democratic Republican Party, organized for Mr. Park by Kim Jong Pil 16 years ago, was said to be in disarray. It served primarily as a vehicle for the head of state and was greatly weakened by his death, according to observers.

The developments show that "South Korea has moved from the right, politically," said one analyst. But it was not clear whether such a shift might be permanent, considering the caution of the martial law command's censors and of General Chon, who heads the Army Security Command, a rival power center to the K.C.I.A. in the past.

Leaders of the political opposition, who were increasingly aggressive in the three months before the murder of Mr. Park, have been quiet since then. The New Democratic Party leader, Kim Young Sam, issued a cautious statement yesterday calling for democracy.

Two other leading dissidents, Kim Dae Jung and former President Yun Po Sun, are kept under surveillance in their homes and cannot see visitors. Kim Dae Jung also has made a cautious statement and neither he nor Kim Young Sam has raised political issues.

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ON PAGE 4-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1979

Army Seizes KCIA Reins; Nation Calm

S. Korean Military Extends Influence After Park's Death

By William Chapman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 30 — The South Korean military has virtually taken control of the powerful Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the wake of President Park Chung Hee's assassination, according to reliable sources here.

A top Army general has been named director of the KCIA, giving the Army command almost total control of an apparatus that numbers thousands of agents throughout the country.

Army counterintelligence agents even took over the routine surveillance of dissidents and political opposition leaders who were formerly looked after by KCIA agents.

The Army move came four days after Park's death, said by the government to have been planned and carried out by the director of the KCIA.

The military moves, which have not been announced formally here, give the Army command overwhelming influence, although the government nominally is being directed by a civilian acting president, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-Hub.

Two prominent military leaders are said to be in positions of greatest influence. One is Defense Minister Ro Jae Hyun and the other is Gen. Chung Sung Wha, the Army chief of staff who is also martial law commander.

The acting president theoretically could have named a civilian leader of the now-disgraced KCIA, whose former director, Kim Jae Kyu, allegedly shot President Park in a KCIA dining room last Friday.

Instead, the massive surveillance and counterespionage apparatus was turned over to Gen. Chung's deputy chief of staff, Gen. Lee Hie Sung, the sources said.

Meanwhile, thousands of South Koreans gathered here in the capital and in other cities yesterday to mourn Park. Government and military leaders met to discuss the situation along the border with North Korea and an official investigation continued into some of the unexplained circumstances of Park's death.

Businessmen and bureaucrats, old women in long black gowns and schoolchildren trooped to altars set up in front of a former capital building in downtown Seoul.

They burned incense and said prayers while ancient Korean music was played in the background. Many wept and kneeling women sobbed as they prayed before 15 large photographs of Park slain Friday night.

Park's body lay in state in the presidential mansion, the Blue House, where special guests paid their last respects. He will be buried Saturday.

Although no immediate threat has come from the communist North following the assassination, the Pyongyang government ordered its Army on alert and today said South Korea was facing "a growing crisis."

But acting President Choi, after meeting with military and Cabinet officials, confirmed today that the country remained calm under martial law, which had been imposed over most of the nation Saturday.

"Everything is in order," Choi said after this morning's meetings.

Opposition leaders have supported official appeals for unity and the United States has stressed several times since Friday its unwavering support of the Seoul government.

The 38,000 U.S. troops that support the South Korean Army have been on increased alert since Saturday. In addition, Washington has sent two airborne warning and control aircraft to South Korea and today moved the helicopter carrier USS Blue Ridge, already on station between Japan and Korea, closer to the Korean coast.

U.S. assessments have agreed with Acting President Choi that there is no sign of imminent threat from the North.

Meanwhile a special investigative group continued probing the events of Friday night when, in addition to Park, five of his bodyguards were killed and another wounded.

After first saying the president had been "incapacitated" in the shootings, a second government account insisted he had been accidentally shot when a quarrel broke out between KCIA director Kim and Park's chief bodyguard and close aide Cha Ji Chul.

But in an "interim report" on the killings released yesterday the government confirmed widely held suspicions that Park had been the victim of an assassination plot organized by Kim and involving at least five members of his staff. The report said Kim was afraid he was going to lose his job and knew he had fallen out of favor with Park, who had come to distrust his judgment and his handling of recent antigovernment demonstrations.

The investigative task force, under supervision of martial law authorities,

was reported today to be questioning many KCIA bureau chiefs to determine whether director Kim had attempted to enlist them in a broader conspiracy.

The major remaining mystery involves what Kim did and whom he saw during the night after the killings.

The government says he was arrested by martial law authorities, but has given neither the time nor the place where he was taken into custody.

One version being widely circulated here is that Kim sought out high-ranking military officers after the killings, hoping to enlist their support and approval for his acts.

[The Los Angeles Times today quoted Korean sources as saying that Kim was not disarmed and arrested until at least three hours after he assassinated Park Kim, and the five KCIA officials who acted with him were arrested at the Defense Ministry, the sources told the Times.

At least two members of Park's Cabinet, which was called into emergency session at the Defense Ministry, were reported to have seen Kim there before he was apprehended, the Times report added, also noting that a revolver was taken from the KCIA chief as he was arrested.]

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Communist governments had their own theories about the slaying.

China's leading newspaper, People's Daily, suggested that South Korean martial law authorities may be "protecting" Kim Jae Kyu because "they dare not disclose the truth of Park's death."

The North Korean Communist Party newspaper Rodong Shinmun charged today that Park's murder may have been "a preventive action by certain behind-the-scenes forces" to "prevent the overthrow of the fascist regime as a result of popular uprising."

The Soviet news agency Tass, in a dispatch from Tokyo, said the assassination was executed by the "South Korean Secret Police acting directly under the guidance of the U.S. CIA." It said the dictatorial president had become "too odious a figure even for Washington," which was frightened because U.S. interests in South Korea were threatened by the recent unrest.

[In Washington, State Department officials categorically denied the Tass allegation.]

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ON PAGE 17-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1979

S. Korea Denies Park Was Killed In Coup Attempt

By William Chapman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 27 — The South Korean government today denied reports that President Park Chung Hee was killed by enemies in an attempted coup, but the official version of his slaying left several unanswered questions.

The government maintained that the 61-year-old ruler was slain Friday by one man—the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency—in a dining room when a quarrel broke out. At least four and possibly five other men were shot to death.

In the aftermath of the mysterious shooting, South Korea's armed forces were placed on alert against possible moves by Communist North Korea, and KCIA director Kim Jae Kyu was formally relieved of his post, government officials said today. Kim was arrested after the shooting and is being questioned by a martial law body set up today, a government spokesman said.

The main unanswered question centered on how the KCIA director could have managed alone to fire at least seven shots to kill Park, his chief of security, and either three or four other bodyguards and escape unharmed to surrender voluntarily to martial law authorities, as the government version maintains.

There was speculation that others may have been involved, but no evidence was made public to support that suspicion.

A presidential spokesman, Lim Bang Hyun, denied a foreign press report that Park was a coup victim.

"That's not true," he told reporters here. He said further details would be announced by the Cabinet as soon as martial law authorities have completed an investigation.

Meanwhile, Seoul remained calm today as it began a nine-day period of mourning for the man who ruled the country for 18 years with a stern hand and a policy of jailing dissenters.

Almost the entire country was under martial law with universities closed and all unauthorized meetings banned.

People shopped in downtown Seoul as on any Saturday afternoon, however. Many clustered around newspaper billboards to read the latest reports issued by the government.

Troops were stationed in government buildings and other key offices, and soldiers stood guard with automatic rifles at Seoul's Kimpo Airport.

Prime Minister Choi Kyu Huh, who was named acting president as the constitution provides, took command of the government.

The United States officially expressed sorrow for Park's death, promising to defend South Korea if the Communist North attacked. U.S. sources said there was no sign of unusual military activity across the Demilitarized Zone where the Communists are believed to have about 650,000 to 700,000 soldiers under arms.

As far as outsiders could determine, the South Korean military was not seeking a share of power. About one division of men, including tanks and armored personnel carriers, was scattered around the city to enforce martial law commands. However, the troops were not deployed in the streets until this morning, about 12 hours after the shooting.

The defense minister and four top uniformed officers promised to support the civilian leadership, and observers here said they had seen no sign of military complicity in any plot.

The government said, in its only official explanation, that Park was killed by the KCIA's Kim in an "accident" that grew out of an argument between Kim and Park's chief of security, Cha Ji Chul.

The official version said Kim shot Cha, accidentally hitting and fatally wounding Park, and then gunned down four other bodyguards who rushed to the president's defense in a dining room at a KCIA executive command post near the Blue House, the presidential residence. At least three and possibly all four of the bodyguards were slain.

In this version, Kim was the only person present who was not in Park's official entourage. According to the account, Kim would have had to have fired at least seven shots in quick succession. Two of the shots, it was reported, struck Park—one in the head and one in the chest.

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Park was rushed to the hospital, according to other sources, by his personal secretary, Kim Kye Won, who was also in the dining room and was the only one, except the KCIA chief, to survive. The shooting occurred at 7:30 p.m. Friday, and Park was pronounced dead at 7:30 p.m., the government said.

According to reports coming either directly or indirectly from the government, Park had been invited by Kim of the KCIA, a loyal supporter, and they sat down to dinner about 6 p.m. with Park's security chief and the personal secretary.

There has been no explanation of what started the argument that the government said led to the shooting. One version being circulated widely asserts that Kim and Cha were old enemies who differed angrily over the government's handling of recent troubles, including defiant statements by opposition leader Kim Young Sam and student riots that struck two southern cities.

According to this account, the KCIA's Kim had taken a soft line, advocating a moderate approach to avoid a widening struggle. Cha, it was said, was a hard-liner who wanted student demonstrations crushed and Kim Young Sam curbed.

That version fit with the general perception here of the two men. Kim was considered a moderate when he was appointed KCIA director three years ago. A former Army lieutenant general, he had been a childhood friend of President Park.

Cha, also a close friend of President Park, was a former general who participated in the 1961 military coup that brought Park to power.

The official version also failed to answer this question: How did the KCIA's Kim apparently manage to slip away from the scene of the shootings without being stopped? He was said to have surrendered voluntarily to military authorities later. It was

not known how long he was at large after the shooting.

This and the large number of shots fired raised suspicions here that other persons may have been involved. But no evidence was immediately available to support that suspicion.

There was also nothing to indicate why Park was dining at the KCIA offices. However, local observers said it was not uncommon for him to eat there with friends. He had returned from a visit to the countryside earlier in the day.

The American response was quick and supportive of the government. In a letter to Acting President Choi, President Carter expressed a "deep sense of shock and sorrow." He said Park had been a "firm friend" of the United States and promised that the United States would stand firmly behind its treaty commitment to South Korea.

About 35,000 American troops are stationed in South Korea. U.S. sources said that their alert status had been stepped up by "one notch," but that no extraordinary precautions had been ordered.

Park is to be buried Nov. 3 at the National Cemetery on a hillside overlooking Seoul. His wife, who was slain during an assassination attempt on Park in 1974, is buried there.

Acting President Choi will serve until new elections are held to choose a successor to complete the five years of Park's unexpired term. It will not be a direct election. The successor will be chosen by the 2,800-member National Council of Unification, which was elected last year by the public for the specific purpose of voting for a president. Park won easily last year.

Observers here predict a lengthy jockeying for position among Park's loyalists who will seek the presidency. Choi is not likely to try for the job. A career bureaucrat and former foreign minister, he has wielded little power in his role of prime minister.

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27 October 1979

PRESIDENT PARK IS SLAIN IN KOREA BY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, SEOUL SAYS; PREMIER TAKES OVER, G.I.'S ALERTED

MARTIAL LAW IMPOSED

Slaying, at a Restaurant,
Is Officially Reported
to Be an Accident

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Saturday, Oct. 27 — President Park Chung Hee, South Korea's ruler for more than 18 years, was fatally shot last night by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency at a restaurant near the Presidential Palace, the Government announced early today. It said the death of the President was an accident.

According to the official version, the assailant, Kim Jae Kyu, a lifelong friend of the President and the host at the dinner, fired his pistol during an "emotional outburst" — an argument with Mr. Park's chief bodyguard. One bullet struck the 62-year-old President, the Government reported, and the bodyguard and three other persons were also killed. The three were not immediately identified.

More than three hours after the President's death, the Cabinet met in emergency session and named Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah, an administrator who has held no real political power, as acting President.

Signal to North Korea

Martial law was imposed all over the nation except the southern resort island of Cheju, and all airports were closed.

The 38,000 United States troops in South Korea were ordered by Washington into an increased state of alert as a signal to North Korea not to attempt military action against South Korea.

The Cabinet named Gen. Chung Seung Hwa, the army chief of staff, as martial law administrator, and he imposed a curfew from 10 P.M. to 4 A.M., decreed press censorship for the first time since 1972 and banned all meetings and outdoor demonstrations.

The Government announced that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Kim, had been taken into custody for questioning.

It also announced that there would be a national funeral for Mr. Park.

President Park, who came to power in a coup on May 16, 1961, had previously survived two attempts on his life. In the second attempt, a Korean gunman from Japan tried to shoot the President while

he and his wife attended a ceremony at the National Theater here to celebrate Korea's liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. The gunman missed Mr. Park but killed his wife.

The earlier attempt came in January 1968 when 31 Communist guerrillas slipped into Seoul and sought unsuccessfully to fight their way into his official residence, the Blue House, to assassinate him.

The President's death followed a series of political protests against his authoritarian rule, including rioting and vast demonstrations in the southern port city of Pusan and the nearby industrial city of Masan. The outbursts there, in which hundreds were arrested, were the worst since student rioting in 1961 led to the ouster of President Syngman Rhee and the beginning of the Park regime.

Opposition Leader Ousted

The recent rioting was apparently touched off by the ouster on Oct. 9 of the leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, Kim Young Sam, a native of Pusan, from the South Korean Parliament, with only the members of the President's Democratic Republican Party voting in favor. Subsequently all 69 opposition members of Parliament resigned.

The sudden death of the President, who for the last seven years has ruled South Korea under a Constitution that he drafted to give himself vast powers, has thrown this nation of 37 million people into political uncertainty. The question being asked here this morning is whether the army will continue to back the present Government if it continues under the highly criticized Constitution of 1972.

There were no immediate signs that Mr. Park's fellow generals had seized power.

The first official announcement of the change in administration came last night with a broadcast saying that the Prime Minister had been named acting President under a section of the Constitution allowing the replacement of the chief of state because of incapacity. Rumors that Mr. Park had been killed swept through the capital, but these were not confirmed until this morning.

Restaurant Within Compound

According to the Government account, the President was shot at the Kungjong Restaurant, which is within a K.C.I.A. compound near the Presidential Palace.

Rushed to a military hospital, he was pronounced dead at 7:50 P.M. [5:50 A.M. Friday, New York time.]

The South Korean Cabinet met at 11 P.M., and shortly after it was announced that the Prime Minister would take over. Seoul was quiet at the time. Some troops were seen around the Government buildings, and there were tanks near the palace. But, despite the rumors, there were no indications that anything violent had occurred or that any anti-Government action was in progress.

Before going to the restaurant for dinner, President Park had officiated at a dedication of a dam near Taejon, 100 miles south of Seoul. He returned here by helicopter.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-18THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1979

South Korea Confirms Assassination of Park

By William Chapman

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Oct. 28.— President Park Chung Hee was assassinated in a plot organized by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency director and involving at least five members of the director's staff, the government announced today.

Reversing an earlier claim that Park had been killed in an accident, the government said he was deliberately killed by KCIA Director Kim Jae Kyu, who had first shot the president's chief bodyguard, who was also a close aide.

Kim and the five were arrested and a government spokesman said that "many other (KCIA) personnel" are under investigation. Kim gunned down the bodyguard and Park inside a KCIA dining room, and his associates shot to death four of Park's other bodyguards and wounded another almost simultaneously, the government spokesman said.

He said Kim acted because he knew Park distrusted him and because of fierce anger against the chief bodyguard, who blocked many of his recommendations before they could reach Park.

The new account differed radically from earlier stories put out by the government after the killings Friday night. The government's first announcement Saturday morning said only that Park had been "incapacitated." Later it stated that Park was killed accidentally when a quarrel broke out between Kim and the chief bodyguard.

Today's announcement came as an "interim report" on the slayings released by a joint investigative command under supervision of the martial law authority. Martial law was imposed yesterday throughout almost all of the country of 37 million.

Despite apparent calm, close to 12,000 troops were posted throughout the capital, the usual midnight to 4 a.m. curfew was expanded to 10 p.m. to 4 a.m., unauthorized public gatherings were prohibited and the news media were under military censorship.

The "tragedy" of the slaying was caused, said chief investigator Maj. Gen. Chun Du Whan, "by the secretly planned criminal acts of Kim Jae Kyu," who organized the plot, apparently on Friday afternoon, after being informed that Park wanted to see him that night. He said Kim feared he would be dismissed in a rumored shakeup of government posts.

In saying that "many others" were being investigated, the report implied that a widespread KCIA plot was behind the killings, but no details of the involvement of others were given.

Meanwhile, thousands of South Koreans lined up today at public altars set up in the capital and throughout the nation to pray and burn incense for the late president.

Opposition leader Kim Young Sam joined Acting President Choi Kyu Huh, who had been Park's prime minister, and other government officials in paying last respects to Park, whose body was lying in state at the official Blue House residence.

Kim Dae Jung, a leading critic of Park's authoritarian rule, warned North Korea not to take advantage of the possible leadership vacuum.

"I warn North Korea not to take advantage of the current situation as the entire people's voice is united (against the Communists), transcending political differences," he said in a statement read by a Seoul radio station.

"We must avoid any internal confusion. However, the current difficulties can be solved only through restoration of a democratic system," he said. Kim Dae Jung had been imprisoned by Park for three years and remained under house arrest after his release in December.

Chun's account today noted that KCIA chief Kim had been distrusted by the president in his handling of "business." This, however, did not answer the question of why the president and his once-trusted aide had fallen out.

There is speculation here that both Park and his now-dead chief bodyguard, Cha Ji Chuk, had wanted Kim to back down harder on student demonstrations and political opponents.

Kim had been accused several times of incompetence in carrying out his duties by Park and feared dismissal when he was summoned by Cha to dine with Park at the KCIA compound near the presidential mansion, an interim report said.

This is the detailed account of events Friday evening provided today in the interim report.

Park, his chief secretary, chief bodyguard Cha, and KCIA chief Kim sat down to eat at 8:20 p.m. Kim and Cha began arguing. Kim left the room 30 minutes later and, as he had "pre-arranged," gave this order to two soldiers:

"When you hear shooting inside the room, do as you are told."

Then he went to an upstairs office, got a pistol, and returned to the dining room where Cha repeated some accusations against him.

At 7:30 p.m. Kim emerged from the room and confirmed that his men were ready. He returned to the dining room and called Cha a nasty name.

He fired one shot at Cha and then shot Park. Then he shot both again.

Outside the dining room, his five aides—two bodyguards, a driver, a secretary and a protocol officer—went into action as two teams. One team killed three of Park's bodyguards in a nearby kitchen and the other team killed two more guards at a nearby, undisclosed location.

Kim used a .38-caliber pistol and four of his aides had identical weapons. The fifth aide used an M16 automatic rifle to make sure the bodyguards were dead.

The government report was vague on what happened after the shootings.

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There was no explanation of why the KCIA's Kim did not also kill the fourth man in the dining room, Park's chief secretary, who is a former director of the KCIA.

It said that that secretary, Kim Kye Won, made a report on the shootings to "martial law headquarters" but the time at which he did that was not given. Martial law was not imposed on Seoul until 4 a.m. Saturday, about nine hours after the slayings.

It was after Kim Kye Won's report that martial law authorities arrested the KCIA's Kim and the five others and ordered an investigation of "many other personnel."

In the government's first report, issued on Saturday, the secretary Kim had been the one who had driven Park to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 7:55 p.m. Friday. That point was not discussed in the report issued today.

It was not clear how long in advance Kim had planned the killings, but the wording of the government statement implied that it was hastily contrived. Kim was told that Park was coming to dinner about 4:30 p.m. that afternoon, less than two hours before it began. It suggests that he plotted the shootings sometime in that period with his associates.

The government apparently issued the interim report to quell speculation and answer some of the main questions left unanswered in its earlier accounts.

The main question had been how Kim could have gunned down so many people alone and escaped alive. The new announcement today also raised to five the number of bodyguards killed along with Park. The figure had been either three or four before.

South Korea's constitution provides that a new president must be chosen within 90 days by the National Conference of Unification, a body of about 2,500 people from all walks of life. Most have been supporters of Park.

The U.S. military commander in South Korea, Gen. John A. Wickham, met top South Korean defense officials today to reiterate American support.

He said later that joint U.S.-South Korean forces were "adequate to meet any possible requirements that may develop" and that the United States was "prepared to defend the Republic of Korea under any circumstances."

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27 October 1979

President Park Killed in South Korea

By William Chapman

Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, Oct. 27—South Korean President Park Chung Hee was shot to death by a government official last night, and the country was placed under martial law early this morning, according to authorities in Seoul.

The Korean strongman, who had ruled for 18 years, was shot by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Kim Jae Kyu during an argument at a dinner party, according to the report.

Government troops this morning occupied all important buildings; universities were closed, and all unauthorized meetings were banned.

The prime minister, Choi Kyu Huh, was named acting president after a Cabinet meeting early this morning. The streets of the city were calm.

The minister of culture and information, Kim Seong Jin, gave this version of the slaying:

Park was dining in a KCIA headquarters restaurant with the agency's chief. The KCIA director became involved in an argument with the president's chief bodyguard, Cha Ji Chul. Kim began shooting and Park was wounded. He died on the way to an Army hospital at 7:50 p.m. (8:50 a.m. EDT.)

The presidential bodyguard and four other men were also slain, the Information Ministry statement said.

Kim, the KCIA director, was arrested by martial law authorities.

The South Korean Cabinet was called into an emergency session at about 11 p.m. and made its first announcement more than five hours later.

The disclosure that Park was dead did not come for several more hours, or about 12 hours after the shooting reportedly occurred. There was no explanation for the delay. The government's first announcements this morn-

ing said only that Park had been "incapacitated."

The Cabinet announced that Prime Minister Choi had been designated acting president in accordance with the constitution.

A division of American troops stationed in South Korea was placed on alert. Seoul is approximately 30 miles from the Demilitarized Zone that separates South Korea from communist North Korea, which has troops on the border.

[The Carter administration issued a statement obviously directed at North Korea, warning that the United States "will react strongly in accordance with its treaty obligations to the Republic of (South) Korea to any external attempt to exploit the situation in the Republic of (South) Korea."

[Senior Defense officials said that the South Korean Army appeared to hold power following Park's death.

[U.S. officials said that South Korean Chief of Staff, Gen. Chung Sung Wha, had emerged as the key figure in Seoul following Park's death. Government officials in Seoul said that Gen. Chung had been named martial law administrator for the whole country.

[U.S. Defense Department officials said that Prime Minister Choi, whose position under Park was largely nominal, does not appear to have emerged with any increased power.

[The State Department issued a statement that said, "The United States regards the matter as an internal one for the Republic of Korea and urges restraint on the part of all."

The announcement of Park's death stunned the capital, but there was no sign of any antigovernment activity on the streets.

The country had been racked by violent student riots at the southern cities of Pusan and Masan, but both cities were calm after Park had imposed

martial law and ordered a roundup of those responsible.

The KCIA has long been a powerful force in South Korean domestic politics and had been considered loyal to President Park, who used the agency repeatedly to round up political dissenters and to root out alleged subversives.

The martial law proclamation promptly banned all unauthorized public gatherings, extended the nightly curfews from four to six hours, imposed nationwide censorship and ordered all ports of entry to be closely checked.

Park's increasing authoritarianism has created strains between Seoul and the Carter administration, which has urged a relaxation of his rule.

Early this summer President Carter visited South Korea and is known to have urged Park to liberalize his government. Carter also met with 12 South Korean religious leaders, several of whom were known to have been opposed to Park's policies.

After Carter left, however, there was a new crackdown. The U.S. administration was particularly disturbed about a bloody police raid on opposition party headquarters Aug. 10.

At the start of his administration in 1977, Carter had ordered a gradual reduction of the U. S. ground troops in South Korea. That proposal was shelved this year, following intelligence reports of a substantial buildup in North Korean military power.

Park, who was 62, had been the target of several assassination attempts. In January 1968, a commando group from North Korea snaked into Seoul and made an unsuccessful attempt to storm the Blue House, the South Korean presidential residence. Two days after that North Korean gunboats captured the U.S. spy ship Pueblo.

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On Aug. 15, 1974, Park and his wife were attending a ceremony in the National Theater in Seoul when a gunman tried to assassinate him. Park ducked under cover but his wife was killed.

The Korean peninsula, situated between China and Japan, has figured prominently in strategic planning for Asia. Since 1945 it has been divided at the 38th Parallel between the Communist North and the pro-Western government in the South.

World War II brought an end to the Japanese occupation of Korea but created the divided country that exists to this day. Soviet forces installed a communist government north of the 38th parallel while the government in the South was headed by Syngman Rhee, who had long struggled to gain his country's independence from the Japanese.

Rhee aligned South Korea with the United States and was president at the time of the invasion by North Korean troops in June 1950.

Rhee's authoritarian rule created general unrest throughout the country. In 1960, student-led demonstrations sparked a popular upheaval throughout the country, which resulted in Rhee's resignation.

The government that succeeded him was led by Yun Po Sun as president and Chang Myon (John M. Chang) as prime minister. The new administration was plagued, however, by administrative chaos and in May 1961, although barely a year in office, was ousted in a bloodless coup led by then Maj. Gen. Park Chung Hee.

The country was governed for two years by a military junta led by Park. In an attempt to restore at least the facade of civilian rule, Park and other leading officers resigned from the Army and under the aegis of their newly organized Democratic Republican Party won the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1963.

A watershed in Park's rule was reached in 1971. After forcing through a constitutional change that enabled him to run for a third term, Park barely eked out a victory over one of his leading civilian critics, Kim Dae Jung.

In October 1972, Park declared a national emergency, proclaimed martial law and dissolved the National Assembly. He promulgated a new constitution that greatly increased the powers of the presidency. In next presidential election, in 1972, only a special group of public figures handpicked by Park was allowed to vote.

In the face of spreading unrest, Park issued a series of decrees that further restricted civil rights. One of the most sweeping was the decree of April 1974 that prohibited any criticism of the government or its policies.

During Park's rule there was little if any relaxation in the tension between the two Koreas. The Demilitarized Zone between them is watched over by two massively equipped armies on continual alert. Over the years there have been frequent incidents as patrols from the two sides encountered each other.

North Korea has tried to infiltrate armed units in South Korea, some of them with the mission of creating an armed revolt in the countryside. They have met with no success, as much because of the conservative nature of the rural South Koreans as to the vigilance of the country's military.

Radio Pyongyang, the official station of North Korea, led its Saturday morning news broadcast with a report of Park's death without comment, according to NHK, the Japanese broadcasting company.

[According to White House officials, President Carter received word of development in Seoul at 2 p.m. EDT]. National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski convened a meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee, the ad hoc crisis management group of the National Security Council. In addition to Brzezinski, the meeting was attended by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who sat in for Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who was out of town; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Frank Carlucci, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[President Carter left for a weekend at Camp David before the meeting.

[The announcement warning North Korea and stating that the United States considered the matter an inter-

nal one for South Korea followed the Coordinating Group meeting.]

The last decade or so of Park's rule was marked by one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. A particular feature of South Korea's development has been the degree to which the increasing prosperity was shared by all social classes and geographical areas.

South Korea countered the soaring price of oil, of which it has none of its own, by an aggressive campaign of selling goods and services to the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East.

Also contributing to this story were Washington Post staff writers John Sharkey and Don Oberdorfer in Washington.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 62NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE
5 November 1979**INSIDE SOUTH KOREA'S CIA**

Whether accidental or not, Park Chung Hee's death at the hands of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency was a supreme irony. Park himself founded the KCIA after seizing power in 1961, and he built it into a vast and brutal secret police force dedicated to maintaining his own absolute control over the country. The KCIA has long kept a close watch on South Korean businessmen, politicians, students and intellectuals. Its far-flung agents have spied routinely on Koreans living in the U.S., Japan and Western Europe—frequently resorting to harassment and intimidation and sometimes even to kidnapping. And, as was revealed during the influence-buying scandal known as "Koreagate," the KCIA has been willing to spend millions in hopes of bribing an ally.

As its name suggests, the KCIA was given a start in life with advice and training from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. But the KCIA operates at home, as well as abroad. It has an estimated 300,000 employees and informers—nearly 1 per cent of South Korea's total population. For eighteen years, it was answerable largely to Park, striking anywhere without warning and without warrant. Prof. Gregory Henderson, a former officer of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, once described the KCIA as "a state within a state, a vast shadowy world of . . . bureaucrats, intellectuals, agents and thugs."

Like a traditional intelligence service, this shadow government collects and analyzes information about the country's arch-enemy, North Korea. But the KCIA also was used by Park as a political watchdog, with a reach that extended well beyond Korea itself. KCIA agents are routinely assigned to

South Korean consulates and embassies, with the mission of infiltrating Korean communities abroad and in-

timidating Koreans who are critical of the Park regime. That, however, is merely routine. In addition, KCIA agents have kidnapped dissident students in West Germany. And in 1973, Kim Dae Jung, Park's leading opponent in the 1971 Presidential elections, was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo and spirited back to Seoul, where he was placed under house arrest.

The KCIA's biggest embarrassment in the U.S. was Koreagate. Tongsun Park, an American-educated South Korean entrepreneur and longtime fixture on the Washington social circuit, spent millions of dollars on largesse to congressmen and other influential Americans during the early 1970s. His objective was to try to ensure continued high levels of U.S. aid for Korea, and to blunt criticism of Park's repressive regime. Tongsun Park denied being an agent of the Korean Government—then fled to London in 1976 to avoid possible prosecution in the U.S. But in 1977, Kim Hyung Wook, a former KCIA director who defected to the U.S., confirmed that Tongsun Park was a KCIA agent who channeled large amounts of money to U.S. congressmen to buy their support for the South Korean Government.

NO CLUES: Now Kim, 54, may have been reached by the long arm of the KCIA. He had nearly completed a book telling the inside story of the KCIA when in early October he left for a vacation in Paris. But about a week after arriving, he dropped out of sight. The hotel in which he had been staying reported that Kim's clothes and luggage were still in his room, but that he had never checked out. There were no other clues.

ANGUS DEMING with bureau reports

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SALT

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SALT Reservation Voted To Permit MX Missiles

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday approved a reservation to the SALT treaty declaring that the United States considers its proposed mobile MX missile system to be permitted by the arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

The committee voted 11 to 1 for the reservation, which the White House says was not necessary. The only vote against came from Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), who opposes building the MX system.

By unanimous votes, the committee also approved reservations stipulating that:

- The United States, in future negotiations, should seek increased access to information on strategic weapon deployment and development.

- The terms of the treaty cannot be extended beyond the pact's 1985 expiration date without approval of two-thirds of the Senate.

- Treaty protocol restrictions on the MX and cruise missiles are not a precedent for future negotiations.

In another development in otherwise slow day at the markup session, McGovern announced his intention to introduce an addition to the SALT treaty calling on the two nuclear superpowers to negotiate "significant and substantial reductions" in their strategic arsenals if they want favorable Senate action on future arms control agreements.

McGovern's proposal is scheduled to come before the full committee tomorrow.

The treaty yesterday picked up an

endorsement from a bipartisan group of six senators, all of whom had previously indicated their support. Sen. John Chafee (R-R.I.) principal spokesman for the group said. Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), the majority whip and a key SALT supporter, had recently suggested that such a joint statement might improve the treaty's prospects.

Several of the senators predicted dire consequences if the Senate rejects SALT-II. "I simply cannot imagine the disastrous result that would follow" rejection, Chafee said.

Others in the group were John Melcher (D-Mont.), who voted against the Panama Canal treaties last year; Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.); Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.); Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) and Robert T. Stafford (R-Vt.).

In the Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), digressed from the business at hand to suggest that the committee's markup sessions were loaded in favor of SALT II, and that presidential counsel Lloyd N. Cutler might be an inadequate administration spokesman for the treaty.

Helms said that a treaty critic should be sitting at the witness tables in the hearing room where Cutler and other administration officials and members of the committee staff have been seated during the markup proceedings.

Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.) and Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) both sharply rebuked Helms for his comments. An aide to Helms said last night that the North Carolina conservative would "go after" Cutler again at today's committee session.

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1 November 1979

2 Senators Soften Proposed Changes for Arms Treaty

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 — Two Democratic Senators whose support for the strategic arms-limitation treaty with the Soviet Union had seemed doubtful proposed milder changes today than had been expected. As a result, they were regarded as leaning toward approval.

But the outcome of the Senate debate on the treaty to limit offensive nuclear weapons did not appear to be much easier to predict because many senators remained uncommitted.

In today's actions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved by a vote of 14 to 0 an understanding to the treaty suggested by Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio. He proposed that, in the next round of arms-control talks, the United States should seek greater cooperation from the Soviet Union in monitoring treaty compliance, including a prohibition on encoding radio signals from missiles undergoing flight tests. The present treaty permits some encoding.

McGovern Looks to Future Cuts

Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, introduced a proposed declaration, to accompany the treaty, that would instruct the United States to seek reductions in strategic weapons in a future pact. He also suggested that the Senate express its intention not to approve a future treaty that did not result in such cuts.

"If my amendment does not pass, I will not vote for SALT II," he said.

As in the case of Senator Glenn's proposal, the one by Senator McGovern was milder than many had expected. Last summer Mr. McGovern indicated that he planned to hold the Soviet Union and the United States to a schedule of annual reductions in weapons.

Senator Glenn had expressed some doubts about the verifiability of the treaty and had said that he might vote against it. But by softening several proposals offered thus far, he has convinced some Senate sources that he will probably vote for the treaty.

In the full Senate debate, opponents are expected to put forward an amendment that would prohibit all encoding of test-flight data during the life of the present treaty. This may be rejected by the Soviet Union, some Administration officials believe.

The Foreign Relations Committee also approved other proposals that prohibit the President from extending the treaty or its protocol without the Senate's consent. The treaty would expire at the end of 1985. The protocol, which temporarily prohibits the deployment of mobile missiles and long-range cruise missiles, would expire at the end of 1981.

The Senate Republican leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, offered a change designed to make clear that the mobile basing system contemplated for the proposed MX missile was compatible with the treaty. Senator Baker agreed to a suggestion that such an understanding would be communicated to the Soviet Union without requiring assent.

Only Senator McGovern, who opposes the MX missile altogether, voted against the understanding. Administration officials did not object to any of the measures adopted by the committee.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 November 1979

George F. Will

The Wrong Sell for SALT

Seizing the bull by the horns is something of a family tradition for Franz Ludwig Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg.

His father, who is high on my list of heroes, placed (not quite well enough) the bomb (not quite enough bomb) that almost killed Hitler. He was executed that evening, July 20, 1944.

Recently his son, a 41-year-old member of the German Bundestag, decided to say what many Europeans feel. He said that America's NATO allies are being ill-used by the Carter administration's campaign for ratification of SALT II. The administration's latest, and probably last, argument for ratification is: do it lest NATO collapse and our allies drift apart and toward the East.

This argument surfaced, briefly, in July, in the first week of Senate hearings. Secretary of State Vance was asked if NATO could survive rejection of SALT II. He paused, dramatically, then answered, lugubriously, "I don't know." Recently this has become the central argument for ratification.

A few weeks ago, Stauffenberg became fed up with what he considers an argument that is perilous, and insulting to boot. So he posed a question for his government to answer formally: does the German government know which European governments the Carter administration has in mind when it issues dire warnings about possible NATO disintegration? The German government answered: "There is no reason whatsoever to link the loyalty of members of NATO, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, to the SALT ratification process."

During a subsequent visit to Washington, Stauffenberg bluntly charged that the Carter administration's argument undermines U.S. leadership by portraying that leadership as fragile—so fragile as to depend on ratification of an agreement about which many serious people, of many persuasions, have the gravest doubts. "It is difficult to comment on this," he says. "It is grotesque." NATO is said to be so weak that it must have SALT II to save its mere existence; SALT II is so weak that it can't be defended on its merits.

Stauffenberg is not the only person who finds some of the current advocacy of SALT II off-putting. Responding to the threat implicit in the idea that, without ratification, NATO will not proceed with theater force modernization, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) says:

"This reminds me of a Marx brothers movie where Chico, whose life is being threatened by armed thugs, points the gun at his own head and shouts, 'If you come any closer, I'll pull the trigger.' ... To accept this threat as a serious argument for SALT II ratification, one would have to conclude that our allies are not dedicated to their own defense. If this is the case, the future of the alliance is not bright, whether SALT II is ratified or rejected."

The administration's fundamental and irremediable problem has deepened during the close, protracted scrutiny of SALT II: it is trying to sell a product for which virtually no senator feels real enthusiasm. So the administration is trying to make much of the fact that there has been a steady stream of statements by European politicians who assert that rejection of SALT II would be a devastating blow to U.S. leadership. This stream might be more impressive were it not so obviously generated and coordinated by Washington.

The administration and Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)

have at last completed their dance. The senator waltzed earnestly around the SALT II agreements, squinting quizzically at them, and then, to the surprise of absolutely no one, said gravely that he likes them just as they are.

The impression that Byrd has wrestled with, and pinned, all reasonable doubts about SALT II is important to the administration because of the decline of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho). As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Church was expected to be the leading advocate when SALT II reached the Senate floor. But after his role in the administration's Cuban fiasco, he is damaged goods.

Stauffenberg scoffs at the idea that Europe would be rattled by Senate rejection of SALT II. If, say, on Dec. 20 the Senate were to refuse ratification, Stauffenberg believes that on Dec. 21 "there would be a lot of headlines, then a nervous gathering in Bonn. Then there would be Christmas, and then you would have a hard time remembering what the trouble was supposed to be."

We shall see. The administration still has neither the votes to pass SALT II, nor a plan for getting them.

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

Brezhnev's Gambit

Early this month, Leonid Brezhnev politely offered to talk about reducing the number of missiles aimed at Western Europe if NATO agrees to abandon plans to modernize its nuclear arsenal. Brezhnev's gambit is indicative of how the Soviets now use arms-control negotiations as an offensive weapon to gain real military advantage.

Moscow is engaged in a vast nuclear build-up against allied forces in Western Europe. It has deployed about 120 SS-20 missiles, which are highly accurate long-range mobile missiles with three independently targeted warheads, and introduced the supersonic Backfire bomber. These weapon systems are not limited by SALT or any other agreement.

By contrast, NATO has almost no offsetting theater nuclear weapons; only 18 farcical French land-based missiles, an estimated 40 submarine-based Poseidons not well adapted to theater warfare, and 156 American F-111 fighter-bombers.

For more than a year, NATO countries have been stuck over what to do in response to the new Soviet SS-20s and Backfires. The U.S. has offered to base 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 new Pershing-2 ballistic missiles in Western Europe in the early 1980s. NATO ministers are slated to make a decision in December on the U.S. proposal.

One thing complicating the decision is the prospect of more negotiations with the Soviets, despite the fact that in the lengthy Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks the two sides have been unable to agree even on the actual composition of present forces. At the NATO conference in Belgium in September, Henry Kissinger complained about the idea of delaying our decision to try to negotiate removal of the SS-20s. The former Secretary of State predicted, "If this is our position, all the Soviets have to do is to begin a negotiation to keep us from doing what they are already doing, negotiation or no negotiation."

This is precisely the gambit Mr. Brezhnev played in his Berlin speech. His decision to withdraw 20,000 of the 400,000 Soviet troops stationed in East Germany and to cut its tank force by 1,000 to 6,000 represents only a frac-

tional reduction. It would leave the U.S. troops in the region outnumbered by 80,000, and pulling these Russian soldiers back to the border would still keep them in easy reach of West Germany. The offer to dismantle some older Soviet missiles, whose role is already being taken over by the SS-20 and Backfire, is only a token gesture.

Cracks in the alliance have already appeared over this issue, and Mr. Brezhnev's proposition could thus prove to be a harmful wedge. Most observers recognize the phoniness of Mr. Brezhnev's offer, but this is how the Kremlin plays the arms-control game.

What is true of Mr. Brezhnev's gambit has unfortunately become true of arms control generally. In its hearings on SALT-II, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been voting down "killer amendments," that is, anything disagreeable to the Soviets. But in the process Senator Howard Baker has compiled a record of the treaty's one-sidedness: its provision for 308 Soviet heavy missiles not allowed the U.S., its exclusion of the intercontinental-capable Backfire and so on. This is not an accident, but the inevitable result when the U.S. negotiates for arms control and the Soviets negotiate for military advantage.

Harvard Professor Richard Pipes has recently written on the Soviet objectives in SALT for the Committee on the Present Danger. He finds they want four things: To inhibit U.S. response to Soviet long-term strategic programs; to fix the number of U.S. systems and thus facilitate the task of rendering them harmless; to prevent an American technological achievement from suddenly neutralizing their build-up; and to create in the U.S. a political atmosphere obstructive to defense expenditures.

Arms control is well worth pursuing, but genuine arms control can't be achieved if the U.S. allows the Soviets to use the negotiations as an offensive weapon. The way to make the Soviets negotiate seriously is to break the present pattern. Proceeding with theater nuclear forces in Europe is one step toward that end. But an even clearer message would be the outright rejection of the strategic arms agreements.

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27 October 1979

Did Bayh Mislead On SALT Verification?

Sen. Birch Bayh (D.-Ind.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was accused last week of giving the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a grossly distorted version of his panel's findings—all in the interest of pushing SALT II.

The Intelligence Committee's 177-page report is stamped "secret codeword," a classification reserved for unusually sensitive matters. But Bayh's two-day closed-door testimony before the Foreign Relations panel was described by columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak as "highly selective—ignoring the bad news and inflating the good, differing in word and spirit from the committee's findings."

Because the Intelligence Committee's findings are so rigidly classified, even those senators who have followed the burdensome security regulations to read the report cannot take the Senate floor to dispute Bayh.

Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio), one of the few senators who has read the report, hotly disputed Bayh's interpretation during his Foreign Relations appearance. But when contacted by Evans-Novak to confirm their information about the report, he could only say:

"Nothing I have read or heard so far takes care of the verification problem, but I cannot even say why because of the high security classification that has been hung on the whole matter. What we have is euphoria based on official statements."

According to Evans-Novak, Bayh never made clear that his panel's secret report states unequivocally that the SALT II protocol (which lasts until Dec. 31, 1981) cannot be verified.

As for the treaty itself, the intelligence panel disputes Administration claims that verification will be easy under the pact. In fact, the report states, "The Soviets could test a new ICBM system with a launch weight as much as 20 to 40 per cent above the SS-19 with less than a 50 per cent chance of detection."

Analyzing what Moscow could do in secret to "break out" of the treaty's limitations, the report declares, "If a covert development were attempted, the Soviets could avoid detection and identifica-

tion of the activity for as long as three years during which some 200 missiles might become operational."

Noting that very few solons have read the Intelligence Committee's super-secret report—available on an eyes-only basis to senators in a closely guarded Senate cubbyhole—Evans-Novak stated: "To accept Bayh's clearly loaded testimony in favor of the treaty is tantamount to voting blind, a condition that someday could return to haunt the Senate."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 7CHICAGO TRIBUNE
29 October 1979Harris Survey

Support for SALT II tumbles

By Louis Harris

PUBLIC SUPPORT for SALT II has taken a tumble, to the point where only a slim 42 to 37 per cent plurality now favors Senate ratification of the nuclear arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Previously, majorities ranging up to 76 per cent had approved of SALT II.

After the cross-section of 1,500 adults nationwide interviewed in the latest ABC News-Harris Survey was asked about a number of pro and con arguments concerning SALT II, a slightly higher 47 to 39 per cent plurality favored ratification. Approval by a two-thirds majority of the Senate is required for the treaty to be ratified.

Most of the arguments against SALT II are now supported by substantial majorities of Americans:

- By 63 to 27 per cent, a majority feels that "unless the Russians agree to withdraw their combat troops from Cuba,

then the U.S. Senate should refuse to ratify the SALT II treaty." Although a 60 to 32 per cent majority opposes this country "threatening to take military action against Cuba if the Russian troops are not taken out of Cuba," and an overwhelming 83 to 13 per cent majority favors "negotiating with the Russians to get their troops out, but not making military threats," it is evident that people are upset about the disclosure of a combat brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba.

Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), who has been one of the leading proponents of linking Russian troop withdrawal from Cuba with passage of SALT II, has proposed a Senate resolution that would insist President Carter pledge that any Russian troops in Cuba posed no threat to this country.

- By 58 to 26 per cent, Americans feel that "although nuclear arms control is desirable, the SALT II treaty which President Carter negotiated does not ade-

quately protect U.S. security."

- In addition to their concern about U.S. security, a 53 to 32 per cent majority of Americans agrees with the claim that "although the new SALT treaty says that the United States and Russia will have roughly equal nuclear strike capabilities, opponents of SALT II are right when they claim that if SALT II is approved, Russia will have nuclear superiority by the middle of the 1980s." The opponents of SALT II, some of whom are former high-ranking military officers, have attracted considerable credibility with the American public with their charges that the treaty will not adequately protect U.S. security.

- By 50 to 39 per cent, a plurality of Americans agrees that "because the chances are that we will keep our end of the bargain and the Russians will not, the U.S. Senate should not ratify the SALT II treaty President Carter signed in Vienna last June."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1979

On Capitol Hill



On another matter Byrd said yesterday he thought a "turning point" has been passed in the SALT II debate, and that momentum is now building in favor of the treaty. But he declined to predict that the treaty, which he now supports, can win two-thirds Senate approval.

Sen. Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii) yesterday announced his support for the treaty.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE Book Week - 8

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1979

Laying Out the Details Behind the Salt II Negotiations

ENDGAME: The Inside Story of SALT II. By Strobe
Talbott. Harper & Row. 319 pp. \$15

By DEBORAH SHAPLEY

SALT II SEEMS DESTINED to be eternally pushed aside for something else. Lately, Senate ratification of the accord took a back seat to the issue of the Soviet troops in Cuba. As far back as 1978, Kissinger's attempts to turn the Vladivostok accord into a final treaty were set aside by the Ford administration due to political pressures. Since the Carter administration has been in charge, Angola, China, and many other things have postponed conclusion of the treaty.

Now comes Strobe Talbott, the translator and editor of two volumes of Khrushchev's memoirs, a Yale graduate, Rhodes scholar and, at 33, *Time* magazine's golden-boy diplomatic correspondent. Talbott has produced *Endgame*, which calls itself "the inside story" of the SALT II negotiations. But the book, like the treaty, may be shoved aside due to forces beyond its control.

The theory behind the book is clear enough: last winter, when the accord was nearly finished and journalists were predicting a "great national debate" in 1979 over Senate ratification, it looked as though the debate would turn on the negotiations themselves: who traded what, who gave in more, who said what, who struck whom. Therefore, an inside account would be indispensable around Washington and highly marketable, too.

DEBORAH SHAPLEY is a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on leave from *Science Magazine*.

But true to form, the predicted SALT debate has not occurred: it has been eclipsed by other, more ominous issues. The president's Punch and Judy show last summer in fixing the nation's attention on energy and then firing three cabinet officials, only one of whom had anything to do with energy; the pseudo-confrontation with the Soviet Union over the troops in Cuba; the Kennedy candidacy—all have raised doubts about the president's ability to orchestrate the public behavior of his administration in some meaningful way. So now, who said what on the secretary of state's airplane two years ago doesn't matter.

This is too bad for Talbott, who has written a remarkably detailed and readable history of the horse-trading within the administration and with the Soviets. Highlights of the book appeared as a *Time* cover story last summer, but SALT students will delight in the amount of additional facts in the book-length version.

Endgame has its problems. Its supposed strength—a plethora of detail and absence of background explanations or analysis—is also a weakness. The book will be of interest only to people who care about the details—because it lacks discussion of the larger themes. There is no chapter on the overall direction of the U.S.-Soviet military balance. There is no analysis of the rise of Henry Jackson, Richard Perle and Paul Nitze as domestic political forces. We hear endlessly about the sparring between the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, but are never told why the different bureaucracies take the different positions they do, and cling to them so firmly. And although Talbott's background in Russian

CONTINUED

studies uniquely qualifies him, he hardly ever backs off to analyze Soviet aims and motives in the talks.

One would not be so hard on Talbott except that these days we expect our best journalists to be good historians too—look at Laurence Stern's *The Wrong Horse*, or John Newhouse's still-classic history of SALT I, *Cold Dawn*. Talbott is clearly one of our most intelligent journalists, and has demonstrated in his Khrushchev coup a knack for publishing books that count.

But *Endgame* falls between stools. The book jacket calls it "a remarkable synthesis of journalism and history" yet it is neither. We are never told the relative veracity of the myriad accounts of meetings and corridor conversations, so must accept all these details as equally true. But they are not all equally true. Walter Slacombe's office in the Pentagon is not "windowless." The leading plan for protecting MX from a Soviet first strike, the MAP system, was not, as Talbott, says, an "expropriated" version of ALPS, a scheme Paul Nitze proposed in 1978 to protect the Minuteman force. And Talbott hardly gives us the "inside story" of Brezhnev's illness. Instead, "over the years he [Brezhnev] had eaten too much starchy food, smoked too many cigarettes, drunk too much vodka, and undergone too much stress. Now he suffered from a variety of chronic respiratory, circulatory, and neurological ailments . . . He had his bad days and his good days." How many of us fit that description?

Nor is *Endgame* quite history, although it appears to be written largely from the perspective of the secretary of state. I deduce this on the basis of the many asides Talbott makes about Vance's feelings—and the absence of such remarks about the emotions of Brown or Brzezinski. ("Whatever misgivings Vance felt, he suppressed them with relative ease." Or, "the cameras, the lights, the array of dignitaries at the foot of the steps to the Air Force plane, the limousines, the motorcade, the VIP guesthouses in Lenin Hills—all this was heady stuff, even for Vance. The skepticism began to dissipate. Maybe something would come of these talks after all . . .")

Ironically, Talbott's apparent familiarity with Vance's views undermines the authoritativeness of the book. There are other views of the key events, which get little or no notice. An obvious example is Talbott's account of the "comprehensive" SALT proposals the Soviets rejected in March of 1977 (after the heady events described above), which turned Vance's first Moscow trip as secretary into humiliation. Talbott's account of the origin of these proposals acknowledges that the idea came from the National Security Council, which also drafted the text of the proposals. But the onus for persuading the administration to try this approach is laid on Harold Brown. (A source in the book says of Brown's presentation to Carter: "It was like a beautifully tied, juicy fly dropped right in front of a hungry trout's nose. The President bit and swallowed right away." Talbott calls the proposals "a debacle" and "a diplomatic disaster.")

But a contrary view holds that in early 1977 it was widely accepted in the SALT bureaucracy that they might try for something quite sweeping, and that the decision to go ahead with the "comprehensive" proposals came as no surprise. Moreover, instead of being a "disaster," the March 1977 proposals had a beneficial effect: They tabled for the first time such issues as ICBM modernization and limits on the number of warheads per missile, which ultimately found their way into the final treaty, making it a stronger document. I do not say this interpretation is right, but it is certainly not so outrageous as to be generally ignored by Talbott.

But having said that *Endgame* won't be the hot item its planners may have wished, and that it is not the definitive book on SALT II, I should add that it can be read as a guide to Carter's handling of SALT, and thus is highly relevant. We see, at key moments, that Carter spoke out on SALT in ways contrary to the line that his capable lieutenants, Vance and Brown, had agreed on, thus raising Soviet suspicions and complicating and protracting the negotiations.

And just as, last summer, Carter fired cabinet officers for behavior he had not discussed with them directly, *Endgame* shows how Carter has allowed Vance and Brzezinski to pursue their own, conflicting strategies for dealing with the Soviets—thus creating more confusion and friction than perhaps was necessary. And we see Brzezinski being allowed to play with the Soviets, as though they were toys, and like toys, insensate and incapable of retaliation—for instance in his courtship of Georgy Arbatov as a "favored" envoy in order to downgrade Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who had enjoyed official favor under Kissinger.

But the reader must seek out these examples. Except for occasional comments, Talbott does not analyze for us how well or badly the Carter White House has handled SALT. Surely it is a subject on which Talbott has views; but he has chosen not to share them. Once again, SALT II has been shortchanged. □

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A27THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1979*Rowland Evans and Robert Novak*

Will the Soviets Kill SALT?

While President Carter warns Senate fence-sitters that they dare not vote against SALT II for fear of Soviet reactions, the Kremlin is risking the treaty's death to secure Soviet military dominance over all of Europe.

The secret dread of Carter's SALT sellers is that Soviet actions may kill Senate ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Far from turning down the decibel level of its harsh attack against modernized nuclear weapons for NATO, the Kremlin shows every intention of increasing the volume.

Turning up the juice on its latest propaganda barrage—so similar to the successful Soviet attack against the neutron warhead a year ago—would incite predictable reactions in the U.S. Senate and quite likely tip the balance against the treaty. That might be characteristic Russian clumsiness, but the suspicion here is that the Kremlin consciously puts European supremacy ahead of SALT.

Carter is getting into this predicament while his agents fan out across the Senate to argue with the rhetoric of near-desperation that fence-sitters must support SALT II; he is wholly unable to control Moscow's bullying assault against modernizing NATO's nuclear weapons.

The president's problem is one of dates. NATO is due to consider, and surely to approve, nuclear weapons modernization at a Brussels meeting on Dec. 13 to give the Western alliance equality with Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons. According to the optimistic SALT timetable of Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, the Senate then will be nearing a final vote on the treaty.

The escalating Soviet attack on nuclear modernization could not come at a worse time with regard to SALT. Led by President Leonid Brezhnev himself, the Soviet campaign reached a new peak Oct. 25 when Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov accused the United States—not NATO—of "whipping up an atmosphere of fear, putting the arms race into a higher gear and openly conducting military preparations."

Such intemperate language is really directed not at the United States but at NATO's vulnerable European members. Yet its unavoidable side effect is to incite anti-Soviet anger in the U.S. Senate, tipping into opposition senators sitting on the SALT fence.

Against the Soviet campaign, Carter's SALT sellers are hard put to find an offsetting political argument, although they are trying desperately hard to win new recruits to the treaty.

On the evening of Oct. 22, Sen. Edward Zorinsky, a maverick Democrat from Nebraska who is the most junior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was telephoned at home by Majority Leader Byrd. Ostensibly, Byrd was asking when the committee might finish up with SALT; actually he called to gently pressure Zorinsky to get off the fence on the right side.

For Zorinsky, that was just more of the same. In three successive days, he was visited by elder statesman Averell Harriman, telephoned by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, and importuned in yet another telephone call by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ("Please, Ed, we need you").

The message is the same for every fence-sitting senator: vote for SALT to prevent Senate Republican leader Howard Baker's getting an advantage over Carter in his presidential campaign; vote for SALT so that our NATO allies will not feel the United States has deserted the road of détente; vote for SALT or "the Russians won't understand us."

Such appeals may well have their persuasive side. But Byrd confides to intimates that he is not close to the 67 Senate votes needed for treaty approval and that he may benefit more from guns than soft soap. Signals are coming from the White House of imminent concessions to Sen. Sam Nunn and others who demand higher defense spending in return for supporting SALT.

The White House scare tactic of warning senators that defeat of SALT could spell the doom of NATO has backfired and is winding down under orders from the top. The president has been told that if SALT is not ratified, the warning could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy—leaving this country not only without an arms treaty but without a NATO alliance.

But substituting defense spending for scare talk will not help if the administration is correct in this private prediction: the Kremlin feels that forcing NATO to scrap nuclear weapons modernization is more important to Soviet ends than inducing the Senate to approve SALT. Seemingly, Moscow puts much more faith in weapons than in treaties.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3

THE NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1979

Carter Gives Byrd Vow on MX and Cruise Missiles

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26 — In promising to proceed with the MX missile and with cruise missiles suitable for use in Europe, President Carter has made clear to Senator Robert C. Byrd that he means full-scale deployment of the weapons.

The President told the Senate majority leader in a letter that "I cannot envisage any circumstances" in which the decision would be changed. Senator Byrd made public, in an interview today, the text of Mr. Carter's letter and commented: "You can't make it clearer than that."

Indeed, the wording chosen by the President could be read to foreclose — or nearly so — any possibility that the still-unbuilt MX mobile intercontinental missile could be traded away for a concession by the Soviet Union in future negotiations on another nuclear arms treaty.

For foreign policy and budget reasons, Mr. Carter's pledge to the West Virginia Senator is likely to be unpopular with some liberal senators who are still unreconciled to the President's decision in June to begin development of the MX system.

Reassurance to Some Senators

On the other hand, the promise may reassure other senators who have expressed fear that the White House would be tempted to prolong the period of validity of a protocol to the strategic arms treaty, now pending in the Senate, that forbids until Dec. 31, 1981, the deployment of mobile missiles and of ground-launched or sea-fired cruise missiles.

In the interview, Senator Byrd also strongly hinted that he favored increases in military spending larger than the 3 percent real growth that President Carter had promised but beyond which he has been reluctant to go.

Yesterday, Senator Byrd endorsed the arms treaty at a news conference and he mentioned the existence of the President's written assurance. Today, the Senator said he called on the President at the White House a week ago and received a letter from Mr. Carter Monday, dated that day. The key paragraph said:

"It is my firm intention to proceed with the testing, development, and deployment of the recently approved sheltered ground mobile MX basing system, and with currently programmed cruise missile deployments. Both are needed for our defense, and I cannot envisage any circumstances under which there would be any de facto extension of the Protocol

which could interfere with our firm intention to deploy these systems."

Mr. Carter also wrote that he was "prepared to assure" that no category of cruise missile or the MX "will be delayed or inhibited" by the treaty protocol.

MX Deployment Starts in 1986

According to present plans, the United States would build 200 MX missiles, each with 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads, and begin deploying them in 1986. All would be operational by 1989. To avoid destruction in a possible first strike by the Soviet Union, each missile would be mounted on a mobile launcher that could move on a "racetrack" course between scattered shelters.

During hearings on the strategic arms treaty, high officials of the Administration said they would consider halting development and deployment of the MX only in the event the Soviet Union made a major reduction in its arsenal of missiles and thus reduced the vulnerability of fixed-site land missiles to destruction.

The present treaty permits the United States to proceed with developing and deploying air-launched cruise missiles, or unmanned winged weapons carried by bombers to the launching points.

Plans for Cruise Missiles

Although the present treaty prohibits actual deployment of long-range cruise missiles until 1982, the present United States five-year defense plan contains programs for deployment of both air-launched and ground-launched missiles of that type. For a number of reasons, partly political and partly technical, there is no "current" firm program for sea-launched cruise missiles.

But one authority on defense matters said that, for practical purposes, "the President's letter seems to be a firm commitment" to seek to deploy ground-based cruise missiles in Europe.

Such a step will require permission of the NATO allies, and the Administration is seeking such agreement.

Senator Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, is one of several Senate liberals who have warned they may vote against the strategic arms treaty if the "price" of its ratification is an increase in military spending and deployment of such powerful and what they feel are potentially "destablizing" weapons as MX. The President's letter, Senator Hatfield said today, "makes SALT II all the more of an illusion and heightens my concern about the SALT process."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 15THE WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1979

NATO Assembly Urges U.S. Senate to Ratify SALT Pact

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Staff Writer

OTTAWA, Oct. 26—A NATO political assembly tonight called for early Senate ratification of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation treaty, in a resolution seen as an important victory for supporters of SALT II.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization members also came out in favor of the deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear arms in Western Europe. It said, however, that such deployment could be scrapped if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate a reduction of its nuclear missiles aimed at Western Europe.

The outcome of today's voting is viewed by many observers as an important boost for the Carter administration, which has placed its prestige behind both SALT II ratification and the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

The SALT resolution was adopted unanimously after Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), a leading opponent of the treaty, warned the assembly against setting "a dangerous precedent of dictating how the Senate shall vote."

The North Atlantic Assembly is nominally independent of NATO but serves as an unofficial link between the alliance and legislators of member states. The assembly meets each fall and encourages political discussion of NATO affairs.

There were 38 abstentions on tonight's SALT resolution, including the U.S. delegation. The delegation, including 11 senators, decided not to take a stand on the issue after two private sessions that several senators described as "very rough" and "exceptionally acrimonious."

Sens. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) charged that the proceedings had been "rigged." Hatch said supporters of SALT II had met secretly with President Carter and his counselor, Lloyd Cutler, last week to

plan what Hatch called today's "manipulation of the assembly."

Supporters of SALT II, led by Sens. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), hailed the assembly's "strong expression of support" as an important element in the ratification fight.

"This could very well be decisive on the ratification vote," said Sen. Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) said.

After four days of negotiations, today's resolutions reflected the mood of the West Europeans, who insist that ratification of SALT II is necessary to persuade public opinion in their countries to accept new American nuclear weapons.

U.S. Senate differences over SALT II, as well as the linkage between its ratification and deployment of new U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, gave special importance to the 25th annual session of the North Atlantic assembly. Normally such gatherings are discussion sessions by Western political leaders, who are rarely called upon to vote and take a direct role on a key issue of common interest.

SALT's supporters got an unexpected boost from Prime Minister Joe Clark of Canada, who told the assembly this morning that Canada "fully supports this agreement as a valuable contribution to stability in strategic weapons." Clark said "a third round

of SALT" should deal with the intermediate-range missiles in the European theater.

Clark also said that Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's arms proposal in his Oct. 6 East Berlin speech "is to be welcomed and indeed applauded." He said Brezhnev's plans "require analysis and clarification."

The Soviet leader pledged to reduce unilaterally Soviet conventional forces in East Germany and curb Moscow's medium-range nuclear missiles in the European theater if the Western allies agreed not to place equivalent U.S. missiles on the continent.

The assembly's resolution on NATO's military modernization plans for the next decade also "welcomes Soviet readiness to negotiate" curbs on intermediate-range missiles, but it said that Brezhnev's Oct. 6 speech was "not yet a sufficient basis for negotiation."

Today's vote appears to clear the way for adoption by NATO at its December meeting of a U.S.-proposed modernization program that would include deploying Pershing 2 and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe.

But the assembly left a way open to include intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in SALT II negotiations by saying modernization should be implemented "in a way that concrete results of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union can be taken into account at any time during the period between December, 1982, and 1983, the earliest possible deployment of the new system."

If the Soviet Union is prepared to "reduce its own long-range" forces, the NATO assembly recommended that the new nuclear weapons could be renounced by NATO countries.

Taking account of West German sensitivity that it not be the only European member with nuclear weapons on its soil, the assembly urged that NATO provide for deployment "in several alliance member states, not just one European country."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1979

To Save SALT, Sen. Byrd Huddled in Secret With Soviet

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd—the one man who might still be able to orchestrate Senate approval of President Carter's SALT pact—has already played an extensive but hitherto secret role in backstage political and diplomatic maneuvering surrounding the treaty.

Byrd withheld his own formal endorsement of SALT II until Thursday, but long before that he had been engaged in secret diplomacy with the Soviet Union to try to prevent a premature demise of the strategic arms limitation treaty in the Senate. The West Virginia Democrat's direct contact with Soviet officials is an apparently unprecedented initiative by a Senate leader.

This account of Byrd's role was volunteered to The Washington Post. It reflects the majority leader's view of events that other sources confirm did take place. Byrd is presently preparing to play a major role in the SALT debate to try to ensure its passage—an uphill battle, in Byrd's view.

Byrd's most dramatic personal intervention in SALT-related diplomacy came on Sunday, Sept. 23, when the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, flew from New York at Byrd's request for a secret meeting in the majority leader's Capitol office.

This was a tense moment in Soviet-American negotiations over the Soviet combat troops in Cuba, whose presence had been revealed dramatically by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) on Aug. 30. Preliminary talks between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Dobrynin had made no progress, and Vance was about to meet with the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, while both were in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. The Carter administration was still hoping that the Vance-Gromyko talks would produce some Soviet concession that would change the "status quo" in Cuba, which Vance and Carter both had said was unacceptable.

Byrd was gloomy about the prospects for these talks. He felt—and had told Carter—that the issue had already been blown far out of proportion, and that statements about the status quo being unacceptable were wrongheaded, since the United States didn't know what that status really was.

Although Byrd thought the flap over the Soviet troops was a phony issue, he also believed that because of it SALT was hanging by the proverbial thread in the Senate. He blamed the administration for creating this precarious situation, and felt that only by beating an elegant retreat from the mess it had created could the White House save its treaty.

This would require Soviet help, at least indirectly, which is why Byrd wanted to see Dobrynin. After deciding in a meeting with aides that he might be able to play a constructive personal role, the majority leader had called Vance the previous Friday night with a reminder that he had had useful talks with Gromyko and Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev on his own trip to the Soviet Union in July. Byrd asked the secretary if it would be useful now for him to see Dobrynin and ask him to try to calm the rhetoric from the Soviet side, while pointing out how precarious the treaty's chances had become because of the flap.

After considering this overnight, Vance called back to approve Byrd's proposed initiative. The majority leader then located Dobrynin in New York, where he had gone to meet with his boss, Gromyko. The ambassador agreed to come to Byrd's Capitol office at 11 a.m. Sunday.

Byrd, his foreign policy aide Hoyt Purvis, Dobrynin and one aide sat down around Byrd's mahogany conference table. The senator told Dobrynin he would like to make a statement and did not expect any comment or reaction from the Russian until he was finished.

He spoke for about 45 minutes. He said that he had still not made up his own mind on SALT II, but that the treaty would have no chance of approval unless the tense atmosphere created by the Cuban incident could be dissipated. He offered two recommendations:

First, Byrd said, it would be in everyone's best interest to avoid any more heated rhetoric about the Cuban issue. Second, it would be useful if the Soviet side could carefully evaluate its position with an eye toward some gesture that could help Carter out of the jam.

Byrd indicated to Dobrynin that he felt the American position in this flap was less than compelling. Nevertheless, he said, the political furor set off by Church's announcement that SALT II could not be approved until the Soviet troops were withdrawn had gravely endangered the treaty's prospects. Any positive gesture the Soviet side could make would be very helpful.

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Byrd told Dobrynin that the idea for this meeting was entirely his own, and that his objectives were to try to improve the atmosphere for a debate on SALT on its merits, uncolored by the emotions surrounding the Cuban matter.

When the Soviet ambassador left, Byrd called Vance and said he would like to meet that night with the president. There was a party scheduled at the White House, but sometime after 9 p.m. Byrd sat down with Carter. Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser.

Byrd repeated the message he had delivered to Dobrynin. Carter asked for Byrd's suggestions, and he gave three:

First, Byrd said, the United States should cool its rhetoric on the Cuban issue and try to let quiet diplomacy work. He said newspaper stories were unhelpful in suggesting harsh retaliations the White House was considering if the Soviets did not alter the status quo. He declared frankly that the president did not have a very strong case.

Byrd said it was inappropriate for a mighty nation to go into a delirium over about 2,300 Soviet troops that had neither airlift nor sealift capability to leave Cuba.

Second, said Byrd, there should be no more White House meetings with congressional leaders to discuss the Cuban situation. Byrd had personally boycotted such a meeting on Sept. 20 after advising Vance that it could only contribute to the appearance of a crisis at hand—an appearance Byrd felt was unjustified.

Third, Byrd advised, do what you can to get this flap behind us. In his opinion, the Soviets would not withdraw the troops because they had been in Cuba for many years, and because Moscow thought the entire dispute was a political incident of no military significance. If they withdrew now, other countries would have to conclude that the Soviets had backed down.

Afterward Byrd felt his intervention might have done some good. He was pleased that subsequent Soviet public statements were relatively restrained, and that the Soviets did produce some last-minute

"assurances" to Carter that helped the president cover his retreat from the "unacceptable status quo" stance. Byrd was pleased with Carter's final speech to the nation on the issue, which he felt helped provide a more realistic perspective.

The Carter administration and numerous pro-SALT senators are hoping Byrd can find a way to revive pro-treaty sentiment and win Senate approval. The majority leader appears eager to make this effort, though privately and publicly he refuses to make any predictions of success.

Byrd has already organized special committees of senators interested in defense spending and future arms reductions, both issues that could bear on some senators' final decisions. Byrd hopes to build a broad consensus on these issues that will help the treaty.

Before the Cuban flap, Byrd believes, SALT II was all but assured of Senate approval. Now the outcome remains problematical.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
1 November 1979

Cuba Signs 'Not Unpleasant'

But Vance Warns Against Optimism on Soviet Presence

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said yesterday there are signs of "not unpleasant" changes in the Soviet military presence in Cuba, but he cautioned reporters not to "leap to optimistic conclusions" about the status of Soviet forces on the island.

At a press conference dominated by questions about tensions in the Caribbean, Vance sought to downplay the importance of new Soviet naval construction in Cuba and hinted that Moscow may be trying to reduce U.S. concerns about the Soviet combat forces stationed there.

Initially, he refused to give details except to say, "Some factors are different from what they were." When reporters pressed him for specifics, he said "It is not unpleasant," but added the warning about drawing too optimistic an inference from his remarks.

Senior Carter administration sources later said privately Vance had not meant to imply that there has been any detectable reduction in the combat brigade of 2,000 to 3,000 men that the United States claims has been put into Cuba by the Soviets.

Instead, the sources said, Vance was referring to U.S. intelligence surveillance that has detected a lowered level of activity by the Soviet forces. As one source put it: "There's no sign of a reduction. But we are seeing much less traffic and physical movement than we saw before."

The brigade initially was detected by U.S. intelligence monitoring in late August because it apparently was engaging in large-scale maneuvers at the time. The sources said its current decreased activity is regarded as potentially significant because it could represent a Soviet effort to demonstrate that its mission is to train Cuban troops and not to engage in activi-

ties posing a threat to Western Hemisphere nations.

The controversy provoked by discovery of the brigade threatened for a time to cause a major confrontation between Washington and Moscow. It led President Carter to announce in a televised address Oct. 1 a number of measures designed to counter Soviet and Cuban activities in the Caribbean area.

But, in talking about the Cuban situation yesterday, Vance took an almost determinedly low-key approach, saying, "We are trying to keep everything in its proper proportions."

In regard to another aspect of the Cuba controversy, Vance confirmed reports that the Soviets are constructing a second pier and some large buildings at the Cuban naval base on Cienfuegos Bay. That has prompted speculation about whether the Soviets may try to use the base to service warships, including submarines with a nuclear capability to strike at the United States.

He said, "There is no indication the pier is for anything other than Cuban use." While he conceded that the construction might lead to port calls at Cienfuegos by Soviet warships, Vance said such calls do not violate the U.S.-Soviet agreements barring introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.

Vance also admitted that one of the buildings under construction at Cienfuegos is similar to those used by the Soviets elsewhere for storage and repair of nuclear missiles. But, he noted, the Soviets also have used these buildings for other purposes such as storage of small, conventional vessels.

He also took the unusual step of using the press conference to take issue with a report by columnist Jack An-

derson. The columnist had asserted that the State Department and Carter's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had clashed over the wisdom of using the Soviet brigade issue as the basis for a propaganda campaign designed to discredit the Soviets and Cubans with other countries.

According to the Anderson column, Brzezinski, over the opposition of Vance, had ordered them to provide data on Cuban activities. Anderson said two-thirds of the ambassadors protested the instructions.

In response, Vance said, "We have been concerned about the activities of the Cubans and the Soviets in various parts of the world. We have conveyed our concerns to other countries and have kept them up to date on our thinking, our views and our information with respect to these issues."

He then added that the messages to collect this information and to convey it to other governments were sent "at my instruction."

Privately, administration sources, while conceding there have been differences between Brzezinski and the State Department about the wisdom of too much emphasis on propaganda attacks on Moscow and Havana, said the degree of these differences had been exaggerated in the Anderson column.

These sources confirmed Vance's statement that the instructions to ambassadors and the relaying of messages to other governments had been drawn up and implemented by the State Department.

They also characterized as totally incorrect the assertion that two-thirds of the ambassadors had protested the policy. Only a few, scattered protests had been registered by U.S. ambassadors around the world, they said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 44THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 November 1979

Vance Notes New Factors on Soviet Brigade

Cuba Development 'Not Unpleasant'

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Soviet brigade in Cuba is now quietly camped near Havana with its manpower and ornaments unchanged since the recent U.S. concern over its combat capability, according to administration officials.

They disclosed this after Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance answered a question yesterday about any changes in the nature of the brigade by saying that "some of the factors are different."

At a news conference, Vance also said there is no indication that a new pier being built at a Cuban naval base "is for anything other than Cuban use." But some administration officials and members of Congress are worried that the new facilities could be used by Soviet nuclear submarines.

Officials said the Soviet brigade continues to have 2,600 men armed with 40 tanks, 60 armored personnel carriers and other weaponry. This was the strength that reporters were told at the time President Carter said

to the nation Oct. 1 that "the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us."

Carter said that the Soviets had

said the brigade "will not change its function or status," which Moscow said was that of a training force. U.S. intelligence analysts insisted the brigade was not engaged in training Cubans and only kept up its own training for combat.

After Carter's speech, Vance hinted publicly that the brigade's combat capability might fade away. He was asked yesterday, a month after Carter's speech, if any change had been detected.

Vance replied, "I do not want to get into intelligence matters," but the United States is following the situation "by intensified intelligence collection."

"Some of the factors are different than they were before. And that is all I want to say," Vance declared.

Reporters pursued the point. "Is it a pleasant or an unpleasant development from U.S. viewpoint?" he was asked.

"It is not unpleasant," Vance replied, but "I don't want you to leap to any optimistic conclusions."

This mystified several administration officials who keep an eye on Cuba with the help of detailed intelligence reports. After several hours of confusion, the best explanation the officials could come up with was

that the brigade's maneuvers had ended.

Vance disclosed construction of a second pier at the Cienfuegos Naval Base on the south coast of Cuba in a meeting Monday with Hispanic Americans. Cienfuegos is where, in 1970, the Nixon administration detected the start of what it thought was to be a Soviet submarine base, and it won agreement from Moscow not to establish its own base there.

Sen. Richard Stone, D-Fla., met with Vance to express his concern.

"The constructions are of major proportions, and it is clear that they are building a major submarine base," Stone said.

Asked about it yesterday, Vance said he could not "rule out the possibility that, when these facilities are completed, (they) might be used for port calls if a Soviet ship should come into the area. But we have nothing now to indicate that this is other than for Cuban use."

Port calls are permitted by Soviet-American understandings on Cuba, the secretary added. He also said intelligence reports do not indicate the construction "of any storage sites for any nuclear materials" at Cienfuegos.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 November 1979

Construction in Cuban port sends ripple through US

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington's latest disclosure of Soviet activity in Cuba — new construction at the deepwater southern port of Cienfuegos — may not be the fresh intelligence report it would at first seem to be.

Some Cubanologists in Washington say that the Soviet construction work outlined by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Oct. 30 has been going on for months and that American officials have known about it.

Several members of United States intelligence community add that they view the construction as part of normal repair work on facilities first built almost 10 years ago. These officials also say that the original pier constructed for Soviet vessels, and particularly for submarines, was a rather primitive affair and that it would be natural for the Soviets to want to upgrade or replace it.

Moreover, the Soviet activity at Cienfuegos appears to violate no US-Soviet understanding regarding Cuba.

Mr. Vance told a meeting of Hispanic-American community leaders in Washington that recently intensified US surveillance over Cuba had detected work on a second naval pier at Cienfuegos, possibly intended for use as a submarine base. In addition, he said, there are several new and "quite large" buildings or sheds.

A State Department official added that there are two submarines at the port — both of which, however, have been berthed at Cienfuegos for five years or so. One is a Soviet ves-

sel used by the Cubans for training purposes. But, according to intelligence sources, the submarine is old, quite decrepit, and unable to dive. The other is a more modern, diesel-powered attack sub armed with conventional torpedoes but no missiles — and manned by a Soviet crew.

Like the August-September controversy over the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba — said by the Carter Administration to be a combat brigade — the Cienfuegos issue is clearly not being accepted by many Cuba specialists as all that important.

The port of Cienfuegos is easily one of Cuba's best harbors, if not the best. It is Cuba's major sugar port with huge cane warehouses and extensive off-and-on loading facilities for the island's major export. Additionally, the island's largest fertilizer plant, built by the British in the early 1970s, is located at the edge of the harbor.

About 10 years ago, when the issue of a possible Soviet naval base at Cienfuegos was first raised, some of the sugar port facilities were mistakenly viewed as part of the supposed naval base. Since then, intelligence sources have been reluctant to jump to conclusions about construction at the site.

There is no doubt that Soviet naval vessels use the harbor as a refueling site. And there are facilities in the port, particularly on the southern side of the bay, where Soviet ships tie up.

The Caribbean has long been largely US controlled. Any buildup of Soviet forces in the area, therefore, is seen by some American politicians and officials as a destabilizing element and as threatening US hegemony.

Soviets Begin Building New Cuban Navy Pier At Cienfuegos Site

United Press International

Intensified U.S. surveillance over Cuba has detected that the Soviets have begun building a second naval pier at Cienfuegos naval base, administration officials said yesterday.

The pier construction was first confirmed by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance in a meeting Monday with a group of Hispanic-American community leaders.

Vance and other State Department officials said they do not know the purpose of the construction, but they also said it does not appear to violate any U.S.-Soviet understandings about Cuba.

The new construction, and possible reasons for it, also were brought up yesterday in a meeting between Vance and Sen. Richard Stone, D-Fla., who first made public the presence of what the Carter administration insists is a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

After the meeting, Stone said, "The construction is of major proportions, and it is clear that they are building a major submarine base."

Stone, who has received classified briefings on the newly discovered construction, said the construction began "months ago" and is "larger than is required for the two subs which are stationed there."

"We should take advantage of the situation to make clear to the Soviets that we will not tolerate a major sub base, either in Soviet hands or in the hands of their Cuban proxies."

Administration officials said the matter has not yet been taken up with the Soviet Union.

A State Department official said the intensified U.S. surveillance announced by President Carter on Oct. 1 detected Soviet construction of the second pier at Cienfuegos as well as several "quite large" buildings or sheds.

Myles Frechette, Cuban desk officer for the State Department, also confirmed to the Hispanic-American conference the presence of two submarines at the Cienfuegos base.

One of them, he said, has been turned over to the Cubans "for training purposes."

U.S. officials said that sub apparently is old and decrepit and unable to dive.

The other one, Frechette said, is a diesel-powered attack sub armed with conventional torpedoes but no missiles.

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ON PAGE A-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1979

Soviet Construction of Pier At Cuban Base Is Reported

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence has determined that the Soviet Union is building a new pier at the Cienfuegos naval base in Cuba, but Carter administration officials said last night they do not know whether the facility could be used for offensive purposes such as servicing Soviet nuclear submarines.


The officials stressed that, at this point, there are no grounds for regarding the pier construction with the same concern triggered by the discovery in August of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

In fact, the officials added, there is no evidence to suggest that the construction violates the understandings reached by the two superpowers in settlement of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Those agreements are supposed to bar the Soviets from introducing offensive weapons onto the island.

They said the construction, which was detected by increased U.S. surveillance of Cuba in the wake of the furor over the Soviet brigade, is being watched closely and has been reported to key members of Congress dealing with security affairs. They added that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance also discussed the matter in general terms at a meeting Monday with Hispanic-American community leaders.

However, despite the cautious tone taken by the officials, fallout from the controversy over the Soviet brigade—coupled with a companion dispute about Cuba as a potential base for servicing Soviet subs and warships—seems certain to unleash new questions about Soviet military activities in Cuba.

That was underscored last night by Sen. Richard B. Stone (D-Fla.), who revealed the presence of the Soviet brigade last summer at a time administration officials were insisting they had no evidence to support such charges.



By Dave Cook—The Washington Post

In a telephone interview, Stone, who has been briefed on the matter, said the construction is of "major proportions" and has been under way for several months. The senator added that he had more information but could not reveal it because it was classified and went beyond the facts that emerged yesterday.

But Stone, who repeatedly has raised questions about Soviet submarine visits to Cuba, said the matter raises questions "of concern about whether the Soviets are attempting to build a major submarine base in Cuba."

He continued: "It is time to get this situation clarified, both in terms of clearing up ambiguities about the extent to which facilities in Cuba can be used by Soviet warships, including those with nuclear armaments, and in terms of making clear we will not tolerate a major base there operated by the Soviets or their Cuban allies."

The U.S.-Soviet understandings about Cuba, which have never been made fully public, have been a subject of controversy over the years in regard to naval matters.

In 1970, after concern developed

that the Russians were building a submarine base at Cienfuegos Bay, President Nixon announced that port calls in Cuba by Soviet submarines and ships would not violate the agreements, but the servicing of such vessels "either in or from Cuba would be a violation."

The pier whose construction has now been detected is in addition to another recently built at Cienfuegos Bay under Soviet supervision. Although it apparently was ready for use when Soviet ships were deployed in the Caribbean last spring, the Russian vessels did not visit Cuba.

That is believed to have been the result of U.S. press reports calling attention to the possibility that a violation of the 1962 agreements and the 1970 Nixon interpretation of the accords might occur. The Carter administration is understood to have warned the Soviets at the time that a visit by the Soviet ships to Cienfuegos could be considered a provocation in this country and lead to strained relations.

However, there has been continued speculation about whether Soviet ships and subs will continue to avoid going into Cienfuegos Bay. As a result, revelation that a second Soviet pier is under construction seems guaranteed to regenerate debate about what the Soviets are up to at the Cuban facility.

According to administration sources, the new construction also involves several large buildings or sheds, and some sources said that this seems like a lot of construction to handle the two Soviet subs known to be at the Cienfuegos base.

One of these vessels, they said, is an overage submarine used by the Cubans for training purposes. They said the other, manned by a Soviet crew, is a diesel-powered attack submarine armed with conventional torpedoes but no missiles.

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ON PAGE B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1979

The Next Cuba Crisis: 1981

By Walter Pincus

IF HISTORY is any guide, the next attempt by the Soviet Union to expand its military operations in Cuba will take place in 1981, when the U.S. presidential election is over and the victorious candidate sworn into office.

The recent mini-crisis over the so-called Soviet combat brigade blurred what actually has been taking place in Cuba over the past 10 years. Having failed in 1962 to turn Cuba instantly into a nuclear missile base, the Soviets in 1969 began slowly and with great patience to build Castro's island into the type of military asset — 90 miles off the U.S. coast — that their military men have always wanted.

For a model, these Soviet marshals had only to look at the ring of American military bases and facilities that for more than 20 years have encircled Russia. Located in more than a half-dozen countries near or on the Soviet border, these so-called forward bases gave the Pentagon advantages in intelligence collection and nuclear submarine servicing capabilities as well as providing a home for short-range aircraft that sit on runways only a few hundred miles from Soviet targets, loaded with U.S. nuclear bombs.

Castro's takeover of Cuba in 1959, Soviet leaders have said, provided the opportunity for the Kramlin to give us a taste of our own military medicine.

Moscow also may have used it as a means to test American leaders, for the key moves to build up Cuba as a Soviet forward base were all set in motion shortly after the inauguration of new American presidents — John F. Kennedy in 1961, Richard M. Nixon in 1969 and Jimmy Carter in 1977.

Days after Kennedy took office, the Central Intelligence Agency brought him reports that Soviet military equipment, including Mig jet fighters, were being sent to Castro. It was fear of a buildup of such equipment in Cuba that led the CIA to press Kennedy for quick approval of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, plans which had been drawn up and approved in the Eisenhower administration.

The 1962 missile crisis brought the superpowers to the brink of war. In the aftermath, the Soviets refrained for several years from any activity that appeared to violate the understanding that they would not introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba.

At the same time, however, they began at home a long-term buildup of ships and strategic arms, including submarines to launch nuclear missiles, that guaranteed that some time in the future Cuba would be valuable for them as a forward base.

It was only months after Nixon had taken office in 1969 that the first Soviet Navy fleet called in Cuba and maneuvered in the Gulf of Mexico. Less than a year later, Soviet long-range TU95 Bear bombers equipped for reconnaissance missions flew into Havana after surveillance of the U.S. East Coast.

In the fall of 1970, the Soviets attempted to establish a nuclear submarine base in Cienfuegos Bay on Cuba's southern coast. The need was simple. North America was a long way from the Soviet submarine home bases; if Cuba could be used as a forward base, the Soviet Navy could keep more submarines on patrol off our East Coast.

At the same time, the United States had sub bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota, Spain, which enabled us to keep our Polaris missile subs on station. Why couldn't the Soviets do the same?

The Nixon administration correctly diagnosed what was going on and, after private negotiations, forced a halt in the base building on the ground that it violated the 1962 agreement barring introduction of offensive weapons.

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The Soviets, however, came out with something. Though they couldn't build a base or service their subs from Cuba, an understanding permitted their warships and submarines to make "port calls" in Cuba.

Though they achieved much less than they had sought, the Soviets pushed their ship visiting rights as far as they could. After 1970, their warships twice a year carried on maneuvers in the Caribbean and put into Cuban ports. Each year they remained a little longer. By 1978, they were in the area over 80 days and at anchor off Cienfuegos for 65.

Between 1970 and 1974, several types of submarines made visits to Havana or rendezvoused with tenders in other Cuban harbors. None were of the long-range ballistic missile Yankee type that since 1969 cruised in pairs along the U.S. East Coast off Bermuda. But they did include a nuclear-powered cruise missile sub and a diesel short-range ballistic missile sub.

Those missile sub visits in 1972 and 1974 drew no public protest from the Nixon administration and no political clamor was raised in Congress.

There is still a question as to whether these submarines carried nuclear missiles. In his new book, Henry Kissinger has written that Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin "was prepared on behalf of his government to affirm that ballistic missile submarines would never call there in an operational capacity." In recent Senate testimony, Chief of Naval Operations Thomas Hayward said it was his understanding that ships or subs carrying nuclear missiles could not call in Cuba. And other sources said U.S. intelligence sensors can determine from the air whether a nuclear device is aboard such vessels.

Supplementing the TU95 aerial reconnaissance program, the Soviets during the Nixon years built an electronic intelligence collection facility in Cuba that could intercept radio and microwaved open-air telephone transmissions from the southeastern part of the U.S.

Russian trawlers, outfitted with sophisticated electronic gear, began to appear off the U.S. Navy's Charleston submarine base and in the waters near Cape Canaveral during U.S. missile test flights. These shipboard intelligence collectors

began to use Cuban ports for servicing, thereby extending the time they could be away from their home ports in Russia.

Thus by the time President Carter took office, Cuba had become a key forward base for Soviet intelligence collection operations and a calling port for warships. But there remained a desire among the Soviet military to make more use of Castro's island.

In 1977, after the new American president declared — as a good will gesture — that he would stop spy plane overflights of Cuba, construction of navy facilities at Cienfuegos began anew.

This base was not to be the same as the one halted in 1970. It was to be a base for Cuban ships and submarines — and to prove the point it was disclosed in 1978 that the Soviets planned to give Castro at least one aged diesel attack submarine.

Along with the submarine, the Soviets also sent Castro Mig23 aircraft to modernize his fighter-interceptor and fighter-bomber force. The new aircraft caused a flurry of protest within the United States, particularly from critics of the SALT II agreement, because a model of the Mig23 used by Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries carries nuclear bombs.

Sensitized by such outbursts, the Soviets apparently decided to cut back on their more visible Cuba-related operations during 1979 while SALT II was an issue.

This year, for example, TU95 flights have been less than half what they were in 1978 and the one Soviet fleet that entered the Caribbean left without even stopping in Cuba.

The Cienfuegos facility, with a new long pier and other buildings, has been completed and to most intelligence analysts appears larger than necessary for the handling of the one Cuban submarine and training sub now there.

The Soviets are too shrewd, however, to engage in any new Cuba ventures with SALT II still hanging fire and a U.S. presidential election on the horizon. The Carter overreaction to the so-called combat brigade would be only a whimper compared to what could be expected from the president and his political opponents should the Soviets introduce a serious new weapons system to Castro's island.

But once the election is over and a new president sworn in, something is bound to happen.

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The 'flash' seen round the world

'Blast' off Africa raises US detection doubts

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The mystery of the brilliant flash which a United States Vela satellite "saw" in the Southern Hemisphere Sept. 22 poses some serious questions — not only about the origin of the phenomenon, but also about US detection capabilities.

South Africa has denied that it carried out a nuclear test. No evidence has been published that would link the three-phased flash (typical of nuclear tests) to a test by any government or group.

Since no US government agency or other source has so far admitted to detecting radioactive fallout, some scientists believe that if a nuclear device was tested it might have been a fusion explosion — set off not by a fission (uranium or plutonium) trigger, but possibly by a high-powered laser.

Why, the scientists and others are asking, did the US State and Defense departments wait until ABC News correspondent John Scali reported the Vela sighting to make it public?

"We were simply reluctant," said one government official, "to publicize a matter which was vague, unproven, and unresolved."

Does lack of other evidence so far show that the United States — despite its costly worldwide surveillance systems for the oceans, the atmosphere, and space — cannot be absolutely certain about what takes place in the remote southern seas and skies north of Antarctica?

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Prof. Bernard W. Feld says that if there was a fission blast, US aircraft and other technical means should have picked up evidence by now to back up the picture from the 170,000-mile-high Vela satellite.

"Such a test," says Dr. Feld, director of MIT's division of nuclear and high energy physics, "would have to leave radioactive traces in the atmosphere. But we haven't heard yet that any were found," despite what US defense officials described as careful searches by specially equipped aircraft.

US Defense Department spokesman Tom Ross said Oct. 30 that no radioactive traces had been found by US surveillance in the Southern Hemisphere, contrary to reports from the Soviet news agency, Tass. Earlier, Tass issued a denial that the flash was caused by explosions aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine.

MIT physicist Costa Tsipis said, "A fusion explosion without a plutonium trigger would probably have to be set off by a huge laser. No one has ever done it, as far as we know. The French have been doing research on laser triggers, and the Chinese have carried out fusion explosion tests most recently."

France normally tests its nuclear devices in the Kerguelen Islands north of Antarctica but eastward of the "flash" area. French tests usually are publicly reported.

South Africa, a major uranium producer, has two known nuclear reactors and since 1975 has operated a pilot plant for enrichment of uranium, with help from West Germany and France.

On Nov. 4, 1977, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to embargo arms shipments to South Africa. A year later, the US canceled contracts for delivery of enriched uranium to South Africa. However, US officials say, France did not cancel its nuclear fuel contracts.

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27 October 1979

U.S. Officials Uncertain About That Event Near S. Africa

Washington

By Don Oberdorfer
and Thomas O'Toole

Washington Post Staff Writers

High U.S. officials expressed uncertainty and some puzzlement yesterday about the cause of a mysterious event near South Africa five weeks ago today that registered on a nuclear detection satellite as an atomic explosion.

"It is not clear there has been a nuclear detonation," Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance told a news conference in Gainesville, Fla. But at the same time, Vance and others gave new details of the satellite sighting, which has caused great concern in high circles that another nation has joined the nuclear weapons club.

The sighting by a U.S. Vela satellite about 60,000 miles in space was of two bright flashes, or pulses, in a sequence and timing characteristic of an atomic explosion.

According to Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio), the former astronaut who is chairman of a Senate subcommittee on nuclear weapons proliferation, Vela satellites have picked up signs of atomic explosions in the atmosphere 41 times since having been sent into space in 1963, and each of those 41 was later confirmed to be an atomic weapons test.

In this case the sighting was about 3 a.m. Africa time on Saturday, Sept. 22, a cloudy night. The bright flashes were somewhere in a large area of the Southern Hemisphere, a circle with a radius of about 3,000 miles including Antarctica, the southern part of Africa and lots of ocean. The sighting was transmitted electronically to the Air Force Technical Applications Division at Patrick Air Force Base near Cape Canaveral.

The Air Force personnel watched a stylus draw two big blips, representing successive flashes of light in the familiar atomic weapons signature. Within two hours of the event, which happened around 10 p.m. Sept. 21 Washington time, word was passed to President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other top officials.

The immediate suspect, and still the most likely in some official minds, was South Africa, the only nation in the area believed capable of a nuclear explosion. However, there had been no hint of an imminent South African blast and there was no announcement by that country that it had tested a nuclear device.

In addition to the Vela satellites scanning large portions of the earth and outer space, the United States employs several other highly sophisticated means to gather nuclear explosion data, including a fleet of airplanes to sample the air for radioactive materials and debris, seismic stations to record the telltale jarring of the earth and acoustic devices to listen for the sound waves set off by a nuclear blast.

Intensive searching, using these other means, failed to turn up confirmation of the report by the Vela satellite. In early stages what are described as "squiggles" on both seismic and acoustic devices seemed to describe an explosion at the right time and area; but further study described the fluctuations as not significant.

Based on the satellite information, government experts came up with an estimate of 2.5 to 3 kilotons (equivalent to 2,500 to 3,000 tons of TNT) as the probable power of the blast involved. Such an atomic explosion would have caused an extremely bright flash in the sky, though somewhat less than the fireball at Hiroshima, where the bomb was about 12 kilotons and was later described as "brighter than a thousand suns."

According to official sources, neither last month nor since have there been any reports by people who saw the flashes in the sky. U.S. intelligence sent out discreet feelers for such reports as well as for any unusual statements or movements in nations which might have been involved, so far without avail.

The lack of technological or physical confirmation has not been taken as conclusive, for several reasons. A senior Pentagon official, in a briefing for reporters, said that in view of the relatively low yield of the apparent explosion and the remoteness of the area, it would not necessarily be expected that radioactive sampling, seismic or acoustic devices would provide confirmation.

The hour of the night, the heavy

cloud cover and the remoteness of the area may have combined to limit physical observation, according to the official.

In addition to a nuclear explosion from a still undetermined source, government officials are considering two other possibilities:

- That a combination of natural events, such as lightning flashes in sequence with a meteor, for example, could have resembled the nuclear weapons signature on the Vela satellite. No one such event, but a combination of events, in extraordinary and precise sequence, would have been necessary for this to happen.

- That somehow the Vela satellite, which has been extremely accurate in the past, malfunctioned and printed the record of an event that never happened. A scientific board of experts who were not involved in the manufacture or management of the satellite is being convened to study this possibility.

Three diamond-shaped Vela satellites orbiting the earth once every 4.5 days at an altitude of 60,000 to 70,000 miles keep a watchful eye for nuclear detonations in the atmosphere or outer space. In addition to optical sensors to register light, the satellites were built to pick up X-rays produced by an atomic explosion and "electromagnetic pulses," radio signals of very short duration which are peculiar to nuclear explosions.

The Vela satellite that recorded the Sept. 22 event was launched in 1970, according to the Air Force, and is the newest of the type. Some of its sensors are worn out and no longer function, and others are not sensitive enough to pick up such a small blast, an Air Force spokesman said.

According to the senior defense officials, the only information the government has is "one piece of data," the light curve of two flashes in the characteristic nuclear weapons pattern.

If an unannounced, unacknowledged nuclear explosion did occur, as the consensus of officials suggests, the questions of who and why are matters of grave importance for governments and people everywhere.

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Most nations detonating their first atomic blast have started with much larger and thus less complex explosions, about 10 to 20 kilotons. But the senior Pentagon official said it is quite possible for a first nuclear explosion to be made deliberately much smaller, presumably in an effort to avoid detection.

Some scientists said they believe the explosion was conducted over the ocean in an attempt at concealment. One scientist speculated that this may not have been the first test over water in this remote area, possibly by South Africa, but that it is only the first detected by the United States.

South Africa has been the prime suspect because of the area of the apparent blast and South Africa's reported ability to enrich natural uranium to weapons grade. The Pretoria government apparently approached a weapons test in the summer of 1977,

but backed off after unprecedented teamwork warnings by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and West Germany.

A secret atomic blast might assure South Africa of a doomsday capability. An acknowledged blast would bring down the wrath of its African neighbors, cause a crisis with the great powers and probably lead to the worldwide economic boycott its enemies long have sought.

It is possible that another nation secretly brought a nuclear device into the area, perhaps on a boat, which was then abandoned for use as the launch platform. Ship traffic has been investigated, so far without results.

Among the nations openly discussed here yesterday in rampant speculation about the source of the nuclear blast were Israel, which is believed to have a small number of untested plutonium bombs, and the "near-nuclear" nations of Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina.

Officials have all but ruled out the possibility that a nuclear submarine exploded in the area. A reactor accident would not have caused the flashes of light, officials said. The accidental explosion of a nuclear weapon aboard a submarine seems unlikely, because no subs are believed to have been in the area.

There is always the possibility that the explosion, if it was an explosion, was detonated by the Soviet Union or China to test something new. But officials have no explanation why they would do so in such a faraway place, since neither nation has been shy before about weapons tests on its own testing grounds.

Contributing to this article was staff writer John M. Goshko.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1979

S. Africa Dismisses Reports of A-Test

Johannesburg

By Caryle Murphy

Washington Post Foreign Service

JOHANNESBURG, Oct. 26—The head of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board today labeled U.S. government suggestions that South Africa might have exploded a nuclear device as "complete nonsense" and denied that this country was responsible for the suspected explosion.

"If there was anything of the sort, my first reaction would be that some other power might have undertaken a test, but it was definitely not South Africa," J. Wynand De Villiers, the Atomic Energy Board's chairman, said.

However, Foreign Minister Pieter Botha offered a more circumspect reply when asked for comment, saying he had "no knowledge of such an event."

He added, "Why don't you ask the Russians or the Chinese or even the Americans?" Botha showed indignation that the United States first suspected South Africa when a U.S. satellite indicated that a low-grade explosion may have taken place Sept. 22 in an area including portions of the Indian and southern Atlantic oceans as well as parts of the Antarctic continent and southern Africa.

The United States is following up with other checks to try to corroborate that an explosion actually took place and to determine what type it might have been.

It is a particularly vast area in

which the phenomenon is supposed to have taken place," Botha said. "If the Americans don't know what is going on, suggest they first make sure of their facts before they run away with the idea. It might even have been the rebirth of Venus," he added, suggesting sarcastically that "the Americans ask Neptune for a report."

U.S. Ambassador William Edmondson confirmed that he met today with Botha to discuss the U.S. information about the possible blast, but he declined to disclose the substance of what was said.

Botha's refusal to categorically deny South Africa had tested a nuclear explosive device is seen by many observers as an attempt to maintain the ambiguity and uncertainty that currently surround South Africa's intentions in the atomic weapons field.

The doubts about this point give South Africa a psychological advantage over its potential enemies without risking the harsh international reaction that might come if South Africa openly admitted it had or intends to acquire nuclear weapons, most analysts here believe.

An cartoon in a local paper today pointed out: "Who needs the real bomb? Rumors are a cheaper deterrent."

South Africa's nuclear energy program is a cause of concern to nonproliferation proponents because it is not subjected to the scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency, from which South Africa was jettisoned in the 1960s. While there is no proof, there is widespread belief that South Africa already has a nuclear weapons capability that quickly could be activated to make it the world's seventh atomic power. The worry is aggravated by South Africa's refusal so far to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

If this country did acquire atomic weapons, it would introduce an ominous new dimension to strife-torn southern Africa, already riven by racial conflict between blacks and whites.

Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha, who is also defense minister and chiefly responsible for building up South Africa's impressive domestic armament program, has described his country's military role as a "stabilizing factor" in southern Africa against what he terms the "Marxist onslaught."

South African officials are particularly worried about the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.

U.S. concern about South Africa's nuclear plans was heightened in August 1977 when a Soviet intelligence satellite spotted what looked like a nuclear testing site under construction in South Africa's Kalahari desert.

Pressed by the United States for assurances that it would not test a nuclear device, South Africa reacted in an ambiguous and contradictory manner. President Carter said he had received these assurances, but then prime minister John Vorster denied this, saying in an American television interview, "I am not aware of any promise that I gave to President Carter."

The administration countered by releasing portions of a letter to Carter

from Vorster in which he had written that "South Africa did not have, nor did it intend to develop a nuclear explosive device for any purposes, peaceful or otherwise."

Covert U.S. efforts to confirm this or to discover whether this commitment had changed under Botha—are believed to be at the root of an incident last April when South Africa expelled three American diplomats for allegedly taking aerial photographs of "strategic installations." Among them was thought to be South Africa's nuclear enrichment plant at Pelindaba near Pretoria. The "spy-plane affair" brought bilateral relations between the two countries to their lowest ebb.

The uranium enrichment plant, which is under construction, has fueled speculation that South Africa is producing weapons-grade material. It is not known for sure whether this plant has capability to produce highly enriched uranium needed for explosive devices.

The government has said the plant is meant to produce only the low-enriched 3 percent uranium hexafluoride that South Africa requires for two nuclear power plants near Cape Town that will come on stream at the end of 1981.

South Africa was originally to get that supply from the United States, but Washington cut it off when Pretoria stalled on signing the nonproliferation treaty. The United States also has stopped a consignment of 57 pounds of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium that South Africa had requested for its Safar 1 nuclear research reactor.

However, some observers point out it is not necessary for South Africa to build an enrichment plant just to provide itself with fuel for its power plants, since the French consortium building them, Framatome, has already indicated it would supply the fuel if the United States did not according to reliable sources.

Moreover, South Africa has no plans for more nuclear power stations.

In an interview with ABC television today, Foreign Minister Botha said the American refusal to furnish South Africa with the highly enriched fuel it needs for the Safar 1 plant "is indeed encouraging my country to initiate its own program of enrichment."

His remark implied that South Africa is pursuing production of highly enriched uranium.

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The chairman of South Africa's domestic arms program said late Thursday that his country was giving preference to the kind of arms needed in an "African war" rather than to highly sophisticated arms.

"In the African context, South Africa manufactures weapons for her own use, but certain highly sophisticated arms will probably never be produced in this country because of the economic implications and because of the lesser role that these arms would play in an African war," said P.G. Marais, chairman of Armscor.

U.N. to Investigate Reports S. Africa Exploded A-Bomb

From News Services

The U.N. General Assembly today instructed Secretary-General Kurt

Waldheim to investigate U.S. reports that South Africa recently exploded a nuclear device, but African diplomats indicated they accepted the reports as true.

Nigeria's ambassador to the United Nations, B. Akporode Clark, speaking on behalf of the African group, told the General Assembly that the alleged blast has created "a fait accompli of tragic and monstrous proportions."

Clark called on the assembly to ask Waldheim to conduct an inquiry and report his findings, and the assembly approved the request without a vote. The assembly's president, Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, said that if true, the atomic test by South Africa "would clearly constitute a serious threat to peace and security in Africa."

Clark said the United States, Israel, Britain, France and West Germany must share the blame "for this grave and unprecedented threat to the security of Africa." He accused those countries of nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

Clark criticized the United States for delaying disclosure of the alleged nuclear test and called this "a sad commentary on international morality."

American, British and Israeli officials promptly denied that there was any cooperation on nuclear power between them and South Africa.

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Donald McHenry, told Clark after the Nigerian's statement that the United States has not supplied nuclear materials to South Africa for the past four years and was fulfilling

its responsibility by pursuing its inquiry into the possibility of a nuclear explosion. McHenry added that the event remained unconfirmed.

McHenry said the United States had discontinued even peaceful nuclear programs with South Africa and would not resume them until that country signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it so far has refused to do. He said the United States would cooperate with Waldheim in investigating the incident.

The Soviet news agency Tass said in a report from New York that Western countries and Israel had supplied South Africa with the technology and equipment to produce enriched uranium, which can be used to make atomic weapons. Tass accused the United States of trying to "dissociate itself from the responsibility which the Western powers bear for building South Africa's nuclear potential in the course of a number of years."

Meanwhile, other African groups reacted strongly to the reports of a South African nuclear blast.

The African National Congress, a South African opposition movement based in Zambia, demanded an urgent U.N. Security Council meeting to impose sanctions on South Africa.

The U.N. representative of the Southwest Africa People's Organization called for a more stringent arms embargo on South Africa, and said the blast was designed to undercut negotiations on Namibia (Southwest Africa) and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Also contributing to this report was special correspondent Michael Berlin at the United Nations.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1979

Soviet Denies It Caused Blast Near South Africa

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Oct. 29 — The Soviet Union denied today that a possible nuclear blast off South Africa last month was the result of an accident on a Soviet submarine.

Tass, the official press agency, said it had been "authorized to state that there were no explosions, accidents or launchings of missiles from Soviet submarines in the area."

It asserted that the flash detected by a United States reconnaissance satellite on Sept. 22 was an atmospheric nuclear test explosion set off by South Africa. This has been denied by South Africa, which has linked the blast to Soviet activities. Experts in Washington had already ruled out the possibility of an explosion on a Soviet submarine.

Tass also said that "United States technical services analyzing air samples established that there exists radioactivity in the area of the explosion." This has not been reported from Washington, and Tass did not give the source of its information.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1979

REPORT OF A-BLAST OFF AFRICA CALLED INCONCLUSIVE BY U.S.

Vance Says the Evidence Makes It
Impossible to State a Nuclear
Test Took Place in Area

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26 — Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said today that the evidence of a nuclear explosion in the southern hemisphere was so inconclusive that it was impossible to state categorically that South Africa or any other country had actually detonated an atomic device.

In South Africa, the head of that country's nuclear development program said it was "complete nonsense" to suggest that the evidence indicated South Africa had tested a nuclear bomb. Official Government statements, however, stopped short of a categorical denial. Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha repeated earlier statements that he had "no knowledge" of any nuclear test. [Page 3.]

Faced with a denial by South Africa of such nuclear activity, and lacking any proof beyond the uncorroborated evidence of a single satellite, the United States Government sought to avoid a major confrontation over what it said was only the possibility that some nation had secretly exploded a nuclear device in an area of some 4,500 square miles, including part of South Africa.

Mr. Vance, at a news conference in Gainesville, Fla., where he was speaking tonight, said "It is not not clear that there has been a nuclear detonation." He said there was only the possibility of a low-yield explosion of two to three kilotons.

Information Detected by Satellite

Because of previous reports of South Africa's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, the Administration was concerned about that country's possible involvement when the first evidence of a suspected nuclear explosion was picked up on Sept. 22 by a Defense Department satellite that detected an intense flash of light while passing over a remote expanse of ocean. [Page 3.]

Members of Congress who have been briefed on the matter have drawn the conclusion that South Africa was responsible for the explosion. But Mr. Vance and other senior officials went out of their way today to avoid linking South Africa or any other nation to the unconfirmed detonation.

"We cannot say an explosion has taken place in South Africa," Mr. Vance said. He added that South Africa had told the United States it would not develop nuclear weapons, and "so far we do not yet have any evidence that indicates that they have."

Hodding Carter 3d, the State Department's spokesman, said, "I am in no position to point a finger at any nation or to a particular spot" where the explosion might have occurred.

Several Administration officials were concerned that the admission that intelligence aides could not decide conclusively about the possible test might raise questions about the ability of the United States to verify the strategic-arms limitation treaty now before the Senate.

Mr. Carter said that "there is no connection to SALT verification." He said that verification of strategic-arms compliance depended on "different kinds of capabilities," and took the position that the ability of the satellite to detect the "extremely small signals" involved in the possible low-yield explosion was a positive sign.

A senior Defense Department official said that "there is no independent evidence that would link a particular country" to the possible explosion.

Indeed, a high-ranking State Department official said privately that he believed the chances were 60 percent that there was no detonation at all. He said the fact that no radioactive debris has been found made it unlikely an explosion took place.

Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of Brooklyn and chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa, said that if South Africa had set off a nuclear device there would be a move in the United Nations to launch an economic boycott against the South Africans, who are regularly condemned in the world body for their racial policies.

Mr. Vance said, "The development of nuclear weapons by South Africa, of course, would be destabilizing and a dangerous step forward." But he repeated that "there are no indications that a bomb has been developed."

Foreign Minister Botha has denied all knowledge of a South African nuclear test and the United States is not seeking to challenge him, a high official said.

Administration officials were defensive about any indications that the intelligence system was faulty.

Mr. Vance said that within hours of the satellite's receiving information about the possible blast, he was discussing the matter with Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser.

"The equipment we had worked perfectly," he said. "We just haven't been able to have any corroborating evidence."

THE NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1979

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ON PAGE 5

U.S. Says It Lacks Clear Evidence Of an Atom Blast South of Africa

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26 — On Sept. 22, an American intelligence satellite, passing over a remote expanse of ocean bounded by South Africa to the north and Antarctica to the south, detected an intense burst of light lasting less than a second. In hours, intelligence aides told President Carter that there was evidence to believe South Africa or some other power had conducted a secret test of a nuclear weapon.

Thus began what Administration officials today described as one of the most baffling international episodes in years, a mystery they freely conceded might not ever be solved.

After weeks of poring over the satellite's findings and searching for further evidence of a possible explosion, senior officials report that the Administration still lacks any conclusive proof that an atomic test took place. And if such evidence existed, they say, it would probably be impossible to tell whether the test was conducted by South Africa or some other country on the threshold of achieving a nuclear capability, such as Israel, Brazil, Pakistan or Argentina.

'A Very Serious Menace'

A senior Pentagon official told reporters today that if one of these countries had tested a nuclear weapon it would constitute "a very serious menace to world stability." But in addition to its possible implications for global security, officials said the incident had raised questions about American intelligence abilities and the effectiveness of Washington's current efforts to halt the worldwide spread of nuclear arms.

Officials said that the intense burst of light was detected by one of 12 specially designed United States Air Force satellites known as Vela. Put into orbit in the mid-1960's, the satellites are equipped to locate and measure the light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation, such as X-rays, released by nuclear explosions.

During the 1960's, the satellites, in elliptical orbits of from 3,400 to 69,000 miles above the earth, were used mainly to monitor the Soviet Union's compliance with the 1963 ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

The satellites are still used for this purpose, but officials said that in recent years the Air Force had been ordered to use them to monitor nations, such as

South Africa, that are acquiring the technical ability to build nuclear arms.

Based on the intensity of the light detected, technical experts calculate that if there was an explosion it would have been in the range of two to three kilotons, the equivalent of about 2,000 tons of TNT in destructive power. The first American atomic bomb was about ten times more powerful.

There is great uncertainty, however, over where the possible explosion might have taken place. Officials said that if more than one Vela satellite had detected the light it would have been possible to pinpoint its source within a few miles. At present, they said, the incident could have taken place anywhere in an area of 4,500 square miles over the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, from the tip of South Africa to Antarctica.

Immediately after being told of the satellite report, President Carter is said to have ordered an extensive effort to confirm the finding using other intelligence means. Officials said acoustical and seismic equipment was checked. At the same time, reconnaissance planes were dispatched to the area in an attempt to pick up traces of radioactive debris in the upper atmosphere.

None of these additional measures, officials reported, were able to confirm the satellite finding.

Possible Natural Causes

While the search for additional evidence was under way, the Administration began an investigation into whether the burst of light had a natural cause. Technical officials said that the character of the burst, one small flash followed quickly by a more intense one, ruled out the possibility of a single natural cause.

However, officials were said to be still examining the possibility that a combination of natural events, such as lightning, reflections from the sun or meteors, could have created the flash.

Several officials suggested that the possible explosion could have occurred aboard a ship fitted out for nuclear testing. It was therefore noted that any one of several countries might have moved a ship into the area and detonated a weapon.

An intelligence aide said that Israel or Pakistan or another nation might have chosen a test site near South Africa in an attempt to throw blame on the South African Government.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 64NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE
5 November 1979

A FLASH OF LIGHT

It lasted less than a second—a flash of light that dimmed, grew bright again and died. Thousands of miles above the South Atlantic, an American spy satellite recorded the flash. Less than four hours later, technicians at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida decided that the signals could indicate a small nuclear explosion. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was awakened at his Washington apartment, and the Carter Administration began grappling with a mystery it has yet to solve.


That was more than a month ago. Last week, the aftershock of the blast—if that's what it was—rippled through Washington and other capitals when the story became public. The State Department issued a statement that was masterly in its vagueness—but nevertheless managed to raise the possibility that what the Vela satellite had registered was a low-yield nuclear explosion by the Republic of South Africa. Top South African officials scornfully denied the charge. But the possibility that the Pretoria regime might have become the world's seventh nuclear power again focused attention on the frightening prospect of nuclear proliferation—and raised some doubts about America's ability to determine just who is and who isn't in the nuclear club.

FLUKE: From their elliptical orbits, which carry them nearly 70,000 miles into space, the three working Vela satellites currently in orbit look down on vast expanses of territory and cannot tell the precise location of many of the signals they receive. Whatever it was that happened that overcast night of Sept. 22 could have taken place anywhere within a 4,500-square-mile area running from the edge of the Antarctic to the southern part of Africa and including vast stretches of the Atlantic and Indian oceans (map). The satellite could not even tell whether the signal had come from land or sea.

It was something of a fluke that the Vela picked up the flash at all; the satellite was launched in 1970 with a life expectancy of eighteen months.

Privately, U.S. analysts insisted that the satellite hadn't been fooled, and pointed out that on 40 previous occasions Velas had successfully detected nuclear tests. One official said that this over-age Vela still was functioning properly and that "no single natural event could simulate the complex

light history" recorded by its sensors. "My gut tells me the South Africans exploded something, but the problem is that there's no smoking pistol," said an Administration aide. In public, however, higher-ranking Administration officials acknowledged that the case was much less than conclusive. "We cannot say an explosion has taken place in South Africa," Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told reporters in Florida.



Southern Hemisphere; the nearest U.S. seismic site is in Pine Gap, Australia. And the explosion, if it was one, had a power of only 2 kilotons, compared with 10 kilotons or more for most initial nuclear tests. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III went so far as to claim that the Vela's ability to detect the "extremely small signals" of last month's "event" was a sign of U.S. monitoring strength.

U.S. intelligence services were seeking a second source of evidence about the event, crisscrossing the area with C-135 transport planes and U-2s equipped to detect radioactive debris as well as tracing ships' records in a search for eyewitnesses. They had no luck so far. But even if the U.S. established that a blast did occur, the problem of finding the culprit would remain. The case against South Africa was entirely circumstantial: it is the only country in the immediate vicinity that is thought to be capable of developing a nuclear weapon. But any of the other "threshold" nations could have towed a weapon into the South Atlantic or the Indian Ocean to conduct a test—with the added advantage of having suspicion fall on South Africa.

'NONSENSE': In Pretoria, the president of the government's Atomic Energy Board called the suggestion that South Africa had tested a bomb "complete nonsense." And Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha suggested scathingly that the U.S. should "ask Father Neptune what is going on in his kingdom." Botha also seized on the incident to lecture the Carter Administration on its leadership of the Western world. "It's like a cowboy not knowing how to handle his gun or walk tall any longer," he said. "I say to you, stop displaying this nervousness... You are frightening your friends and appeasing your enemies."

Two days after the announcement from Washington, spokesmen for the South African Navy raised the possibility that the mysterious explosion had been caused by an accident on a Soviet nuclear submarine. Vice Adm. J. C. Walters said it was "common knowledge" that a Soviet Echo II-class submarine had been cruising through the strategic shipping passage around the Cape of Good Hope during September and said that the navy was investigating "this real possibility." U.S. defense experts dismissed the theory as absurd, noting that, at worst, an accident on a nuclear submarine would generate not a nuclear explosion but a meltdown. "And in that case," one analyst said, "we would have seen a huge radioactive mess out there, and would have long since detected it."

Some critics of the SALT II treaty tried to link the Administration's inability to pinpoint the location and nature of the possible explosion with the issue of SALT verifications. But State and Defense Department officials were quick to point out that there is little similarity between monitoring Soviet missile ranges and scanning out-of-the-way corners of the globe for one-shot nuclear tests. The U.S. has few seismic or acoustic monitoring stations in the

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Last week's dispute between the U.S. and South Africa was not their first over nuclear weapons. The initial flare-up was triggered by the Soviets. They informed the U.S. two years ago that the South Africans appeared to be building a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert west of Johannesburg. After U.S. satellites confirmed the existence of the site, the South Africans dismantled some of the test equipment.

But U.S. attempts to get close-up photographic evidence of the South Africans' nuclear program led to a major diplomatic incident between the two countries. Last April, South African state security agents discovered that a spy camera was hidden in the belly of the private plane used by Ambassador William Edmondson. South Africa charged that the plane had been routinely crisscrossing the Kalahari. Three Americans—the military attaché in Pretoria and the pilot and copilot of the Beechcraft—were expelled from the country.

South Africa's advanced nuclear research is conducted at Pelindaba, tucked away in the mountains outside Pretoria. Scientists at the plant—which operates under tighter security than exists at any defense installation in the country—are said to have perfected a cheap process for enriching uranium, a key step in the cycle that can lead either to nuclear power or to the bomb. But South Africa still needs highly enriched uranium from the U.S. for the American-built research reactor at Pelindaba. Protracted negotiations were held last year between the U.S. and South Africa aimed at getting the Pretoria government to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The talks failed because South Africa refuses to open up Pelindaba to international inspection, and the U.S. won't deliver refined nuclear fuel until it does.

South Africa is only one of the growing list of nations that seem to be on the verge of joining the nuclear club. So far, the only countries known to have tested nuclear weapons are the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and India. Among the other "threshold" nations:

■ **ISRAEL.** The CIA determined as long ago as 1974 that Israel had at least ten nuclear weapons. Because it has never openly tested

a bomb, the Israelis have, in the most narrowly technical sense, kept their pledge not to be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. But as one expert with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna says: "A country like Israel doesn't have to test a bomb. As long as the newspapers keep telling everyone it has the bomb, its purposes are served."

■ **PAKISTAN.** The late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that Pakistanis would "eat leaves and grass, or even go hungry" to match India's nuclear potential, and his successor, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, hasn't changed that policy. Western experts disagree on how soon Pakistan will detonate its crude nuclear device, with Europeans tending to say that it could happen soon and Americans guessing that it could be two more years.

■ **SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN.** The U.S. continues to supply both countries with nuclear fuel, equipment and technology—all contingent on their continued abstention from weapons development. Both have accepted "full-scope safeguards," which means that they are inspected by the IAEA

to make sure that neither fuel nor technology is diverted to weapons programs. Of course the IAEA, like most watchdog agencies, is missing a few teeth. And Taiwan is understandably less confident about the U.S. defense commitment than it was before Washington recognized Peking.

■ **ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL.** "Argentina's small nuclear program . . . probably will provide the basis for a nuclear-weapons capability in the early 1980s," the CIA reported five years ago. Brazil and even Chile are thought to be in the same category.

Iraq and Libya would jump to the top of the list if either managed to buy the necessary technology. But the frightening truth is that the list of threshold nations would include any country with a nuclear-energy program—and there will be about 40 of those in 1985. Technological advances have made it possible to convert from nuclear energy to atom-bomb building in shockingly short order—in some cases, in a matter of days. It has been five years since India leaped the gap, which helps explain why the U.S. took the possibility of a South African test so seriously. "Adding any one country to the nuclear-weapons list after a long period in which no one was willing to break a kind of taboo obviously makes it more difficult to keep the barriers up," said an official in Washington.

A number of international efforts are under way to strengthen those barriers. The U.S., the Soviet Union and Britain are negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. And more than 100 nations, most of which do not possess nuclear-arms capability, have signed the eleven-year-old nonproliferation treaty. But the effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons depends largely on faith. If have-not countries cannot count on restraint by nuclear powers—or by other have-nots—they may accelerate bomb-building programs. Whatever the source of those brief pulses of light in the antipodes last month, they may yet undermine the rickety structure that seeks to keep the nuclear club exclusive.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
30 October 1979

Court Supports NSA Stance on Withholding Data

By Timothy S. Robinson

The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled here yesterday that the supersecret National Security Agency does not have to give a detailed public explanation for its refusal to disclose documents sought by the public under the Freedom of Information Act.

According to the 3-to-0 ruling, federal judges should accept without question the agency's statements to the judge explaining why disclosure of documents obtained by its monitoring of worldwide communications could be harmful to the national security. In addition, there is no need for judges to examine the documents themselves before ruling in NSA's favor, the court said.

The ruling, written by U.S. Circuit Court Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey, sets a higher burden on the public in FOIA suits against NSA than exists in similar suits against the Central Intelligence Agency. The ruling fully condones a procedure under which NSA submits affidavits secretly to the judge explaining its reasons for refusing to disclose documents.

The present case is one example where some of the interests of the adversary process are outweighed by the

nation's legitimate interests in secrecy and orderly process for disclosure. Wilkey wrote for the court.

The ruling came in a suit filed against NSA by activists Jane Fonda and Thomas E. Hayden, who were told that the agency had located foreign intelligence reports in its files concerning them but refused to give them the material.

Once the suit was filed, the agency told the court disclosure of the information would jeopardize its mission of collecting intelligence through the monitoring of foreign electromagnetic signals.

The NSA filed a secret 20-page statement with the judges refusing even to itemize the documents it was withholding from the plaintiffs. U.S. District Court Judge Howard F. Corcoran read the statement and ruled in NSA's favor without reading the materials compiled on the plaintiffs.

The appellate court noted that a higher standard of secrecy exists in connection with NSA because, among other reasons, persons with access to the material might be able to determine what channels the agency is monitoring.

"After reading the classified affidavit, we find that it was reasonable, in the interests of national security, to conclude that the information was sensitive and properly classified," Wilkey wrote.

In another FOIA ruling yesterday affecting public access to materials in the nation's intelligence community, a federal judge ruled that persons seeking documents from the CIA should not be billed by the agency for processing the request if release of the information would benefit the general public.

U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. said the fee for handling the material can be charged only if the person requesting the material is the only one who will benefit.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
30 October 1979

Fonda, Hayden Lose Bid for Secret Papers

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled yesterday that activists Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden cannot receive certain documents they had requested under the Freedom of Information Act from the National Security Agency.

In a 3-0 opinion written by Associate Judge Malcom Richard Wilkey, the appeals court ruled that Senior U.S. District Judge Howard F. Corcoran had correctly ruled that information sought by Hayden and Fonda about themselves from NSA should not be public.

In another Freedom of Information Act case, U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. ruled that the CIA could not charge fees to locate and copy documents

which could be of widespread public interest if released.

Robinson's ruling, which could have widespread impact on the thousands of FOIA requests received by all government agencies, came in a suit brought by Elizabeth Eudey, a researcher at the University of California at Berkeley.

Eudey had asked the CIA to provide documents for a book she is writing about the relationships between the American government and French and British labor unions since World War II.

She sued when the CIA said it would only release a few documents and wanted large fees to search its records.

The agency would not waive its fees because it ruled that her research did not meet the test of being in the widespread public interest.

Robinson said, "The statute does not permit a consideration of how many documents will ultimately be released. The court notes, moreover, that a single document may, in the present context, substantially enrich the public domain."

In the Hayden-Fonda cases, Corcoran had ordered NSA to prepare a detailed index of its denial of records about Hayden and Fonda that had been obtained from "foreign electromagnetic signals."

Instead of providing a detailed index which it contended would in itself compromise the secrecy of intelligence gathering, NSA provided Corcoran with a 20-page "Top Secret" affidavit about the issues involved, even though the agency was not contending that the information about Hayden and Fonda itself was particularly sensitive.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 October 1979

Will arms for Morocco solve the Sahara conflict?

The United States is confronted with an increasingly sticky diplomatic problem in North Africa. The question is whether it should provide King Hassan II of Morocco with new military equipment for use against guerrillas fighting for control of the Western Sahara. President Carter favors such aid but his foreign policy establishment is divided on the subject. Barring a consensus, and in light of the extreme complexity of the problem, we feel Congress is wise to consider such aid with the utmost skepticism and caution. If the US is not careful, it could find itself embroiled in a widening — and unwinnable — war.

Here are some of the elements to be weighed:

It is argued that Morocco is a traditional friend which has served Western interests in Africa and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, also friends of the US, favor such aid for King Hassan (and the Saudis reportedly are even prepared to provide the funding). President Carter is understandably sensitive to the latter's concern that, if he does not provide the requested help, he will undercut still another pro-Western leader who has been a force for stability and moderation. Lending weight to this argument is the fact that the guerrillas are supported by Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union.

But here an ostensibly black-white argument dissolves into many hues of grey. Algeria, for instance, may be suspected of seeking influence in the region through support of a new ministate in the Western Sahara. But it cannot be overlooked either that Algeria provides the US with major supplies of natural gas and has been moving away from the Russians and toward the West. It is certainly no less important for Washington to court the new more moderate government in Algiers than to show support for King Hassan in Rabat. To complicate the situation further, the Soviet Union has a long-term agreement with Morocco for the supply of phosphates and is therefore not eager to become heavily involved in the guerrilla struggle. Also, it is far from clear that the Polisario Front, the rebel organization fighting for the independence of some 75,000 people in the Western Sahara, is pro-Soviet. . . .

Hence, if the US accommodates King Hassan, it risks compelling the Russians to throw more into the fray and making the Polisario increasingly militant.

It is also argued that the Polisario rebels now are attacking Morocco proper and that Hassan therefore needs the arms to defend his country — or at least to be able to negotiate from a position of strength. On this score it ought to be borne in mind that the fighting started when Morocco seized the Western Sahara, inviting a Polisario strike. The United States does not recognize that annexation. Both the US and the Organization of African States stand behind the 1975 call of the UN for a plebiscite in the region.

In deciding this issue, Congress must also take account of the fact that it might be sending arms down the drain. According to US intelligence reports, the Moroccan Army is in extremely poor shape; it is weak and demoralized. Supplying the armed reconnaissance planes and helicopter gunships King Hassan wants could be only a first step. The US could find itself fueling and being drawn into a full-scale war between Morocco and Algeria and, given the intensity of nationalist feeling in Africa, one which Morocco could not win.

In the final analysis, it is easy and tempting to throw arms at a problem. But the route to a solution of the Saharan dilemma has to lie through negotiation. King Hassan must be brought around to see that he must talk both with the Polisario insurgents and with Algeria about the issue of self-determination. Any new military aid for Morocco ought at the least to be firmly linked with an effort toward that end: . . .

U.S. officials try to defuse Algeria-Morocco standoff

By HENRY L. TREWHITT

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The administration has opened an intense diplomatic campaign to prevent war and save a friend in north-west Africa, one of several trouble spots that are keeping senior diplomats on the road.

Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, returned last night from Morocco, where he was explaining to King Hassan II the terms of America's offer of advanced tactical weapons. The king is reported to be under heavy internal pressure to hold the former Spanish Sahara, to the south of Morocco, against guerrillas supported by Algeria.

As Mr. Christopher arrived at Andrews Air Force Base, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, was scheduled to depart. He was on his way to Algeria for the celebration of the 25th anniversary of Algeria's revolution against France.

Mr. Brzezinski's announced mission was entirely ceremonial. But the administration plainly hoped his presence would reassure Algeria of American goodwill. He is expected privately to urge restraint in Algerian-Moroccan relations.

Several armed clashes already have occurred between Moroccan and Algerian troops in the contested region where their borders blend with that of Spanish Sahara.

Last week the administration announced that it would supply King Hassan with advanced helicopters, armed reconnaissance planes and other arms provided he agreed to negotiations with his challengers. The decision followed attacks by Polisario Front Guerrillas, supported by Algeria, into the uncontested territory of Morocco itself.

Hassan may lose throne, U.S. report warns

Washington (Reuters)—King Hassan II of Morocco is in danger of being overthrown within a year because of ineffectual leadership and a war in the Sahara

which he cannot win, according to a United States intelligence report.

Widespread corruption among government officials; uncritical advisers with limited powers and major economic difficulties were other factors that could spark a coup attempt from within his security forces, the report said.

The report, obtained by Reuter, was compiled by the State Department from the intelligence assessments of four government agencies for the Carter administration.

The agencies were divided as to whether King Hassan would reassert leadership. The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency doubted that he would.

The CIA, in the report, said: "Hassan will lose control of events—probably within a year—and eventually his throne."

State Department intelligence experts believed that Hassan would reassert effective leadership and continue in power for the next several years.

And analysts from the Pentagon agreed that the king would continue in power "at least over the next year."

But all agencies, according to the report, agreed that the monarchy was in danger.

"Major economic difficulties have combined with fallout from an unwinnable Saharan war to weaken King Hassan's position," the report said. "Prospects for losing his throne are greater than at any time since the early 1970s."

"The overall threat to the monarchy is serious, and the political fallout from an unwinnable Saharan war is the most likely catalyst for a direct challenge to the king," it said.

The report, an interagency intelligence memorandum, was prepared before President Carter's decision last week to supply sophisticated arms to King Hassan to encourage a negotiated settlement to the Saharan conflict with Polisario guerrillas.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
31 October 1979

Rockefeller dinners draw gilt-edged

VIPs

Betty Beale

The world's most prominent banker came to Washington Sunday, drew with him some of the top industrialists around the globe and tossed two big, glittering dinners in their honor.

David Rockefeller, chairman of the far-flung Chase Manhattan Bank and his wife Peggy gave an informal dinner Sunday night for 100 at the National Portrait Gallery that turned out to be reunion of the famed Trilateral Commission, and a black-tie dinner Monday night at Anderson House for over 200 that was impressively glamorous. Bob Strauss spoke at the latter, and managed to boost his candidate, Jimmy Carter, throughout.

Both parties were in honor of the bank's International Advisory Committee — the gilt-edged industrialists and bankers from foreign countries and from the U.S., whose chairman is Henry Kissinger.

Mingling with Washington's VIP figures were the two biggest tycoons

in their respective countries — Johnny Agnelli (the macho sportsman Italian industrialist who owns Fiat) and his super-chic wife Marella; and Jeh Tata — the legendary "Mr. India" who owns Air India, Tata Steel, Tata Railroads, you-name-it.

Two other motor moguls of the IAC who were present with their wives were Ford Motor Co. President Philip Caldwell, and Volvo's chief executive officer Pehr Gyllenhammar who came here from Sweden for the semi-annual meetings of the advisory committee and accompanying festivities.

Other big wheels at the meals, blue chips among the vips, were Holland's Gerry Wagner, chairman of Royal Dutch Petroleum, Germany's Hans Merkle, head of Robert Bosch Co., Ian Sinclair, chairman of Canadian Pacific Limited, and Switzerland's Pierre Liotard-Vogt, head of Nestle's Chocolate.

Douglas Dillon, a member of the IAC, the Tri-Lateral Commission, and, more importantly for Monday night, a member of the Society of the Cincinnati which owns Anderson House, was co-host with Rockefeller. He and his wife Phyllis received in the upstairs French drawing room with Rockefellers and the Kissingers, Nancy wear-

ing a striking gold-enscrolled black jacket.

From there guests poured into the long, narrow gallery that was elbow to elbow with bigwigs. There was Clare Luce suddenly face to face with CIA Director Stansfield Turner who abolished the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on which Clare had served previous presidents.

They greeted each other coolly. The next time they found themselves standing together, Luce quoted an earlier president as saying, "No man ever left the White House with the reputation he brought into it. A man is very fortunate to enter government without a great reputation, so to speak, because he has no place to go but up. Your reputation has been constantly rising." Turner looked pleased.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A22THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1979

Aspin Concludes U.S. Did Not Spy on Young

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) has concluded after a two-month investigation that there is "not one iota of evidence" to support charges that U.S. intelligence agencies spied on former United Nations ambassador Andrew Young last summer.

In a report made public today, Aspin concludes: "I now feel quite confident that no U.S. intelligence agency was violating the law and keeping a watch on Andy Young."

Aspin is chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee. The report he issued was his own.

Young was forced to resign the U.N. post after it became known that he had violated official U.S. policy instructions by meeting secretly July 26 with Zehdi Labib Terzi, the Palestine Liberation Organization observer at the United Nations.

Young later asserted that, before he admitted the meeting to State Department officials, the department had in its possession a "very accurate report" of his session with Terzi. In an Aug. 19 TV interview, Young said: "I don't know how they got it, but I have seen such a report."

That touched off a rash of speculation in the press and elsewhere that some federal agency such as the FBI or the Central Intelligence Agency had bugged Young's New York apartment or had kept him under surveillance.

However, Aspin said his investigation had established that the report cited by Young was about another meeting where the PLO official was not present and that there is no evidence, direct or indirect, pointing to any improper conduct in the incident by U.S. intelligence agencies.

The Washington Post reported on Aug. 21 that the State Department had received on July 30 an intelli-

gence report about a Young luncheon meeting on July 26 with the U.N. ambassadors of Kuwait and Syria. The report said the two Arab ambassadors had suggested that Young talk with Terzi, although it gave no indication that such a meeting actually was agreed upon.

Young, Terzi and the two Arab envoys did get together that evening, but State Department officials have insisted that they never received any third-person report of that meeting. Instead, they say, the report later described by Young refers to the luncheon meeting earlier that day when Terzi was not present.

Aspin's report corroborates the State Department's account. He notes that, with the exception of Terzi, the participants in the two meetings were the same and adds: "I surmised at first that perhaps Mr. Young thought that the report he read of the noon lunch was in fact a report of the evening meeting."

But, Aspin's report continues, "Mr. Young tells me that he was under no such misapprehension but that he felt constrained under the circumstances from fully clarifying the situation. He has confirmed to me since that to his knowledge there is not and was no intelligence report of the evening meeting."

In addition, Aspin says, he has concluded from his investigation that it was unlikely, as some reports have said, that Israeli intelligence agents violated U.S. law and eavesdropped on the apartment where Young and Terzi met.

"It seems probable that Israel did know that some sort of meeting took place," Aspin says. But, he adds, there were several ways through which Israel could have learned of the meeting without violating U.S. law, such as having agents inside the PLO or in Arab countries with knowledge of the encounter between Young and Terzi.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C27THE WASHINGTON POST
29 October 1979

Jack Anderson

State Dept. Obstructing Cambodia Aid

Jimmy Carter's sanctimonious sermons on human rights have become a cruel mockery to millions of Cambodians, who are dying of starvation and disease—helpless pawns being sacrificed in the deadly chess game of big-power politics.

Despite assurances from the Carter administration that the United States would give food to Cambodians "irrespective of their political authority," officials within the State Department have deliberately sabotaged this humane policy, according to a wide variety of sources.

The problem has been that people in lower levels, specifically in the East Asian desk, have been doing nothing but obstructing efforts to aid the Cambodians, one Capitol Hill source told our reporter Lucette Lagnado.

The Foggy Bottom bureaucrats have been blaming legal and congressional roadblocks for their inaction. But the real reason, according to our sources, is a deep-seated anti-Vietnam bias in the State Department.

Apparently, it was feared that some relief supplies might fall into the hands of the Vietnamese invaders, helping them solidify their authority in Cambodia. Rather than run the risk, our callous diplomats chose not to implement the massive food program needed to prevent the virtual extinction of the Cambodian people.

The anti-Vietnamese "tilt" in the State Department was recently reflected in the shameful U.S. vote to seat the infamous Pol Pot regime in the United Nations, despite the evidence—which we have been reporting for more than four years—that it was responsible for the slaughter of mil-

lions of Cambodians since it seized power in 1974.

For reasons of global strategy, the United States deems it important to join the Chinese in support of Pol Pot, and oppose the rival government set up by Soviet-backed Vietnamese troops. "It was more important for us to give the Soviets a diplomatic kick than it was for us to feed the people," charged one knowledgeable source.

It's not as if the horrors of Cambodia's starving millions came as any surprise to our policymakers. The State Department has known since at least March that the unhappy country was facing a food shortage of catastrophic proportions, according to sources in the department and Congress. Intelligence reports informed the administration that only 5 to 10 percent of Cambodia's arable land was being planted last spring.

This was confirmed by a secret CIA report in early August, which offered the harrowing prediction that as many as 3.5 million people would starve to death as a result of poor harvests next December and January. Other reports indicated that typhus and malaria were decimating the population. There are virtually no children under age 5, and for every birth there are 10 deaths.

Footnote: Robert Oakley of the State Department's East Asian bureau denied that his office had failed to implement the policy on food aid to Cambodia. "The Vietnamese wouldn't let us" distribute the relief supplies, he said, and the program was hampered by strict monitoring procedures insisted on by Congress.

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ON PAGE A6

THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 October 1979

In Afghanistan, 2 Soviet Trends Now Emerging

By DREW MIDDLETON

Two trends are now discernible in the Soviet Union's efforts to use Afghanistan as the primary base for Soviet military and political operations in Southwest Asia. One is the establishment of army and air bases near the Iranian frontier.

The second is the reconstruction of Afghanistan's internal security forces.

Military Analysis The economic basis for the efforts is an infusion of financial and commercial support. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that contracts valued at more than \$200 million have been signed by the two Governments and that more than 2,000 Soviet personnel are advising and in some cases managing Afghanistan's economic ministries.

The Moslem rebellion against Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin's regime apparently has slowed Soviet military penetration but not stopped it. According to European intelligence sources, the Russians have established a military base near Farah, a town 65 miles from the Iranian frontier, and expanded the Afghan air base at Shindand, 75 miles from that frontier.

The closeness of these bases to Iran has encouraged speculation among Western analysts that the Russians want to build positions from which they can apply military pressure on Iran. A source pointed out that the Treaty of 1921 between Iran and the Soviet Union was still in force and that it gave the Russians the right to intervene in Iran should internal developments appear to them to threaten Soviet interests.

One such development could be a counterrevolution against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that would have the political support of the Soviet Union. Analysts suggest that such a counterrevolution would draw its main strength from the middle class but say that it would be sustained, if it was initially successful, by Soviet propaganda and arms.

The Russians' intention to tighten their grip on Afghanistan's internal security apparatus was foreshadowed by Prime Minister Amin's announcement on Sept. 18 that he had found it necessary to reorganize the security services. This was followed at the end of the month by a statement that the Soviet Union would supply vehicles and equipment worth \$6.7 million to the People's Police Organization.

These Soviet actions have been accompanied by the transfer of modern equipment, including fighter planes, helicopter gunships and tanks. The aircraft, according to European intelligence sources, carry Afghan Air Force insignia, but the majority of the air crews are Russian.

Soviet military shipments to Afghanistan in 1978 were a small percentage of the record \$3.8 billion in arms deliveries by the Soviet Union to non-Communist, less-developed countries that year, according to a C.I.A. report recently made available.

2 Possible Routes

Speculation on how the Russians intend to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan, which must include elimination of the present rebellion, follows two lines.

One is that they will concentrate on building from the center out. This would mean stronger political and economic support for Mr. Amin, including expansion of the present measures to strengthen the security forces.

The second is that Moscow will decide that only the exercise of overwhelming military power can defeat the tribal military uprisings that have endangered the new Government's hold in Afghanistan and the lives of some of its Soviet supporters.

The first course will take time. The Soviet Union already is committed to \$500 million in economic aid to Afghanistan, according to the C.I.A., and contracts worth \$200 million have been signed for programs that have been formulated.

One of these projects has military as well as economic importance. It is the construction of a railroad and vehicle bridge across the Amu Darya River at Hairatan, near Sher Khan, to provide the first direct connection between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.


Factors Affecting Decision

The Russians also have contracted to supply \$30 million worth of petroleum equipment this year and next, to begin studies for construction of a copper smelter and a fertilizer plant and to renovate Sher Khan's river port to increase its cargo-handling capacity.

Several unknowns make it difficult to foresee the course the Russians will follow in Afghanistan.

One is the durability of the tribal uprisings. Mr. Amin may decide to open his Government to some members of the Moslem opposition. Or the Afghan Army, bolstered by Soviet helicopters and advisers, may gain the upper hand in the fighting.

Another factor is the uncertainty about the Soviet leadership in a period in which Leonid I. Brezhnev is reported to be seriously ill. The consensus among experts is that in the event of Mr. Brezhnev's death, foreign programs will be halted until a new regime can examine them.



The New York Times / Oct. 30, 1979

Russians reportedly have established military base near Farah and expanded air base at Shindand.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1979

OPINION AND COMMENTARY

Aiming at military bankruptcy

Joseph C. Harsch's arguments for more US military spending. ["Decision for West: whether to match new Soviet might"] is a classic bit of alarmist nonsense. When he tells us that the United States "reduced its armed forces from 3.5 to 2.5 million men," he makes it sound like a large-scale unilateral disarmament. If he showed the dates, it would be obvious that these figures reflect the demobilization of our Vietnam "expeditionary" forces.

Mr. Harsch also seems unaware of how much money we have really been spending for armaments. The Pentagon's own figures show that we have increased our national defense outlays every year since 1976; the annual increase works out to about 2 percent a year *plus* inflation. Meanwhile, hawkish legislators in Washington are proclaiming that the Soviets are spending \$140 billion a year on defense, a fiction derived by misusing CIA estimates. As the CIA report itself warns, "this dollar cost analysis does not measure actual Soviet defense expenditures or their burden on the Soviet economy." The truth is that both sides spend heavily, and we spend more, even though the Russians spend a bigger fraction of their total wealth.

The funny part of Mr. Harsch's piece is his illogical conclusion: If the West surges ahead, it will "give the men of Moscow some real reasons to think seriously once more about mutual restraint in weaponry." Why should a big US military build-up scare the Soviets into wanting arms restraints if, as Mr. Harsch argues, the only proper US response to a Soviet military build-up is to spend even more ourselves? Columns like this one give us another big push down the road to military bankruptcy.

Washington

James J. Treires
Chief Economist

Center For Defense Information

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C1THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
31 October 1979

The Ear

DEEP EAR . . . Acute *angst* has hit Harcourt Brace Jovanovich publishers in the Big Ap. Ear hears: Deborah Davis's "Katharine the Great" is about to hit the stands. This, darlings, is the bio of O.P. publisher Kay Graham. The high point — or low, depending on Who You Are — is where Deborah names Deep Throat. She says he was Richard Ober. (Of course you remember Richard, Earwigs. He was James Angleton's Tonto at the CIA: Counterintelligencer extraordinaire and top tamale of Operation Chaos; also, according to Dreadful Deborah, Ober was a very close pal of a Certain Editor at the O.P.) Dear little New York Maggie was all set to serialize "Katharine the Great," Ear hears, but got in such a tizzy over some of its hot stuff that they've dropped it. No point watching that space, darlings. Stick with Ear.

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E 14

THE WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1979

Jack Anderson

Brzezinski Blueprint Full of Hard Lines

There's an untold story behind the latest Cuban crisis that is rocking Washington's intelligence community to its foundations. At the center of the controversy is the real power behind President Carter's foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Despite vigorous protests from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and top intelligence officials, the determinedly hawkish national security affairs chief is pushing ahead with a plan to turn his boss into an implacable Soviet baiter.

Brzezinski saw his best chance of getting the Soviets' goat when the issue of Soviet combat troops in Cuba threatened to escalate into a major confrontation between the world's two superpowers.

Behind closed White House doors, Brzezinski argued for the hardest possible line against the Kremlin, which viewed the Cuban incident as a giant publicity whoop-de-doo for U.S. politicians and refused to budge.

For all his supposed expertise on the Kremlin, Brzezinski badly misjudged the Soviet reaction. It was Carter, not the Soviets, who backed down.

Brzezinski promptly drafted a secret memorandum outlining a three-phase program to put the Soviets in their place and to restore Carter's damaged prestige. We have seen the memo, and it's a blueprint for reviving the Cold War.

The first phase calls for the propping up of anti-communist governments in this hemisphere, accompanied by a carefully orchestrated campaign to educate the American public

to the gravity of the Cuban-Soviet threat to U.S. security.

In the second phase of the Brzezinski blueprint, the United States would initiate a worldwide campaign of propaganda and political pressure against the Soviets and Cubans. The Central Intelligence Agency would have primary responsibility for covertly generating anti-Soviet propaganda abroad, using every available means, including the Voice of America.

In furtherance of Phase Two, Brzezinski ordered a questionnaire sent to all U.S. ambassadors, instructing them to provide data on Cuban activities in their area that would be used for the propaganda campaign. The questionnaire, labeled Top Secret Umbra, was opposed by Vance and his top aides. Two-thirds of the ambassadors protested the instructions, an unprecedented show of opposition.

But such is Brzezinski's clout with Carter that the White House ordered that the questionnaires be completed.

Phase Three of Brzezinski's grand design would have the United States giving military aid to regimes threatened by Cuban and Soviet military adventures, a process that already has begun in Somalia and Morocco over State Department objections. Even more provocative is the possibility, now under consideration, of sharing military technology with the Chinese, as a direct threat to the Soviet Union.

According to diplomatic sources, Vance has stated privately that the Brzezinski plan would "reverse 15 years of American diplomacy."

Footnote: Brzezinski isn't wholly wrong about Soviet-Cuban designs upon the western hemisphere. Here are other excerpts from classified intelligence reports: (1) "The issues that had strained Cuban-Soviet relations 12 years ago are no longer even minor irritants." (2) Castro "apparently now accepts the Soviet view that Latin America is not yet ripe for armed revolution." (3) But "this does not mean that Castro and Soviet leaders will give up the option to support 'national liberation movements' in Latin America when they feel conditions for revolution are propitious."

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ON PAGE 16

THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
1 November 1979

CIA hits bid to end spy shuttle to U.S.

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington (News Bureau) — The Central Intelligence Agency yesterday opposed a bill sponsored by Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.) to eliminate the CIA's long-held privilege of spiriting foreign agents and defectors into this country without worrying about immigration laws. CIA officials said the measure could put the lives of such defectors "in jeopardy."

For decades the CIA has been permitted to bring up to 100 foreign agents and defectors into this country secretly each year without bothering with the immigration laws that apply to all other aliens. But Holtzman, chairman of the House Immigration Subcommittee, proposed eliminating the provision.

Long concerned over alleged Nazi war criminals who managed to slip into the United States under false pretenses, Holtzman contended that the CIA may be using the law to bring in foreigners who do not qualify strictly as intelligence sources.

Holtzman suggested that the spies use the same "parole" procedure the Immigration and Naturalization Service has used to bring in political refugees. But immigration officials said this would mean that far more bureaucrats in the government would know about the arriving spy and security would be jeopardized.

Cites enormous benefits

Acting CIA General Counsel John D. Morrison, in a statement prepared for Holtzman's subcommittee, contended that the CIA "has used the authority sparingly but with enormous benefit over the 30-year period since its enactment."

Some of the more publicized defectors in recent years have been Soviet officials, and some of them have received mixed grades from CIA officials.

Perhaps the most controversial is Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB officer who is still on the CIA payroll. Nosenko, at one point, was held in solitary confinement for three years in a specially built prison because CIA officials believed he was still working for the Soviet Union.

Nosenko defected shortly after John F. Kennedy's assassination and told CIA officials that he had read Lee Harvey Oswald's Soviet file and concluded that the Soviet Government had nothing to do with the assassination of President Kennedy.